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ABSTRACT 
 
Alexandria N. Ruble: “Equal but Not the Same”: 
The Struggle for “Gleichberechtigung” and the Reform of Marriage and Family Law in East 
and West Germany, 1945–1968 
(Under the direction of Karen Hagemann) 
 
 
This dissertation explores the interplay of political, social, and economic factors that 
first prevented and later led, despite all resistance, to the reform of family law in East and 
West Germany in the 1950s and early 1960s. After 1945, Germans inherited a Civil Code 
that dated back to 1900 and had designated women as second-class citizens in marriage, 
parental rights, and marital property. In the postwar period, in the context of the founding of 
the East and West German states and the rising Cold War, female activists in both Germanys 
revived the old feminist goal of reforming civil law, but faced fierce resistance from 
Protestant and Catholics. After much struggle, legislators in both states replaced the old law 
with two new, competing versions that purported to expand women’s rights in marital and 
familial matters. I argue that the East-West German competition in the Cold War provided 
the momentum to finally accomplish the long-desired reforms. In both states, allusions to the 
other Germany’s treatment of women marked political discourse and were a key factor in all 
negotiations and decisions on family policies. The project demonstrates that gender and the 
family were important markers of difference between the two Germanys and, more broadly, 
battlegrounds of the Cold War.  
This dissertation widens scholarly understandings of gender and the family in the two 
Germanys and Central Europe in two crucial ways. First, while scholars have previously 
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conceived of women’s roles in East and West Germany as largely dissimilar, this project 
shows how family law linked and complicated the bond between the two states. At the same 
time, this study acknowledges the key differences between the East and West that ultimately 
set the two states on divergent paths regarding family law and gender roles. Second, this 
project challenges current understandings of gender, politics, and citizenship in the 1950s by 
showing that female activism in East and West Germany reemerged after the end of the 
Second World War, meaning that feminism was alive and well long before the 1970s.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1949, the provisional constitutions of the two newly founded German postwar 
states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) in the East, made the same bold and unprecedented promise to their 
citizens: to incorporate Gleichberechtigung von Männern und Frauen, or “the equality of 
men and women,” into all future legislation. In East Germany, controlled by the Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), the constitution 
immediately invalidated all laws opposing equality. The West German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), meanwhile, mandated the Bundestag and the government, led by the Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) and 
its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union 
Deutschlands, CSU), to overturn all legislation that conflicted with the principle of equality 
by 31 March 1953.  
One major area that required extensive reform was marriage and family law, 
regulated by the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) from 1900, which was still in 
effect in both postwar Germanys. The BGB’s regulations concerning marriage and family 
designated women as second-class citizens in marriage, parental rights, and marital property. 
Not all citizens of the German Empire subscribed to these notions of marriage and the family. 
The majority in the bourgeois and socialist women’s movements, for instance, fought since 
the late nineteenth century against the patriarchal Civil Code. This struggle continued after 
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1945 in East and West Germany. Female activists in both newly founded German states 
urged politicians to alter the BGB. After approximately a decade of debate among politicians, 
society, and the media, coupled with resistance from the Christian conservative parties, 
Christian women’s associations, and the Protestant and Catholic Churches, legislators in the 
FRG and GDR replaced the old law with two new, competing versions: the 1957 Equal 
Rights Act (Gleichberechtigungsgesetz) in West Germany and the 1965 Family Code 
(Familiengesetzbuch) in East Germany. The new laws purported to expand women’s rights in 
marriage and the family. These parallel pieces of legislation, ostensibly separate because of 
the division of postwar Germany, remained intimately linked, however, because of their 
shared history. Since the late 1940s, the emerging Cold War thus shaped these debates and 
decisions, because the respective family model and the role and status of women in society 
were used in political discourse as “markers of difference” from the state on the other side of 
the Iron Curtain. Here, like in many other areas of politics, society, and culture, the 
relationship between the FRG and GDR was one of “demarcation and entanglement.”1  
Prior scholarship has explored the situation of women, gender, and the family in East 
and West Germany, but has rarely examined the entanglement of the deliberations and the 
political processes that resulted in the new Equal Rights Act in the FRG and the Family Code 
in the GDR. “Entangled history,” as explained by historians Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-
Gerhard Haupt, “looks at interrelationships between two entities, whether nations, regions, 
towns, or institutions.”2 Although rarely explicitly identified as a category of analysis by 
                                                 
1 Christoph Kleßmann, “Abgrenzung und Verflechtung. Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen 
deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 29-30 (1993): 30-41. 
2 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, “Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems,” in Comparison 
and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective, eds. Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 31.  
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mainstream studies of contemporary history, gender historians working on post-1945 
German and European history have identified and explored the importance of gender and the 
family as central “markers of difference” and entanglement between East and West Germany 
and Europe since the 1990s. They emphasize the many interrelated discourses and policies 
and suggest “gendering” comparative studies.3 As historian Susan Pedersen observes, 
comparative women’s and gender history can “offer meaningful explanations for particular 
outcomes, not […] formulate general laws.”4 Family law in the two Germanys thus offers a 
fruitful case for a comparative study of “entangled” post-1945 German history, because a 
shared legal history and similar cultural norms tied the two states together. At the same time, 
the contest of the Cold War and different economic, social, and political systems divided 
them, which is also revealed in different gender ideologies in both postwar Germanys that 
emphasized opposite ideas of a woman’s role in the family, society, economy, and politics. 
The family laws introduced in both German states in the 1950s and 1960s reflected these 
tensions. 
This dissertation explores the interplay of political, social, and economic factors that 
first prevented and later led, despite all resistance, to the reform of marriage and family law 
in East and West Germany. It examines how the federal governments, the governing political 
parties, the parliaments, social organizations, churches, and the media discussed 
Gleichberechtigung and its place in civil law between 1945 and 1965. The study asks: how 
                                                 
3 For an overview of the state of research, see Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel, “Gender and the Long 
Postwar: Reconsiderations of the United States and the Two Germanys, 1945-1989,” in Gender and the Long 
Postwar: Reconsiderations of the United States and the Two Germanys, 1945-1989, eds. Karen Hagemann and 
Sonya Michel (Baltimore and Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 1-27; as well as the 
forthcoming volume edited by Friederike Brühöfener, Karen Hagemann, and Donna Harsch, Gendering Post-
1945 German History: Entanglements (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2018).  
4 Susan Pedersen, “Comparative History and Women’s History,” in Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-
National Perspective, eds. Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (London: Routledge, 2004), 99. 
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did the different actors discuss and negotiate the terms of the new family laws in both 
Germanys? What political, social, cultural, and economic factors influenced their 
discussions? And to what extent were “entanglement and demarcation” deciding factors in 
these negotiations and the resulting legislative changes? The dissertation argues that the East-
West German competition in the Cold War provided the momentum to finally accomplish the 
long-desired reforms. In both states, allusions to the other Germany’s treatment of women 
and gender not only marked political discourse, but were key factors in all negotiations and 
decisions on family law and other policies related to gender. The project confirms and 
demonstrates that gender and the family were important markers of difference between the 
two German states and were battlegrounds of the Cold War.  
Although the Cold War provided the catalyst for change, the struggle for equal civil 
rights of women, especially in marriage and the family, had a much longer tradition in 
Germany. Civil equality in marriage and family law was, from the beginning, a major aim of 
the rising women’s movement in the nineteenth century.5 One important cause for this 
struggle was the German Civil Code that had been contested since the publication of its first 
draft in 1881. The bourgeois and socialist women’s rights activists labeled it a “patriarchal 
law” and demanded reforms since the 1880s, because it gave, among other things, the 
husband and father the final decision in all matters related to the household and family. They 
aimed to formulate a different version of the law that honored equal civil citizenship for 
women, which they considered a fundamental condition for their equality with men.6 Despite 
                                                 
5 The developed literature on the German women’s movement is presented in Belinda Davis, “The Personal is 
Political: Gender, Politics, and Political Activism in Modern German History,” in Gendering Modern German 
History: Rewriting Historiography, eds. Karen Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2007), 107-127. 
6 Dieter Schwab, “Gleichberechtigung und Familienrecht im 20. Jahrhundert,” in Frauen in der Geschichte des 
Rechts: Von der frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Ute Gerhard (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), 793.  
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their ardent resistance, female activists and socialists lost this battle. The Reichstag, the 
national parliament of the German Empire, approved the Civil Code in 1896, which then 
became effective on 1 January 1900. 
For nearly two more decades, until the German Empire’s collapse in the 
Novemberrevolution of 1918 at the end of World War I, the BGB’s provisions restricted 
married women’s legal personhood. The establishment of the democratic Weimar Republic 
in the context of this revolution on 8 November 1918 offered new opportunities for women 
in principle, though practice was a different matter. Although the Weimar constitution from 
11 August 1919 proclaimed in Art. 109: “All Germans are equal before the law. Men and 
women have in principle the same civic (staatsbürgerliche) rights and duties,” it did not 
promise equal civil rights to women, especially in marriage and the family.7 Rather, Art. 119-
122 of the Weimar constitution guaranteed the “special protection” of marriage and family. 
Despite proposed changes to the Civil Code, the fierce struggle of liberal and socialist 
feminists for the equal civil rights of women and men continued until the end of the Weimar 
Republic.8  
After 1933, the Nazi regime implemented its racial policy in legislation such as the 
antisemitic Nuremberg Laws from September 1935 and the introduction of a separate 
Marriage Law in July 1938 that allowed, for example, the easy divorce of a “racial 
intermarriage” or a “childless marriage.”9 Furthermore, in 1939, a Nazi legal commission 
                                                 
7 Article 109 of the Weimarer Verfassung reads as follows in the original German text, “Alle Deutschen sind 
vor dem Gesetze gleich. Männer und Frauen haben grundsätzlich dieselben staatsbürgerlichen Rechte und 
Pflichten,” http://www.documentarchiv.de/wr/wrv.html#ERSTER_ABSCHNITT02. 
8 Schwab, “Gleichberechtigung und Familienrecht,” 796-801. 
9 Elizabeth Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and 
Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 21-23; Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the 
Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 372.  
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began debating a full-scale overhaul of the old Civil Code’s marriage, family, and marital 
property law sections.10 They intended to refit the BGB with racialized language, but set it 
aside in 1941, planning to return to the task once Nazi Germany won World War II.  
The defeat of the Nazis on 8 May 1945 and the subsequent military occupation by the 
British, French, Americans, and Soviets created a legal vacuum in Germany. Although the 
Allied Control Council invalidated racist Nazi laws in 1945, further legal reforms were 
necessary to accommodate the dramatically altered structure of many families. After all, 
approximately 30 percent of the estimated 17.3 million German men who were called up 
Wehrmacht had died.11 They left behind a “surplus” of 7 million women who took up jobs 
and had to raise families on their own because of the immense losses during the war.12 In 
response to this legal gap, the Allies introduced their own marriage law, called 
Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 16, or the Ehegesetz, in February 1946.13  
One of the problems of the Allied Control Council marriage law was that it left many 
provisions of the old Civil Code intact. Several male political leaders at the time maintained 
these regulations because they saw the family as necessary to stabilize and restore Germany’s 
gender and social order in the wake of postwar destruction. Many female contemporaries, 
especially leftists and liberals, however, believed that the BGB no longer reflected the 
changed status of women in society. They demanded that the promise of “civic equality,” 
                                                 
10 Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, Heinrich Lehmann, and Wolfgang Siebert, Volksgesetzbuch, Arbeitsberichte der 
Akademie für Deutsches Recht, vol. 22 (Munich: Beck, 1942), 11. 
11 Rüdiger Overmans, Deutsche Militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), 
215, 225. 
12 Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 3; Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern 
Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 255. 
13 Annette F. Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 231. 
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already made in the Weimar constitution, had to finally be fulfilled and extended beyond 
political rights to all areas of the economy, society, and family. One important early arena for 
this postwar struggle became the debate about the provisional constitutions in the four zones 
occupied by the Western Allies and the Soviets. 
In 194748, following months of conflict set off by the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine (1947), the European Recovery Program (ERP), known as the Marshall Plan 
(1948), and disagreements over the democratization of Germany, the Soviets and the 
Socialist Unity Party decided to move forward on their own terms without the Western 
Allies. In March 1948 they formed the People’s Council (Volksrat) to rewrite the constitution 
and design a government modeled after Soviet-style democratic centralism. In their 
discussions over the basic rights of the East German constitution, the SED-controlled 
People’s Council debated, but ultimately agreed that the new constitution would immediately 
overturn all laws that prohibited Gleichberechtigung, in particular the BGB. The suggestions 
of regional women’s committees and the mass women’s organization, the Democratic 
Women’s League of Germany (Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands, DFD) proved 
persuasive. They had already begun drafting proposals for the new marriage and family laws 
even before the advent of the People’s Council, as a demonstration of their commitment to 
the old socialist program of “women’s emancipation” (Frauenemanzipation). Oppositional 
parties such as the Eastern branch of the Christian Democratic Union (Ost-CDU) and the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, LDPD) 
likewise offered propositions for legal changes, but the increasing acquiescence of these 
parties to SED rule limited their influence. Despite contrary opinions among the parties, they 
all agreed, unlike their Western counterparts, that Gleichberechtigung should apply to all 
 8 
 
areas of society, politics, and the economy. Thus, the new constitution of the GDR, approved 
on 7 October 1949, went into effect with the following promise in Article 7: “Men and 
women have equal rights.”14 The SED, however, viewed the family as the central cell of its 
new socialist society. The new constitution therefore included an additional provision 
guaranteeing that marriage and family “are the foundation of social living” and stood under 
the special protection of the state. Even at this juncture, East Germans had trouble balancing 
socialist beliefs in equality with age-old cultural norms regarding marriage and family. 
In response to the People’s Council, the Western Allies and their German partners 
convened the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) in September 1948. In the 
Western zones, legal experts and politicians were more sharply divided and could express 
themselves more publicly. Members of the main political parties, the Christian conservative 
CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, the leftist Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), the liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei, FDP), and the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei 
Deutschlands, KPD), which was banned in 1956) disputed how to reconcile the “equality of 
men and women” and the “protection of marriage and family” during the proceedings of the 
Parliamentary Council. While the SPD, KPD, and a handful of FDP members pushed for 
legal equality of men and women in politics, the economy, and society, the CDU/CSU and 
some FDP representatives focused on the protection of marriage and family.15 In a political 
compromise, proposed by the only four women in the Parliamentary Council and backed by 
                                                 
14 The original German text reads: “Mann und Frau sind gleichberechtigt." See the East German constitution, 
October 7, 1949. http://www.documentarchiv.de/ddr/verfddr1949.html 
15 Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 41.  
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public support, the Council reluctantly accepted the following formulation of Art. 3.2 of the 
Basic Law, approved on 8 May 1949: “Men and women have equal rights.” In exchange, the 
SPD and KPD agreed to include the CDU/CSU-proposed Art. 6, which echoed the Weimar 
constitution by stating: “Marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state.”16 
Because many existing laws contradicted Art 3.2 of the Basic Law, Art. 117 stipulated that 
all legislation had to be reformed by 31 March 1953. The Cold War entanglement of both 
states informed the argumentation of politicians in these early debates on the constitutions of 
the FRG and GDR, who constantly invoked the other Germany and its policies on women as 
a way of differentiating their position on equality.17  
After the constitutions were approved and both states were officially founded in 1949, 
the problem of how to reconcile constitutional promises of Gleichberechtigung and 
protection of marriage, motherhood, and the family remained unresolved on both sides. In the 
GDR, the Ministry of Justice produced a draft of the new family law in January 1950, which 
came under intense scrutiny from legal experts and the DFD. In particular, they struggled to 
reconcile the goals of the new socialist state with the old bourgeois Civil Code and societal 
norms. The new family law thus never went before the East German parliament 
(Volkskammer) for approval. Instead, in September 1950, the Volkskammer passed the Law 
for the Protection of Motherhood and Children and for the Rights of Women (Gesetz über 
den Mutter- und Kinderschutz und die Rechte der Frau), which provided numerous welfare 
provisions to assist working mothers and furthermore overhauled some provisions of the old 
                                                 
16 The original text of Article 3 states: “Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt.” The original text of Article 6 
states: “Ehe und Familie stehen unter dem besonderen Schutze der staatlichen Ordnung.” See Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 1949, http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/1949/grundgesetz.html 
17 See for example: “Sechsundzwanzigste Sitzung 30. November 1948,” [AGG], Kurt Georg Wernicke, Hans 
Booms, and Walter Vogel. Der Parlamentarische Rat, 1948-1949: Akten u. Protokolle (Boppard am Rhein: 
Boldt, 1975), 752. 
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BGB, such as the Stichentscheid, the right of a husband to make the final decision in the 
marriage and family. This law served both pragmatic and ideological goals. During the 
1950s, with the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan in the GDR, the SED increasingly 
needed married women and mothers to fill labor shortages. The party therefore had a 
profound economic interest to help them to balance domestic and work responsibilities, but 
also wanted to affirm its rhetorical commitment to women’s emancipation.18 Although the 
Ministry of Justice tried in 1954 and 1958 to redraft the Family Code (Familiengesetzbuch), 
it took eleven years until its passage. The long-awaited arrival of the new Family Code in 
1965 came after over a decade of political and social resistance inside the GDR, particularly 
from both the Protestant and Catholic churches, but more broadly from enduring cultural 
values. Despite all socialist rhetoric of women’s emancipation, a traditional gendered 
division of labor dominated in the economy, society, and the family in everyday life in the 
GDR.  
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, West Germans faced a similar dilemma. The 
Federal Ministry of Justice worked on a new family law between 1950 and 1952. The 
Bundestag, the West German parliament, however, failed to meet the constitutionally-
mandated deadline, propelling its members into increasingly intense debates. Women in the 
major leftist and liberal political parties (SPD, KPD, and FDP), independent nonparty 
women’s organizations, and trade unions pushed for changes that would grant women more 
autonomy and equality in marriage, family, and the workplace. Their main opponents were 
                                                 
18 Leonore Ansorg and Renate Hürtgen, “The Myth of Female Emancipation: Contradictions in Women’s 
Lives,” in Dictatorship As Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Konrad Hugo 
Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 163-176, 165; Dagmar Langenhan and Sabine Roß, “The 
Socialist Glass Ceiling: Limits to Female Careers,” in ibid, 177-194, 177-178; Donna Harsch, Revenge of the 
Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 8, 44. 
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Christian conservative women who supported the family policy of the ruling CDU/CSU, 
which was buttressed by the Catholic and Protestant churches and their associations. These 
organizations, such as the German Catholic Women’s Federation (Katholischer Deutscher 
Frauenbund, KDFB), Catholic Family Federation (Familienbund der Katholiken, FdK), the 
Protestant welfare organization Diakonie (Deutsches Diakonische Werk), Protestant women’s 
associations such as the Protestant Women’s Aid (Evangelische Frauenhilfe), and 
commissions formed by both major churches were instrumental in pressuring the federal 
government and Parliamentarians of the national representation of the Bundestag to pursue a 
Christian-conservative family policy based on the ideal of the male-breadwinner-family.19 
They feared that more autonomy and equality for women, especially their paid work outside 
the home, would threaten the stability of the family, which they perceived as the basis of 
state and society. For them the family was, alongside the churches, the only “unsullied” 
institution that had survived the Third Reich. The goal of their policy was not only the re-
Christianization, but also re-familialization (Re-Familialisierung) of West Germany, which 
they saw as the best form of “protection” against the “threat from the communist East,” with 
its “socialized children” and “exploited and exhausted working women.”20 Male members of 
the CDU/CSU and other parties were also concerned that granting more equality to women 
would undermine the status of men in politics, economy, and society, but they discussed this 
fear less openly. 
In the end the conflicting discourses in both German states resulted in new marriage 
                                                 
19 Lukas Rölli-Alkemper, Familie im Wiederaufbau: Katholizismus und Bürgerliches Familienideal in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1965 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000), 416-487; Claudia Lepp, Tabu der 
Einheit?: die Ost-West-Gemeinschaft der evangelischen Christen und die deutsche Teilung (1945-1969) 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 91. 
20 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 180.  
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and family laws that represented an ambiguous and half-hearted reform, especially in the 
FRG. With the approval of the Equal Rights Act (Gleichberechtigungsgesetz) on 18 June 
1957 (implemented on 1 July 1958), the FRG took an important step toward legal equality of 
men and women. The law removed, for example, the Stichentscheid, meaning that women 
could have equal input on matters such as domicile and how to raise their children. Married 
women were now also allowed to work outside the house without their spouse’s consent. But 
their rights were still limited in certain ways; they were only permitted to do paid work 
outside the home if it was reconcilable with their “obligations” in the household and family.21 
This restriction clearly marked the 1957 Equal Rights Act as a political compromise designed 
to protect the dominant ideal of the male-breadwinner family that informed Christian-
conservative family policy.  
The 1965 Family Code (Familiengesetzbuch) of the GDR, passed on 20 December 
1965, was an even more important legal step towards civil equality of women. The 
provisions of the final law were much more progressive compared to those of its Western 
counterpart. According to the new Family Code, spouses had equal rights and duties in 
marriage and family, including in raising their children. They also shared all property and 
were equally responsible for contributing income to the household. Unlike the West, where 
married women and mothers were supposed to work at the most part-time, state policies 
encouraged East German women to work full-time, even as mothers.22 The state provided 
                                                 
21 Christine von Oertzen, Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen: Geschlechterpolitik und 
Gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland 1948-1969 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 12, 14-
15, 359. 
22 Christine von Oertzen and Almut Rietzschel, “Das ‘Kuckucksei’ Teilzeitarbeit. Die Politik der 
Gewerkschaften im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich,” in Frauen arbeiten. Weibliche Erwerbstätigkeit im deutsch-
deutschen Vergleich, ed. Gunilla-Friederike Budde (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), 212-251. 
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necessary all-day facilities for children, which enabled them to do so.23 In everyday life in 
East Germany, however, an unequal division of labor in the workplace and at home persisted 
even after 1965.24 
Although social organizations and politicians in both Germanys were able to modify 
legal definitions of Gleichberechtigung to some extent, much was left to be done regarding 
the reform of marriage and family law and its application in societal practices. In West 
Germany, the 1957 Equal Rights Act was at best a first step towards establishing the long-
demanded equal civil rights of women. In fact, the law came under scrutiny almost 
immediately. In July 1958, for example, when the new law came into force, the left-liberal 
political weekly Der Spiegel published an article that criticized the practical impact of the 
law.25 This was the first of many critical voices in the mass media that would come during 
the late 1950s and 1960s, particularly after the rise of the New Women’s Movement in the 
late 1960s. The political push for more gender equality finally led the SPD/FDP coalition, 
which took over the federal government in October 1969, to a far-reaching reform: the First 
Law for the Reform of the Marriage and Family Law (Erste Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und 
Familienrechts), approved by the Bundestag on 14 June 1976 and enacted on 1 July 1977.26 
                                                 
23 See Karen Hagemann, “Between Ideology and Economy: The ‘Time Politics’ of Child Care and Public 
Education in the Two Germanys,” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society 13, no. 2 
(2006): 239-241; see also Karen Hagemann, “A West-German ‘Sonderweg’? Family, Work, and the Half-Day 
Time Policy of Childcare and Schooling,” in Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, 
Preschool, and Primary Education in Europe, eds. Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, Karen Hagemann, and Konrad 
H. Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 275-300; Monika Mattes, “Economy and Politics:  The Time 
Policy of the East German Childcare and Primary School System,” in Children, Families, and States: Time 
Policies of Childcare, Preschool, and Primary Education in Europe, eds. Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, Karen 
Hagemann, and Konrad H. Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 344-363. 
24 Hagemann, “A West-German ‘Sonderweg’?,” 275-300; Mattes, “Economy and Politics,” 344-363.  
25 “Die Zukunft der Notare,” Der Spiegel 28, July 9, 1958, 22-26. 
26 Ute Gerhard, Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts: von der frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: 
Beck, 1999), 811. 
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In the GDR, the new Family Code from 1965 legitimated the ideal of the socialist 
family based on equality between the sexes and the need to overcome the bourgeois male 
breadwinner family model associated with the West. This law finally fulfilled, at least in one 
German state, all the demands of the liberal and socialist women’s movement of the prewar 
period and gave women legally equal civil citizenship. Yet the GDR is an especially 
interesting case, because despite legal equality and all socialist rhetoric of “women’s 
emancipation,” the gendered division in the family in the everyday life remained similar to 
the FRG.27 Sociologist Ute Gerhard refers to this gap between law and practice as a “cultural 
lag.”28 Consequently, men and women in both German states possessed rights that were 
“equal but not the same,” which most likely reflected the dominant thinking of most ordinary 
citizens about gender differences in both German states. Despite all other dissimilarities, 
most Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain agreed in the first two postwar decades on at 
least one point: that men and women were different by nature and thus not the same, which 
defined their roles in the family and society.29 
Looking back at the public discourse in both German states, it is remarkable that 
despite all other differences, contemporaries usually framed the conversation on 
Gleichberechtigung in terms of women’s rights.  This emphasis on women is telling, because 
it marks women as the sex that has to be made “equal” and “emancipated” to the standards of 
men. If “equality” is a “women’s question” (Frauenfrage), then women are perceived as the 
                                                 
27 Carola Sachse, Der Hausarbeitstag: Gerechtigkeit und Gleichberechtigung in Ost und West, 1939-1994 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 34.  
28 Ute Gerhard, “Family Law and Gender Equality: Comparing Family Policies in Postwar Western Europe,” in 
Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool, and Primary Education in Europe, eds. 
Karen Hagemann, Konrad H. Jarausch, and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda (New York: Berghahn, 2011), 81. 
29 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 7. 
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“exception” and men as the “universalized norm.” However, a more careful reading of the 
contemporary sources shows that actors at the time reflected on the changing role of 
husbands and fathers too, only less openly. A study like this therefore needs to critically 
analyze both the images of masculinity and femininity drafted in this discourse, because 
“gender equality,” the current term used for Gleichberechtigung, is a relational concept.30  
The influence of the Cold War, which defined the boundaries of thinking, was 
another dimension in the contemporary discourse that was shared by both states. The East-
West relation of demarcation and entanglement created an especially difficult situation for 
the Left, especially the SPD, in the FRG. The SED, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, now 
occupied traditional socialist positions regarding the family, education, and the gender 
equality of the Weimar SPD, eliminating the possibility of taking the same stances for the 
newly founded postwar SPD in the West. This narrowed discursive space in the West 
informed and restricted the debate and implemented policies on the “women’s question” in a 
dramatic way. The socialist women’s emancipation theory promulgated by parts of the SPD 
and the trade unions during the Weimar Republic was no longer an acceptable position in the 
anti-Communist climate of the postwar West.31 Similar to CDU/CSU supporters, even most 
female SPD members propagated now that “women are equal but not the same” and thus 
supported a relational feminism and the ideal of the male breadwinner family. During the 
                                                 
30 For more on the concept of “gender equality” see the part on methodology. 
31 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 73; see Patrick Major, The Death of KPD: Communism and Anti-
Communism in West Germany, 1945-1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Stefan Creuzberger 
and Dierk Hoffmann, “Geistige Gefahr” und “Immunisierung Der Gesellschaft”: Antikommunismus und 
Politische Kultur in der frühen Bundesrepublik (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014) for longer studies of anti-
Communism in the FRG. For literature on socialist women before 1945, see Karen Hagemann, Frauenalltag 
und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und Gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik 
(Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1990); Jean H. Quataert, Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy, 1885-1917 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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Weimar Republic, this approach to feminism was primarily supported by the older female 
leadership of the Social Democratic women’s movement and its followers. The younger 
female generation in the ranks of the Weimar SPD often still continued to press for the old 
socialist idea of women’s emancipation that promoted paid work as the major path to 
equality.32  In the East, this powerful ideal was difficult to overcome too, not in the official 
political rhetoric of the SED, but in the day-to-day practice. 
The condensed narrative above reveals that the years between 1945 and 1968 were 
rife with arguments over equality, marriage, and the family. This dissertation focuses on the 
period between the approval of the provisional constitutions in 1949, which promised 
equality between men and women and required its inclusion in all laws, and the enactment of 
the 1957 Equal Rights Act in the West and the 1965 Family Code in the East and the 
respective aftermath of these reforms in politics and society of both states. After an overview 
chapter of the developments before 1945 mainly based on the existing research, my own 
analysis begins in the early postwar period because the end of World War II incited crucial 
social, political, and cultural changes that had a lasting impact on understandings of 
Gleichberechtigung in East and West Germany and influenced the debates about the 
respective constitutions. For different reasons, 1968 is a useful endpoint for the FRG and the 
GDR. In the FRG, 1968 marked the rise of the New Women’s Movement, whose members 
broke away from the “relational” approach to feminism of the earlier women’s movement 
and called for more radical reforms of marriage and family law based on an “individual” 
                                                 
32 See for the Social Democratic women’s movement in Weimar Germany and controversies about 
emancipation theory extensively, Hagemann, Frauenalltag, 509-638. 
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approach to feminism.33 On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the SED approved a new 
constitution in 1968 that asserted its socialist agenda more strongly than the 1949 
constitution. It included a clearer declaration that “men and women are equal in all areas of 
society, state, and private life,” thus establishing a stronger commitment to the socialist 
program of Frauenemanzipation.34 Therefore, in 1968, a new turn of debates on the questions 
of Gleichberechtigung and Frauenemanzipation began in both German states and societies. 
Historiography 
My dissertation builds on and contributes to the scholarship on gender and the family, 
and gendered politics in the postwar Germanys. Historians such as Sybille Buske, Christine 
Franzius, Donna Harsch, Elizabeth Heineman, Robert Moeller, Merith Niehuss, Christine 
von Oertzen, and Carola Sachse, next to others, have emphasized the significance given to 
marriage and the family as a “stabilizing force” not only by the American Allies and West 
German legislators, but also by the Soviets and East German politicians.35 Their scholarship 
demonstrates how public policies in the postwar Germanys contained unchanged notions of a 
                                                 
33 See more on the terms “relational” and “individual” feminism, Karen Offen, European Feminisms, 1700-
1950: A Political History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 21-22. 
34 See the 1968 East German constitution, http://www.documentarchiv.de/ddr/verfddr.html#KAPITEL%201-2. 
Women’s emancipation had been a tenet of the socialist movement since the late nineteenth century, but had 
always been subsumed by class struggle. Several scholars have outlined the SPD argument that solving the class 
problem would solve the “women’s question.” See Catherine Dollard, “Socialism and Singleness: Clara 
Zetkin,” in The Surplus Woman: Unmarried in Imperial Germany, 1871-1918 (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2009), 164-175; Jean Quataert, Reluctant Feminists, 5-17; Hagemann, Frauenalltag, 516-551; Karen Offen, 
European Feminisms, 200-212. 
35 Sybille Buske, Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard: eine Geschichte der Unehelichkeit in Deutschland, 1900-
1970 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004); Christine Franzius, Bonner Grundgesetz und Familienrecht: die 
Diskussion um die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau in der westdeutschen Zivilrechtslehre der 
Nachkriegszeit (1945-1957) (Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann, 2005); Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 2; 
Heineman, What Difference, 112; Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 196; Merith Niehuss, Familie, Frau und 
Gesellschaft: Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland 1945-1960 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 7; Oertzen, Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen; Sachse, Der 
Hausarbeitstag. 
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gendered division of labor that continued to relegate women to domestic roles, despite the 
rhetoric of equality and “women’s emancipation,” which was especially developed in the 
GDR. Women in both Germanys were responsible for housework and family care, even if 
they worked full-time outside the house.36 In the East they had better access to job training 
and full-time work, because the chronic labor shortage in the GDR created a high demand for 
female workers. They also were supported by the state with all-day childcare and a protective 
legislation for working mothers, but the conventional gendered division of labor at home was 
not questioned.37  
In spite of the relation of entanglement and delineation between the East and the 
West, in-depth comparisons of the situation of women in East and West Germany are few. 
One exception is Carola Sachse’s 2002 monograph on the Hausarbeitstag or “housework 
day,” which shows how both German states designed policies after 1945 to alleviate the 
double burden of work and household labor for women, yet simultaneously reinforced a 
gendered division of labor.38 Similarly, more recent works by Gunilla Budde, Karen 
Hagemann, and Monika Mattes have pointed out the gendered dimensions of the entangled 
debates and policies related to labor, social and family policy and the time-structure of 
                                                 
36 David Großekathöfer, “Es ist ja jetzt Gleichberechtigung”: Die Stellung der Frau im nachehelichen 
Unterhaltsrecht der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003). Großekathöfer’s 2001 dissertation explains that by denying 
divorced women access to alimony, the SED encouraged them to enter the workforce. 
37 Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Frauen der Intelligenz: Akademikerinnen in der DDR 1945 bis 1975 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003); Karin Zachmann, Mobilisierung der Frauen: Technik, Geschlecht und Kalter 
Krieg in der DDR (Frankfurt/M. & New York: Campus, 2004); Oertzen, Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am 
Zuverdienen, 14; Sachse, Der Hausarbeitstag, 15, 95-96, 111; Hagemann, “Between Ideology,” 239-241; 
Gesine Obertreis, Familienpolitik in Der DDR, 1945-1980 (Opladen: Leske Budrich, 1986). 
38 Sachse, Der Hausarbeitstag, 34. For a discussion of how educational policy reinforced the gendered division 
of labor before the late 1960s, see also Hagemann, “Between Ideology,” 242.  
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childcare and education systems in the two Germanys.39 Leonie Treber’s study on the 
postwar policy of the clean-up of the rubble in both Germanys and the West German mythos 
of the Trümmerfrauen provides yet another example of comparative gender history.40 My 
dissertation contributes to existing scholarship by comparing the reforms of civil laws, which 
determined women’s civil rights in marriage and the family as well as property rights. 
Another way my research adds to the history of marriage and family is by including 
the dimension of fatherhood and masculinity in the analysis of postwar discourses. As Robert 
Moeller and Christine von Oertzen have demonstrated, in West Germany, protecting 
motherhood was a major goal of the Christian conservative Adenauer administration, whose 
proposed reforms to family law and policy sought to reinforce a male breadwinner/female 
homemaker/female part-time worker model. Related language about fatherhood and 
masculinity remain underexplored in their main monographs, however.41 According to 
scholars such as Frank Biess, Heide Fehrenbach, Robert Moeller (in other works), Uta 
Poiger, and Till von Rahden, masculinity was in crisis after World War II. Men who returned 
home from the front felt emasculated, especially in comparison to their American 
                                                 
39 Hagemann, “A West-German ‘Sonderweg’,” 275-300; Mattes, “Economy and Politics,” 344-363; Budde, 
Frauen Arbeiten. 
40 Leonie Treber, Mythos Trümmerfrauen: Von der Trümmerbeseitigung in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit und 
der Entstehung eines deutschen Erinnerungsortes (Essen: Klartext, 2014). See on the “Trümmerfrauen” also, 
Karen Hagemann, “Geschichtswissenschaft, Medien und kollektives Gedächtnis: Zum ‘Mythos 
Trümmerfrauen’,” Neue Politische Literatur, no. 4 (2015): 203-212; and for another example of forthcoming 
scholarship comparing gender in postwar Berlin, Jane Freeland’s recent dissertation, “Behind Closed Doors: 
Domestic Violence, Citizenship and State-Making in Divided Berlin, 1969-1990,” (Ph.D. diss., Carleton 
University, 2015). 
41 Moeller’s Protecting Motherhood briefly covers some discussions of fatherhood on 191-192; Oertzen, 
Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen, 14. 
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occupiers.42 “Remasculinization,” especially of fatherhood, therefore occupied a central role 
in West German rhetoric.43 A similar need to strengthen masculinity after the war existed in 
the GDR, but little historical work has been done so far on the legal definitions of 
masculinity and fatherhood in East Germany.44 My dissertation touches on the changing 
cultural, social, and legal constructions of masculinity and fatherhood that accompanied the 
discussion over an expansion of women’s civil rights in the reforms of marriage and family 
law in both states.  
This study of marriage and family law also contributes to the history of gendered 
politics in the postwar Germanys. Historiography on gender and politics during the 1950s 
and early 1960s has concentrated primarily on women’s roles in “formal” institutions such as 
the parties and parliaments. Some of this scholarship was written by contemporaries who 
conducted sociological studies of women as voters, party members, and parliamentarians in 
the 1950s and 1960s.45 Later studies in the 1970s and 1980s by political scientists and 
sociologists shifted from studying demographics of women in formal politics to analyzing 
                                                 
42 Heide Fehrenbach, “Rehabilitating Fatherland: Race and German Remasculinization,” Signs 24, no. 1 (1998): 
107-127; Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 12-13. 
43 Susan Jeffords, “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s: Discussion,” Signs 24, no. 1 (1998): 163-
169; Robert G. Moeller, “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s: Introduction,” Signs 24, no. 1 
(1998): 101-106; Till von Rahden, “Fatherhood, Rechristianization, and the Quest for Democracy in Postwar 
West Germany,” in Raising Citizens in the Century of the Child, ed. Dirk Schumann (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2012), 141-165. 
44 Uta G. Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero? Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s,” Signs 24, no. 1 
(1998): 147-162.  
45 Gabriele Bremme, Die politische Rolle der Frau in Deutschland: eine Untersuchung über den Einfluss der 
Frauen bei Wahlen und ihre Teilnahme in Partei und Parlament. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956). 
See also Gabriele Sandmann-Bremme and Mechtild Fülles, Die Frau in der Politik (Cologne: Verlag 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969). 
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their impact on particular legislation, such as the 1957 Equal Rights Act in West Germany.46 
More recently, historians have turned to detailed studies of the influence of women in the 
major political parties (CDU, SPD, and FDP) in West Germany.47 Much of this scholarship 
has outlined the discrimination against women in all political parties and the parliaments. It 
described the female activism that followed the old patterns of Weimar policy therefore 
usually as a “failure.” My dissertation re-evaluates female activism both in- and outside of 
“formal” politics and its influence. It argues that there was feminist activism before the new 
women’s movement in both German states, which is indicated by a small number of studies. 
Works on the 1950s and 1960s that have analyzed the gendered nature of political 
participation outside of voting, the parties, or Parliaments are few. Renate Genth’s edited 
volume on women’s organizations in Berlin is one example, but it only covers women in the 
immediate postwar years of 1945–49 and the Western Allied sector.48 The best-known 
analysis of East German women’s political participation is Donna Harsch’s Revenge of the 
Domestic.49 Harsch shows that women, particularly in the DFD, were instrumental in 
                                                 
46 Ines Reich-Hilweg, Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt: der Gleichberechtigungsgrundsatz (Art. 3 
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(Berlin: Trafo Verlag Dr. Wolfgang Weist, 1996). 
49 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic. 
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pressuring the SED to change its employment and family policies to better accommodate 
working women’s needs as mothers and breadwinners. Myra Marx Ferree’s recent study on 
German Gender Politics in a Global Perspective includes a chapter on the German women’s 
movement from 1848 to 1968.50 The main analytical thrust of her chapter, however, is 
comparing the German and American cases. Thus, she devotes scant attention to women’s 
organizations and the East-West relationship. Genth, Harsch, and Ferree have offered 
important insights into the continuance of the women’s movement after World War II. Yet 
their studies are still limited in some ways. First, they have focused primarily on women 
instead of gender in a broadly defined sphere of politics. Second, the East-West relationship 
has not been drawn out explicitly in these works and deserves more attention because it 
informed so much of the contemporary discourse on Gleichberechtigung and its enactment in 
marriage and family law. 
The historiography on gender in German politics in the 1950s and 1960s can be 
characterized as looking forward and backward at the same time. Some feminist scholars 
have criticized the older generation for failing to accomplish more substantial changes, or for 
not pressing the government for the same issues they found relevant in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Most prior studies have thus ignored the intense political discourse on Gleichberechtigung in 
marriage and family law in both postwar Germanys that began long before the new women’s 
movement in the late 1960s in the FRG. Even feminist scholarship on the post-1945 
women’s movement has claimed that there was no serious activism for “gender equality” 
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before the new women’s movement.51 They overlooked the development in the East and the 
role of the different political parties, the media, and social organizations in the struggle for 
Gleichberechtigung. They also ignored the fact that in both states it was mainly women, 
often representatives of women’s associations, who challenged the gendered division of labor 
in the economy and society and advocated for changes. My project thus builds on this 
scholarship, but simultaneously challenges some of its main assumptions. 
 
Methods and Sources 
My theoretical and methodological approach combines the concepts of path 
dependency and histoire croisée with the approaches of political history, discourse analysis, 
and most importantly, gender history and feminist theories of citizenship and civil society. 
First and foremost, my work draws on the concept of path dependency, introduced by 
political scientists. One of them was Paul Pierson; according to him, “we cannot understand 
the significance of a particular social variable without understanding ‘how it got there’—the 
path it took.”52 His observation that states in similar conditions proceed on different paths 
historically and that “ ‘small’ or contingent events,” timing and sequence, and the role of 
institutions can influence “ ‘large’ outcomes” fits well for my own study of how the two 
Germanys began with the same law and similar conditions and ended up following very 
different paths.53 He analyzes which factors shaped and inform certain paths of the 
development of a state, its institutions and policies, enabled change, or prevented it. His main 
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argument is that states and institutions tend to continue on a taken path, because change is 
often costly, not only financially, but also socially and culturally. The longer a path is 
trodden and embedded in the structures of a system, the more difficult reform becomes. In 
other words: “New institutions and policies are costly to create,” and increasing returns 
makes each step along the old path “more attractive for the next round.”54 In the context of 
the Cold War, politicians in both German states had to weigh the political, economic, and 
social costs of reforming the old shared family laws, which not only had a long legal tradition 
but also had informed several other policies regarding the family and gender relations. The 
old family laws reflected ideas about gender that were part of society and culture in both 
postwar German states, despite a different political rhetoric in the propaganda of the GDR.55 
Thus, laws, institutions, and policies were not the only factor that made reforms challenging. 
Following here historians Karen Hagemann and Konrad H. Jarausch, who used the approach 
of path dependency in their comparative project of the time structure of child care and school 
systems in postwar Eastern and Western Europe, my study emphasizes that cultural norms 
and the gender order, in addition to legal, institutional, and economic conditions, determined 
their separate paths.56 Reigning cultural norms about gender and the family pushed 
politicians and certain interest groups, especially the Protestant and Catholic churches, to 
defend the image of the male breadwinner/female homemaker, which forced legislators to 
reassess their work on the two laws. The approach of path dependency is therefore vital for 
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my project, because it allows me not only to identify the different political, economic, social, 
and cultural factors that interacted and prevented family law reforms in both German states, 
but also to determine the historical moments and factors that enabled change. 
My dissertation also draws on the approach of histoire croisée, suggested by 
historians such as Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann.57 They argued that a 
comparison of states, countries, and regions is not enough, because they usually have an 
entangled history. In other words, “the objects and practices are not only in a state of 
interrelationship but also modify one another reciprocally as a result of their relationship.”58 
Postwar Germany, as one of the few historical examples of a divided nation-state with a 
common history, provides a unique case study for an entangled transnational study, 
suggested by histoire croisée, because the two sides at all levels (high politics, society, and in 
the media) were so closely interrelated, shared a joint history, and shaped each other’s laws 
and policies. This approach helps me parse out the connections as well as similarities and 
differences between the two German states’ and societies’ negotiations over family law. 
In both Germanys, dominant gender norms played an important role in constructing 
power hierarchies, social structures, and determined, to some degree, the paths each state 
took for family law reform. I rely on historian Joan W. Scott’s conception of gender as both a 
framework for understanding power relationships between different groups of men and 
women as well as a way of studying the changing meanings of sex/gender, masculinity, and 
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femininity.59 Scott’s definition of gender as context-specific and a relational signifier of 
power is important for my research, because while contemporary discussions were explicitly 
about raising women to equal status with men, they were also implicitly about men’s status 
and rights. Granting women equal civil rights was important for both sexes, because it had 
consequences for men too, whose power and authority as husbands and heads of the family 
would be weakened, but who could gain new experiences as equal partners in a marriage and 
fathers. For some contemporaries, the consequences for men and the family structure were 
considered prohibiting factors for changing the law, even if it meant further limiting 
women’s rights. Other historians of post-1945 German history have analyzed discourses 
about the Frauenfrage (“women’s question”) and motherhood, but I take the relational aspect 
of gender more seriously in order to deconstruct the contemporary discourse on motherhood, 
fatherhood, and spousal relations that were the core of marriage and family law. Furthermore, 
Scott emphasizes historicizing language, which is important for my work. The idea of gender 
as a social construction did not exist in contemporary discourse. I thus employ “gender” 
strictly as an analytical category. For the analysis of the contemporary discourse I attempt to 
deconstruct and historicize the central concepts of the time in order to more accurately 
convey its historical meaning. One central concept was Gleichberechtigung, equality 
between the men and women. 
Additionally, Scott’s argument that language and discourse construct knowledge 
about sexual difference, especially in politics, is fruitful for my work.60 I apply her 
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suggestion in my study of how different actors in politics and society defined 
Gleichberechtigung and attempted to challenge dominant discourses and related policies, and 
thus, set marriage and family law on new paths. Based on feminist scholarship on “gender 
and politics,” I define “politics” to include political institutions (such as the governments, 
parties, and parliaments); social organizations (especially the Protestant and Catholic 
Churches and women’s associations); and the public with its mass media.61 I devote special 
attention to the role of political actors outside of the parties and parliaments in the disputes 
over family law, interrogating ways civil society has historically served as a venue for 
individuals, groups, and associations to pressure the members of formal political institutions 
for equal civil rights.  
“Civil citizenship rights” are a central point of my analysis. Following the work of 
leading historians and sociologists, I see gender as a central component of citizenship. I use 
feminist sociologist Ruth Lister’s concept of citizenship, which inverts sociologist Thomas 
Marshall’s tripartite conception of political, social, and civil rights and instead emphasizes 
that women, unlike men, tend to gain civil rights much later than political and social rights.62 
In this context Lister defines citizenship as a practice that “involves fulfilling the full 
potential of the status” via political participation.63 She asserts, however, that even when 
women have the right to vote or the right to work, they still lack the “personal autonomy” 
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offered by civil rights that serves as a “precondition for action in any culture.”64  
Historian Kathleen Canning builds on Lister’s theoretical framework in her call to 
historicize citizenship in the context of German gender history. Canning develops Lister’s 
rights-based approach by accounting for the historical subjectivity of citizenship. She 
“considers both the power of law and citizenship discourse and the interventions and 
interpretations of those who encounter, embrace, or contest them” as central to 
deconstructing historical understandings of citizenship and how it has changed over time.65 
She furthermore does not restrict citizenship to the realm of law, but argues that popular 
culture, the media, and consumption inform the practice and contemporary understandings of 
citizenship as well.  
“Practice” of citizenship complements a rights-based approach, according to Lister 
and Canning. In particular, informal politics were (and are) an especially critical venue for 
women’s political participation.66 Illuminating this idea in the German context, historian 
Belinda Davis has argued that the literature on women’s politics in Germany has shown “that 
effective activism requires some work outside existing formal political channels but also 
necessitates efforts to increase a presence within these structures as well.”67 Here, too, 
Canning’s assertion that citizenship is fluid, contested, and can be informed by many actors 
and institutions is important. Combining Lister’s, Canning’s, and Davis’s approaches help 
me to understand how different actors, especially party and non-party women’s associations, 
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but also members of the media, conceptualized civil rights differently and worked inside and 
outside of official channels to challenge and change contemporary understandings of civil 
rights in marriage and the family. 
Building on this idea of informal activism, my study is also informed by comparative 
research on the history of feminism as a political movement. I do not label my historical 
actors as “feminists,” as the term was rarely used by contemporaries. Before 1933, some used 
the term “Frauenrechtlerin” (women’s rights activists), but after 1945, they identified 
themselves as members of women’s organizations. The term “Feministin” was reserved for 
activists of the new women’s movement and defined by “individual feminism.” Recent 
historical scholarship, however, has shown that the term “feminism” can be a useful category 
for a comparative analysis of the struggle for equal rights of men and women. Historian 
Karen Offen suggests extending our understanding of “feminism” and to differentiate 
between “relational” and “individual feminism.” “Relational feminists” believe that men and 
women are different by “nature” and their “innate” biological differences lead to different 
cultural and social “characters” of men and women, which in turn define their sphere of 
activity in the economy, society, and politics. Because of their “spiritual motherhood,” 
women “by nature” are better suited to serve in the “female spheres” of the economy, 
society, and politics. They “complement” men. This approach led to the slogan “equal but 
different.”68 Meanwhile, “individual feminism” is based on the assumption that all men and 
women have the same human rights as human beings. Therefore, the rights of an individual 
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transcend everything, including sexual difference.69  
As Offen points out, however, there is not a strict dichotomy between individual and 
relational feminisms in practice. Both positions were fluid and need to be understood as 
relational and in their specific historical context. She stresses that “any comprehensive 
discussion of feminism must therefore encompass both these argumentative traditions, 
account for the ways in which they point to very different societal outcomes, and examine the 
tensions between them in particular contexts.”70 Despite her insistence of the multiple 
meanings of feminism, she does not include in her study the tradition of “socialist feminism.” 
Her main argument is that socialist feminists believe that a full emancipation of women is 
only possible when the working class is liberated, i.e. after an economic and social 
revolution. For them the social and the women’s question are closely connected. Only 
women’s integration into the labor force can therefore contribute to their “emancipation.” For 
her, this disqualifies them from being “feminist.” My own study uses a broader definition of 
feminism that includes all three approaches and emphasizes the fluidity of these positions. 
One example is the aforementioned development of the debate in the Weimar SPD.71 In the 
post-1945 SPD women’s organization, relational feminism dominated and explains why in 
the context of the Cold War in the SPD, few female members radically questioned the 
gendered division of labor in politics, society, and family. Following Offen, I analyze the 
competition and interplay between the different forms of feminism in order to understand 
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how and why various women’s rights activists struggled with each other to redefine men’s 
and women’s equal rights in marriage and the family from the mid-1940s to the late 1960s.  
Additionally, the concept of “civil society” is central to my project, because I view it 
as the primary arena where women advocated for equal civil rights in marriage and the 
family. In particular, I utilize an “action-logical” approach to civil society, understood, 
following here Karen Hagemann, as “a web of autonomous associations and activities 
independent of the state, which binds citizens together in matters of common concern and by 
their existence or actions.”72 Furthermore, this approach identifies civil society as self-
organized, peaceful, and aimed as “the so-called common good.”73 For my own study, 
particularly the West German half, the action-logical approach makes the most sense, 
because I examine how numerous autonomous groups—the major churches and their 
religious associations, women’s organizations (secular and Christian), trade unions, and 
professional federations—all voluntarily took up family law reforms as a joint cause, for the 
“common good,” despite their different perspectives and goals. They create unity and 
simultaneously exclude by “othering.” Next to gender and class, religion is of crucial 
importance for my study, because religious women’s organizations were often at the 
forefront of debates on the new family law, at least in the West.74 With these theories, I am 
able to use the debates over the Equal Rights Act in society to examine how voluntary 
organizations in the West pressed for reforms, and what circumstances enabled or limited 
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their abilities to respond. 
Although “civil society” is a helpful framework for the FRG, the Western concept of 
civil society does not fit well for the East, because the GDR was, by most accounts, a 
dictatorship that “destroyed civil society in most respects.”75 For this reason, scholars have 
typically identified the citizen movements of the 1980s as the beginning of civil society in 
the GDR, because it was otherwise barred.76 Yet other scholarship on the cultural sphere of 
the GDR has argued that traces of a civil society were present before the 1980s among the 
East German literati such as Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym.77 Furthermore, individual actors 
still remained capable of peaceably protesting the government. In my own study, I do not 
argue that the GDR had a developed “civil society” in the 1950s and 1960s. Still, to 
paraphrase historian Jürgen Kocka, I seek out the “residuals of civil society [that] survived 
the dictatorships.”78 In this project, the residual elements of civil society mostly existed in the 
Protestant and Catholic churches in the GDR, whose protests against the Family Code 
exposed that “the dictatorship’s rule was more limited than assumed by theories of 
totalitarianism.”79  
Finally, as a method, I employ discursive analysis in order to understand the 
construction of discourse on Gleichberechtigung on the different levels of politics, civil 
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society, and the media. I consider social background, political affinity, experiences, 
memories, and other factors to be part of the formation of discourse by different political 
actors. Newspapers and magazines played an important role in both mediating and reflecting 
debates on gender equality to their audiences. Additionally, theories on the discursive 
construction of “the other” are important for my examination of the entangled relationship 
between the FRG and the GDR. The construction of competing discourses, how they 
changed, and their interplay on the different levels of politics, society, and the media 
comprise much of my analysis.80  
The interdisciplinary approach of my dissertation is based on a broad variety of 
primary sources and printed sources like protocols, reports, newspapers, and journals in order 
to understand the struggle for Gleichberechtigung and its implementation in marriage and 
family law in East and West Germany between 1945 and 1968. The first level of my analysis 
explores the discussions and negotiations among members of governing political institutions. 
In particular, I focus on the official politics of the federal governments and their ruling 
parties, specifically the CDU/CSU and the federal Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Family 
in the FRG, and the SED and the Ministries of Justice and Interior in the GDR. Here, I rely 
on internal documentation from the West German Ministries of Justice, Interior, Family, and 
the Office of the Federal Chancellor, such as memoranda, Stellungnahmen (opinion pieces), 
drafts of legislation, petitions from West German social organizations, and other 
miscellaneous documentation. Published sources such as the Bundeskabinett protocols are 
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equally important. Likewise, for the GDR, I use gray material from the SED-Zentralkomitee, 
the Office of the Ministers’ Council (Ministerrat), and the Ministries of Justice and Interior 
and the State Secretary for Clerical Issues. These collections also contain memoranda, 
petitions, letters, legislative drafts, meeting minutes, and opinion pieces. Such documents 
allow me to peer inside the internal debates within the East and West German governments, 
in order to distinguish the most important issues concerning marriage and family and how the 
arguments for and against the proposed laws were constructed. 
The second level of my study analyzes the debate in society and the degree to which 
societal intervention alternately halted and drove forward the reforms. I especially look at 
social organizations like the churches, trade unions, and independent women’s associations; 
the major political parties and their women’s organizations; and the parliaments. To 
understand their internal deliberations, I analyze memoranda, party newsletters, fraction 
protocols, and depositories of party leaders. Of special importance are internal memoranda, 
letters, and meeting minutes of the women’s organizations of the CDU/CSU, FDP, KPD, and 
SPD and their newsletters such as Gleichheit, Genossin, Was Frauen wissen wollen, and 
Frau und Politik. Similarly, I examine publications from Catholic and Protestant 
organizations such as Die Christliche Frau and Evangelische Verantwortung. Additionally, I 
rely on gray material from the Women’s Office of the German Trade Union Confederation 
(Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB). For the GDR, I examine petitions, opinion pieces, 
protocols, reports, meeting minutes, internal memoranda, and newsletters such as Die Frau 
von heute and Lernen und handeln for the SED, Ost-CDU, LDPD, DFD, and other respective 
political parties and organizations such as the Free German Trade Union Confederation 
(Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB). In particular, citizens’ petitions—sent in 
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through a system set up and monitored by the SED—provide a critical lens into ordinary East 
Germans’ complaints and praise for the forthcoming legislation. Finally, I utilize the 
published parliamentary protocols for the Bundestag and Volkskammer. These sources 
provide not only a sense of the discourse within the respective political parties and 
independent organizations, but also an idea of how the relationships among associations in 
“civil society” functioned and were affected by the Cold War political culture. 
On the third level, I explore in what ways the media in the GDR and the FRG 
represented and mediated the debates over family law. Here I study national newspapers and 
magazines such as Neues Deutschland and Berliner Zeitung for the GDR, and Die Welt, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Spiegel, and DIE ZEIT for the 
FRG. Where necessary, I include regional newspapers, because these were more commonly 
read in the early 1950s in West Germany than national dailies.81 Additionally, women’s 
magazines such as Für Dich in the GDR, and Brigitte and Constanze in the FRG are critical 
to my project. Interesting sources for the broader public response are Leserbriefe, or letters to 
the editors, in the national newspapers and these three magazines. I have selected these 
newspapers and magazines in order to get a broad spectrum of political viewpoints, at least in 
West Germany. In the GDR, the national newspaper Neues Deutschland was controlled by 
the SED and conveyed only its political agenda. Nevertheless, it is important to analyze and 
understand the SED’s presentation in Neues Deutschland of the debates over the new 
socialist Family Code. 
Finally, all levels of my dissertation compare the discourse and processes in East and 
West in order to analyze their entangled relationship during the Cold War. For the 
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comparison of the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that informed the 
legislation and policies and their long-term aftermath, I use economic, demographic, and 
social statistics and government reports as well as the extensive secondary literature. In my 
analysis of the parliamentary protocols, party-level discussions, newspapers, and other 
documents, I pay close attention to the references to the other Germany and the Cold War.  
My dissertation is structured in six chapters. Chapter 1 summarizes the pre-1945 
debates, led by the different branches of the German women’s movement, over changing the 
marriage and family law provisions of the Civil Code. Chapter 2 examines the impact of the 
postwar “crisis years” and the Soviet and Western Allied occupations on women and the 
family between the years 1945 and 1947, focusing on how women’s organizations regrouped 
and began, even at this stage, to press for changes to family law. Chapter 3 looks at 
constitutional reforms in the Soviet and Western Allied occupation zones in 19481949, 
specifically female activists’ initiatives to include an “equality clause” and a “family 
protection clause” in the forthcoming provisional constitutions (approved in both states in 
1949). Chapter 4 explores the first stages of debates over the new marriage and family laws 
in each German state from 1949–1953, which failed to produce new legislation by mandated 
deadlines. Chapter 5 analyzes the second round of deliberations over the new laws in the 
FRG, which led to the 1957 Equal Rights Act. It ends in 1968 with the rise of the New 
Women’s Movement, which initiated a new discussion of family law in the 1970s. Finally, 
Chapter 6 covers the final negotiations that resulted in the 1965 Family Code in the GDR. In 
1968, the GDR’s new constitution provided an even stronger formulation of the equality 
clause, leading East Germans on a new path regarding women’s rights. Each chapter stresses 
the connections, but also key differences, between the two Germanys in the early Cold War. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ENGENDERING PATRIARCHY: MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN GERMAN 
LAW BEFORE 1945 
 
On 4 February 1896, jurist and judge Gottlieb Planck, the Bundesrat (Federal 
Council) commissar and a prominent National Liberal parliamentarian, addressed the 
Reichstag, the national parliament of the German Empire, on the forthcoming reforms to the 
Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB). In his speech, Planck stressed the urgency and 
necessity of a common legal structure to govern the German Empire, a federative nation-state 
with 25 federal states (Bundesstaaten) and different legal traditions, based on the General 
States Laws for the Prussian State (Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten) from 
1794 and the Napoleonic Code from 1804. He identified several reasons for the new 
legislation, but above all, he emphasized that “community order, property, inheritance, 
marriage, [and] family stand as the wide and firm basis of a common German law.”1  
When Planck made this statement, politicians in the German Empire had been 
debating civil law for approximately two decades without any resolution. After Germany 
unified “from above” in 1871, the conservative German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, 
recognized that “Germany existed on paper, but it lacked widespread legitimacy as well as 
seasoned institutions.”2 He therefore initiated several legal reform projects, which included 
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the creation of one unified Civil Code, drawn together from the legal codes of the 25 
kingdoms, duchies, free cities, territories, and principalities that formed the German Empire. 
He tasked Planck and the National Liberal Party—then the largest party in the imperial 
Reichstag—with formulating a new Civil Code. 
 After more than twenty years of controversial debate and protest, mainly from the 
German bourgeois women’s movement, Catholics, and the Social Democratic Party, the 
Reichstag finally passed the new Civil Code on 18 August 1896, slated to go into effect on 1 
January 1900. The new law regulated the formation of contracts, property rights, inheritance 
rights, and marital and familial relations. Regarding family law, National Liberal and 
conservative politicians envisioned a legal order in which husbands took precedence over 
their spouses in all areas of marital decision-making, marital property, and parental authority. 
Married men, for example, had the right to make all decisions for their wives and families. 
Married women could only work with the express permission of their husbands. Upon 
marrying, women relinquished the rights to their personal property. Furthermore, the right to 
divorce hinged on the guilt principle. Finally, unwed mothers and their children did not 
possess the same legal status as married women and their offspring.  
 These provisions became a mainstay of German jurisprudence and politics for more 
than half a century, outlasting the empire and the following four political regimes, two world 
wars, and the division of Germany after 1945. Although historians have examined the causes 
and effects of the Civil Code in-depth, they have not adequately explained why this particular 
legislation endured so long in Germany.3 This chapter shows that, despite continuous 
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resistance, the fourth book of the Civil Code remained largely unaltered throughout the 
Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich because many contemporaries saw 
the male breadwinner/female homemaker family model outlined in the BGB not only as a 
unifying and stabilizing force in German society, but also as the basis of a functioning state. 
Although the discourse about stability remained the same, the circumstances that precipitated 
anxieties about national stability changed. In the late nineteenth century, the Civil Code 
became a response to unification and industrialization. When the empire crumbled at the end 
of World War I, especially the conservative Catholic politicians of the Center Party 
(Zentrumspartei, Z), which governed first in a coalition with the SPD and the liberal German 
Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP), and later also with more national- 
conservative Protestant parties like the German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) 
and right-wing German National People’s Party (Deutsche Nationale Volkspartei, DNVP) 
vehemently opposed any reform of the Civil Code’s prescriptions for marriage and the 
family. The Catholic and Protestant majority in the Weimar society saw the family as a 
stronghold against economic and social crisis and the dangers of “socialism,” their label for 
the Weimar welfare state. After seizing the government in 1933, the Nazis, too, presented the 
male breadwinner/female homemaker family as the solution for social peace and stability in 
the German Volksgemeinschaft (“Community of People”), similar to the Catholic Center 
Party and the Protestant nationalist-conservative parties during the Weimar years and thus 
did not support any major changes to the Civil Code. Early on, they implemented, however, 
special regulations for all “non-Aryan” marriages and families, like the antisemitic 
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Nuremberg Laws (Nürnberger Gesetze) from 16 September 1935. Their defeat in 1945 at the 
hands of the Allies ensured that the Nazi project of a new, racialized family law never came 
to fruition. From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, family law 
provisions remained the same as major political, social, cultural, and economic upheavals 
confronted each political regime.  
 This chapter also demonstrates the continuing public conflict over the fourth book of 
the BGB. From the beginning, its aims and language were contested. Proponents of the new 
regulations—namely liberal and conservative politicians—praised the law for protecting 
women and preserving their “natural” differences from men.4 Meanwhile, the bourgeois 
women’s movement and the Social Democratic Party—representing decidedly different 
political and social strata—both railed against the new law’s severe restrictions on women’s 
legal personhood. These groups continued their struggle against the Civil Code during the 
Weimar Republic, but were quickly silenced after the Nazis’ seizure of power in January 
1933. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) outlawed and persecuted its opponents from the Left. The umbrella 
organization of the bourgeois women’s movement, the Federation of German Women's 
Associations (Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, BDF), founded in 1894, dissolved itself in 
1933 because it did not want to become a Nazi organization. 
  This first chapter describes the political, social, and economic factors that influenced 
the initial form of the marriage and family law provisions of the Civil Code, and discusses 
why it stayed in force despite two changes of the political regime in 191819 and 1933. The 
first section traces the BGB’s inception following the unification of Germany in 1871 and 
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importance for the German Empire. The second section outlines how the dissolution of the 
German Empire following the end of World War I and the Weimar Republic (1918/191933) 
shaped new debates over marriage and family law. The last section analyzes the fate of 
marriage and family law during the Third Reich (19331945).  
 
Drafting the Civil Code, 18741900 
The 1900 Civil Code had its roots in the disparate regional codes that governed 
marriage and the family prior to German unification in 1871. Married women’s 
subordination to men was long embedded in the legal tradition of the civil laws of many 
states and principalities of the Holy Roman Empire and German Confederation of 1815. For 
example, the General State Law for the Prussian States, passed in 1794, gave men legal 
authority over their wives.5 In addition, the Napoleonic Code of 1804, which remained 
applicable in several German territories that had belonged to the Confederation of the Rhine 
even after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, made the situation even more complex. After the 
unification of 1871, the so-called “Rhenish Law” applied in a sixth of the territory of the 
German Empire (for example, in the newly acquired Rhenish territories of Prussia, the Grand 
Duchy of Baden, and the Bavarian Palatinate). In addition, the Kingdom of Saxony 
implemented its own Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch für das Königreich Sachsen (the Saxon BGB) 
in 1865, which stipulated that after marriage, men controlled their wives’ property, women 
adopt their husbands’ surname, and women could no longer conduct business transactions by 
themselves.6 Despite different legal traditions, the various civil laws and regulations of the 25 
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federal states in the new German Empire shared a certain inclination toward limiting 
women’s civil and property rights within marriage. 
The result of the different legal traditions was that, despite a general tendency of the 
legal regulations to protect patriarchal structures in marriage and family, the practice often 
differed by region, as historian Margaret Barber Crosby notes.7 The legal situation was 
further complicated by the fact that marital contracts based on local inheritance customs and 
statutes could trump federal law, even when the laws of a federal state stated otherwise. This 
was a common practice before the implementation of the Civil Code.  
The variety of regional statutes and customs came under intense scrutiny after 
German unification. In 1873, Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor and head of the 
Bundesrat—the Federal Council comprised of the heads of each German state—initiated 
reforms of civil law as part of his unification process for the German Empire. On 20 
December 1873, the Reichstag approved an amendment to the Gesetz betreffend die 
Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches that added civil law to a long list of laws in need of 
revision.8  
To address the issue of the Civil Code, Bismarck and the Bundesrat appointed the 
Kommission zur Erarbeitung eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (or shorter BGB 
Commission) in the Reichstag, which faced the daunting task of consolidating at least eight 
major regional civil codes and hundreds of local customs and statutes into one 
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comprehensive body of law to govern the fledgling German nation-state.9 In this 
commission, Gottlieb Planck emerged as one of its leaders and the central figure in the 
formulation of one common family law.10 Born to a prominent liberal family from the 
Kingdom of Hannover, Planck had studied law in Göttingen and Berlin, where he took 
courses on Roman law, German private law, Pandecticism, inheritance law, and civil 
society.11 He was a civil servant for the Kingdom of Hannover before entering the 
Hannoverian Parliament as part of the National Liberal Party (Nationalliberale Partei, NLP). 
After the annexation of Hannover and German unification in 1871, Planck joined the new 
German national parliament, the Reichstag, where he continued to represent the NLP. Urged 
by Bismarck, his party formed an alliance with the Conservative Parties, who shared similar 
goals of supporting unification and a strong empire by reducing the power of the Catholic 
church and its Center Party as well as the Social Democratic Worker’s Party and the labor 
movement, supporting industrialists, increasing the intervention of the state, and 
standardizing all laws.  
Planck’s educational background and political beliefs informed his approach to the 
law. Like many nineteenth century legal experts, he had been trained in Roman and German 
law. The Civil Code ultimately reflected both schools of thought, although in the case of 
family and marriage law, the Germanist influence was much more evident. For instance, 
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Germanists rejected old Roman notions of independent marital property for married women 
and adopted older Germanic notions of masculine control of the property.12 Many of the 
Family Law committee members, such as Planck and Richard Schroeder, subscribed to these 
Germanist interpretations of law, which shaped the formulation of the Civil Code. 
Furthermore, Planck was committed to legal unity, to a point of being “more 
concerned in the 1870s with the formal aspects of legal unification than with the content of 
the law.”13 Historian Michael John notes that Planck believed that “‘a unified legal 
consciousness will develop out of unified legislation’.”14 Planck was willing to overlook 
regional peculiarities that may have come with marriage or family law because he theorized 
that one unified law would eventually override these differences. Moreover, liberals saw 
legal disunity as impeding economic growth.15 In addition, Planck was a devout legal 
positivist. According to John, Planck and his fellow commission members followed “a legal 
philosophy which emphasized the unimpeded exercise of personal choice by autonomous 
legal subjects,” which they of course thought of as male, because only men possessed the 
preconditions for individual autonomy.16 It is important to keep this in mind. Reflecting 
nineteenth-century bourgeois thinking, most contemporary legal experts coded personal 
liberties and freedoms as male. According to historian Karen Hagemann, this was “part of an 
‘invented tradition’ designed to secure male supremacy not only in the family, but also in the 
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economy, society, and politics.”17 For a National Liberal like Planck, then, autonomous legal 
subjects such as propertied men could only have free rein if their wives or children could not 
interfere, especially in matters of property ownership or inheritance. 
In addition to Planck’s legal knowledge and political beliefs, the conditions facing the 
BGB Commission members factored into their approach to the new law as well. In the 
beginning, the BGB Commission had to balance several competing interests in the fledgling 
and fractured German Empire. It had to consider Prussia’s predominant position—which 
Bismarck was eager to protect—and whether or not following a Prussian model would be 
acceptable to non-Prussian states.18 The commission ultimately rejected this idea, choosing 
instead comprehensive reform, although, as historian Dirk Blasius notes, Prussia still ended 
up with the most influence.19 Relatedly, Planck and the BGB Commission also had to 
consider the degree to which local interests were given space in the law; in this regard, 
family law played a special role, because it was seen as “unsuitable for national legislation 
because of regional variations.”20 Despite the reluctance of some legislators, the commission 
pushed for one comprehensive law in order to draw the splintered empire together.  
The BGB Commission’s 1888 draft of the Civil Code reflected the ways Planck and 
other leading committee embraced Germanist legal thought, which was based on Roman law, 
positivism, and liberal notions of masculine privilege. The new legislative draft stood poised 
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to eliminate all regional differences in treatment of married women in favor of one national 
code. Although the draft obligated both spouses to a mutual “marital community,” it also 
privileged men in several areas of marital relations, property, and parental authority. For 
instance, from this point forward, men had the right to make all decisions for their wives and 
families, including where the family resided. Women had to take their husbands’ names upon 
marriage. Additionally, women were charged with leadership of household affairs and wives 
could only complete legal transactions with their husbands’ permission. Furthermore, men 
could control their wives’ property. Divorce rulings—which could typically only be pursued 
in cases of adultery—rested on the guilt principle. In cases of divorce, if the woman was 
declared the guilty party, she would take her maiden name so as not to besmirch the man’s 
family name. Declarations of guilt affected custody, too. Male children over the age of six 
would go to the father, while male and female children under the age of six could remain 
with the mother. Men possessed the legal right to make all decisions regarding the children, 
though mothers had the duty to care for their children. Finally, the proposed law removed 
rights of illegitimate children to make material or familial claims to their fathers. As a whole, 
the law limited married women’s individual rights in favor of male authority and 
subordination to the family unit.21 
Over the next eight years, until its approval in 1896, the draft remained largely 
unchanged, despite resistance from bourgeois women’s associations, male legal experts, 
Social Democrats and Catholics, who all protested for different reasons. From its inception in 
1874, the BGB Commission came under fire from women’s organizations such as the 
General German Women’s Association (Allgemeine Deutscher Frauenverein, ADF), founded 
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in October 1865 in Leipzig by the Saxon educators, journalists, and women's rights activists 
Louise Otto Peters22 and Auguste Schmidt23, who led the organization until the 1890s.24 In 
March 1894, Schmidt formed with other leaders of the growing bourgeois women’s 
movement, like Helene Lange, the founder of the General German Women Teachers 
Association (Allgemeinen Deutschen Lehrerinnenverein, or ADL), the Federation of German 
Women’s Associations (Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, or BDF) as an umbrella 
organization of the bourgeois women’s movement. Schmidt was the leader of the BDF until 
1899. She was succeeded by the liberal-minded minded “Frauenrechtlerin” Marie Stritt, who 
had founded the Legal Protection Association for Women (Rechtsschutzverein für Frauen) in 
1894 in Saxony that soon became a national organization.25 As the leader of this 
Rechtsschutzverein and later the BDF, Stritt was an ardent opponent of the patriarchal Civil 
Code. In 1910, however, Stritt was replaced by the more conservative Gertrud Bäumer, who 
had belonged to the BDF executive committee before as a leader of the ADL. One year after 
its founding the BDF represented 65 associations; by 1913, the number had grown to 2,220 
with approximately 500,000 members.  
According to historian Michael John, there was a “lack of attention paid to the 
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deliberations of the [Civil Code] commission before 1888,” but the work of the ADF, which 
he ignored, undermines this assertion.26 Between 1874 and 1900, the ADF and the BDF 
employed several strategies to protest the proposed legislation. In 1877, following a public 
“Appeal! (Aufruf!)” in the previous year, the executive board of the ADF petitioned the 
Reichstag to ensure that the forthcoming national Civil Code guaranteed “general legal 
equality of the sexes (die allgemeine rechtliche Gleichstellung der Geschlechter).”27 They 
requested the removal of provisions that deemed women “incapable;” changes to divorce 
law; and changes to custody rights for both parents. In addition, they asked that women be 
allowed control over their own property and inheritance. They requested the removal of 
patriarchal authority and custody over children in the case of divorce and elimination of 
“general stylistic elements in the law” that reduced women to the same status of minorities 
and invalids.28 This petition to the Reichstag, was forwarded to the responsible BGB 
Commission, led by Planck and the Reichskanzlei, the office of the Chancellor Bismarck, but 
neither answered it. For the legal historians Stephan Meder and Arne Duncker, the lack of 
response indicates that “no party-political discussions of its contents” occurred.29 They 
believe that it was as a “tactical error” of the ADF not to address the Reichstag directly.30 
Given the misogynist political culture of the time, however, it is unlikely that this would have 
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created more response. 
The silence of the BGB Commission and the Reichskanzlei left the ADF little 
recourse for further action at the time. The bi-weekly newspaper of the ADF, Neue Bahnen, 
edited by Peters and Schmidt, regularly published articles against the draft of the BGB, but 
had few options to create publicity beyond the newsletter and petitioning. Later on, the BDF 
changed its tactics. In 1895, it formed a legal committee (Rechtsausschuss), published 
several anti-BGB brochures, and ratcheted up its public protests.31 According to one source, 
they sent in approximately 20,000 signatures to the Reichstag in 1896.32 They furthermore 
continued to critique the Civil Code in the many newspapers and magazines of women’s 
movement, including the Centralblatt des Bundes Deutscher Frauenvereine, the national 
publication of the BDF, which was published since 1899.33 Although the ADF and later the 
BDF railed against the Civil Code, they had difficulty persuading the male legislators in the 
Reichstag. After all, they had little political capital because they were not allowed by federal 
law to join political parties until 1908 and were prohibited from voting until 1919. Since 
women were not a constituency, politicians in the Reichstag had little incentive to listen to 
their demands. Contemporary critics were aware of these problems; one later blamed “the 
spirit of masculine egoism” for the final version of the law.34 
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Next to the leading organizations of the bourgeois women’s movement, the Social 
Democratic Party was among the most vocal opponents of the new BGB. From its foundation 
in Eisenach in 1869, the Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of August Bebel, 
made “women’s emancipation” (Frauenemanzipation) one of its main tenets. Bebel was a 
strong supporter of gender equality. His book Women and Socialism (Die Frau und der 
Sozialismus), published in 1879, became a socialist bestseller. By 1891, more than 220,000 
copies were published in Germany alone; by 1914, 53 German editions came out and the 
book was translated into 20 languages, with several editions. In the book Bebel denounced 
the patriarchal oppression of women in capitalist societies and developed the vision of a 
liberated woman in the socialist future.35 One of his main arguments was that female 
emancipation required women’s economic equality with men in order to achieve liberation 
from other constraints within the family, politics, and society. But he also insisted on civil 
and political equality of men and women. His position influenced the different SPD program 
before 1914, including the Gotha program from 1875 and the Erfurt program from 1891. The 
latter was the first program after the abolition of the Anti-Socialist Law that had banned the 
Social Democratic Party and trade unions, closed 45 newspapers, and prohibited all groups or 
meetings that spread social democratic ideas. But the SPD was still allowed to participate in 
the Reichstag elections and gained increasing influence.36 In 1893, the party achieved 23 
percent and in 1912 nearly 35 percent of the votes in the Reichstag elections. From the 
beginning the SPD Reichstag’s faction under Bebel’s leadership fiercely opposed the BGB. 
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Despite its programmatic support of “women’s emancipation,” however, the majority of the 
male members in the SPD, like most men in Wilhelmine Empire, did not perceive women as 
equal, as the struggle of the Social Democratic women’s movement against male prejudices 
and resistance in its own party indicates.37 
Prominent legal experts such as Gottlieb Planck and other Reichstag members 
resisted giving into the women’s movement’s and the socialists’ demands. In June 1896, for 
instance, in an address to the Reichstag, Planck refuted the women’s movement’s claims by 
arguing that the “natural concept” of different rights in marital life was in the “interests of 
women,” especially compared to life before the BGB.38 Another Reichstag member, Freiherr 
von Stumm-Halberg, a representative of the Free Conservative Party (Freikonservative 
Partei), referred the women’s movement as “evil” for “evoking opposition between the 
sexes” and “bringing dissent into the marriage.”39 Even after the law’s approval in August 
1896, Planck continued to face opposition. At one point, in 1899, Planck responded to the 
protests, addressing a Göttingen women’s group. He explained, for instance, that men had the 
“marital duty” to support the entire family.40 He pointed to the predominance of men’s 
economic support as a reason to disenfranchise their wives at home. He argued, however, 
that women were not disadvantaged by the law: the “Schlüsselgewalt” granted women 
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authority within the household.41 In his view, the separate and unequal roles of the sexes was 
not only natural, but an asset to society. 
This type of argumentation appealed to an unexpected ally: Catholics. Initially, 
Catholics opposed the draft legislation, although for decidedly different reasons than the 
bourgeois and socialist women’s movements. For Catholics, the law, and by extension the 
state, interfered too much with the authority of the church. Protestant conservatives, such as 
Bismarck, and liberals, such as Planck, opposed the influence of the Catholic Church, 
perceiving it to undermine the aims of the nation-state.42 Bismarck responded to the 
perceived threat of the Church by waging the Kulturkampf, a “domestic preventative war 
against the Catholic minority,” and its political representatives, the Center Party (Zentrum) in 
the 1870s.43 During the Kulturkampf, the government had pursued a number of laws that 
supplanted the Catholic Church with civil institutions. For instance, civil marriages became 
mandatory across the German Empire in 1875. This anti-Catholic legislation was designed to 
support German unifications under national-liberal augury and limit and control the power of 
the Catholic Church.44 Indeed, Catholics perceived measures such as the 1875 civil marriage 
regulation as attacks, although, as historian David Blackbourn points out, they gradually 
“came to feel more German with the years.”45 
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Although Catholics initially took issue with state intervention, the underlying 
sentiments of the Civil Code resonated with their Catholic beliefs. In fact, the Catholic 
Center became allies of the National Liberals in the debates about the new law, in spite of the 
two parties’ long history of hostility. They became a major force in the process of the 
implementation and enforcement of the BGB. One reason was, that since 1890s, the National 
Liberals’ influence was waning and political Catholicism and socialism were growing more 
popular among the electorate.46 For this reason Bismarck and the conservative parties struck 
up an “uneasy compromise” with the Center to combat the SPD’s growing influence,47 which 
in the 1890 Reichstag election for the first time received with nearly 20 percent of the 
votes.48 Only together, the Center, the National Liberals, and Conservatives comprised with 
51 percent the majority of the votes and seats in the Reichstag, meaning that only as a bloc, 
they could outweigh the SPD. Collaboration on the matter of the Civil Code was easy, 
despite all former antagonism, because the National Liberal proposals, for the most part, 
closely matched Catholic and Conservatives views on familial structure and male authority.49 
The BGB was passed in the Reichstag in 1896 with 232 votes, 80 of them by the Center. 48 
Reichstag members opposed new Civil Code and 18 voted in abstention.50 
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Despite fervent resistance and a last ditch effort in 1899 to petition the Reichstag, the 
ADF, BDF, and SPD were not able to revoke the law.51 On 1 January 1900, the BGB came 
into effect. The new Civil Code attempted to define all areas of private life for the 
approximately 50 million residents of the Empire through five books: “Common Property,” 
“Obligation,” “Property Law,” “Family Law,” and “Inheritance Law.”52 The fourth book, 
“Family Law,” offered a number of provisions governing the rules of engagement and the 
marriage ceremony, prohibitions on marriage, the spousal community, parental authority, 
divorce, and marital property.   
The Civil Code’s prescriptions for marriage and the family did not distinguish 
between men and women on several matters such as who could marry, spousal community, 
and divorce. No one, for example, was permitted to commit incest by marrying relatives or 
adopted siblings.53 As another example, the rules of engagement stated that fiancé(e)s may be 
liable for expenses incurred on behalf of the marriage if they broke off the engagement. In 
the case one of the pair was at fault for ending the engagement (i.e. committed adultery), then 
he or she was legally liable for damages.54 Additionally, marriage was designated a “spousal 
community” and abuses of spousal rights were grounds for divorce, which remained strictly 
regulated.55 Either spouse could press a divorce case in the case of adultery, criminal activity, 
abuse, malicious behavior, abandonment, attempted murder, or if a spouse’s mental illness 
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destroyed the “intellectual community” of the marriage.56 No one could enter a new marriage 
before the last one was dissolved.57 Divorce required a guilty party.58 Finally, marriage 
contracts could be used for declaring separate property holdings.59 These are all examples of 
provisions that gave the same rights to married men and women. 
At the same time, the new law distinguished between the rights of men and women in 
several areas such as marrying age, parental authority, and property rights. For example, 
while men could not marry before the age of twenty-one (the legal age of majority), women 
could marry at the age of sixteen.60 Additionally, although both partners were supposed to 
contribute mutually to the “marital community,” husbands were endowed with the 
Stichentscheid, or the right to make all decisions for their wives and families. Men 
furthermore held the right to determine the domicile of the family (an extension of §10, 
which required married women to share their residence with their husbands). If a woman 
believed her husband abused his right, then she was not obligated to follow the decision, but 
often had to for the sake of keeping her family together.61 Furthermore, while husbands were 
required to support their wives according to their station in life, property, and employment 
capability, women could only contribute financially in the case that their husbands were not 
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able to do so, reinforcing the place of men as breadwinners.62 Women who stayed home were 
entitled to the right to lead and maintain the household—thus identifying wives as the 
primary domestic caretakers—and intervene in their husbands’ business if necessary, though 
husbands had the right to prohibit wives from doing so. If a man abused this right, then his 
wife could press a legal suit against him in the guardians’ court (Vormundschaftsgericht).63 
In parental authority, the father was designated the primary authority over the child and 
tasked him with caring for the child’s “person and property” (which included the right to 
decide their education).64 The mother could step in as the primary authority only if the 
father’s authority was hindered.65 If a couple did not create a contract, then control of 
women’s property transferred to their husbands upon marriage and property obtained by the 
woman (such as through her employment) during the marriage was considered communal 
property.66 The property of wives (with the exception of jewelry, clothes, utensils, and 
acquisitions through work or independent enterprise), for example, transferred to their 
husbands upon marriage.67 In the case the woman was incapacitated, the husband’s 
administration of property could not go through without her legal representative present.68 
While neither spouse could remarry before the last marriage was dissolved, women 
specifically were barred from entering a new marriage for ten months, and they typically had 
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to keep their ex-husbands’ surnames, which they were required to take upon marriage.69 
Finally, it excluded illegitimate children and single mothers from full equality with legitimate 
children born to married couples.70 The fourth book on “Family Law” governing matrimonial 
community, marital property, and parental rights plainly identified men as breadwinners and 
invested them with full authority over their wives and families. The BGB furthermore 
attempted to secure a clearly gendered division of labor in family and society, defining 
women as caretakers of the home and family.  
According to historian Volker Berghahn, the enactment of the Civil Code “was 
celebrated at the time of its ratification [in 1896] as a great advance in the creation of a 
modern bourgeois society.”71 But its feminist and socialist opponents hardly saw it as 
progress. In 1902, the BDF mounted one last campaign against the Civil Code, but to no 
avail. In the meantime, the organization pursued other paths to women’s equality, such as the 
struggle for equal access to higher education, better job opportunities, the professionalization 
of social work and the fight for women’s suffrage. After 1908 many members also joined the 
political parties.72  
By the demise of the German Empire in 1918, the social and political status of 
women had improved to some degree, though they had yet to achieve equal status with men 
in all areas of politics, the economy, and society. The access to secondary education for girls 
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had improved. Between 1900 and 1909 German universities in all federal states finally had 
opened their doors to unmarried women with the necessary educational prerequisites. Other 
professional options, especially in the teaching profession, social work and health care, also 
slowly opened for middle- and upper-class women.73 Since 1908, women of any class could 
join political parties, but unlike their male counterparts, could still not vote or be elected for 
any parliamentary position. Despite these changes, cultural assumptions about the gender 
order and biological difference between the sexes as well as the “proper” gender division of 
labor in the family dominated.  
As this section has shown, there were several legal, political, and social currents that 
shaped the formation of the Civil Code. The legal experts appointed to the BGB Commission 
had to balance competing interests in the empire, which led them to reject a Prussian-style 
code and to emphasize the importance of legal unity. On an ideological level, National 
Liberals saw the new family law as rooted in natural sexual difference. Male authority and 
the disenfranchisement of women in marriage and the family, they believed, was best for 
Germany’s development. The bourgeois women’s movement and socialists never really 
accepted this version of the law and protested its approval. The semi-authoritarian nature of 
the imperial government barred socialists from gaining much traction and prohibited women 
from voting at all, thus diminishing the opposition’s chances of overturning the Civil Code. 
Once the law was in place, it became even more difficult to protest. The bourgeois women’s 
movement ended up focusing its energies elsewhere, hoping to attain women’s equality in 
other arenas, such as education or professional life. World War I further altered their path, as 
the BDF devoted itself to nationalist and patriotic wartime causes. As the German Empire 
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crumbled after its defeat in World War I and in the wake of a November Revolution of 1918, 
Germans saw the potential for a democratic republic at last. This Germany would, in the 
imaginations of many women, also bring more equality to them. 
Weimar’s Broken Promise to Women, 19191933 
The defeat of the German Empire in World War I and the Novemberrevolution of 
1918 opened the door to radical political and social transformations in Germany. In the years 
to follow, politicians in the new Weimar Republic continued to address the fall-out of the 
First World War, constructing a series of policies and laws to deal with large-scale postwar 
demographic changes, demobilization of soldiers, economic upheaval, and political 
instability. Despite such massive changes in Germany after the war, some elements of 
imperial Germany’s legal and political structure, such as civil law, remained intact. The 
fragile postwar economic and political environment, changes in gender roles, and anxieties 
about the failure of the traditional family all pushed contemporaries in the Weimar Republic 
into heated debates about expanding constitutional rights and reforming the Civil Code. 
One of the first decrees of the two leading parties of the revolution—the Majority 
Social Democratic Party (Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, MSPD) and 
the Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, USPD), founded in April 1917 as an socialist anti-war opposition—introduced 
general universal suffrage for men and women over the age of twenty. In other words, they 
abolished the three-class voting system for men in the Prussian state and other 
Bundesstaaten, extended the universal suffrage for the Reichstag elections to women and 
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lowered the voting age from 25 to 21.74 Women first exercised their right of active and 
passive suffrage in the National Assembly (Nationalversammlung) elections on 19 January 
1919 with a nearly 90 percent participation rate (average 83 percent).75 The MSPD and the 
USPD came out of the elections as the two majority parties in the National Assembly, though 
the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum), the left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP), the 
national-liberal German People’s Party (DVP), and nationalist-conservative German National 
People’s Party (DNVP) came in at a close second.76 9.6 percent of the members of the 
National Assembly were female; nearly half of them (21) belonged to the MSPD and 
USPD.77 Even though the MSPD and the USPD were the largest parties, they had to form a 
coalition government with the DDP and the Center.78 Friedrich Ebert (MSPD) became the 
provisional President of the new Weimar Republic and Philipp Scheidemann (MSPD) its first 
Chancellor. The 423 elected delegates of the National Assembly then gathered in Weimar on 
6 February 1919 to draft a national constitution for Germany. The negotiations among the 
four coalition parties influenced the content and form of the new Weimar Constitution, which 
was enacted on 31 July 1919 and signed on 11 August 1919.79 The new constitution formally 
declared a parliamentary republic in Germany; professed individual rights for citizens; and 
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proclaimed rights and regulations for community life, including the family. 
Three articles of the Weimar Constitution—Articles 109, 119, and 121—addressed 
the status of women, family, and marriage. Article 109 specified that: “All Germans are 
equal before the law. Men and women have in principle the same civic rights and duties.” 
This provision ostensibly granted equal political rights to both sexes, but the phrase “in 
principle” constrained their equality in other areas of society, the economy, and at home. 
Article 119 further qualified “equality,” defining it within the context of marriage and the 
family. The article stated, “Marriage, as the cornerstone of family life and the nurturing and 
growth of the nation, stands under the special protection of the constitution. Marriage 
depends on the equality of both sexes.” The second and third paragraphs of Article 119 
guaranteed mothers, families, and especially “child abundant families” state protection and 
welfare assistance.80 It made no mention of unmarried women, but their children were 
afforded “equal conditions for their physical, spiritual, and social development.”81 Equal 
rights in the Weimar Constitution were predicated on gender and marital status. 
The problems the new constitution posed for married women and unmarried mothers 
were already apparent during the negotiations over its content in the National Assembly. 
Female parliamentarians of the SPD and USPD had quickly identified the problems of the 
draft of the constitution presented by the State Secretary of the Department of the Interior 
and later Reich Minister of the Interior Hugo Preuß (DDP).82 The female leaders of the 
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Social Democratic women’s movement, Luise Zietz (USPD) and Marie Juchacz (MSPD),83 
for instance, proclaimed that the wording of the constitution was too limiting and would 
reinforce the patriarchal structures outlined in the Civil Code, which indeed remained in full 
force throughout the existence of the Weimar Republic.84 Accordingly, in July 1919, the 
factions of SPD and USPD in the National Assembly proposed a more broadly formulated 
“equality clause” that read: “Men and women have equal civic rights. Provisions of public 
law and civil law are to be framed accordingly.”85 Their suggestion would have removed the 
qualifying phrase “in principle” and enforced a reform of the Civil Code. But the more 
conservative majority in the National Assembly, backed by their female parliamentarians, 
rejected this proposal. They defeated the SPD and USPD by a vote of 144 to 128.86 The 
limited equality of men and women was crystallized when the entire constitution was signed 
into law in August 1919.  
Zietz’s and Juchacz’s fears came true: civil law never changed during the Weimar 
Republic. This consequence was not a result of apathy on the part of the MSPD, USPD, or 
the DDP. The Social Democrats and the DDP had party programs that favored different 
approaches to “women’s emancipation” and higher numbers of women in the Reichstag, 
many of whom championed changes to the Civil Code. Well-known female activists such as 
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Zietz, Juchacz, and Toni Sender represented the MSPD and USPD in the Reichstag. Other 
prominent women, such as Clara Zetkin, formerly of the SPD, joined and represented the 
KPD. Additionally, BDF leaders Gertrud Bäumer and Helene Lange,87 alongside Marie-
Elisabeth Lüders and Agnes von Zahn-Harnack,88 for example, had joined the left-liberal 
DDP and tried to push the party towards the support of earlier goals of the BDF, such as 
equal civil rights, better access to education, and improved employment opportunities. 
Bäumer and Lüders also represented the DDP in the Reichstag.89 Meanwhile, they continued 
to serve in the executive board of the BDF and its member organizations and used these 
positions to sway middle-class, secularized Protestant women. Women such as Zietz and 
Lüders spoke up in the Reichstag and advocated changes to longstanding legislation such as 
the Civil Code. 
Female socialists and liberals, however, were unable to get the support of Catholic 
and other more conservative female representatives in the Reichstag who refused any reform 
of the German Civil Code from 1900 and supported the politics of their own party in this 
matter. Based on the small number of gender-separated counting of votes, they argued that 
the majority of women supported a more traditional family ideal and voted for that reason in 
higher numbers than men for the more conservative, confessional parties—the national-
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liberal DVP, the conservative Catholic Center, and the nationalist-conservative DNVP.90 All 
three parties indeed appealed to specific groups of female voters, but in different ways. The 
DVP pushed for the equality of single women in the workplace on the grounds that their 
feminine characteristics were a benefit to the workplace. For married women, it emphasized 
the importance of a male-breadwinner/female homemaker family.91 Meanwhile, the Center, 
driven by Catholic politics, argued fervently for women’s natural place in the home as wives 
and mothers. With similar arguments, the DNVP rallied middle-class, Protestant women to 
its cause. One of its representatives in the Reichstag was Paula Müller-Otfried, the founder of 
the conservative German Protestant Women’s Association (Deutsche Evangelische 
Frauenbund, DEF), which was not a member of the BDF and had rejected female suffrage 
until 1919.92 All three parties tried to rally female voters with platforms designed to foster 
anxieties about associations with Marxism, cosmopolitism, and feminism. They pledged to 
foster the national strength of Germany and to preserve the integrity of Germany’s Christian 
heritage. Furthermore, female voting declined over the course of the Weimar Republic and 
increased only in moments of crisis.93 The Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei 
Deutschlands, KPD), founded in 1918, the MSPD and USPD, which joined together again in 
1921, and the DDP offered more progressive party programs for women and did well among 
certain sets of female voters, especially in the working class of the urbanized and 
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industrialized Protestant regions and its large cities.94 But they could win neither Catholic 
women, nor large numbers of Protestant female voters from the urban, middle- and upper 
classes, nor from rural regions. These groups of women voted for the Center, DVP, and 
DNVP. Female voters, thus, were as split as the male voters. Many supported parties that in 
the Weimar Reichstag rejected any change to the Civil Code. 
The legislators of the Catholic Center, DVP, DNVP, and later, the rising NSDAP 
rejected all changes to civil law because they saw it as a stabilizing force for the Weimar 
Republic, which for them was in a state of constant crisis. In the eyes of many politicians, 
especially Catholics and nationalists, the war had exacerbated the already slowing birth and 
marriage rates, and thus jeopardized the traditional family. Moreover, a “surplus” of roughly 
2 million women existed in Germany after World War I, creating further anxiety about 
restoring childbirths and marriages.95 The incarnation of confessional and conservative 
anxieties was the postwar image of the “New Woman,” single, “sexually emancipated and 
childless,” who “symbolized both the liberating changes in sexual mores and the nightmare 
of nationalists concerned that the German nation was in danger of dying out.”96 Indeed, 
Catholics and nationalists saw the “New Woman” as both competition and temptation for 
men.97 Socialists and some liberals responded to these perceived postwar crises with 
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proposals such as changing divorce regulations and the rights of unwed mothers, and 
propagated an ideal of the “New Woman” that emphasized a “compassionate marriage” 
(Partnerschaftsehe) and “comradeship” (Kameradschaft) between men and women, as 
indicated in the “Equal Rights, Equal Duties” slogan of the MSPD on an election poster from 
1919. Meanwhile, Catholics and nationalists continued to propagate the family ideal of the 
male breadwinner/female homemaker family and countered that the old Civil Code’s 
provisions would help restore social and gender order and allow women to take their rightful 
places in the home and the family.98 
One of the major areas of the Civil Code that gained traction in the Weimar Reichstag 
was divorce reform. The divorce rate had increased significantly during the war, going from 
14.66 per ten thousand marriages ending in divorce in 1914 to its peak of 32.57 per ten 
thousand in 1920, and subsequently declined slightly in the early years of Weimar.99 Divorce 
occurred largely because of war-related circumstances; adultery, financial independence, 
abuse, and readjustment to cohabitation were among the main troubles for married 
couples.100 Under the old Civil Code, couples could pursue divorce for multiple reasons such 
as adultery, marital breakdown, desertion, mental incapacity, and death threats. To obtain a 
divorce for any of the above-mentioned reasons, however, couples had to prove guilt of one 
party, which could become expensive, difficult, and leave one partner (typically women) 
economically vulnerable. The USPD, MSPD, and DDP reacted by suggesting replacing the 
                                                 
98 Ben B. Lindsey, Companionate Marriage (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1927); Lynn, “Contested 
femininities”; Hagemann, Frauenalltag. 
99 Blasius, Ehescheidung, 157-158. 
100 Michelle Mouton, From Nurturing the Nation to Purifying the Volk: Weimar and Nazi Family Policy, 1918-
1945 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71-72; Richard Bessel, Germany after the 
First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 228; Boak, Women in the Weimar Republic, 222. 
67 
 
guilt principle with no-fault divorce. On 26 January 1921, for example, Marie-Elisabeth 
Lüders (DDP)—one of the first women to receive a doctoral degree in Staatswissenschaften 
(today political sciences) in Germany in 1912 and an unmarried mother herself—proposed 
the replacement of the guilt clause with no-fault divorce in the case of irreconcilable 
differences.101 More than a year later, Johannes Hoffmann (SPD) cited the “unsettling of 
morals and especially marriage morality” and the staggeringly high number of “unlucky 
marriages” after World War I as evidence of the need for change to divorce law.102 He 
suggested that introducing no-fault divorce would circumvent practices such as committing 
adultery in order to formally end a marriage.103 The SPD and the DDP found support outside 
the Reichstag; the BDF, too, supported no-fault divorce on the basis of irreconcilable 
difference.104 Easier divorce regulations therefore found a large support base, but also much 
opposition, in- and outside the parliament in the years following World War I. 
SPD and DDP representatives in the Reichstag who tried to push through reforms of 
the divorce section of the Civil Code had to persuade their less enthusiastic national-liberal, 
Catholic, and nationalist conservative colleagues in the parliament without success. They 
offered a number of reasons to bar reforms. Some of them, such as Adelbert Düringer 
(DNVP), opposed the proposal on the grounds that it stood counter to the “Christian 
worldview,” a recurring argument for the Catholic and nationalist parties.105 Later on, in June 
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1922, when the DDP tried again to introduce divorce law reforms, Center and DVP 
representatives halted them on the grounds that marriage was “insoluble” in Christianity.106 
The Christian and conservative parties were backed by a powerful ally: the Protestant and 
Catholic Churches. The latter denounced divorce reform as “a new sad symptom of the 
progressive demise of the morality of our people.”107  
Along with Christianity, these parties invoked the dangers of Bolshevism as a reason 
to halt reforms. The Russian Bolsheviks had, in fact, first allowed no-fault divorce already 
one year after their revolution in 1918.108 They furthermore no longer distinguished between 
legitimate and illegitimate births, and did not require registered marriages any longer.109 The 
Protestant and Catholic Churches and more conservative parties in the Reichstag seized upon 
these recent reforms in Soviet Russia to undermine the SPD.110 While the KPD embraced the 
Soviet model, moderate socialists hesitated to accept comparisons to the Bolsheviks, because 
they shared the anticommunist sentiments of their political opponents.111 Although the SPD 
wanted to push through reforms, it desisted to preserve its own reputation and keep peace 
with its coalition partners. 
In addition to divorce, legislators sought to reform the section of the Civil Code on 
illegitimacy. After World War I, illegitimacy rates had risen and sparked nation-wide anxiety 
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about the family. By 1921, for example, the rate of out-of-wedlock births rose to 9.7 percent 
in Prussia (up from 7.7 percent in 1910) and 8.1 percent in Hamburg (from 5 percent).112 The 
average illegitimacy rate hovered around 11 percent until 1933.113 Although these numbers 
were not particularly high, Weimar policymakers still perceived illegitimacy to be a 
symptom of the “crisis of the family” and the endangered health of the “body of the 
population” (Volkskörper), especially because of the high infant mortality rate of out-of-
wedlock children.114 Weimar politicians thus wanted to help illegitimate children without 
condoning their mothers’ behavior, which some contemporaries saw as morally depraved. 
While some socialists, Communists, and liberals advocated introducing new welfare 
programs and legislation to assist single, unwed mothers, their opponents in the nationalist 
conservative parties and the Catholic Center feared that equality for out-of-wedlock children 
would undermine the rights of legitimate children to inherit, and moreover, would encourage 
promiscuous women.115 The Center Party, DVP, and DNVP were supported in this matter 
outside the Reichstag by the increasingly conservative majority in the BDF, the Protestant 
and Catholic Churches and their women’s organizations, the German Protestant Women’s 
Association (Deutscher Evangelischer Frauenbund, DEF), founded in 1899, and the German 
Catholic Women’s Association (Katholischer Deutscher Frauenbund, KDFB), founded 
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1903.116 Meanwhile, only the KPD faction in the Reichstag and its Communist supporters 
outside together with a small number of more radical socialists wanted to radically redefine 
marriage and family law.117 
Whichever side they supported, Weimar politicians recognized out-of-wedlock 
children as a problem. To deal with the increased numbers of illegitimate children, in 
addition to many other issues of youth welfare, the Reichstag controlled by a government 
under Joseph Wirth (Center Party), based on a coalition of his party, the SPD, and the DDP 
in power from October 1921 to November 1922, implemented the Reich Youth Welfare Law 
(Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetz, RJWG) on 9 July 1922. It was the first attempt to create a 
consistent and unified law in the area of youth care and youth welfare, based on a 
compromise of Social Democratic and Catholic principles. One aim of the RJWG was to 
carry out Article 121 of the Weimar constitution: “Legislation has to create equal 
preconditions for children born out of wedlock, concerning their bodily, spiritual and social 
development, as they are given to legitimate children.” For this purpose the RJWG created a 
“Youth Office,” designed to identify legal guardians for out-of-wedlock children and offer 
guidance for their care.118 Although the RJWG made some minor changes to the Civil Code, 
such as introducing legal guardians for illegitimate children, for the most part, the old law 
remained the same and legislators largely dropped the subject of the Civil Code for several 
years, until 1928, near the end of the “golden years” of Weimar.119 Following the May 1928 
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elections, the SPD had a much stronger position in the Reichstag, while other parties such as 
the DNVP and the NSDAP had lost seats. This empowered the Social Democratic 
delegation—the largest in the Reichstag and allied with the DDP, Center, DVP, and the 
Bavarian People’s Party (BVP)—to introduce a proposal to “implement Article 119,” 
especially its first section: “Marriage, as the foundation of family life and of the preservation 
and increase of the nation, stands under the special protection of the constitution. It shall rest 
upon the equality of rights of both sexes.”120 Like in earlier years, however, the SPD failed to 
sway the Catholic Center, and once a Center Party representative, Karl Theodor V. Guevard, 
became Minister of Justice, any reform of the family law including divorce law became a lost 
cause.121 This policy of continuity was strongly supported by the conservative judiciary. 
Many judges were holdovers from the Kaiserreich and sided with the DVP, DNVP, and later, 
NSDAP.122 
Although Social Democrats, often aided by the DDP, never reached their aim to 
change the laws on divorce or illegitimacy, they still shaped marriage and the family in 
Weimar through other means, such as social and welfare policy. They sought to expand the 
welfare state for all Germans, but especially the working class. While the postwar crisis years 
gave conservatives moral reasons to promote the family, this period also gave trade unions 
incentive to press for higher wages, especially in the period of stability, and the SPD to push 
for social policies secured unemployment and health insurance as well as old age pensions 
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and improved public health care and welfare, including maternal and child care.123 
Sometimes, these issues crossed political lines and the SPD could form coalitions with the 
Catholic Center, DDP, and DVP. One example for the latter is maternity protection 
(Mutterschutz).124  
Since 1929, however, when the Depression hit Weimar Germany, the resources for 
social aid and welfare increasingly dried up. The fiscal depression thus precipitated shifts in 
thinking on the benefits of welfare and who should receive it. Historians Michelle Mouton, 
Detlev Peukert, and Paul Weindling have concluded that traces of future Nazi policy were 
present in Weimar.125 With more and more German families seeking state assistance, some 
prominent doctors and social reformers began to advocate “the elevation of the interests of 
the ‘race’ above those of the individual.” 126 Although the approach of social hygiene and 
eugenics increasingly gained influence in Weimar Germany, similar to many other countries 
in the interwar period (including Sweden and the United States), a racist approach to 
eugenics still remained on the fringes, and the republic’s pluralistic nature meant that the 
state, unlike the Nazis, did not create a uniform family policy. 
For fourteen years, left and liberal politicians in the Reichstag, with the strong 
support of the SPD women’s movement and the dwindling help of BDF outside the 
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parliament, repeatedly tried and failed to reform the Civil Code.127 While Weimar’s “crisis 
years,” its high divorce rates, and rising levels of out-of-wedlock births motivated Social 
Democrats, Communists, and some liberals to change outdated provisions, the unstable 
economic environment and fractured politics of the young republic also offered conservatives 
reasons to keep the law as it was. Trapped in a grand coalition with the Center and DDP for 
several years of the Weimar Republic’s rather fragile existence, the SPD often had to 
surrender on issues such as divorce reform.  
The establishment of the Weimar Republic was in many ways a turning point for 
equal rights. The 1919 constitution, although flawed, reflected an important first step with its 
articles guaranteeing equality in principle and protection of the family. For the first time, 
women could vote and serve in public office alongside men. By the same token, nationalist 
conservative and Catholic politicians used their positions to block initiatives to reform the 
Civil Code. Laws and social policies promoted a male breadwinner through dismissing 
married women from their jobs and increasing the family wage for men. It was an era of 
expanded political and social rights to some degree, but men and women were never afforded 
equal civil rights. When it comes to equal rights for men and women, Weimar may best be 
summed up as an era of mixed legacies. 
 
Alterations to Civil Law during the Third Reich  
The Nazi takeover on 30 January 1933 put an end to the pluralistic Weimar Republic 
and within half a year transformed Germany into a totalitarian state that promoted and 
protected the racial supremacy of “Aryan” Germans. In order to carry out their racial agenda, 
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the Nazi Party infiltrated many areas of private life, such as marriage and the family. The 
Nazis saw marriage, and by extension the family, as the nucleus of the wider 
Volksgemeinschaft because both institutions “had a large part to play in the ‘racial 
preservation’ of the nation.”128 While state intervention in private matters was not 
particularly new to Germany, the racialized understanding of marriage and the family was.  
The Nazis had several reasons for targeting marriage and the family as part of their 
broader agenda. For one thing, marriage, reproduction, and the family were key components 
of the racial ideology undergirding the Nazi regime. Nazi propaganda linked the supposed 
and the “degeneration” of Weimar society to the “degeneration of the family” and the 
German people as a whole. In Nazi rhetoric, the further decline of the birth rate after the First 
World War, the “New Woman,” cosmopolitanism and Bolshevism, and racial mixing, 
especially with Jews, all threatened the health and strength of the Aryan German Volk and the 
German nation during the Weimar Republic.129 The Nazi leadership, according to historian 
Lisa Pine, thus “considered the Weimar era to have been one in which there was a great lack 
of understanding about family life.”130 They responded to this lack with a series of welfare 
and family policies and laws aimed at redefining marriage and the family. 
One way the Nazis intended to cultivate their racialized ideas of marriage and the 
family was through large-scale reforms of the family law sections of the Civil Code. 
According to historian Michael Stolleis, the Nazis even considered removing the old Civil 
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Code entirely.131 With the aim of Nazifying German law, the leading Nazi lawyer Hans 
Frank founded the Academy of German Law (Akademie für Deutsches Recht) in 1933, an 
institute where lawyers and politicians collaborated to pursue this project. Many scholars 
have dismissed Nazi-era law as an aberration that destroyed the traditional German 
Rechtsstaat.132 In order to understand post-1945 German legal practice, however, attempted 
Nazi legal reforms must be taken seriously. After all, the Nazi regime, for all its tyrannical 
tendencies, still relied on “constitutional and legal legitimacy” and continued many pre-1933 
legal practices.133 The regime’s reluctance to completely abandon old legal traditions, partly 
explains why it attempted in the end to reform civil law and make it “better suited to the 
national spirit emanating from the ‘community of blood and soil’ than the BGB,” rather than 
overhaul it.134 
Under the guidance of Hans Frank, in 1939, Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, a 
conservative jurist and law professor, assembled eleven experts (many of whom were Nazi 
party members or at least sympathizers) in a working group to draft the new “People’s Code” 
(Volksgesetzbuch, VGB), which would regulate marriage and family, personal rights, 
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property rights, labor law, and other aspects of German society.135 Hedemann outlined 
numerous reasons for the revisions. For one thing, they wanted to unite the “abundance of 
smaller laws, regulations, [and] proclamations” in the Third Reich.136 Between 1933 and 
1939, the Nazis had passed several new laws and policies aimed at “fixing” German families 
with racial hygiene. On the one hand, the Nazis tried to accomplish this goal by prohibiting 
“racially unhygienic” persons from marrying or reproducing. As historian Gisela Bock has 
argued, the Nazi regime used reproductive and maternal policies to discriminate against 
Jewish, non-Aryan, and “feeble” women.137 On 14 July 1933, for example, the regime passed 
the “Law for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases,” which authorized 
members of the medical and social work communities to forcibly sterilize some mentally 
and/or physically ill Germans.138 The government could also deny couples the right to marry, 
depending on their health or family history.139 In addition, the Nuremberg Laws of 15 
September 1935 prohibited Jews (and other “non-Germans”) from marrying or engaging in 
sexual relations with Germans.140 These laws were meant to intervene in personal relations 
and halt any possibility of “diluting” German blood with racially impurities or 
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physical/mental disabilities. 
At the same time, Nazi regime promoted the marriage and procreation of “racially 
pure” Germans. State authorities encouraged couples to visit doctors and find out their racial 
suitability before marriage. Those who did not fit could be denied marriage certificates. 
Additionally, the Nazis tried to increase the birth rate by incentivizing births. For example, 
couples received subsidies per child. Furthermore, racially pure women with several children 
received medals from the state, because the Nazis saw their work as mothers as service to the 
nation.141 According to female Nazi leaders, the famed “Kinder, Kirche, Küche” was 
empowering for Aryan women.142 Another way the Nazis promulgated racially pure births 
was through the Lebensborn program, created in 1935, where SS men were encouraged to 
procreate with approved Aryan women in Germany, and later on, in Norway and several 
other occupied countries.143  
The Nazis’ emphasis on racial purity also made party leaders consider adopting more 
lenient attitudes toward divorce and illegitimacy, despite reservations about promoting 
immorality. The party toyed with the idea of introducing no-fault divorce, for instance, 
because it would ease dissolution of marriages for racially mismatched partners, or pairs who 
were unable to produce racially pure offspring.144 Racial hygiene factored into Nazi views on 
illegitimacy as well. Pronatalist Nazi policies, such as tax breaks, were meant to encourage 
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equal treatment of “racially pure” unwed mothers and their children.145 Furthermore, the 
Nazis saw illegitimate children as another potential solution to the falling birth rate, although 
they faced resistance from some doctors and eugenicists.146 
As the Nazis expanded their empire, their legal statutes extended to their occupied 
territories. In 1938, following the annexation of Austria, the Nazis passed the Gesetz zur 
Vereinheitlichung des Rechts der Eheschließung und der Ehescheidung im Lande Österreich 
und im übrigen Reichsgebiet (hereafter Ehegesetz), designed to bring all areas of the German 
Reich under one distinctly National Socialist law. On the one hand, the law abolished parts of 
the older BGB. It removed several provisions that regulated entry into marriage, annulment, 
and divorce.147 Now, men and women could divorce if they had married a “non-Aryan” or 
were unable to reproduce. On the other hand, the law maintained some parts of the BGB, 
such as the minimum marrying age for men (21, or 18 if legally independent from parents) 
and women (16).148 Bigamy was prohibited.149 Women had to wait 10 months to remarry 
after a divorce.150 The new law furthermore added distinctly Nazi racial rhetoric to the old 
law. Those “incapable (geschäftsfähig)” or “of foreign blood” could not marry those of 
German blood (a reiteration of the two earlier Nazi laws passed in 1935).151 The Nazis also 
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refused anyone serving in the Wehrmacht or Reich Work Service from marrying without 
permission until their mandatory service ended.152 The 1938 Ehegesetz unified the Austrian 
and German civil codes until the occupation powers overturned it in 1946.153 
Despite already having several laws on the books, the replacement of the BGB still 
resonated with the Nazis for numerous reasons. For one thing, the Nazis viewed the People’s 
Code as a symbol of the historic progress of their regime. Hedemann labeled the VGB a 
“dose of stability” for the Third Reich, implying that the preceding years had been too erratic 
and had unmoored the traditional family.154 Furthermore, according to Hedemann, the old 
law did not “speak to the disposition and voice of the people” after so much sociological 
change.155 Finally, the Academy aimed to replace “the individualistic and liberal character of 
both old Civil Codes [with] the idea of community spirit and community welfare,” themes 
considered more appropriate to the Nazi idea of Volksgemeinschaft.156 Such language was 
meant to depict the years preceding the Third Reich as unstable and present the VGB as a 
positive solution to these problems. 
Hedemann also identified German expansion and World War II as reasons to go 
forward with legal reforms. One impetus was the 1938 Ehegesetz, which spurred the 
Academy to create “an entirely new unified law” for all Germans.157 The Academy thus 
continued its work throughout the early years of World War II, despite criticism that they 
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were not contributing to the war effort. Hedemann asserted that they were working on the 
“ethos” that would “accompany the writings and landmarks of peace for the German people 
in the future.”158 The new VGB, he argued, would represent the “crowning achievement of 
the martial and political events” for the “völkisch lives of ninety million [people].”159 The 
Academy continued its work until 1944, when its president and the Reich’s Justice Minister, 
Otto Georg Thierack, formally called it off.160 
In the meantime, between 1939 and 1942, the working group drafted part of the new 
Civil Code, titled “Grundregeln und Buch I.” The “basic principles (Grundregeln)” were 
intended to guide the ensuing laws and keep them in line with the Nazi party program. In 
fact, Hedemann went as far as to declare the Grundregeln “sentence for sentence, saturated 
with the Nazi way of thinking.”161 The third principle exemplified Hedemann’s assertion. It 
stated:  
Marriage as a fundamental institution of völkisch communal life stands under the 
special protection of the legal order. It should prove itself to be a complete spousal 
life partnership and serve the higher goal of the preservation and furthering of the 
race and species.162  
 
While echoing the wording of the Weimar constitution’s promise to protect marriage, the 
Grundregeln imbued this statement with distinctly Nazi rhetoric about safeguarding the Volk 
and racial purity. Parents were furthermore obligated to raise their children “in the spirit of 
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National Socialism;” the state promised to assist them.163 Both clauses demonstrated Nazi 
commitment to institutions such as marriage and the family as a way to promulgate their 
expansionist and racist goals. 
 The draft of Buch I, though incomplete, outlined certain provisions the Academy 
deemed important for married individuals and their families, such as naming rights, legal age 
of consent, and parental authority of legitimate and illegitimate children. Given Germany’s 
defeat in World War II, it remains unknown what the final version of a Nazi civil law would 
have looked like. The fragments that do exist offer some insight into the Nazi vision of civil 
law. Above all, Buch I imbued marriage and the family with the Nazis’ racial and völkisch 
agenda. Men, after all, could only marry if they had served the nation through the military or 
labor.164 Women did not have similar restrictions, presumably because their service to the 
nation would come after marriage, when they bore the children of racially pure men. Married 
women had to share their husbands’ domiciles.165 They could also, “depending on the 
provisions of marital property,” freely control the use of their own assets.166 Unmarried 
women risked losing their children, since the law mandated that illegitimate children go to 
live with their fathers.167 For the most part, the proposed VGB reinforced a male head-of-
household and female nurturer, and even illegitimate children (if recognized) were seen as 
better off in the hands of paternal authority, rather than their unwed mothers. Neither of these 
ideas were radically different from the Kaiserreich or Weimar. At the same time, to be able to 
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marry and reproduce, German men and women had to place the nation, state, and the German 
race first, and this sentiment marked a clear change from earlier decades of German history. 
The defeat of the Nazis in May 1945 brought their empire to an end, and with it, the 
Volksgesetzbuch reforms and other marriage laws and family policies. Several factors 
enabled the Nazis to pass these laws. On the one hand, there was the existence of the Nazi 
“dual state,” a term coined by political scientist Ernst Fraenkel to describe how the Nazis 
simultaneously operated outside the parameters of the law while relying on old legal 
frameworks, trained lawyers, and the judicial system to carry out other goals.168 The people 
behind the reforms, such as Hans Frank or Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, had trained as lawyers 
in the late years of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic, but became complicit and 
even enthusiastic supporters of the Nazi regime. The case of the Civil Code illustrates how 
the Nazis intended to retain the old legal order, but update and Nazify it by adding racialized 
language. 
On the other hand, the Nazi dictatorship’s circumvention of old traditions and the 
former democratic structure shaped the form of the Volksgesetzbuch as well. In 1933, they 
eliminated most dissent in society—and therefore anyone who could have opposed changes 
to the Civil Code or other legislation—through the Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung, or 
“bringing into line.” The first targets were the oppositional parties on the left, the SPD and 
KPD. Many female and male leaders of the SPD and representatives in the parliaments, for 
example, Herta Gotthelf, Marie Juchacz, and Toni Sender, the editors of the SPD women’s 
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magazine Frauenwelt, were forced to leave the country.169 Others, such as the lawyer 
Elisabeth Selbert, who had the courage to run for a mandate in the Reichstag in March 1933, 
stayed in Germany, but risked political persecution.170 The BDF and its associations soon 
became targets as well. The Nazis requested that all associations exclude Jewish members. 
To avoid this step and dissolution by the Nazis, the BDF and many of its associations 
dissolved themselves in 1933.171 Some of the former Jewish leaders of the BDF, like Alice 
Salomon, the founder of the Social Women’s Schools, had to emigrate.172 Others like Gertrud 
Bäumer and Marie Elisabeth Lüders stayed in Nazi Germany, but lost their positions in civil 
service.173 The Nazis, meanwhile, replaced the formerly independent women’s movement 
with their own women’s associations, such as the National Socialist Women’s League (NS-
Frauenschaft), under the leadership of Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, and the German Women’s 
Bureau (Deutsche Frauenwerk, DFW).174 Although male Nazi party leaders often argued 
among themselves over marriage and the family, which sometimes hindered movement 
forward on certain reforms such as divorce law, they nevertheless benefited from silencing a 
                                                 
169 On Herta Gotthelf (1902–1963), see Karin Gille-Linne, Verdeckte Strategien: Herta Gotthelf, Elisabeth 
Selbert und die Frauenarbeit der SPD 1945–1949 (Bonn: Dietz, 2011); and on Toni Sender (1888–1964), see 
Christl Wickert, “Sender, Toni,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie 24 (2010): 248–249; and Annette Hild-Berg, 
Tony Sender (1888–1964): Ein Leben im Namen der Freiheit und der sozialen Gerechtigkeit (Cologne: Bund-
Verlag, 1994). 
170 Selbert managed to hold onto her position as a lawyer, but had to support her family after her husband was 
prohibited from working because of his political beliefs. See Gille-Linne, Verdeckte Strategien; and Hessische 
Landesregierung (ed.), Ein Glücksfall für die Demokratie: Elisabeth Selbert (1896-1986)—die grosse Anwältin 
der Gleichberechtigung (Frankfurt/M.: Eichborn, 1999). 
171 Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland, 143. 
172 On Alice Salomon (1872–1984), see Dirk Hainbuch and Florian Tennstedt, Biographisches Lexikon zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik 1871 bis 1945 (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2010), vol.1, 134–135. 
173 On Gertrud Bäumer, see above; on Marie-Elisabeth Lüders (1878–1966), see Doris Kull, “Marie-Elisabeth 
Lüders (1878–1966): Das Leben einer Parlamentarierin zwischen Fortschritt und Tradition” (PhD diss. 
University of Düsseldorf, 1988). 
174 Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland, 129. 
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large portion of the population that would have opposed their proposals. 
Under the Third Reich, marriage and the family took on new meanings for the 
totalitarian regime with racist and expansionist aims. No longer just protected by the state, as 
they had been under Weimar, marriage and reproduction were seen as services to the German 
nation and the Nazi state. Several family policies and laws passed between 1933 and 1938 
both permitted and prohibited certain groups of Germans from marrying and producing 
children. The Nazi Party’s desire to keep old German legal traditions alive led its leaders to 
embrace reform, rather than elimination, of the old Civil Code. The draft People’s Code 
would bring together the disparate policies and pieces of legislation governing marriage and 
the family under one umbrella. The work of the Academy furthermore benefited from the 
silence of potential opponents in society. Although the Academy kept working well into 
World War II, despite admonishment, it never completed its task. Nazi capitulation in May 
1945 ensured that the People’s Code never materialized and that all existing legislation 
would soon be undone by the Allied occupation. 
  
Conclusion 
 As this chapter has shown, between 1871 and 1945, the path dependency of the 
German Civil Code was shaped by numerous legal, political, social, cultural, and economic 
factors. First, the legal and institutional frameworks were significant. Imperial politicians 
examined the 25 different legal codes before settling on a BGB that most closely resembled 
the Prussian and the Napoleonic Codes. These two legal codes were the most restrictive for 
women in Germany before unification. Moreover, many imperial politicians, especially 
National Liberals, Conservatives, and the Catholic Center, subscribed to Enlightenment ideas 
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about masculine authority and privilege. These legal and intellectual traditions came together 
in the 1900 Civil Code and, with the support of the semi-authoritarian imperial government 
and the fractured Weimar Reichstag, remained just strong enough to prevent legislative 
change later on. 
 Second, the changing political circumstances of Germany before 1945 shaped the 
creation and retention of the 1900 Civil Code. At the outset, National Liberals and 
conservatives—with the aid of Bismarck’s pseudo-authoritarian government—saw the Civil 
Code as a unifying force in the recently established and disjointed German Empire. Prior to 
unification, approximately 25 different regional and local statutes governed spousal and 
familial relations and marital property. One German nation-state, in contemporary thinking, 
required one common civil law. The National Liberals and conservatives at the helm of the 
legal reforms constructed a law that reflected their respective beliefs in personal property and 
male dominance. Over time, despite opposition, this law became the accepted norm in 
German society, and one that conservatives and some liberals fought to maintain throughout 
the Weimar Republic. Under the Third Reich, the Nazi Party saw the law as yet another way 
to construct their racist and misogynistic utopia. 
Relatedly, decreasing criticism from society also played a role in the law’s longevity. 
From the beginning, the women’s movement, socialists, and even some male legal experts 
opposed Planck’s proposed Civil Code. They sent letters to the Reichstag, printed articles in 
the women’s press, and published brochures that protested the Civil Code. Their efforts, 
however, never swayed the National Liberals, Center, or German Conservatives, whose 
parliamentary alliance in 1896 was just strong enough to ensure the approval of the BGB. 
During the Weimar Republic, some women’s movement leaders used their new positions in 
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the Reichstag to press for reforms, which were especially salient in the post-World War I 
years when the state of the family had changed dramatically. Outside the parliament, they 
sometimes gained the support increasingly conservative BDF, who still formally opposed the 
Civil Code, but pursued other paths to greater equality for women as well, such as 
educational and professional development. Under the Third Reich, the elimination of 
parliamentary opposition and an autonomous civil society ensured the silence of those who 
would have protested the Nazis’ reforms to civil law. 
Third, economic changes factored into the formulation of the Civil Code. For one 
thing, unification necessitated bringing together all labor and civil laws. Furthermore, 
industrialization had prompted workers to form their own political movement and party, 
which also vowed to protect female laborers. The existence of working-class women, 
however, clashed with the ideal male breadwinner/female homemaker family model that 
National Liberal, Catholic, and Conservative politicians imagined. The upheaval of World 
War I, in which thousands of women took over men’s jobs, reinvigorated discussions during 
the Weimar Republic about the rights of women in all areas of the economy, politics, and 
society. The takeover of the Nazis in 1933 and the start of World War II in 1939, in many 
ways, replayed these same issues for many women who had already lived through the First 
World War.  
 Finally, hegemonic ideas about gender and social and cultural norms steered these 
debates and ultimately prevented reform. Politicians throughout the Empire, Weimar, and the 
Third Reich emphasized its potential for stabilizing an unsettled Germany. Imperial 
politicians, especially National Liberals and conservatives, stressed the law’s unifying force 
for the population of a fractured empire. Later on, the altered state of marriage and the family 
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after World War I and the “crisis years” of Weimar pushed some politicians to support 
retaining the law’s patriarchal provisions. After 1933, the Nazis seized on Weimar’s frequent 
instability as a reason to “fix” German marriages and families with racialized family policies 
and laws. While the reasons for instability changed over time, the discourse about the 
importance of the family for stability did not. 
 Opponents of the Civil Code, for their part, protested how the law reinforced 
hierarchies between men and women in marriage and the family. In some matters, such as the 
marriage ceremony, divorce regulations, or adoption, the language of the law did not 
distinguish between the rights of men and women. In other areas, however, the law awarded 
married men and fathers far greater rights and duties. For example, men had the right to make 
all decisions for their wives and families. Married men were entitled to control and benefit 
financially from their wives’ property. Men alone had the right to decide if their children 
could marry before the age of twenty-two. Even unwed mothers were not considered the 
legal guardians of their children. Meanwhile, married women did not have equal rights in 
their marriages or authority over their children. They could not remarry until ten months after 
their last marriage ended. They technically still owned their own property, but had to 
relinquish control over its usage and assets. Mothers only gained formal authority over their 
children if the husband died. If divorced, a woman still had to bear her former husband’s 
name; if declared guilty, he could permit her to renounce his name, indicating masculine 
control. Although at times, some Germans demanded reforms of parts of the law, such as 
divorce or legitimacy after World War I, its provisions—and thus its prescriptions for gender, 
marriage, and the family—remained intact well into the postwar period. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FAMILIES IN CRISIS, SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION: REBUILDING POSTWAR 
GERMANY, 19451947 
 
 
On 15 December 1949, Frau K. wrote to the West German federal government to 
express her reservations about the current marriage law, known as Allied Control Council 
Law Nr. 16, or the Ehegesetz. The Western and Soviet Allies approved the law, designed to 
replace existing Nazi marriage laws, on 20 February 1946. In the eyes of some 
contemporaries, however, the legislation was not necessarily an improvement over past 
conditions. Frau K. explained that she had been married nine-and-a-half years, during which 
she renounced her claims to social security at the behest of her husband. After he committed 
adultery, she pursued a divorce and was declared the “guiltless” party in 1947, meaning she 
was entitled to alimony as long as she did not work. She posed the following question to the 
federal government: “What right do legislators have to expect guiltless divorced women to 
live worse than adulterers?” According to her, the 1946 Ehegesetz was “in urgent need of 
reform” and “far worse than that of the Third Reich,” an unqualified phrase meant to grab the 
attention of lawmakers who sought desperately to avoid resemblance to the Nazi regime.1   
By the time Frau K.’s letter arrived at the West German federal government in 
December 1949, Germany had undergone remarkable changes in the four years since Nazi 
Germany’s defeat on 8 May 1945. Immediately after the Nazis’ surrender, the Soviets, 
                                                 
1 Frau Christel Krajno an die Bundesregierung, December 15, 1949, B140/36525/50, BArch Koblenz.  
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British, Americans, and French began to confront the effects of total war, namely 
demobilization of troops and reconstruction of the landscape, economy, politics, and society. 
The war and its immediate aftermath, especially the return of former soldiers, contemporaries 
believed, had precipitated a postwar crisis of the family. Many Germans and the Allies 
viewed the postwar “return to the family” as part of the demobilization and restoration of a 
society shaped by National Socialism, militarism, and war. 
Less than a year after Nazi Germany’s surrender, on 20 February 1946, the Allies 
approved the Ehegesetz. In the preceding months, the Allies had pursued various measures to 
implement the four “D’s”: denazification, democratization, demilitarization, and 
decartelization.2 Part of this process was legal reform. As part of denazification, the 
Ehegesetz removed all provisions from earlier, Nazi-era marriage laws that contained 
“eugenic or racially-based norms.”3 At the same time, the Allied law did not create, 
according to Frau K., better circumstances for married or recently divorced women. The 
1946 Ehegesetz, in fact, upheld several provisions from the 1938 Nazi law and did not 
overturn the old BGB’s regulations on marital property schemes, spousal relations, or 
parental authority. After 1945, married women were still legally required to obey their 
husbands’ decisions, turn over management of their property to their spouses, and relinquish 
full authority over their children. 
These regulations technically governed marriage and the family in all four of the 
occupation zones. After the formal division of Germany into two states in 1949, these 
                                                 
2 Christoph Klessmann, Die doppelte Staatsgründung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 78. 
3 Petra Kannappel, Die Behandlung von Frauen im nationalsozialistischen Familienrecht (Darmstadt and 
Marburg: Hessischen Historischen Kommision Darmstadt und der Historischen Kommission für Hessen, 1999), 
195. 
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provisions remained valid in the German Democratic Republic until 1955 and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany until 1957. Despite the longevity of the 1946 law, prior studies of the 
Civil Code in the postwar Germanys have tended to gloss over it.4 I seek to explain the 
different political, social, and economic factors that influenced the decision to adopt the 1946 
Allied Control Council law, a critical stepping stone toward the postwar debates about the 
Civil Code. Its provisions emerged in the specific context of denazification during postwar 
political and legal reconstruction and served an important function for Allies and Germans in 
context of the aftermath of World War II and the occupation: providing legal parameters in 
the midst of a perceived postwar crisis of the family. This crisis, contemporaries maintained, 
stemmed from major demographic changes, new family arrangements, and changing labor 
market conditions. In response, some contemporaries, especially Christian conservatives, 
turned to the image of the family and the old provisions of the BGB as stabilizing forces. 
Meanwhile, the perceived crisis pushed others, such as women’s associations, Social 
Democrats, liberals, and Communists, to embrace the new family structures (especially 
families led by single or widowed working mothers) and urge reforms of the longstanding 
Civil Code. 
This chapter also demonstrates that the Civil Code became salient and contentious 
once again in the early postwar years in the Soviet and Western zones. In the midst of their 
                                                 
4 Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 50. Moeller skips from the 1938 Nazi law to the Basic Law 
debates in the Western zones in 1949. Gesine Obertreis’s study of family policy in the GDR devotes little space 
to this law and although she explains that it “did not further develop marriage law,” she does not explain how. 
See Obertreis, Familienpolitik in der DDR 19451980 (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1986), 109. Elizabeth 
Heineman also surprisingly omits mention of the 1946 law. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband 
Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003); Christine Franzius also mentions the 1946 law as a denazification measure. Franzius, Bonner 
Grundgesetz und Familienrecht: Die Diskussion um die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau in der 
westdeutschen Zivilrechtslehre der Nachkriegszeit (1945-1957) (Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), 16. 
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reconstruction processes, the Allies chose the expedient solution by denazifying the 
legislation and reinstating longstanding regulations on marriage and divorce. While the Allies 
provided necessary legal parameters for an increasingly chaotic and confusing environment, 
their decision to do so attracted criticism, namely from women’s associations, who had long 
been critical of the Civil Code and then been barred from public political participation during 
the preceding twelve years of the Nazi regime. In the context of postwar reconstruction and 
the reemergence of political parties and social organizations, Communist and non-
Communist women’s organizations in the East and Social Democratic, Christian 
conservative, Communist, and independent, non-party women’s associations in the West 
were able to begin discussing reforms to the Civil Code in the early postwar years. At the 
same time, women’s associations’ discussions were subject to the politics of the burgeoning 
Cold War, which dictated the political space they could inhabit and limited their ability to 
press for reforms until the Allies resolved the “German problem.” Their willingness to pursue 
reforms, even at this early juncture, however, reflected that they viewed the postwar years as 
a “moment of promise.”5 Even if their proposals were contingent on the outcome of the 
earliest Cold War battles, they still represented important strides in the postwar years toward 
rectifying past legal constraints on women and provided important templates for later debates 
about a new Civil Code. 
This chapter begins by examining the perceived postwar crisis of the family in the 
four occupation zones. Here, I examine how labor policies, demobilization, and personal 
crises shifted the gender order that had become predominant during World War II and 
eventually drove many Germans to seek out the traditional family as a stabilizing 
                                                 
5 I borrow this term from Mark Mazower’s Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 
2000), 229. 
92 
 
mechanism. The second section covers the political and social reconstruction of the four 
occupation zones, which led to the re-establishment of women’s organizations. The third 
section explores the denazification of German law, in particular marriage law. It shows that 
denazification was a driving force for the Allied occupiers, who then inadvertently 
implemented legislation that limited women’s rights. The fourth section analyzes how 
women’s organizations reacted to the 1946 legislation and the older BGB regulations and 
began to craft their own versions of a new Civil Code.  
 
The Postwar Crisis of the Family 
On 8 May 1945, the military leadership of the German Wehrmacht submitted 
unconditionally, leaving the German population at the mercy of the victorious Western and 
Soviet Allies who subsequently occupied the territories of the former Reich. Before the end 
of the war, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allies had made plans for postwar 
occupation, but had to abruptly shift gears upon Germany’s surrender when the realities of 
wartime destruction did not measure up to their expectations.6 As historian Gerhard 
Weinberg succinctly put it, “The Allies found a Germany without government or 
administration, but with massive destruction, misery, and dislocation.”7 
Misery and dislocation appeared frequently in postwar accounts of the “crisis years.” 
Allied bombings had reduced several large German cities to rubble, destroying 
approximately 3.4 million of 17 million homes.8 In addition to harming infrastructure and 
                                                 
6 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 21. 
7 Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. 2nd ed. (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 838. 
8 Volker Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 1987), 177. 
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homes, the Allies had attacked major industrial areas of Germany, thus crippling the postwar 
economy. Meanwhile, expellees from the East fled westward to escape the approaching Red 
Army and vengeful neighbors. A large portion of these 6.5 million expellees were women 
and their children.9 In accounts of the months immediately after the war, Germans often 
recalled their own suffering in this period of chaos and destruction. 
The effects of mass destruction, especially on the gender order, marked the 
contemporary discourse in the occupation zones. Sociologists, the census, and women’s 
magazines, for instance, all noted the demographic imbalance of the sexes.10 The war, 
especially its final months, had exacerbated the gender gap in Germany that dated back to 
before the First World War.11 Although Germany already had a “surplus” of women after 
1918, the high number of male casualties in the Second World War only worsened the 
demographic discrepancies, because 5 million of the approximately 18 million men who had 
volunteered or been called up to the front never returned home.12 By the end of the war, 
approximately 7 million more women than men lived in occupied Germany.13 To be sure, the 
numbers differed slightly in the four zones. The 1946 census counted 7 million more women 
                                                 
9 Merith Niehuss, Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft: Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in 
Westdeutschland 1945-1960 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 28. 
10 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 27. 
11 Catherine L. Dollard, The Surplus Woman: Unmarried in Imperial Germany, 1871-1918. 1st ed. (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009), 200. 
12 Rüdiger Overmans placed the number at 5.3 million. See Overmans, Deutsche Militärische Verluste im 
zweiten Weltkrieg (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), 16-17, 228; Elizabeth Heineman places the number of 
casualties between 3 and 4 million. See Heineman, What Difference, 48. Frank Biess offers a more conservative 
estimate at 1.5 million. Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar 
Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 19. 
13 Heineman, What Difference, 3. 
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than men, a number that decreased gradually over time.14 By 1950, in West Germany, there 
were 3 million more women than men; in the East, it was 2 million.15 The smaller total 
population in the East (18 million in 1950) compared to the West (51 million) meant that 
proportionally the “surplus” was larger in the East.16 
Those 7 million women comprised what historian Elizabeth Heineman calls the 
“generation of German women standing alone” who had managed paid work, raising their 
families, and other tribulations during and after the war.17 One particular challenge for many 
women during the war was balancing employment and home life. Single women were often 
conscripted into six months to a year (or more, later on) of wartime service that ranged from 
factory work to auxiliary military service.18 Meanwhile, women who had married and lived 
with their spouses before the war could collect a family allowance and work to support their 
children, but the family allowance was docked according to a percentage of her income. In 
consequence, many wives found it more financially rewarding to stay home.19 In June 1941 
and January 1943, decrees ordered married women to return to the workforce, but many 
found reasons to remain exempt and by 1944, female participation only went up 1.2 per cent 
                                                 
14 Heineman, What Difference, 210; Donna Harsch uses a more conservative estimate of 5 million. See Harsch, 
Revenge of the Domestic: Women, The Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 20. 
15 Heineman, What Difference, 210. 
16 “Bevölkerungsentwicklung,” last modified 2012, Statistisches Bundesamt: Statistisches Jahrbuch 2011. 
17 Heineman, What Difference, 44, 80. 
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for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World 
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more than before 1939, namely because many women already worked.20 Those who did work 
received low wages, endured long hours away from home, and had little upward professional 
mobility.21 
Nazi Germany’s surrender brought women’s work in wartime industries to an abrupt 
end. Although work conditions during the war had not been ideal by any stretch of the 
imagination, employed women faced a series of new challenges related to survival, the 
process of demobilization, and labor under the Soviet and Western occupations. After the 
war, women’s focus shifted to their families’ survival, an unpaid task that required long 
hours. Some women, especially in the East, had to toil as Trümmerfrauen, clearing the rubble 
from the streets of major cities.22 Women often bore the burden of negotiating the black 
market economy, housing shortages, ration shortages, and migrations. For female expellees 
from the East, survival was especially complicated.23 Meanwhile, as part of demobilization, 
Allied labor policies, especially in the West, prioritized reintegrating men into society and 
the economy, often at the expense of married women. To some degree, being pushed out of 
the workforce was not a new phenomenon for the older generation of German women, many 
of whom had been fired from their jobs to make space for men in the context of the Weimar 
demobilization policy after the First World War.24  
                                                 
20 Heineman, What Difference, 63. See also Rüdiger Hachtmann, Industriearbeit im „Dritten Reich“. 
Untersuchungen zu den Lohn- und Arbeitsbedingungen in Deutschland 1933–1945 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
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21 Heineman, What Difference, 61-64. 
22 Leonie Treber, Mythos Trümmerfrauen: Von der Trümmerbeseitigung in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit und 
der Entstehung eines deutschen Erinnerungsortes (Essen: Klartext, 2014), 202.  
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In other ways, however, demobilization of men and the return of married women to 
the home after 1945 were fundamentally different from 1918. For one thing, the political 
circumstances differed dramatically. Unlike after the First World War, there was no 
revolution or postwar German government; the Allies took over all aspects of governance 
and did not quickly transfer power to Germans.25 Furthermore, although the Wehrmacht had 
surrendered unconditionally, its officers never disbanded the military, and the Allied Control 
Council did not formally dissolve the armed forces until 25 September 1945.26 In the 
meantime, the Allies placed nearly 10 million troops into prison camps to awaiting 
processing or, for some, trial. Initially, the Allies released men without proper papers, though 
they changed this policy in 1946. The Allies agreed to release all prisoners-of-war by 
December 1948, a promise that the West upheld; the Soviet Union did not follow through 
until 1950.27 The absence of a government, lack of official demobilization policies, and 
differing procedures made demobilization into a long and drawn-out process that did not take 
place uniformly across the occupation zones. 
For the next five years, roughly 2 million former Wehrmacht soldiers, as well as 
civilians and women employed by the military, returned to Germany, precipitating the 
perceived postwar “crisis of the family.”28 Historian Elizabeth Heineman states that: “While 
men’s absence had not shattered the ideals of marriage and the nuclear family, men’s 
                                                 
25 Volker Berghahn mentions that official Allied governance began on 5 June 1945. See Berghahn, Modern 
Germany, 177. 
26 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 28. 
27 Biess, Homecomings, 45. 
28 Biess, Homecomings, 45; idem, “Men of Reconstruction – The Reconstruction of Men: Returning POWs in 
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presence frequently did.”29 Many of these men came home “exhausted, weak, and often 
traumatized,” which prompted “widespread (and divergent) diagnoses of a masculinity in 
crisis.”30 Indeed, certain experiences transcended borders. After years apart, husbands and 
wives had to reacquaint themselves to each other and postwar daily life. This process and 
period of adjustment elicited a range of responses, from relief and elation to abuse and 
manipulation.31 The more extreme cases of abuse often stemmed from men’s perception that 
their jobs and positions as patriarchs had been usurped by women. Men, according to 
contemporary discourse, no longer had a firm grasp on who they were.  
Even if similar patterns existed on both sides, discourses about imperiled masculinity 
nevertheless differed across borders. In the West, psychiatric and medical professionals 
focused on how malnutrition and mistreatment in Soviet POW camps contributed to men’s 
desexualization and continued trauma after the war.32 In the East, Communist party leaders 
emphasized how the return of former fascist soldiers held the potential to disrupt the 
Sovietization of postwar Germany.33 At the same time, East Germans propagated the idea 
that imprisonment had depoliticized men—equally insulting in the highly politicized Soviet 
zone.34 In both societies after the war, contemporaries emphasized the necessity of 
“remasculinizing” men, but in a distinct contrast from the “hypermasculine, militarized ideal 
                                                 
29 Heineman, What Difference, 108. 
30 Biess, Homecomings, 12. 
31 Heineman, What Difference, 118, discusses the case of one woman whose husband blamed her for his 
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of the National Socialist front-line soldier” and the starving returnees.35 
For many contemporaries in the East and the West, an essential piece of 
remasculinization was employment. German officials across all four zones, in fact, argued 
for the release of POWs for the sake of the economy.36 Not that the economy was recovering 
very quickly. The Allies had bombed several key industrial regions such as the Ruhrgebiet in 
Germany, which retarded postwar growth.37 Moreover, as a punitive measure, the Allies 
enforced heavy reparations, often paid in the dismantlement and transportation of factory 
equipment. The Soviets especially insisted on carrying out this policy. 
Even if the four Allied powers agreed that integrating former POWs into society and 
the economy was necessary, economic recovery and labor policies still varied across borders 
and along gendered lines. In the West, occupation labor policies, designed to promote 
capitalism, placed a heavy premium on male labor. After 1948, Western employers began 
dismissing women from their jobs in order to grant men their old positions (if available) or 
privileged spots based on their presumed roles as breadwinners.38 Women who remained in 
the workforce tended to be single, widowed, or divorced.39 While the Western Allies 
ostensibly allowed equal pay for men and women, they ultimately left enforcement to the 
discretion of employers.40 Meanwhile, the Soviets shied away from the same approaches, 
                                                 
35 Biess, “Men of Reconstruction,” 342. 
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partly because of the larger demographic imbalance in the East and partly for ideological 
reasons. In August 1946, for example, the Soviet authorities issued an “equal pay for equal 
work” order and supposedly barred sexual discrimination (although practice was often a 
different matter).41 They furthermore actively sought out women for employment in their 
planned economy.42 Demobilization and labor policies were therefore designed to help 
German families, but depending on the occupation zone, had adverse effects on women in the 
years immediately following the end of the war. 
For some Germans, survival, labor, and demobilization contributed to personal crises. 
Indicative of the difficulties of postwar reunions, the divorce rate boomed. In 1948, for 
example, there were 87,013 divorces granted—the highest number after the war.43 Historian 
Dagmar Herzog notes that this number was ten times the pre-World War I rate.44 Many 
couples credited the difficult wartime separation and reunification as reasons to pursue 
divorce.45 Additionally, illegitimacy rates also went up significantly during and after the war. 
In the West, non-marital births reached their highest point in 1946 at 16.4 percent and 
declined thereafter, hitting 10 percent in 1950.46 In the East, nearly 200 per one thousand 
births in 1946 were non-marital, though this rate declined quickly, reaching a low point 
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around 1949 with around 120 per thousand births.47 The “surplus of women,” high divorce 
rates, and increased numbers of out-of-wedlock births meant that non-traditional family 
structures became more normal, as single women often headed households, lived with ex-
partners because of the housing shortages, or found “uncles” with whom they cohabitated.48 
Popular attitudes reportedly became more accepting of these non-traditional family 
structures.49 As historian Robert G. Moeller points out, however, popular attitudes were more 
about “accommodation to conditions that were viewed to be exceptional” rather than 
adjustments to long-term trends.50 In fact, many Germans in the West began to associate 
marriage and the nuclear family with stability and order in the wake of wartime destruction. 
Some commentators, especially Christians, expressed disappointment on behalf of the 
“surplus” women who would never marry.51 In the East, many Soviet and German 
Communist leaders labeled marriage a “hopelessly outdated” institution because of its 
association with women’s economic dependence.52 On the ground level, however, citizens of 
the Soviet zone often embraced more traditional views of marriage and familial structures.  
 In all four occupation zones, contemporaries perceived the immediate postwar years 
as a crisis of the family. Media pundits and politicians emphasized the problematic nature of 
the “surplus” of 7 million women. Meanwhile, medical professionals and politicians stressed 
the emasculated state of male prisoners-of-war and sought to correct their condition through 
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labor policies. At home, Germans confronted the difficulties of reunion. Some couples never 
recovered from the wartime changes, choosing instead to divorce. In the immediate postwar 
years, altered family structures became more normal. While these families became accepted 
in both German societies, their existence also precipitated the opposite reaction: a shift 
toward wanting “traditional” family and marital structures. As the next section shows, 
women’s groups, which reemerged in the context of postwar political and social 
reconstruction aided by the Soviet and Western Allies, took a vested interest in the postwar 
crisis of the family. 
 
 
Re-forging Politics and Society in the Postwar Germanys  
 
At the fore of the postwar crisis of the family were female activists. In the weeks 
immediately following the end of World War II, women organized on the grassroots level 
across the four occupation zones in order to help women and their children survive. In all 
four occupation zones, but especially in the Soviet zone, women’s groups quickly became 
targeted by occupation authorities.  
The Post-1945 Development in the Soviet Occupation Zone 
Early on, the Soviets and German Communists tried to bring women into their fold by 
directly taking control of women’s grassroots activities. For example, the Soviets turned 
“women’s centers,” which sprang up immediately after the war ended, into “antifascist 
women’s committees” (AFA) in June 1945.53 On a pragmatic level, the AFA were 
responsible for helping women collect food and clothing, operate soup kitchens, and learn 
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their legal rights.54 On an ideological level, the Soviets and leaders of the newly re-founded 
Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland, KPD) hoped the AFA 
would unify the previous divisions in the women’s movement under the guise of antifascism, 
antimilitarism, and promoting democracy (albeit Soviet-style). To some extent, the AFA 
succeeded, bringing together roughly 300,000 women from all political persuasions and 
economic backgrounds (housewives, farm laborers, and white-collar workers).55  
The Soviets’ support of women’s emancipation stemmed from a combination of their 
own history of revolution as well as contemporary circumstances induced by occupation. 
Since 1918, the Soviets, in particular female activists like Alexandra Kollontai, had grappled 
with the “woman question” in Russia with varying degrees of success.56 The Communist 
Party had a Women’s Department (Zhenotdel) that had called for an end to bourgeois family 
order in 1918.57 According to historian Wendy Z. Goldman: “The Bolsheviks believed that 
capitalism had created a new contradiction, felt most painfully by women, between the 
demands of work and the needs of the family” and that socialism provided a solution to this 
double-burden.58 Although the Women’s Department’s influence faded in the 1930s, 
especially as Stalin called to strengthen the role of the family, the idea of women’s 
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emancipation was still a core tenet of the Soviet platform.59  
Despite the Soviets’ commitment to women’s emancipation, attracting German 
women to Communism after 1945 was still a daunting task. Before 1933, women had 
traditionally voted for the SPD or the Center, not the KPD.60 Furthermore, historians Norman 
Naimark and Donna Harsch both suggest that the Soviet Red Army’s aggressive actions 
against women may have provoked a backlash against Communism.61 The long history of 
“emancipating” women in Russia, a spotty history of female support of the KPD, and a 
recognition of women’s plight under the occupation led the Soviets and their German 
partners to try desperately to attract women to Communism.  
Within a few months, the Soviets took further steps toward centralizing the AFA 
under Communist rule. On 30 October 1945, SMAD issued Order Nr. 80, which decreed that 
the antifascist women’s organizations were both officially sanctioned and under the 
jurisdiction of the city administrations.62 After Order Nr. 80 came out, the German 
Administration for Education designated a department (“Frauenausschüsse”) to cover all 
issues related to women. In July 1946, the Berlin Central Women’s Committee and the 
Education Department worked together to form a compendium of all women’s committees in 
the SBZ, the Central Women’s Commission (Zentralen Frauenausschuss, or ZFA).63 In 
March 1947, the ZFA was supplanted by the Democratic Women’s League of Germany 
                                                 
59 Goldman, Women, the State and Revolution, 338. 
60 Harsch, Revenge, 28-29. 
61 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 129; Harsch, Revenge, 29. 
62 Obertreis, Familienpolitik, 34. 
63 Karin Opelt, DDR-Erwachsenenbildung (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2005), 56. This ZFA should not be 
confused with its forerunner, the Berlin ZFA. 
104 
 
(Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands, DFD).64 By September 1947, 242,000 
women—most of them unaffiliated with a party and housewives—had joined the DFD.65 
The “bringing into line” of the women’s associations in the Soviet zone was 
representative of a larger trend of political consolidation in the East. Even before the 
Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August 1945, where the Allies agreed to negotiate and 
finalize plans for the end of World War II and Germany’s political restoration, the Soviet 
Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) had already begun rebuilding politics and 
governmental structures in their zone. Eager to outpace their Western counterparts, defuse 
the impact of the independent antifascist committees that had sprouted up around the Soviet 
zone, and take control of the civilian populace, in June 1945, SMAD set up districts and 
installed Communist Party members in secondary administrative positions.66 The Soviets 
then authorized the reestablishment of the KPD, the long avowed enemy of Nazism, in June 
1945.67 In particular, the Soviets favored exile leaders like Walter Ulbricht who had already 
been a part of the Central Committee of the KPD during the Weimar years and then spent the 
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Second World War in Moscow.68  
Although the Soviets clearly preferred Communists, they allowed other political 
parties to form as well. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, SPD), following on the heels of the KPD in 1945, argued that they too 
had opposed Nazism.69. Before 1932, the SPD had been the largest party in Weimar and had 
fiercely opposed both the more radical KPD and the far-right NSDAP. New parties emerged 
as well after 1945 in all four occupation zones, including the Soviet zone. Protestants and 
Catholics—represented during the Weimar period by several bourgeois and nationalist 
parties such as the Center Party, DDP, DVP, and DNVP—joined forces to create the inter-
confessional Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, or East-CDU 
when referring to the Soviet zone branch).70 Liberals formed the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Germany (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, LDPD) in the Soviet zone in July 
1945.71 Within these spaces, German men and women—but mostly men—could reorganize 
politically under the watch of the Soviet authorities. 
Although the Soviets ostensibly permitted political diversity, provided the parties 
were antifascist, in practice, they supported Communist rule of the Eastern zone. Exiled 
German Communists had arrived in Germany in April and May 1945 with a clear agenda for 
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their country’s future: an antifascist “German road to socialism.”72 Such a path, many 
believed, would loosen the rigorous adherence to Leninism that Weimar Communists had 
advocated and would promote “a more egalitarian cast to a social or liberal democratic 
formation.”73 This vision fell to the wayside in the face of political competition among 
socialists in the first year of the Soviet occupation. Social Democrats and moderate 
Communists found themselves surrendering to the minority of Communists willing to 
implement a Soviet-style state. Although German socialists would not completely abandon 
the “German road” until 1948, there were already signs of a gradual tightening of political 
space in the Soviet zone. In April 1946, for example, having already suffered losses in the 
Western zone elections and fearing an electoral defeat to their Social Democratic rivals in the 
approaching elections, the KPD in the Soviet zone forced the SPD to merge into one party: 
the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED). The party 
eventually pushed out former Social Democrats and asserted control over all other non-
Communist parties (like the East CDU and their women’s associations) in the East.74  
In addition to women’s associations and political parties, other social organizations, 
namely trade unions, churches, and the press, reemerged in the Soviet zone after the war. The 
SED’s relations with social organizations varied from antagonistic to acquiescent. As they 
had with women’s associations, the Soviets and the SED were able to more easily assert their 
authority over some social organizations, such as the trade unions. The Weimar-era 
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Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, a confederation of the free German trade unions, 
had been founded in 1919, but was disbanded by the Nazis on 1 May 1933 and replaced by 
the German Labor Front.75 On 10 June 1945, SMAD ordered the reestablishment of trade 
unions under their authority.76 In February 1946, the Confederation of Free German Trade 
Unions (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB) came together in the Soviet zone as 
an umbrella mass organization for individual trade unions.77 The FDGB also established 
women’s sections for employed, single women, although the SED shut these down in 1948.78 
The Soviet occupation forces also quickly re-established the press, which had been 
subjected to the Nazis’ policy of Gleichschaltung since 1933, but allowed only publication of 
periodicals by “parties and social groups” that supported “the socialist revolution.”79 By the 
1950s, Soviet/SED censorship of the press left the SED-run newspaper, Neues Deutschland, 
the Berliner Zeitung, some regional papers, the Christian Democratic Neue Zeit, and the 
major women’s magazines Für Dich and Die Frau von heute.80 
In some cases, however, the Soviet occupation forces and the ruling party in the East, 
the SED, were unable to assert complete control over social organizations. The Protestant 
and Catholic churches were one important example. Sociologist Sabrina Petra Ramet states 
                                                 
75 Andrei Markovits, The Politics of the West German Trade Unions: Strategies of Class and Interest 
Representation in Growth and Crisis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 62. See also Heinrich 
Potthoff, Freie Gewerkschaften 1918-1933: Der Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund in der Weimarer 
Republik (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1987). 
76 Siegfried Mielke and Peter Rütters, eds., Der Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1945 bis 1949/50 (Bonn: 
Dietz, 1985), 27. 
77 Klessmann, Die doppelte Staatsgründung, 130. 
78 Heineman, What Difference, 186. 
79 Christian Steininger, “Die freie Presse: Zeitung und Zeitschrift,” in Die Kultur der 50er Jahre, ed. Werner 
Faulstich (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002), 232. 
80 Heineman, What Difference, 186. 
108 
 
that initially, the Soviets and the SED praised “the brave conduct of the [Protestant] clergy in 
the struggle against the barbarism of Hitler.”81 They were aware that 92 percent of the 
population in the Soviet zone were Christian. But unlike the highly centralized Catholic 
Church, Protestants in the immediate postwar years had to confront potentially divisive 
theological and political differences. During the Nazi regime, Protestants split in three 
groups: the traditional Evangelical Church of the Old Prussian Union, the Nazi-supporting 
German Christians and the Nazi-opposing Confessing Church. To overcome this divide, 
various Protestant factions bonded together in 1948 to create the Protestant Church of 
Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, EKD), an umbrella structure designed to 
oversee the Länder-based church operations (Landeskirchen) in all four occupation zones 
and, after 1949, in both German states. Only in 1969 the Eastern Landeskirchen broke away 
and founded the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR (Bund der Evangelischen 
Kirchen in der DDR, BEK).  
Leaders of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in the East took a decidedly anti-
Communist stance in the postwar years. As many church leaders emerged from the shadows 
and asserted their opposition to totalitarianism and Soviet rule, the SED grew less tolerant 
and began actively attempting to halt church activities. Thereafter, the ruling party and the 
two major churches maintained a relationship that alternated between antagonism and 
cooperation. On the one hand, because devout Communists viewed Christianity as 
incompatible with socialism on an ideological level and the churches as political competition, 
the SED tried to suppress the influence of the churches. On the other hand, some church 
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leaders and members of the East-CDU collaborated with the SED in an effort to make 
Christianity compatible with socialism.  
 
The Development in the Western Zones 
While the Soviets and the SED consolidated and centralized Communist rule in the 
East, the West went in the opposite direction, encouraging decentralization and plurality, 
provided it was antifascist, pro-Western democracy, and after 1947, anti-Communist. Much 
like they did in the Soviet zone, women’s “self-help” groups organized on the local- and 
regional level within the first few weeks of the end of the war, primarily to help women 
restore their daily existence, especially food rations.82 Over time, political parties and 
independent women’s associations took over their work.83 These groups, for the most part, 
escaped the overt politicization of their counterparts in the Soviet zone.84 Some Western 
women’s groups, however, did have a certain political agenda. Regionally-based groups like 
the Bremer Frauenklub 1945, for example, considered themselves part of the larger 
antifascist movement that spanned the four occupation zones.85  
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Antifascism and aid ostensibly connected women across the four occupation zones, 
but women’s groups in the West still faced considerably different circumstances than their 
Eastern counterparts. Logistics were one problem. According to political scientist Angela 
Icken, these groups had little opportunity to work together because of the destroyed 
infrastructure and the necessity of interzonal travel passes (unlike the Soviet zone, which was 
smaller and under one central authority).86 Organizing on a national level became easier once 
they received official licensing by the occupation powers in January 1946.87 Still, women’s 
organizations did not hold their first interzonal meeting until May 1947 in Bad Boll.88 
Furthermore, women’s associations did not have much bureaucratic support and their 
treatment depended on their occupiers. The British Military Government, for instance, 
assigned women’s affairs to its Civic Development Section in the summer of 1946.89 The 
Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) established its own Women’s 
Affairs Section of the Education and Cultural Affairs Branch nearly two years later, in March 
1948, a result of pressure from American women’s rights activists to address the “women’s 
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problem” in postwar Germany.90 Meanwhile, the French never formally set up a bureau for 
women.91  
Even without guaranteeing much formal or financial help, British and American 
occupation governments vowed to assist women. The American women appointed to lead the 
Women’s Affairs Section, such as Ruth Woodsmall, a former teacher and later a United 
Nations Commission on the Status of Women representative, “intended to empower women, 
albeit in the private sphere,” and invested little in politicizing German women or offering 
other paths to equality (such as equal wages).92 The British and American Women’s Affairs 
Branches pursued citizenship and re-education programs for women, which largely stemmed 
from the popular Allied assumption that under the Nazi regime, women lacked political 
development, were apathetic, or as historian Rebecca Boehling characterizes it, were 
repressed.93 The Western Allies therefore designed various programs to reacquaint women 
with democracy and social welfare while fulfilling their “womanly” desires.94  
Despite Allied efforts to democratize German women, especially the older ones who 
already had active and passive voting rights in Weimar Germany and often were members of 
the many Weimar women’s organizations, hardly needed an introduction to democracy. 
Many leaders of the new women’s committees and organizations had been politically active 
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in Weimar, either in the Reichstag, the Landtag (the equivalent of a state representative 
assembly), or at the local level. Many of these women rejoined major political parties after 
the war, and some of them led the parties’ women’s committees. The Social Democrats were 
the only major party to include a formal branch devoted to women when they introduced the 
Frauenbüro in 1946, headed by Herta Gotthelf, the female activist who had edited the Social 
Democratic women’s newsletter Genossin in the prewar years and then spent the war in 
exile.95 Christian Democrats and Free Democrats, although they had regional and local 
groups, did not introduce their own national-level women’s committees until the early 
1950s.96 At the helm of these groups were women such as Helene Weber, a former Center 
Reichstag representative, and Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, a leader of the Evangelische 
Frauenarbeit.97 Finally, the Communist DFD formed its West German branch in 1950 under 
the leadership of Lilly Wächter.98 By the early 1950s, every major political party in West 
Germany had an official, national-level women’s committee. 
While political parties offered one way for women to press their concerns, 
independent, non-party women’s associations provided another option. Women such as 
Theanolte Bähnisch, a lawyer and Social Democrat from Hannover who founded the Club 
deutscher Frauen, or Schwarzhaupt, who founded the Frankfurter Frauenausschuss, 
established groups on the local or regional level with the aim of replicating the pre-1933 
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bourgeois women’s movement’s “non-confessional” and “non-party” goals.99  
These non-confessional and non-party women’s organizations represented a variety 
of political and professional interests. Many of these associations dated back to before 1933 
and had been forced to disband when the Nazis came to power. For instance, the German 
Female Citizens’ Union (Deutscher Staatsbürgerinnenverband, DSV)—founded in 1865 as 
the ADF and renamed in the 1920s—picked up its work again in 1947 and formally 
reestablished itself in 1949 under the watch of Else Ulich-Beil.100 Similarly, the German 
Female Academics’ Union (Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund, DAB), founded in 1926 by 
Agnes Zahn-von Harnack and Marie-Elisabeth Lüders, reemerged on the regional level in 
1948. The DAB formed a national-level organization in June 1949 under the leadership of 
Zahn-von Harnack, Lüders, and Emmy Beckmann.101 Others were successors to earlier 
organizations. The German Female Lawyers’ Association (Deutscher Juristinnenbund, DJB), 
for instance, derived from the remnants of the earlier Deutschen Juristinnen-Vereins. The 
association reestablished itself as the DJB in 1948 under the guidance of well-known female 
legal experts such as Elisabeth Selbert, Erna Scheffler, and Schwarzhaupt.102 These 
organizations had been active in Germany before 1933, dissolved under the Third Reich, and 
reemerged in public after 1945. 
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Alongside non-confessional associations were religious (namely Christian) women’s 
organizations. Founded in 1903 and forced to disband in 1933, the Catholic German 
Women’s Association (Katholischer Deutscher Frauenbund, KDFB) continued its work 
under the umbrella of the church. The organization re-formed after 1945 underneath the 
direction of Gerda Krabbel.103 Associated with this organization were other Catholic 
women’s groups, such as the Berufsverband Katholischer Fürsorgerinnen run by Helene 
Weber. In addition to Catholic women’s organizations, the Protestant women’s 
associations—the Protestant Women’s Aid (Evangelische Frauenhilfe, EF), German 
Protestant Women’s Association (Deutsch-Evangelischer Frauenbund, DEF), and German 
Protestant Women’s Work (Evangelische Frauenarbeit Deutschlands, EFD)—reestablished 
themselves after 1945 under the leadership of women such as Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt and 
Hildegard Ellenbeck.104 These associations worked closely with both their church leaders and 
the CDU/CSU in the postwar years. All of these women’s organizations—non-party, 
professional, or confessional—reemerged in the immediate postwar years with the tacit 
support of the Western Allies. 
To be sure, these categorizations of women’s associations in the West are somewhat 
superficial. Many female leaders represented several organizations or parties at once. 
Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, for example, was a CDU member, led the Protestant Women’s 
Work and the Juristinnenbund, and worked for the Protestant Church. Whatever their 
affiliation, the women who led these organizations brought years of experience and political 
activism with them. But the variety of associations and multiple affiliations caused discord as 
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well. SPD Frauenbüro leader Herta Gotthelf, for example, condemned the work of female 
SPD leaders like Theanolte Bähnisch who established independent women’s associations. 
Gotthelf was highly critical of their efforts, forbade them to continue, and asserted that the 
SPD was the only women’s movement that Germany needed.105 Many women, either 
because of prewar experiences or because they had seen the “bringing into line” of the DFD 
with the SED in the East, preferred the independent organizations to the SPD. Additionally, 
the CDU faced its own, different set of problems. For Christian conservative women, 
historian Petra Holz argues, tension came from the divisions between national and local 
leadership over which women’s issues to prioritize (e.g. “practical” versus broader legal and 
political matters).106  
Western military officials feared that disunity among women would create space for 
Communist infiltration. As the Cold War began in 1947/48, historian Hanna Schissler asserts 
that the Americans mobilized women’s groups to foster anti-Communism.107 After all, by 
early 1947, the Soviets had eliminated the possibility of political competition in the East and 
consolidated the women’s committees into the DFD, which had a marginal but growing 
presence in the West.108 British occupation officials responded to the DFD by supporting the 
formation of one women’s association (the Deutscher Frauenring) in 1947 to unite all of the 
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regionally-based independent women’s associations in their zone.109 The American occupiers 
also later funded the set-up of the Informationsdienstes für Frauenfragen in 1951, which then 
became the Deutscher Frauenrat—effectively the successor to the prewar BDF.110 The 
Allies’ efforts to unify German women, however, were ultimately hindered by old divisions 
and different interests. 
Allowing a plurality of opinions—provided they were antifascist, democratic, and 
anti-Communist—was a key point of the Western Allies’ approach to reconstructing society 
and politics its occupation. Unlike the Soviets, the Western Allies waited until after the 
Potsdam Conference from 17 July 17 to 2 August 1945 to authorize political parties and 
other social organizations. The Americans allowed local branches of each party to congregate 
at the end of August 1945; the British followed suit a month later. The French, still bent on 
punishing Germans, refused to permit political parties until the end of the year.111 In the 
Western zones, the SPD and the CDU/CSU emerged as the leading parties. The SPD’s 
postwar leader, Kurt Schumacher, had spent the war locked away in several different 
concentration camps and opposed Communism, therefore granting the SPD further 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.112 His faction of the party was simultaneously anti-
Western and anti-Communist. Other prominent members, such as SPD Women’s Office 
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leader Herta Gotthelf, had survived the war by going into exile in London.113 The SPD 
considered its clean credentials to be the gateway to the top spot in postwar Western politics. 
The SPD’s primary opponent was the Christian conservative CDU and its Bavarian 
sister party, the Christian Social Union (Christlich Soziale Union, CSU). Initially, the 
CDU/CSU had a strong regional presence in the West, but did not form a national leadership 
until 1950. Nevertheless, the leaders of the CDU and the CSU across the occupation zones 
(including the East) shared a commitment to reshaping Germany through Christianization 
and a return to “traditional” societal roles.114 These views comprised the platform of the 
future party chairman, Konrad Adenauer, a devout Catholic and staunch anti-Nazi who had 
been mayor of Cologne. Adenauer was decidedly more pro-Western than Schumacher and 
emerged as the biggest threat to the SPD leader.  
The outcome of the power play between the SPD and CDU/CSU in the Western 
zones depended on the cooperation of smaller parties. One of the most important was the 
Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), formed officially in December 
1948 from several disparate liberal factions across the three Western sectors.115 It was 
designed to bring together former Weimar-era liberals from the German People’s Party 
(DVP), the German National People’s Party (DNVP), and the German Democratic Party 
(DDP). The conservative German Party (Deutsche Partei, DP) formed after the war as well, 
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but received fairly limited support.116 For Catholics who chose not to enter the CDU/CSU, 
the Center Party (Zentrum, Z) still existed in some pockets of Germany.117 For those on the 
far left, the KPD offered a marginal, but viable, option.118 The Western zones as a whole, 
because of the anti-Communist politics of the Americans, British, and French, were reluctant 
to embrace leftist politics, though the SPD’s strong presence after the first federal election in 
August 1949, when the CDU/CSU got 31 percent, the SPD 29 percent, the FDP 12 percent 
and the KPD 6 percent. The election results indicate that the majority of German voters 
remained, for a time, in the political center.119  
In addition to political parties, the Western Allies authorized the establishment of new 
social organizations such as trade unions, professional organizations, and the press. The 
FDGB’s Western counterpart, the Confederation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), was formed in April 1947 in the British zone and then 
reorganized as an umbrella association for all trade unions in the Western Allied occupation 
zones in October 1949.120 The DGB majority traditionally allied itself with the SPD and 
KPD, although its base also included Protestant and Catholic workers who supported the 
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CDU, which at times divided DGB leadership.121 The DGB also had a women’s division, led 
by CSU member Thea Harmuth.122 Additionally, professional organizations such as the 
German Lawyers’ Union (Deutscher Anwaltverein, DAV) reemerged after 1945.  
Finally, the Western Allies permitted the press to reopen in their zones. The Allies 
ensured some modicum of control by vetting applications and only granting licenses to anti-
Nazi, democratic editors and journalists.123 The Western press displayed a greater diversity of 
opinion and was in principle less restrictive than in the East. Over time, newspapers grew 
again in popularity. By the late 1950s, 70.3 percent of the 39.3 million adults in the FRG read 
a daily newspaper, either a regional version or one of the national dailies: the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Frankfurter Rundschau, Die Welt, or the weekly paper DIE 
ZEIT and the weekly illustrated magazines Der Spiegel and Stern.124 Others received their 
news from trade, church, or party newsletters such as the social democratic Vorwärts or the 
Christian-conservative Christ und Welt. In addition commercial women’s magazines like 
Constanze or political newsletters for female party members like the social democratic 
Genossin/Gleichheit were options for readers. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, the press 
served as an important mediator and communicator of ideas between the upper echelons of 
political leadership and its readership.  
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Other mediators in the West were leaders in the Catholic and Protestant Churches, 
who often used their sermons and church newsletters to sway churchgoers and used formal 
petitions to pressure the federal government. Among Catholics, the anti-Nazi archbishop of 
Cologne, Josef Frings, became a well-known member of the Christian conservative CDU.125 
Similarly, his Protestant counterpart Otto Dibelius—an anti-Semite nationalist who 
nevertheless opposed the Nazis and allied himself with the West—joined the CDU and 
became an outspoken opponent of the SED in the East.126 Because of the Christian politics of 
the CDU/CSU and anti-Communism, the churches became influential political players in the 
postwar years. 
In the months immediately following the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviets and the 
Western Allies embarked upon the political and social reconstruction of their occupied 
territories. As a first step, the four powers aimed to reintroduce democratic, antifascist 
political parties and social organizations in Germany. These processes differed greatly across 
borders. In the Soviet zone, “democratization” became marked by political consolidation 
under Communist rule. In the Western zones, “democratization” meant a plurality of political 
options—as long as they were antifascist, anti-Communist, and pro-Western-style 
democracy. In the context of democratization, women’s associations were permitted to re-
form. As the next section shows, at the same time the Allies began to reestablish political 
organizations and women’s associations, they also approached the legal reconstruction of 
Germany. 
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Allied Legal Intervention in Postwar Family Law 
Without a government, the legal system still had no enforcement. The absence of a 
postwar government meant that racist Nazi laws technically stayed on the books a few 
months into the Allied occupation, until the Potsdam Conference. Here, Allied leaders met to 
reevaluate their earlier discussion at Yalta and devise the next phase of planning for 
Germany’s future.127 To carry out these plans, they formed the Allied Control Council 
(ACC), the highest governing body in the occupied sectors, which functioned until March 
1948, when the Soviet zone withdrew in order to begin its independent constitutional 
reforms. The Council established the semblance of stability and unity because, unlike other 
policies that were left up to the discretion of each military governor, these laws applied 
uniformly across the four zones. On 20 September 1945, for instance, the ACC declared all 
Nazi laws null and void in all four zones.128 The ACC then periodically issued a number of 
orders, laws, and proclamations that asserted its authority over the four sectors. One of these 
laws was the Allied Control Council Law Nr. 16 (Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 16), issued on 20 
February 1946, which established regulations for marriages and families in the absence of 
other laws.129  
More than anything else, the Allied Control Council Law Nr. 16 was intended as a 
denazification measure. The ACC’s September 1945 order had explicitly overturned laws 
such as the 1935 “Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor,” but did not 
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address other marriage or family laws.130 Since the People’s Code had never come to fruition, 
two laws pertaining to marriage and the family—the 1938 “Law for the Unification of 
Marriage and Divorce Regulations in Austria and Surrounding Territories” and the old Civil 
Code—were still in effect until the Allies overturned them.  
For their part, the Allies settled on partial reforms rather than a radical overhaul. The 
1946 Ehegesetz scrapped the racist language embedded in the 1938 law, but it did not 
overhaul all Nazi-era legislation related to marriage and the family. The 1946 law, for 
instance, upheld the 1933 “Law against Abuses of Marriage and the Adoption of Children” 
and the 1938 “Law on the Change and Addition of Family Law Regulations and the Legal 
Status of Stateless Persons,” which had overturned the BGB’s regulations on entering and 
nullifying marriages, divorce, custody, the legal status of children born to annulled 
marriages, and marriage among persons already related by marriage.131  
In addition to hanging onto some Nazi-era provisions, the Allies also chose to reuse 
the language from the 1900 Civil Code. Under the 1946 law, men under the age of 21 and 
women under the age of 16 could not marry.132 Siblings, whether full, half, adopted, or 
illegitimate, were barred from marrying.133 Remarriage was prohibited until annulment, 
divorce, or otherwise voided, to prevent bigamy.134 If one party was found guilty of adultery, 
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he or she could not marry the other party.135 A woman could not remarry within ten months 
of the dissolution of her last marriage, though exemptions could be given.136 Parties of either 
gender with children could not remarry until the Guardianship Court approved. Intentions to 
marry had to be announced publicly six months ahead of time, and ceremonies had to be 
performed before civil authorities.137 Marriages were to be annulled if they did not follow the 
proper procedure; if a woman married to obtain a new name “without the establishment of 
conjugal relations;” were bigamous, or contracted out of “willful deceit.”138 If partners 
assumed dead reappeared and their spouses had remarried, the first union was considered 
dissolved.139 No-fault divorce could be pursued, after a separation of three years, in cases of 
adultery, destruction of “conjugal life,” “mental derangement,” or mental and/or physically 
contagious diseases.140  
While the 1946 law provided all of these measures on marriage and divorce, it did not 
overturn several existing measures of the old BGB. Marital property schemes, for example, 
still dictated that married women’s property and their assets were controlled by their 
husbands.141 Furthermore, old provisions such as the Stichentscheid, or the right of the 
husband to make all decisions in the family, were still valid.142 Full parental authority and 
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decision-making were still the domain of the father.143 Women still had to take their 
husbands’ surnames.144 If married, their husbands still had the right to bar their wives from 
working.145 Women were still considered the head of the household and could only work if 
their husbands were unable to support the family.146 Although the 1946 law expanded rights 
in divorce law and dismissed outdated regulations on entering marriage, it did not overhaul 
provisions that had long constrained women’s rights in marriage and over their children. 
Despite the limits of the law, there were several reasons why the Allies chose this 
path. Above all, they were interested in denazification. Although the Allies retained parts of 
Nazi-era laws, these sections were not necessarily indicative of the racist Nazi worldview. 
The Allies made sure to remove the portions of the 1938 law that most reflected racist Nazi 
beliefs. The Allied decision to pursue partial reforms may have been the diplomatic route. By 
February 1946, the four Allies already had a history of poor cooperation. The Soviets, for 
instance, had been obstinate at the Potsdam Conference and had delayed approving the 
formation of the ACC or voting on other joint decisions.147 Fully rewriting the law would 
have required compromise among the Soviets, Americans, British, and French. Any serious 
discussion would have likely ended in stalemate, especially because the four powers had very 
different conceptions of gender roles in marriage and the family. Additionally, the 1946 law 
was the expedient choice in a constantly evolving and chaotic postwar environment, 
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especially one in which the Allies prioritized other initiatives, such as currency reform.148 
They wanted to get a new law on the books, and recycling the old BGB’s measures provided 
a fast and easy solution. Finally, reusing German text may have made the legislation more 
familiar to the Germans under occupation since, in theory, they would have known the 
provisions of the old BGB. This combination of reasons likely pushed the Allies to adopt 
regulations that were reminiscent of the older Civil Code. Allied Control Council Law Nr. 16 
went into effect in this form on 1 March 1946.149  
Issues with the Allied Control Council Law soon arose, however, that the Allies did 
not anticipate. The British Zone Central Justice Administration, for example, received several 
inquisitive letters from jurists and other legal officials scattered across the Western zones in 
19461947. For instance, one woman wanted to know if there were rules about attaining a 
divorce from her husband who was in an internment camp.150 Others sought guidance on 
matters such as the recognition of marriages contracted between non-Germans in postwar 
Germany.151 Finally, the British Zone Central Justice Administration got questions about 
how the age of majority for marriage worked.152 
The women’s presses on both sides of the border also reflected on the postwar crisis 
and problems with the law. Women’s magazines such as Die Frau von heute in the Soviet 
zone, Sie in West Berlin, and Constanze in the British zone editorialized on divorce, the 
balance of power in marriage, the effects of women’s employment on partnerships, and 
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illegitimacy.153 Readers’ letters were another strategy the editors used to highlight problems. 
In September 1946, for example, Die Frau von heute printed a letter from orphaned nineteen 
year old Annedore Z., who asked if she could marry without her guardian’s permission. Her 
fiancé had recently returned from a prisoner-of-war camp, but her legal guardian forbade the 
marriage. Annedore wanted to know if she had to wait to marry.154 Another writer asked if 
her husband, also recently returned from the front, had the right to divorce her without her 
consent.155 In each case, the female writer expressed some confusion or frustration with the 
law. As a whole, editors of Western and Eastern women’s magazines used the pages of their 
publications to deliver critical evaluations of the state of the postwar crisis of the family and 
its legal ramifications. 
Apart from minor revisions set by the Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 52, passed on 21 April 
1947, the Ehegesetz remained on the books until 1955 in the East and 1957 in the West. The 
Allies chose the text for purposes of expediency and ease as they tried to quickly denazify 
and restabilize Germany. The result, however, was a law that continued to dictate unequal 
rights for men and women in marriage and the family. Shortly after the Allies pursued legal 
rebuilding, as the next section shows, women’s associations began to debate the future of the 
Civil Code.  
 
 
Women’s Committees Fight for a New Civil Code 
 
The postwar crisis of the family, the introduction of the 1946 Ehegesetz, and the 
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opportunity to organize spurred women’s associations in all four occupied zones to begin 
crafting their own proposals for a new civil law. One of the early goals of the ZFA (and then 
the DFD) in the Soviet occupied zone was to reform the Civil Code. To this end, in August 
1946, the ZFA established a legal commission, led by Hilde Benjamin.156 Benjamin had 
joined the KPD in 1927 and became a lawyer for the party. After the Second World War, she 
joined the newly founded SED and worked her way up to Chief Prosecutor and Director of 
the German Justice Administration for the Soviet zone. She furthermore had been a longtime 
advocate for women’s rights.157 Within the ZFA, she led a commission comprised of 
women’s working groups from across the five Länder and occupied Berlin sector. The 
working group aimed both to attract women to the legal profession and to clarify complicated 
legal matters to women in the Soviet zone. At its first meeting in August 1946, for instance, 
the commission vowed to provide “clarity for all legal questions,” especially those that “no 
longer correspond[ed] with social developments.”158  
Moreover, rather than merely provide social welfare in response to the changed 
society, the legal commission sought to change the laws standing in the way of “full equal 
rights of women.” In particular, Benjamin identified the “place of women in family law” and 
“the rights of unmarried mothers and illegitimate children” as laws that “hung in the air” and 
desperately needed revisions. The ZFA planned to collect proposals from the regional and 
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local women’s committees, discuss them in the Kommission meetings, then send on all 
suggestions to the German Justice Administration. This plan, Benjamin hoped, would bring 
together “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches to change the laws.159 
Beyond sending proposals to the German Justice Administration, the ZFA and the 
DFD found other ways to express their opinions about civil law, namely through publishing 
in the women’s press. Between 1946 and 1948, the editors of East German women’s 
magazines such as Die Frau von heute and Für Dich published series of articles and readers’ 
letters that simultaneously praised the SED for its progressive stances on equal rights while 
criticizing the enduring status of the old Civil Code. One article by SED member Käthe 
Kern, for instance, a former Social Democrat, applauded the ruling party, because “the full 
equality of women is realized for the first time as a human right.”160 
At the same time, the women’s press sought to expose readers to existing obstacles to 
equality and therefore subtly critiqued the continued existence of the Civil Code and the 
SED’s lackluster attempts to change it. The editors and authors conveyed their criticism 
through two strategies. One way was to simply present the limitations of the law. In May 
1947, for example, Für Dich published an unsigned article that began with a rhetorical 
question: “How would it be if women still wore fashion from 1897? [...] We would all find 
that a bit strange, right?”161 The query gave way to a larger point: if women would not stand 
for dressing in the same clothes for fifty years, why should they obey the same outdated 
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laws? The article then featured the insights of a male jurist on several parts of the old BGB, 
which had not been changed under the 1946 law. First and foremost, the article emphasized 
that Germany had a responsibility to move away from the “capitalist-patriarchal principles of 
family law of the BGB that formerly only existed for the husband and father and imposed 
serfdom on wives and mothers.”162 It therefore suggested changing the Stichentscheid to give 
spouses equal say in all decisions concerning the marriage and family. Furthermore, the 
article argued that women’s rights to work outside the home and represent their husbands 
legally could no longer be limited. Men would no longer have control over their wives’ 
property. Finally, unmarried mothers would get full authority over their children. Similarly, a 
series titled “Equality Yes—But Also Equal Rights,” published in 1948 by Für Dich outlined 
each aspect of the old Civil Code that was still valid under the 1946 Ehegesetz.163 These 
types of articles not only informed readers about their legal rights, but exposed them to their 
legal limitations.   
 Another rhetorical strategy the authors and editors in the East often employed was 
comparison to the Soviet Union. In an October 1946 article in Die Frau von heute, Elli 
Schmidt called the work of the Soviet occupiers a “great gift” to women.164 Schmidt’s 
positive assessment was not surprising, as she enjoyed close relations with the Soviets and 
the SED. Trained as a seamstress, Schmidt joined the KPD in 1927 and spent the war in exile 
in Moscow. She returned to Germany in June 1945 and became a leader of the women’s 
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division of the Central Committee of the SED.165 Despite these accolades, leaders of the 
Soviet zone women’s committees also used the Soviets’ progress to criticize the SED’s work. 
In an article from 2 September 1948, for example, the author pointed out that in the Soviet 
Union, women were free to choose their maiden names or their new husbands’ names.166 The 
article did not explicitly critique the SED, but the comparison implied that other, better 
models of family law existed than what remained in effect in Germany.  
 Finally, the editors of women’s newspapers often printed readers’ letters as a way to 
voice problems with the legal situation in the Soviet zone. Sometimes letters expressed the 
cultural and social barriers women faced at home. In one letter, for instance, a Frau F. stated 
that she was excited to join the DFD, until her husband intervened on the ground that married 
women should stay home and refrain from political activity.167 Other times, readers’ letters 
emphasized legal confusion. Frau L. wrote in June 1947 to complain that she had been 
adhering to the BGB and working in her husband’s business, but the Soviet authorities 
ordered her to enter the workforce.168 Another woman wrote to ask if it was really possible 
that her husband could demand a divorce without her consent.169 Like the other articles, the 
publication of these letters served to inform female readers about their rights and offer 
                                                 
165 “Schmidt, Elli,” last accessed February 11, 2017, https://www.bundesstiftung-aufarbeitung.de/wer-war-wer-
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solidarity with other women, while pointing out legal and cultural barriers that still existed in 
the Soviet zone. 
While the SED asserted its control over the ZFA and the DFD, there were still 
opportunities in the early postwar years for non-Communists (mainly liberals and Christian 
Democrats) to discuss a new civil law. In October 1947, for instance, the East CDU’s 
Women’s Committee addressed the ZFA’s recent proposals for a new BGB. According to the 
East CDU, the ZFA’s suggestions focused too much on Gleichberechtigung of women, not 
the family, which would only leave women “isolated and more vulnerable.”170 They were 
highly critical of the ZFA’s assertion that the law would reflect the “people’s opinion 
(Volksanschauung),” observing that the Nazis had relied on populist sentiments.171 In the 
end, the East CDU put together a list of its own positions, which reflected a combination of 
their Christian views and addressed the limits of the BGB and the 1946 law. Its members 
agreed that the right to spousal obligation (meaning that spouses were beholden to form a 
matrimonial community) could stay. They suggested maintaining men’s right to decide the 
domicile; in all other matters, spouses would have the mutual right to decide. The committee 
supported women taking their husbands’ names, leaving open the option of hyphenation. 
They agreed that women should receive assistance from their husbands in maintaining the 
household. Women would still be obligated to help their husbands’ business. Men could 
retain the right to restrict women’s power to represent them (regarding household matters) 
with the permission of the court. Men could also no longer terminate their wives’ work 
contracts. With tightening political space, however, the Christian conservative women’s 
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suggestions were sidelined in favor of the ZFA/DFD’s. Still, their discussions highlight that 
women’s associations in the East engaged with the problem of the Civil Code at a very early 
stage, even before the Cold War began or the German question was solved. 
It was clear early on that the SED and the Soviet occupiers saw women as central 
players in the reconstruction of the East. Similar to the trade unions and the press, 
Communist leaders brought antifascist women’s committees under their influence as much as 
possible within the first year of the occupation. While political parties such as the Ost-CDU 
and the LDPD were permitted to have their own women’s committees, these groups were 
gradually shut out by the SED-supported ZFA and DFD. The result was that, for the rest of 
the Soviet zone’s (and later the GDR’s) lifespan, Communist women dominated all discourse 
on gender roles, labor, and the family.  
In the Western zones, the paradigm was reversed. Communist women were in the 
minority, while the SPD and independent women’s associations dominated the critical 
discourse that aimed for reforms of women’s rights in marriage and the family. Despite their 
divisiveness, many Western women’s associations possessed similar goals to one another and 
to their Eastern counterparts: to rebuild Germany “as a new democratic state” in opposition 
to the Nazi dictatorship that preceded it.172 A fundamental part of reconstruction, these 
leaders maintained, was granting women equal rights, especially in marriage and the family. 
In January 1946, the Founding Program of the Frankfurter Frauenausschuss vowed, for 
instance, that the organization would fight for the “complete equality of women in all areas” 
(especially public office and the workplace) and would work to guarantee women equal 
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rights in marriage and marital property.173 The Dortmunder Frauenausschuss similarly 
professed its commitment to the struggle “for the equality of women,” legal aid for women, 
and “support and help for employed and breadwinners of their families.”174 Finally, in 1946, 
the official program of the Hannover-based Club deutscher Frauen promised “the recovery 
of family life” and the “reinsertion of women in public life.”175 
Although groups like the Frankfurter Frauenausschuss were clearly committed to 
equality in marriage, fewer archival records on Western women’s committees’ early work on 
the Civil Code exist, likely a result of the decentralized nature of social organizations in the 
West. Many women’s associations did not develop national-level umbrella organizations 
until 1948 or the early 1950s; as a result their records from the earlier period remain spotty.  
The limited pieces of evidence available from the SPD and the CDU, however, indicate that 
discussions about the Civil Code occurred in the West, even if complete documentation of 
their debates is unavailable in major archives. The SPD left the most complete paper trail, 
most likely because the party had an official Frauenbüro since 1946 that kept records of 
local- and regional-level discussions. On 28 December 1947, for instance, a local SPD 
women’s committee leader from Regensburg, Friedl Schlichtinger, sent a list of proposals to 
the SPD Frauenbüro. The recommended changes concerned the rights of illegitimate 
children, namely that it would give them “equal claims to spiritual and corporal assistance as 
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legitimate children.”176 The proposed law would also ensure that the father would be 
whoever had been with the mother during the conception time; if there were multiple 
potential fathers, they would all be held accountable. Alimony, however, depended on the 
father’s station in life, especially if he was an occupation soldier.177 Schlichtinger’s proposals 
illustrated that local-level discussions of family law occurred. The SPD brought up the Civil 
Code again at its September 1948 women’s conference and during the Parliamentary 
Council.178 Records from Christian conservative women point to discussions about equal 
rights and civil law in the Christian conservative women’s circles as well. In 1948, for 
instance, CDU women’s leader Stefanie Roeger from North Württemberg prodded her party 
to introduce an equality clause that would both guarantee men and women equality in 
professional life as well as promote equal treatment of domestic duties.179  
Traces of critical discourse about equal rights and the future of the Civil Code can be 
found in the Western women’s press as well. The West Berlin magazine Sie and the 
Hamburg-based women’s magazine Constanze, for instance, published articles that clearly 
supported equal rights for unwed mothers and urged women to pursue divorces.180 The SPD 
women’s newsletter for female party members, the Genossin, edited by Hertha Gotthelf, 
printed articles that criticized the state of the BGB as well, homing in on issues that the 1946 
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Ehegesetz had not addressed, such as the right of men to make all decisions for their families 
or men’s right to control and profit from their wives’ property holdings.181 The editors of 
these magazines thus exposed their subscribers to critical issues surrounding women’s equal 
rights and status in marriage and the family. 
From the beginning, the women’s committees in the West faced certain obstacles that 
their Eastern counterparts did not. For one thing, they faced physical and logistical barriers. 
Restrictions on travel and much larger territories prevented a national-level movement from 
forming until later. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of politics and society in the West 
meant that debates over issues like the future Civil Code often occurred on the local or 
regional level and are more difficult to trace in the archival record. Another issue women’s 
committees faced was overcoming long-established ideological, class, and confessional 
differences that had marked the German women’s movement since the late nineteenth 
century. Additionally, they faced the problem of aligning goals with the Western occupiers, 
who wrongly assumed that German women needed democratization. The endeavors in which 
the Western Allies were willing to put time and money, such as initiatives to teach women 
citizenship, were not what women’s committee leaders envisioned for themselves. Unlike the 
Soviet zone, the Western Allied powers did not intervene early on in the women’s 
committees, although they showered them with more attention later on when they realized 
what an invaluable tool women were to rebuilding Germany.182 Finally, as the Cold War 
began in earnest in late 1947/early 1948 and the Allies found a solution to the German 
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questions, women’s associations became subject to the tug-of-war and limited political space 
in which they could maneuver.  
 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, between 1945 and 1949, numerous legal, political, social, 
cultural, and economic factors shaped the paths of family law under the Soviet and Western 
occupations. First, the legal and institutional frameworks in both states informed the 
diverging paths in the four zones. In the context of the chaotic postwar “crisis of the family,” 
contemporaries turned to the old Civil Code as a source of stability. At this stage, path 
dependency was strong in the Soviet and the Western zones, mostly because the Allied 
powers implemented the Allied Control Council Ehegesetz in February 1946. This 
legislation, designed to provide parameters for the imperiled states of marriages and families, 
largely reinforced old provisions lifted from the Civil Code. At the same time, path 
dependency was less strong in some circles. In particular, female activists in the Western and 
Soviet zones saw the postwar crisis year as a tabula rasa for women’s rights and were less 
keen on retaining the old law.  
 The particular political climate of the occupation zones influenced nascent 
discussions of marriage and the family as well. In the Soviet zone, the SED, with the backing 
of their occupiers, gradually exerted control over other political parties, the press, trade 
unions, and women’s organizations. This process allowed Communists to begin discussing 
legal reforms, even before they knew the fate of Germany, but it also prevented other groups 
from having a say. Meanwhile, in the Western zones, the decentralization and variety of 
political parties, trade unions, media outlets, and women’s associations allowed a plethora of 
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opinions to circulate, but also reinforced longstanding divisions among certain groups in 
society.  
 Third, economic factors mattered immensely in contemporary responses to the 
perceived crisis of marriage and the family in the occupation years. Across Germany, there 
were more women than men. In the East, the Soviet occupiers dealt with their imbalanced 
gender ratio by integrating single, married, and widowed women and mothers into the labor 
force and creating an “equal wages for equal work” policy to entice women to keep 
contributing to the planned economy and reconstruction efforts. In the West, the Allies 
pushed married women and mothers out of the work force as soon as their husbands began 
returning home, emphasizing that male employment was necessary to restore stability and 
help men recover from the war. By 1949, the two sides had adopted two different family 
models that would then shape future reforms of marriage and family law. 
Fourth, notions of the gender order and hegemonic cultural ideas played important 
roles in the occupation zones. Part of the reason why the postwar crisis of the family was 
considered such a calamity was because of the upended gender order. Although women’s 
organization leaders in East and West resisted the old BGB, the 1946 Ehegesetz, and the 
reinforcement of traditional family roles, not all Germans did. Men who returned from the 
front were unwilling to give up their positions as patriarchs. Many women, who had worked 
and raised the family in men’s absence, were equally unwilling to relinquish authority. For 
some Germans, however, a return to the traditional family was desirable during postwar 
crisis. In addition, the occupying powers’ different emphases on women’s emancipation 
affected how much attention they gave to women and gender issues as well. The Soviets’ 
own history of female emancipation, coupled with their fear of losing control of the Soviet 
138 
 
zone, led them to actively fight for women’s support. Meanwhile, the Western occupiers 
were less focused on women’s public roles and emancipation, although they were concerned 
about “democratizing” German women after twelve years of fascist dictatorship. They 
therefore initially invested less money and support for women, only ratcheting up aid after 
the Cold War began in late 1947/early 1948. 
Despite all of their differences, one of the things that bound the diverging states 
together was the 1946 Ehegesetz. In all four occupation zones, family law continued to limit 
married women’s equality with men. Married women still had to obey their husbands’ 
decisions, relinquish control of their property and its assets, and take their husbands’ 
surnames. As the case of the woman at the beginning of the chapter, Frau K., illustrates, they 
often faced financial disadvantages if they chose to divorce their spouses. Women’s groups 
recognized these problems and sought to change the Civil Code accordingly. They 
acknowledged, however, that changing the Civil Code required more than just proposals. As 
the next chapter shows, prominent female activists fought for equality clauses in the new 
constitutions as the first steps that would facilitate bigger alterations to other legislation such 
as the Civil Code. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
“MEN AND WOMEN HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS”: 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN POSTWAR GERMANY, 1946–1949 
In January 1949, the high-ranking female SED functionary Käthe Kern published an 
article in the Soviet zone women’s magazine Die Frau von heute titled “Bonn Opposes 
Women’s Rights.” Kern had been active in the SPD women’s movement in Berlin before 
1933. After 1946, she joined the SED, rose up in the ranks of the East German Democratic 
Women’s League, the DFD, and then became a representative of the People’s Council 
(Volksrat), the Soviet zone’s constitutional convention.1 In her article, Kern relayed to 
readers that the Parliamentary Council—the Western zones’ constitutional congress in 
Bonn—had rejected a proposal to grant women greater equality with men in their provisional 
constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).2 In contrast, the SED and the People’s Council 
had already adopted complete equality for men and women as a basic right in their own 
constitution. Kern therefore labeled the People’s Council’s stances on equality as “a step 
forward for women and a peaceful future” and labeled the West as “backwards.”3  
When Kern’s article was published, the People’s Council had been working on a new 
                                                 
1 For Käthe Kern’s biography, see: Heike Amos, Die Entstehung der Verfassung in der Sowjetischen 
Besatzungszone/DDR 1946-1949 (Münster: LIT, 2006), 59; “Käthe Kern,” last modified October 2009, 
http://bundesstiftung-aufarbeitung.de/wer-war-wer-in-der-ddr-%2363%3B-1424.html?ID=1671. Kern was born 
in 1900 and joined the SPD in 1920, eventually becoming leader of the SPD Greater Berlin women’s 
committee. She joined the SED in 1946 and became, alongside Elli Schmidt, a chairwoman of the SED Central 
Committee women’s department. 
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constitution for the Soviet zone for nearly a year. In 1947, the wartime alliance had broken 
down in the context of the Cold War, which led to increasing conflicts between the Soviets 
and the West. These were further fostered by the introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan by the US government and the related currency reform in the three West 
German zones. Already in early 1948, the Western Allies excluded the Soviets from the Six-
Power Conference. In response, the Soviets left the Allied Control Council and began 
constitutional reforms in their occupation zone. In the context of debating basic rights for the 
citizens of the future German Democratic Republic (GDR), female activists such as Kern and 
Hilde Benjamin advocated constitutional equal rights for men and women. The People’s 
Council propagated the equality clause as fulfillment of socialist women’s emancipation 
theory and proof that the Soviet zone was more progressive than the West. Moreover, they 
promised equal wages for men and women, state protection of the family, and equal rights 
for out-of-wedlock children as constitutional rights. 
In response to the Eastern People’s Council, the Western zones convened their own 
Parliamentary Council in September 1948. Shortly thereafter, the Social Democrats, 
supported by some Free Democrats and female activists from other parties, proposed a 
broader equality clause. Initially, they faced opposition from Christian conservatives and 
Free Democrats, who insisted on keeping the old Weimar formulation that men and women 
were only equal “in principle.” Furthermore, they argued that the Basic Law must protect 
marriage and the family. The Christian conservative coalition changed their position, 
however, when women’s organizations, trade unions, and individuals protested the decision. 
In the end, the two sides compromised, creating a Basic Law that contained a broader 
equality clause and a family protection clause. 
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On 23 May 1949, the West German Basic Law went into effect with the promise that 
“men and women have equal rights” (“Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt”). A few 
months later, on 7 October 1949, the East German People’s Council passed their own 
constitution, complete with a nearly identical equal rights clause that read: “Men and women 
have equal rights” (“Mann und Frau sind gleichberechtigt.”) Additionally, in each state, the 
promise of Gleichberechtigung was constrained by the “family protection clause,” which 
guaranteed that the state would safeguard marriage and the family. Finally, both provisional 
constitutions guaranteed the overhaul of all legislation prohibiting Gleichberechtigung. In the 
GDR, this clause went into effect immediately; the West German government had until 31 
March 1953 to change its legislation. The matching mandates encased in the 1949 
provisional constitution of the GDR and the Basic Law of the FRG provided the necessary 
legal foundation for reforming the longstanding Civil Code in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Scholars who have written on gender and the family in the two provisional 
constitutions have not fully explained how and why East and West German politicians 
adopted the matching equality clauses.4 This chapter shows that strong path dependencies, 
manifested through different political, social, and economic factors, determined the 
negotiations and decisions regarding the equality clauses in the provisional constitution of the 
GDR and the Basic Law of the FRG in the context of the early Cold War. At the same time, 
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this chapter demonstrates that, in certain ways, the discussions and decisions on both sides 
were similar. For one thing, politicians in East and West relied on similar discourses about 
the historical precedents of the Civil Code, in Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi Germany to 
defend and oppose equality. Furthermore, as the chapter will reveal, the intensifying Cold 
War conflict not only factored into their discourse, but determined the decisions each side 
made, although to different degrees.5  
 This chapter covers the debates over the equal rights and family protection clauses in 
the Soviet and Western occupation zones between 1946 and 1949. The first section examines 
the discussions over the equality of women in a new, all-German constitution in the Soviet 
zone. At first, the SED was complacent with recycling the Weimar constitution’s equality 
and family protection clauses. The intervention of German female activists and the Soviet 
occupiers pushed the SED to accept a stronger equal rights clause. The second section 
analyzes the parallel debates in the Western zones. Here, politicians and legal experts fought 
long and hard to retain the Weimar formulation, partly as a rejection of Soviet-style equal 
rights for women. In the end, however, they surrendered to the masses of women protesting 
for greater legal protection. The third section reverts to the Soviet zone, where the West’s 
adoption of a broader equal rights clause took SED politicians by surprise and provoked them 
to look one step ahead to reforming the Civil Code. 
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Emancipating Women in the Soviet Zone, 1946–1949 
 
In July 1946, the SED approached the Soviets about writing a “Reichsverfassung,” or 
a national constitution that would cover all German territories.6 Several events in the 
preceding months precipitated this pitch. First, the CDU and SPD had fared much better than 
the KPD in local and regional elections in the American zone, making the KPD and the 
Soviets uneasy.7 The KPD, in fact, responded in April 1946 by forcing the SPD in the Soviet 
zone to merge with them into the SED to guarantee electoral gains. Second, at the end of 
June 1946, the American Allies started to write Länder (in American usage, state) 
constitutions in Württemberg-Baden, Bavaria, and Hessen. The American occupiers made it 
clear early on that they intended to pursue American-style federalism in their zones, which 
startled the SED and the Soviets. Historian Konrad H. Jarausch argues that part of the 
problem stemmed from different conceptions of democracy in the Soviet and Western 
sectors, namely democratic centralism versus federalism.8 When the US rejected the idea of a 
centralized Germany at the Paris Conference in July 1946, pushing instead for a federalist 
system, the Soviets balked and gave the SED permission to draft a national constitution.9  
In August 1946, the responsible SED committee presented the Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany (SMAD) with the first draft of the “Constitution of the 
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Democratic Republic of Germany.”10 Four of the five male committee members—Wilhelm 
Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Max Fechner—were political leaders of the 
SED with little legal training. Pieck and Ulbricht, both Communists before 1933, spent 
World War II in exile in Moscow before returning to Germany with the Red Army in April 
1945.11 Grotewohl and Fechner, former Social Democrats, were imprisoned during the war 
for their SPD membership and resistance to the Nazis.12 The fifth committee member, Karl 
Polak, had received his law degree in 1933, but was dismissed from his civil service post 
under Nazi law because of his Jewish heritage. He went into exile in the Soviet Union, where 
he taught legal theory in Tashkent. He returned to Germany in 1946, joining the KPD/SED.13 
His law degree and time in exile teaching law in the Soviet Union qualified him to lead the 
constitutional reforms within the SED. 
When Polak produced the first draft of an all-German constitution in August 1946, 
the Soviet authorities did not approve it. Historian Heike Amos’ comprehensive study on the 
subject does not explain why, apart from mentioning that Soviet authorities disagreed on it.14 
One possibility is that the Soviets wanted to see how local elections in their zone would go 
                                                 
10 Amos, Entstehung, 37. Translation: “Verfassung der demokratischen deutschen Republik.” The SED also 
presented a draft outlining the Parteivorstand of their party.  
11 Hermann Weber, “Pieck, Wilhelm,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie 20 (2001), 421-422. https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/gnd118594273.html#ndbcontent; Mirjam Husemann, “Walter Ulbricht,” last modified September 
17, 2014, https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/walter-ulbricht 
12 Dorlis Blume and Irmgard Zündorf, “Otto Grotewohl,” last modified February 19, 2016, 
https://www.hdg.de/lemo/biografie/otto-grotewohl.html; Markus Würz, “Max Fechner,” last modified February 
19, 2016, https://www.hdg.de/lemo/biografie/max-fechner.html  
13 For Karl Polak’s biography, see Amos, Entstehung, 37-50. 
14 Amos, Entstehung, 53. Two authorities within SMAD did not agree on the matter and sent it to Moscow, 
where higher-ups, likely because of increasing tensions among the Allies in Germany, also tabled the problem. 
The reasons are not clearly stated in Amos’ study of the issue. Amos, however, also did not focus on gender and 
may have glossed over the issue in an otherwise comprehensive study. 
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before broaching the topic. Another likely reason was that the draft, which closely resembled 
the old Weimar constitution, was too moderate in nature. Although Polak made some key 
changes, such as moving the “Basic Rights and Duties of Germans” section, the text still 
replicated much of the liberal, bourgeois language of the constitution of the failed Weimar 
Republic and did not offer a radically transformed template for a future German socialist 
state.15   
In September 1946, SED deputy chairman and former Communist Party leader 
Walter Ulbricht pressured SMAD to revisit the issue.16 One of Ulbricht’s main arguments 
was legal and political unity. Ulbricht insisted that publishing a draft of the national 
constitution would remind Germans that the Soviets and the SED intended to keep Germany 
united, unlike their Western counterparts.17 He furthermore told the Soviets that it was no 
longer sufficient to criticize the West, but that the SED needed to take action.18 The SED’s 
relative success in the October elections for the state parliament (Landtag) convinced the 
Soviets to relent and allow the SED to move forward with composing the national and state 
constitutions for Germany.  
In November 1946, the SED assembled a constitutional committee of sixteen 
representatives, in contrast to the insular group that drafted the August 1946 version.19 A key 
difference was that this time, the SED permitted women to participate. Käthe Kern was the 
                                                 
15 Amos, Entstehung, 358-405. 
16 For further information on Walter Ulbricht’s rise to power in the Communist Party of Germany, see Eric 
Weitz, Creating German Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 293-303, 318-322. 
17 Amos, Entstehung, 54.  
18 Ibid. 
19 The committee was comprised of sixteen representatives from each of the five Länder in the Soviet zone, as 
well as delegates from the different groups within the SED. Amos, Entstehung, 58-59. 
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sole female delegate, chosen to represent women’s interests. As the “token woman” in the 
SED constitutional committee, Kern lobbied for a separate and stronger equality clause under 
the pretext that the former Social Democratic women she represented and who had fought so 
long for equality wanted it.20 The leader of the commission and former SPD chairman Otto 
Grotewohl rejected her proposal on the grounds that “the big picture will be blurred if 
everyone plucks the morsel from the kitchen that tastes especially good to him.”21 
Undeterred, Kern responded by forwarding a written request for the amendment to the SED 
Central Office and SMAD. Perhaps motivated by their own constitutional guarantees of 
equal rights for men and women22, or seeing the political opportunity to attract women to 
Communism, the Soviets responded positively to Kern’s appeal and ordered the SED to add 
the equality clause.23  
Kern’s initiative and Soviet intervention on her behalf altered the path of the German 
constitution in the Soviet zone. Had the Soviets approved Polak’s initial version, which 
largely replicated the old Weimar formulations, married women would have experienced 
little change in their legal rights. The new version published on 16 November 1946, however, 
expanded civil rights for women, gender, and the family. For example, Article 7 stated: “Men 
                                                 
20 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 35-40; Amos, Entstehung, 59. 
21 Amos, Entstehung, 64; Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 131. Naimark claims that Kern and 
Grotewohl were former lovers, which may have contributed to their conflict in the committee. 
22 “1936 Constitution of the USSR,” December 1936, 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.html#chap10 
23 Käthe Kern petitioned the SMAD authorities on November 11, 1946. Five days later, the draft was published 
in Neues Deutschland with the equal rights clause in it. Given Otto Grotewohl’s outright dismissal of Kern’s 
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answer either way. Since the Soviets’ own constitution included an equal rights clause in Article 122, it is 
possible that they saw this as a prime opportunity to “Sovietize” the SED and the Soviet zone using the equal 
rights clause in the constitution as another vessel. 
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and women have equal rights (Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt).” Additionally, 
Article 25 specified: “The family stands under special constitutional protection. Marriage 
derives from the equality of both sexes.” Furthermore, Article 26 said: “Women are equal to 
men in all areas of civic, economic, and social life. All legal definitions that oppose the equal 
rights of women are overturned.” Finally, the same clause promised equal wages for men and 
women and equal treatment of illegitimate children and their unwed mothers.24  
The SED hid Kern’s struggle with her male colleagues from the public. Instead, the 
SED used the Soviet zone press to present a positive and unified public image of its treatment 
of the equality clause. One strategy the East German media used was emphasizing historic 
change. Several articles published in the November and December 1946 editions of Neues 
Deutschland praised the SED’s draft for finally overcoming the shortcomings of Weimar.25 
Two of the authors, non-party female activist Majabert Foerstner and Kern, both identified 
the phrase “in principle” as the central problem. It was, as Foerstner pointed out, a 
“weakening” word, one that diplomats used “to say no when they do not want to say no.”26 
The articles simultaneously critiqued the old Weimar text and lauded the SED’s attempts to 
create more equality for men and women in all areas of the economy, politics, and society. 
Additionally, newspaper editors employed contemporary comparisons to the division 
of Germany and the West. At the time, the Western zones were in the midst of creating state-
                                                 
24 See also “Entwurf einer Verfassung für die deutsche demokratische Republik vom 14. November 1946,” in 
Amos, Entstehung, 358-405. 
25 Majabert Foerstner, “Die Frau in der Verfassung,” Neues Deutschland, November 28, 1946, 4; Käthe Kern, 
“Die Frau und der Verfassungsentwurf,” Neues Deutschland, November 26, 1946, 4; Friedrich Möglich, “Das 
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26 Foerstner, “Die Frau in der Verfassung.” 
148 
 
level constitutions, many of which included their own versions of equality clauses.27 The 
West, however, had not yet broached the subject of a constitution or equality on the national 
level. The editors of Neues Deutschland therefore presented the SED as the leader in the race 
with the West over equal rights for women. An article titled “Voices from the West,” from 19 
December 1946, for example, featured an unidentified woman complaining about the 
proceedings in the Bavarian state constitutional committee. Some Bavarian representatives 
had opposed the inclusion of an equality clause on the grounds that the Bible granted men 
authority over women.28 The article ended by juxtaposing the Bavarian regional constitution 
(Landesverfassung) with the SED draft and the Weimar constitution, pointing out that only 
the SED would give women the full legal equality that they never experienced before. Using 
the voices of Western women to condemn the Bavarian constitutional committee’s position 
on Gleichberechtigung was a way for the SED to criticize the West while also reproving their 
political opponents, the Christian Democrats.29  
Given the CDU’s gains in earlier local- and regional elections, SED leaders aimed to 
discredit the opposing party, harping on equal rights as one reason to disparage their 
opponents. In a Neues Deutschland article from 28 December 1946, the editors emphasized 
how the issue of Gleichberechtigung differentiated the SED from the East-CDU. The SED 
asserted here that equality of the sexes stood, alongside dispossession of large estates, the 
                                                 
27 The Americans had started to draft Land-level constitutions in June 1946 in Württemberg-Baden, Bayern, and 
Hessen. Britain soon followed suit, though its states (Schleswig-Holstein and Nordrhein-Westfalen) did not 
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“conveyance of natural resources,” and the punishment of former Nazis as one of the four 
prerequisites “that promote progressive democratic development in Germany.”30 The 
message communicated to readers was that the CDU would not address the issues facing 
Germany. As a whole, the impression the SED aimed to give readers was that they had 
produced historical change for the trajectory of women’s rights that their Christian 
conservative and Western counterparts were unable and unwilling to accomplish.  
The SED’s media campaign for equality dropped off for much of 1947 as the wartime 
alliance among the Western Allies and Soviets deteriorated in the context of the Cold War. 
The Allied powers saw Germany more and more as the nucleus of future European stability. 
Indeed, Germany was already relatively stable compared to the rest of Europe, especially 
countries such as Greece, where between 1945 and 1949 a civil war was fought between the 
Greek government army, supported by the United Kingdom and the United States, and the 
Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), the military branch of the Greek Communist Party that 
had led the partisan struggle against the Nazi occupation, backed by the new Yugoslavian, 
Albanian, and Bulgarian governments. In response, US President Harry S. Truman delivered 
a special speech to Congress on 12 March 1947 in which he laid out the eponymous “Truman 
Doctrine”: “the policy of the United States to support “free peoples” who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” which tried to prevent 
the rise of Communism.31 In June 1947, the US drew up the Marshall Plan, although it would 
not be signed into law until a year later, which aimed to support, as part of the fight against 
Communism, the development of Western European capitalist economies.   The Soviet 
                                                 
30 “Zum Verfassungsentwurf der CDU,” Neues Deutschlands, December 28, 1946. 
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Union reacted by strategically delaying approval of the Plan. Throughout 1947, numerous 
meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers failed to settle outstanding disagreements 
among the Soviets and Western Allies.  
The SED revisited the issue of the constitution in December 1947 at the London 
conference. Here, the SED created the People’s Congress (Volkskongress) movement, an 
initiative designed to introduce direct democracy as a form of government for Germany. The 
Soviets and SED envisioned a provisional congress comprised of representatives from the 
Eastern and Western sectors that would draft an all-German constitution.32 Delegates from 
across the occupation zones attended the first meeting, but the composition of the group—
primarily the SED and a small number of Western KPD representatives—raised red flags for 
the Western Allies.33 The Western Allies failed to latch on to the idea, and further 
demonstrated their dissonance by not inviting the Soviets to the London Six-Power 
Conference in February 1948, where they discussed the “German question.” 
The Soviets and the SED took their exclusion from the Six-Power Conference as a 
signal that the wartime alliance could not be reconciled. In response, they pulled out of the 
Allied Control Council. In February 1948, Grotewohl recommended turning the People’s 
Congress movement into a “provisional parliament.”34 The Soviets approved the idea, thus 
paving the way for the new parliament, dominated by the SED, to begin its work on 19 
                                                 
32 Inga Markovits, “Constitution Making After National Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990,” William & 
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33 Ibid. 
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March 1948.35 Grotewohl chaired the Constitutional Committee (Verfassungsausschuss), 
which became responsible for debating individual, social, and cultural rights in the new 
socialist Germany, Grotewohl argued that the SED cared deeply about individual freedoms. 
He stated, “As far as private life comes into consideration, I would like to leave no doubts 
that my party would not like to work with petty restrictions in the constitution, but rather that 
the principles of private life and the right to personal freedom should be seen as universal.”36 
Grotewohl cited equal rights for men and women as a specific example of universal 
freedoms, proclaiming that “it is self-evident that men and women must be treated equally in 
the constitution.”37 He said little more on the topic, but made his point clear enough: that the 
People’s Council intended to include constitutional equality for men and women, as the SED 
had championed since 1946. 
Grotewohl’s defense of women’s equality was surprising, given his earlier disregard 
of Käthe Kern’s proposals.38 At the same time, a lot had changed in a year and a half. By the 
time the Constitutional Committee convened in June 1948, German division was almost 
inevitable as a result of the exclusion of the Soviets from the Six-Power Conference, their 
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37 Ibid. 
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rapid departure from the Allied Control Council, and the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the currency reform in the West German Trizone on 10 June 
1948, which cemented the economic and political division of Germany. Going on their own 
path allowed the SED and the Soviets to pursue their own version of basic rights without 
consideration of or fighting with the Western Allies. Furthermore, the SED had already 
embraced a broad equality clause and recognized the salience of equal rights as a “Cold War 
weapon.” Although Western states had, to different degrees, granted women equal rights in 
their state-level constitutions, the People’s Council (and the SED) saw an opportunity to 
implement equality on a national level first. 
It was one thing to support equality in principle, but another to actively change 
inequities. Many male People’s Council representatives were reluctant to do the latter and 
relied on their female colleagues to do the heavy lifting for the constitutional convention. In 
the Constitutional Committee and the People’s Council at large, female SED and DFD 
delegates such as Hilde Benjamin, Käthe Kern, and Hildegard Heinze, a lawyer and former 
member of the KPD from Saxony, took the reins. Kern argued, as she had in November 
1946, in favor of “the complete equality of women to be anchored in a future constitution.”39 
Kern called for the constitutional equality of men and women “in all areas of public 
(staatlich), economic, and social life” and to overturn (“sind aufzuheben”) all legal barriers 
preventing equality for women.40 Furthermore, she asserted, constitutional equality for 
women was important “for the entire economic construction and redevelopment of 
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Germany.”41 At the same time, Benjamin argued that the People’s Council’s current 
guideline, which stated, “Women are equal (gleichgestellt) with men in all areas of 
constitutional, social, and economic life,” was insufficient because it implied that men were 
always the measuring stick for women.42 She proposed instead the same formulation as the 
earlier SED draft, which stated: “Men and women have equal rights.”43 
Female activists recognized that they needed to move from promises to enactment. 
Heinze observed that the concept of equal rights and its inclusion in the constitution were not 
disputable.44 Rather, she asked, “The question is only, how can we actually implement it 
[Gleichberechtigung] as effectively as possible?”45 She insisted that they could go further to 
demand equality in all areas. Heinze suggested, in fact, that the wording change from “be 
overturned (sind aufzuheben)” to “opposing legal definitions are overturned 
(entgegenstehende Bestimmungen sind aufgehoben).”46 Immediate removal of the laws 
would avoid a temporary legal loophole, because there would be no dispute between existing 
laws and the basic rights of citizens in the Soviet zone. As a specific example, Heinze raised 
the problem of the future viability of the Civil Code. According to Heinze, the Civil Code’s 
provisions on family law, marriage law, marital property law, and unmarried mothers 
demanded special attention. Similarly, in a separate address to the People’s Council, Hilde 
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Benjamin expressed concern that the current discourse had omitted civil equality for men and 
women. She stated: 
It is not only necessary that the forthcoming German constitution explicitly 
pronounces this basic right [of equality]. […] Women’s work, for decades, has no 
longer been imagined as nonexistent in our economy. But [equality] is completely 
missing in private life, especially for married women under family law.47  
 
In Benjamin’s opinion, in order to move forward, Germany had to enact equality in all 
spheres.  
In addition to focusing on historical precedent, female activists often used comparison 
to the West to present their own reforms in a better light. Kern, for instance, criticized the 
Weimar Republic and Western (specifically the Bavarian and Bremen) state constitutions for 
only guaranteeing equality “in principle (grundsätzlich),” an empty promise that perpetuated 
legal disadvantages for women.48 As another example, Benjamin asserted that equality “is 
missing, as we can see in the Western part of Germany, in the area of constitutional equality” 
and that “[equality] is absent, with the exception of the Soviet zone in the subjective side of 
their role in economic life, i.e. regarding the recognition of the demands of women in the 
framework of the economy.”49 Here, she stressed that even if the Soviet zone had not yet 
achieved full equality in all areas, they had still done more than their Western counterparts. 
As another example, Benjamin identified the restrictions on female, and especially married, 
tenured civil servants (Beamtinnen) as an example of flawed West German laws. Similarly, 
in October 1948, Kern cited Western quotas of 10 percent of female students in higher 
education, whereas the Soviet zone’s percentage of women had already risen to 33.5 
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percent.50 Furthermore, she noted that in Bavaria, married female doctors could still be 
dismissed from their jobs; this would be the case until 1953 when the Bundestag changed the 
civil service law.51  
At its next meeting in October 1948, the People’s Council agreed to adopt the new 
constitution, although it was not yet legally binding. Between 1946 and 1948, constitutional 
equality in the Soviet zone underwent several changes. Originally following the Weimar 
template, the SED decided to abandon its first draft under pressure from female activists like 
Käthe Kern and the Soviets, which resulted in their adoption of a broader equality clause. 
Once the SED settled on this version, they argued it was a vast improvement over the 
Weimar formulation, it was more progressive than the West, and it would facilitate the long-
desired reforms of the Civil Code. Since the ruling party first broached the topic of a national 
constitution in 1946, however, the international stakes of the constitutional debates in the 
Soviet zone had changed dramatically. By late 1948, the SED was under more pressure to 
out-do the Western sectors, where a concurrent discussion of a new constitution—and by 
extension, women’s equality with men—was occurring. As the next section shows, similar 
discourses over the constitutional equality of men and women unfolded in the Western 
Parliamentary Council in late 1948 and early 1949, but different impulses shaped their 
decision to adopt a broader equality clause. 
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Sexual Equality “In Principle” in the West German Basic Law, 1948–49 
By October 1948, the Western sectors had begun their own state and national 
constitutional reforms, as Käthe Kern alluded in her speech to the East German People’s 
Council in the same month.52 The formation of the People’s Council a year before had forced 
the Western Allies into a tight spot. They could agree to the Eastern constitution, as the SED, 
Soviets, and West German KPD hoped in vain, or they could create a separate West German 
state.53 The Western Allies chose the latter. They wanted, however, to preserve the 
possibility of reunification in the future and therefore officially pursued a “provisional” 
government and “Basic Law (Grundgesetz)” rather than a constitution.54 With these 
considerations in mind, a committee crafted a set of guidelines for the forthcoming Basic 
Law at the Herrenchiemsee Convention in August 1948.55 Herrenchiemsee set the stage for 
the upcoming Parliamentary Council, where the basic structures and rights of West German 
citizens would be defined.  
On 1 September 1948, sixty-five delegates gathered in Bonn to compose the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ambivalence permeated the atmosphere of the 
opening sessions of the convention. Memories of the failures of the Weimar Republic, 
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coupled with the destruction of the Nazi regime, created a nation-wide anxiety about 
democracy. Moreover, the Western delegates were well aware of the developments in the 
Eastern People’s Council. Some historians suggest that most Germans had some hope for 
democracy, because “it offered an experiment, a pragmatic effort that could hardly be worse 
than the status quo,” which remained rather unstable.56  
Part of this instability was political. Average Germans were rather apathetic about 
politics and democracy in general.57 Those who were politically active had to carve out their 
spots carefully. They had to prove themselves sufficiently antifascist, anti-Communist, and 
pro-democracy. Initially, SPD leaders believed they might represent the best of these 
qualities, but they had to compete with the recently formed center-right CDU/CSU, whose 
chairman, Konrad Adenauer, also held the powerful position as chair of the Parliamentary 
Council.58 The outcome of the power play between the SPD and CDU/CSU depended on the 
cooperation of smaller parties in the Council. The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
formed a coalition with the CDU/CSU, often throwing its three votes in the larger party’s 
favor.59 Likewise, the conservative German Party (DP) and the Catholic Center Party (Z) 
aligned themselves with the CDU/CSU on the Council.60 The SPD’s closest ally was the 
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marginalized KPD, but even the Social Democrats kept their distance from Communism 
because of their anti-Communist politics.61 The Council leaned more to the right, as most of 
the liberal and conservative parties voted alongside the CDU/CSU, whereas only the 
Communists voted with the SPD.62  
Divisions in the Council were not only along political lines, but gendered lines. Only 
four of the 65 delegates (6 percent) were women. Representing the Social Democrats were 
long-time activists Elisabeth Selbert, a lawyer from Kassel, and Friederike Nadig, a social 
worker and politician from Westphalia.63 From the CDU came Helene Weber, a prominent 
Catholic German Women’s Union leader from North Rhine-Westphalia. Finally, Helene 
Wessel, a social worker from the Dortmund area, represented the Catholic Center Party.64 
Together, they became known as the “four mothers” of the Basic Law.65 The FDP, DP, and 
KPD had no female delegates, but their leading female members worked behind the scenes to 
influence their parties’ male representatives.  
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On many issues, the four women were divided and voted along party lines. When it 
came to Gleichberechtigung, however, the four women joined forces to mount a campaign 
against their male compatriots in the Council. They all believed in the importance of an equal 
rights clause, even if their conceptions of equality differed. Nadig and Selbert, for instance, 
unequivocally supported equal legal rights of men and women in all areas of the economy, 
politics, and society, including marriage and family. Weber and Wessel meanwhile wanted 
the “natural differences between the sexes” to define their gender specific tasks in all areas, 
while acknowledging that the equal rights of both sexes were inviolable.66 As a result, they 
championed equal rights while also defending the utility of the family protection clause. 
Discussions over Gleichberechtigung began in the Committee on Basic Matters and 
Rights (Ausschuss für Grundsatzfragen und Grundrechte, AGG), whose task was to identify 
the fundamental issues affecting the future Federal Republic and to determine the basic rights 
of its citizens. Upon the insistence of the SPD and the FDP, the AGG drafted a Catalog of 
Basic Rights, which Social Democrat Ludwig Bergsträsser, a political scientist and 
parliamentarian from Hesse, presented to the committee in late September 1948.67 
Bergsträsser’s Catalog began with a broad statement about equality (“Gleichheit”): “All 
people are equal before the law without consideration of sex, race, origin, religion, or 
political persuasion.” He supplemented this proclamation with recycled language from the 
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Weimar constitution: “Men and women have the same fundamental civic rights and duties.” 
Additionally, the Catalog guaranteed equal rights in employment. It stated that all public 
offices were equally accessible to everyone. Finally, women and youth must receive the same 
wages “for equal activity and equal accomplishment.” Bergsträsser argued that an equality 
statement was necessary to correct the wrongdoings of the Hitler era. He singled out the 
equality clause as an area that demanded special attention because it represented an “entire 
series of legal definitions and customary traditions that have not drawn out the reasoning of 
the principle [of equality].”68 
Some Council representatives used vague legal language as a strategy to respond to 
Bergsträsser’s proposals. As the Council debate over access to public office showed, 
proponents of inequality were keen to gloss over explicit references to women.69 Hermann 
von Mangoldt, a lawyer and CDU politician from Schleswig-Holstein, who was also the 
AGG chairman, explained to this committee that there had been much disagreement over 
reusing the Weimar formulation, which stated:  
(1) All citizens, without exception, in accordance to law and corresponding to their 
capabilities and accomplishments, are permitted to serve in public office. 
(2) All admission regulations against female civil servants are removed. 
(3) The requisites of a civil service appointment are regulated through law.70  
 
According to Mangoldt, stipulating that no prohibitions existed on female civil servants was 
                                                 
68 “Katalog der Grundrechte 21. September 1948,” in Der Parlamentarische Rat, 1948-1949: Akten u. 
Protokolle, 16. 
69 “Sechste Sitzung 5. Oktober 1948,” in Der Parlamentarische Rat, 1948-1949: Akten U. Protokolle, 135. 
Public office, as committee chairman and law professor Hermann von Mangoldt defined it, included civil 
servants (Beamten) and honorary civil service appointees (Ehrenbeamten). For biography of Hermann von 
Mangoldt, see: “Hermann von Mangoldt,” last modified September 1, 2008, 
http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-geschichte/grundgesetz-und-parlamentarischer-rat/39105/hermann-von-
mangoldt-cdu. He had been a member of the Nazi lawyers’ union and maintained his teaching position 
throughout the Third Reich. In 1948 he was elected to the Landtag of Schleswig-Holstein. 
70 “Sechste Sitzung 5. Oktober 1948,” in Der Parlamentarische Rat, 1948-1949: Akten u. Protokolle, 135. See 
also the 1919 Weimar constitution: http://www.documentarchiv.de/wr/wrv.html 
161 
 
superfluous, because the equal rights clause covered women’s rights.71 The Council voted to 
remove the second paragraph. Without the explicit guarantee that women would have equal 
access, coupled with the third paragraph, female activists had reason to fear that future 
lawmakers could once again (as they had in Weimar and Nazi Germany) pass legislation 
barring women from office.  
With the issue of public office settled, the Council then focused its attention on the 
subject of equal wages, a difficult subject because of the East. Two years before, the Soviets 
had enforced an “equal wages for equal work” policy in their zone.72 The impending East 
German constitution furthermore promised equal wages for men, women, and youth in 
Article 18.73 The Western zones had left the issue to the discretion of individual factory 
owners, with the unsavory side effect of much lower levels of implementation. Large salary 
differences continue to exist in most cases. Given this precedent, the SPD wandered into 
tenuous territory when it proposed that “women and youth have claims to equal wages for 
equal activity and equal accomplishment.”74 The SPD, however, found unlikely allies in the 
FDP and some Christian conservative female activists. Theodor Heuss, the leader of the FDP 
and future president of the Federal Republic, threw his support behind the SPD, only 
stopping to warn them that the original wording could become problematic because “it leads 
one to conclude that women and youth should be treated equally, but not in relationship to 
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men.”75 Helene Weber (CDU) offered her staunch support for an equal wages clause. The 
SPD responded by remedying its formulation to say: “Equal activity and equal 
accomplishment require equal wages.”76  
Other members of the AGG opposed the SPD’s proposal. Mangoldt (CDU) 
emphasized two potential problems with implementing equal wages. He argued that there 
was an issue with “the equality in wage assessment,” implying that it was too difficult to 
monitor the determination of wages by employers.77 In other words, he was unwilling to 
intervene in the workplace, thus allowing employers to continue to discriminate against 
women. Moreover, Mangoldt followed up these remarks with a second point, what he called 
“the entire question of social order.” He asked, “Why is this special issue singled out here?” 
It was wholly inappropriate, he asserted, to bring up the problem of equal wages in the AGG, 
whose purpose was to determine basic rights.78 Rather than addressing the fruitfulness of 
equal wages for men and women in the new postwar state, Mangoldt skirted the issue by 
emphasizing that legislators could not intervene in workplace practices of privately owned 
companies on a logistical or a juridical basis.  
In a matter of moments, the few allies among the FDP and CDU/CSU abandoned the 
SPD. Heuss (FDP) offered up the alternate wording “equal rewards,” claiming now that 
making equal wages a constitutional right might prevent promotion opportunities and 
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therefore become “a consequence for individual life possibilities.”79 Helene Weber (CDU) 
asserted that equal wages did not belong as a basic right, though she conceded that they 
remained an important social-political issue.80 Other members of the CDU/CSU, such as 
Anton Pfeiffer, a leading Bavarian politician, expressed sympathy for the SPD’s sentiments, 
but nevertheless asserted that the issue belonged elsewhere.81  
Members of the SPD tried in vain to defend their position. Frieda Nadig (SPD) 
averred that the issue was not merely social-political, but that women and youth had claims 
to such basic rights.82 Nadig’s background as a youth social worker and member of the 
Westphalian provincial diet informed her ardent support.83 She claimed that such a 
constitutional right “could mean a fundamental change for the majority of women who had 
no rights in these areas.”84 Similarly, Bergsträsser pointed out that many labor agreements 
expressly stipulated lower wages for women who performed equal work. To make the matter 
a constitutional right was, he asserted, “important for the sense of a modern structure and 
equal rights of women.”85 The SPD thus saw equal wages as a necessary basic right for the 
new and modern postwar German state. Their opponents attempted to block the issue by 
arguing that it would undermine social order and intervene too much in the affairs of 
                                                 
79 “Sechste Sitzung 5. Oktober 1948,” 143. 
80 Ibid., 144. 
81 Ibid., 145. For the biography of Anton Pfeiffer see: Christiane Reuter-Boysen, “Pfeiffer, Anton” in: Neue 
Deutsche Biographie 20 (2001), 314. http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118828169.html.  
82 “Sechste Sitzung 5. Oktober 1948,” 144. 
83 For Frieda Nadig’s biography, see: “Frieda Nadig, 1897-1970,” last modified January 19, 2016, 
https://www.hdg.de/lemo/biografie/frieda-nadig.html 
84 “Sechste Sitzung 5. Oktober 1948,” 144. 
85 Ibid. 
164 
 
employers.  
At this point, the opposition of the CDU/CSU and FDP proved too much for the SPD, 
who were forced to temporarily concede on the matter. The subject of equal wages, however, 
emerged again in November 1948 in the context of a debate over the non-discrimination 
clause in the constitution. Here, the Council addressed the West German KPD’s proposal for 
a Basic Rights Catalog. Its suggestions namely centered on social and economic rights. One 
article (vaguely reminiscent of the SED’s language) stated: 
Men, women, and youth receive equal wages for equal work. 
Women enjoy special protection in labor contracts. Laws will establish facilities that 
ensure that women can reconcile their tasks as citizens and creators with their duties 
as wives and mothers. 
Motherhood grants women claims to the special protection and welfare of the state. 
Out-of-wedlock births may not disadvantage mother or child.86 
 
The KPD’s suggestions reflected the long-standing goals of the party. Since the 1920s, it 
wanted to grant women the social and economic equality they needed to achieve 
emancipation. At the same time, it reinforced notions that women’s roles were defined as 
much by marriage and the family as they were the workplace. 
The KPD’s suggestion resonated with many members of the Council. Some members 
of the AGG responded by noting that some Western state constitutions (specifically Bavaria 
and Hessen) offered equal wages for equal work. Helene Weber (CDU) furthermore 
suggested adding the phrase: “If they accomplish the same work, they have the claim to equal 
wages.” Nadig (SPD) offered her support for the KPD by way of comparison. She observed 
that in the Soviet zone, the SED’s draft went even further in its promises of full equality to 
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women, equal wages, and special protection in labor contracts.87 Her use of comparison was 
a way to subtly label the Western KPD’s proposal as moderate and non-threatening. Nadig’s 
argument, however, had the unintended consequence of reminding the Council of the SED’s 
actions in the Soviet zone and that any support of the Western KPD might lead the new 
republic down the same path. Despite the Council’s initially positive—or at least, not 
outright negative—reactions to the KPD, enough center-right and liberal members voted 
against the “equal wages” clause to ensure its permanent omission from the final draft of the 
Basic Law.88 
The Council’s debates over “equal wages,” which stretched out for a full two months, 
reflected the ambivalence of its members on the issue. Most of the representatives could 
agree that men and women deserved equal wages if they performed equal work. The problem 
was their willingness to upend traditional social and economic structures in order to 
implement equal wages. The CDU/CSU and their liberal allies refused to experiment with 
social order—although it was already destroyed in the immediate postwar years—at the 
expense of expanding women’s rights in the workplace. The SPD was willing to take the 
gamble, but could not overcome its Christian conservative and liberal rivals to do so. Nor, for 
that matter, could it avoid semblances to the Soviet zone. 
A second issue that arose during the AGG’s debates was the family protection clause. 
Prompted by a series of petitions submitted by primarily male Catholic Church members, the 
CDU/CSU initiated a campaign to include a “family protection” clause in the Basic Law. 
One group from Eschweiler, claiming to represent all Catholics in the city and surrounding 
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region, proclaimed to the Council that they demanded “the protection of marriage and the 
family” for the sake of “the Christian ethnic community (Volksgemeinschaft).”89 
Furthermore, the CDU/CSU justified their suggestion by citing the UN’s as-yet-unpublished 
Declaration of Human Rights, which identified the family as the “fundamental cell of society 
and demanding of protection.”90 Finally, the center-right delegates claimed that the precedent 
of a family protection clause in the Weimar constitution necessitated its repetition in the new 
Basic Law. 
The SPD opposed the CDU/CSU’s suggestion on the grounds that it would prevent 
the enactment of “a family law that matched modern relationships.”91 The CDU/CSU, 
however, was less concerned with the future of the republic than they were repeating its past. 
Legal expert Adolf Süsterhenn, Minister of Justice in Rheinland Pfalz and one of the 
founders of the CDU, claimed that the Weimar constitution had actually gone too far in 
granting women equality in marriage.92 He stated, “The equality of men and women in 
marriage can only exist so far as the natural functions of the sexes are allowed to agree.”93 
When the Social Democrats objected that such beliefs hindered legal equality and did not 
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account for social changes for women, the CDU/CSU replied that guaranteeing “absolute 
equal rights” would not change “the nature of men and women.”94 
Essentialist arguments were not the only form of rhetoric the CDU/CSU and their 
liberal allies used to undermine the SPD. Christian Democratic discourse also reflected a 
poignant awareness of the increasing Cold War tensions with the East. When Nadig proposed 
changing the Civil Code, Mangoldt pointed out that the UN Declaration should prompt the 
Council to “take leave of its strong contact with the East and its laws,” especially regarding 
marriage and family, because “in Russia the relations are just different.”95 How much this 
argument was part of Cold War rhetoric demonstrates the previous section: the everyday 
gender relations in Russia and the Soviet zone were not so different and even in the discourse 
and policies one can find similarities. The SED, for instance, had its own “family protection” 
clause, although it was equally committed to an expansive equal rights clause. Moreover, the 
Council was well aware of the developments in the East. When the CDU/CSU encouraged 
their compatriots to “take leave” of the East, they intentionally constructed the idea that the 
two sides were fundamentally different in regards to their policies on marriage and family 
and tried to make both to a marker of Cold War differences.  
The CDU/CSU’s ability to erect the notion of fundamental differences between East 
and West in the context of the Cold War had huge consequences for the SPD as it struggled 
for Gleichberechtigung. When the SPD initiated discussions on the equal rights clause in 
November 1948, they faced the challenge of both fighting the CDU/CSU’s traditionalist 
stance as well as avoiding resemblance to the SED. They pursued the following reforms to 
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Bergsträsser’s Catalog of Basic Rights. First, they wanted to keep the opening line of the 
“equality” paragraph: “All people are equal before the law.”96 Second, they proposed for the 
first time in November 1948 that the Council should adopt a broader formulation of the equal 
rights clause that stated: “Men and women have equal rights.”97 Finally, the SPD qualified 
that they wished to uphold the third paragraph, which read: “No one may be discriminated 
against or advantaged because of his ancestry, sex, and so forth.”98 
Did the rest of the Parliamentary Council consider all people to be equal before the 
law? The discourse employed by the CDU/CSU demonstrated that they believed in the 
contrary. They drew inspiration from liberal jurist and fellow Council delegate Richard 
Thoma, already in the Weimar Republic a leading expert in constitutional law, who had 
recently published a critique of the Catalog of Basic Rights.99 Thoma asserted, regarding 
equality, that it “is the task of the law...to treat what is the same equally and what is different 
unequally, or ‘handle it according to its nature.’”100 Thoma implied that sexual difference 
was natural and therefore must be handled differently from other forms of rights. His 
formulation became the basis of the CDU/CSU’s position on Gleichberechtigung. Mangoldt 
(CDU) defended Thoma, drawing out several examples of difference that, in his mind, 
demanded particular legal treatment. He stated, “Legislators must treat a minimum of rights 
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equally. But there are individual rights and duties, let’s say professions, where there are 
different possibilities to treat them differently for reasons of difference.”101 Mangoldt 
followed up this statement by pointing out the role of ethnic or racial differences in law, 
observing that groups such as Gypsies (Roma/Sinti) or African Americans who just “had 
natural nuances that must lead to a different regulation.”102  
Another line of argumentation concerned masculinity and the rights of fathers. Some 
Christian conservative members argued against equality because it would not treat men 
fairly. For instance, Mangoldt argued that some legal protections regarding motherhood 
could not extend equally to men.103 Council representatives in the opposition did not entirely 
disagree with Mangoldt. Bergsträsser (SPD) called the idea of “manly motherhood” 
“absurd,” indicating that he was hesitant to embrace complete equality of the sexes as well.104 
In addition, Helene Weber (CDU) asserted her own position that, “No equality exists among 
men either,” pointing out to the Council that drawing distinctions between men and women 
was arbitrary, since all individuals were different.105 Some Council members, then, tried to 
undermine support for women’s equality by highlighting its detriments for men and arguing 
that no one was created equal. 
In order to build on the promises laid out in the original formulation of Paragraph 1, 
the SPD offered as Paragraph 2: “Men and women have equal rights.” Nadig (SPD) argued 
that such wording was necessary to ensure the reform of the BGB. In particular, she singled 
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out the property rights of married women as a highly problematic section of the Civil Code. 
As she further noted, it was no longer uncommon for women to earn more than men or to 
have their own professions. She implied that it was ridiculous for a law to persist that 
relegated women’s property to their husbands when, given the current social crisis, they were 
often the breadwinners in the family.106  
Several liberal and center-right representatives immediately ganged up on Nadig. 
Thomas Dehler, a left-liberal FDP member who would later become the FRG’s first Minister 
of Justice, opposed the SPD’s proposal on the grounds that it would make the BGB 
unconstitutional.107 Mangoldt (CDU) argued that the third paragraph’s non-discrimination 
clause should provide sufficient legal protection. After all, he retorted to the Council, “Civic 
equality has not yet been implemented everywhere in Europe. In Switzerland women do not 
yet have the vote. We are already far ahead in this direction and we would emphasize in this 
way, what was formerly controversial.”108 
Other members of the Council were somewhere in the middle. Helene Weber, for 
example, supported the notion of altering the legal prohibitions encapsulated by Civil Code. 
However, she expressed reticence toward the idea of completely changing women’s roles. 
She claimed that there were cases where women’s work forced them to “withdraw” from the 
family, a situation that was “good neither for the woman, her husband, or the children.”109 
Weber thus proved an unstable ally for the SPD, which was unsurprising given her Catholic 
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background. While she expressed support for changing the Civil Code, her arguments for 
women’s roles in the family did not set her radically apart from her male colleagues. She 
exemplified the contradictory attitudes toward Gleichberechtigung held by many CDU/CSU, 
liberal, and even some Social Democratic women at the time. 
The November 1948 debate over Gleichberechtigung demonstrated the divisiveness 
of the issue. For Social Democratic delegates like Nadig or Bergsträsser, the need for a wide-
ranging equality clause was clear. Without it, they believed the future government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany would never be able to change the longstanding Civil Code. 
Others like the Catholic women’s leader Weber had to reconcile the conflict between their 
desires for legal equality and preservation of different societal roles for men and women. 
Finally, Christian-conservative members such as Mangoldt and Dehler refused to confront 
the possibility of male authority changing, so they relied on legalese to argue around the 
issue. In the end, the committee tabled the discussion. 
In early December 1948, the SPD reintroduced the equality clause before the Steering 
Committee of the Parliamentary Council. This time, the SPD employed a decided shift in 
strategy. Party leaders enlisted the help of Elisabeth Selbert, a female activist and jurist. 
Selbert’s path to politics had been anything but straightforward. Born to a “rural middle-
class” family, she eventually became politically active in the Weimar Republic, joining the 
SPD and standing for local election. Meanwhile, she completed a dissertation on divorce 
rights and began to practice family law. Her work as a lawyer supported her family during 
World War II after her husband (a longtime SPD leader) was removed from his position for 
political reasons. After 1945, Selbert came to prominence again within the SPD, though her 
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later attempts to join the Bundestag and Federal Constitutional court failed.110 
When Selbert went before the Steering Committee, the SPD stood in a precarious 
position regarding equality. It had already suffered several defeats since the Council had 
convened, the last only four days before. The Steering Committee was set to review the 
Catalog of Basic Rights, which included an equality paragraph that stated: 
1. All people are equal before the law. The law must treat what is equal as equal, it can 
treat what is different according to its nature. No one’s basic rights may be violated. 
2. Men and women have the same civic rights and duties. 
3. No one may be discriminated against nor advantaged because of his sex, ancestry, 
race, language, homeland and origin, beliefs, religious, or political views.111  
 
Once again, the SPD recommended to change the second paragraph to say: “Men and women 
have equal rights.”112 
The SPD’s success, at this stage, largely depended on Selbert’s ability to convince the 
Steering Committee. She approached her speech from three different angles. First, she harped 
on historical precedents, declaring that it was “self-evident that today, one must go further 
than Weimar and that equality must be given to women in all areas.” Second, she argued that 
women’s sacrifices during the Second World War necessitated granting them full equality. 
The non-discrimination clause (paragraph 3 of the above quote), she asserted, would do little 
to guarantee women the equality they deserved. Accordingly, she suggested that the Council 
not only adopt the SPD’s formulation, but that they add a statement guaranteeing its 
implementation in the Civil Code by 31 March 1953. Finally, she warned the Council that if 
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they did not comply, the “leading women in the entire public” would protest.113  
The CDU/CSU rebuffed Selbert’s powerful arguments on the grounds of “legal 
consequences.”114 According to Mangoldt (CDU), the CDU/CSU never disagreed with the 
notion of women’s equality with men, but rather “the legal consequences that cannot be 
overlooked concerning the different definitions of civil law.”115 He qualified that they had 
specific concerns about family law, not necessarily marital property or marriage law. Besides 
the potential legal crisis, he argued that the SPD’s framing was unnecessary because the non-
discrimination clause was there as a “security measure.”116 When Mangoldt pointed out that 
marital property could change, but not the patriarchal family law, he reified the CDU/CSU’s 
belief that the status of women and the family (as a social structure) were unchanging, 
because they were based on “natural differences” between the sexes. The exclusion of a 
wide-ranging equality clause was indeed a security measure, one designed to protect the 
notion that (perceived) biological difference determined legal status. 
These assumptions permeated the Council. Liberals and Communists alike proved 
unwilling to accompany the SPD, although for different reasons. The FDP, though it objected 
to the existing marital property structure, remained reluctant to change other aspects of 
family and marriage law that were “not equally applicable for both [spouses].”117 One 
delegate, a liberal Protestant lawyer named Max Becker, asked the Council rhetorically: 
Should men and women take both names? Whose name will the child have, the 
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man’s, the woman’s, or both? Who has legal authority over underage children, the 
man, woman, or both? Whose opinion comes first, if they don’t agree with each 
other? You see, the practical implementation offers considerable difficulties.118  
 
Furthermore, Becker warned the Council that imposing a 1953 deadline would create a legal 
vacuum. 
Meanwhile, the KPD called the SPD’s formulation “empty” and insisted again, 
unsuccessfully, on the inclusion of an “equal wages” clause to substantiate women’s claims 
to equality.119 When Selbert rebutted that the SPD’s broad wording included equal wages, the 
KPD responded skeptically. They implied that the SPD’s priorities were misguided. Heinz 
Renner, a KPD politician and former Minister from North Rhine-Westphalia, argued, “The 
place that the BGB allots women is in my opinion simply a manifestation of the place that 
the bourgeois capitalist society gives women.”120 The actual solution, he asserted, was to 
ensure women and men earned equal wages for equal work. Additionally, he expressed fear 
that the proposed 1953 deadline would prove ineffective and would only result in the 
repetition of the stalemates that had occurred in Weimar. 
The CDU/CSU not only defended its stance on juridical grounds, but pursued another 
rhetorical alternative: seizing upon the politically weak position of the SPD. According to 
Theophil Kaufmann, a Christian Democratic journalist, there were many legal definitions 
that protected the “peculiarities and special tasks of women.” He quoted an article from the 
Social Democratic Party organ, Neuer Vorwärts, which explored the working lives of women 
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in the Soviet Union, as evidence of how the East “erased” sexual difference. He stated: 
It says there: ‘Women are equal to men there, and one has taken [into account] in the 
legal and actual place in public life of women no consideration of the biological basis 
and the spiritual demeanor of women. The fact of equalization [Gleichsetzung] to 
men creates unattractive appearances before all in the production process.’121  
 
Kaufmann pointed out to the SPD and KPD—using their own words—that they shared the 
Christian Democrats’ reluctance to grant full equality because of women’s essence and 
biology. According to Kaufmann, it was best to focus on preventing discrimination based on 
sex, but not enforcing complete equality. He claimed that the phrase “equal rights 
(Gleichberechtigung) does not capture what we actually want.”122 Rather than compare the 
SPD to the Soviet zone, the CDU/CSU capitalized on the Left’s precarious position in the 
West in the context of the Cold War to demonstrate its inability to accomplish the goals it set 
out for equality. The CDU/CSU’s arguments proved to be just effective enough. With a 
narrow margin of two “yeas”, the committee voted to reject the SPD’s proposal and adopt the 
CDU/CSU’s formulation. 
The Western public learned from newspapers and radio broadcasts of the SPD’s 
defeat. The Munich Radio (Münchner Rundfunk), in the American controlled occupation 
zone, supported the position of the SPD and communicated to its listeners that all hope was 
not yet gone. Gleichberechtigung would come before the plenary again and that listeners 
could remain optimistic that “the real sense for the role of women in economic and public life 
will conquer prejudice.”123 The liberal-conservative DIE ZEIT reported on the success of the 
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Catholic and Protestant churches, though it did not mention the SPD’s defeat.124 The SED 
newspaper Neues Deutschland reported that the Bonn “splinter constitution” paled in 
comparison to their own constitution, which guaranteed full equality to the sexes.125 Many 
readers and listeners, regardless of political milieu, reacted to the news with discernible 
unease and with no clear consensus, as the public uproar would demonstrate.  
Within a week of the meeting, the Parliamentary Council started to receive petitions 
and telegrams from independent women’s organizations, trade unions, and individuals 
protesting the recent decision. Historians such as Elizabeth D. Heineman and Robert G. 
Moeller have noted that, unlike the rest of the Parliamentary Council’s proceedings, the issue 
of gender equality generated intense public reactions.126 These petitions expressed a range of 
different opinions that stretched from complete support for the SPD to rejection of any of the 
parties’ proposals. Many of the petitions from individual associations within the Deutscher 
Frauenring, for example, expressed support for the SPD’s formulation, even though many 
members did not support the party in general.127 Erdmuthe von Falkenberg, leader of the 
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independent, non-party Heidelberg Women’s Association (Heidelberger Frauenverein), who 
had studied law from 1931 to 1939 and was Wissenschaftliche Assistentin (assistant 
professor) at Juristische Seminar (law department) at the University of Heidelberg from 1945 
to 1949, expressed her association’s “sharp protest against the denial of full equality in the 
constitution.”128 Similarly, the telegram from the independent Karlsruhe Women’s Group 
(Karlsruhe Frauengruppe) noted that they “joined the plea of the women of Hesse and 
Wuerttemberg-Baden to change the formulation of Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the basic 
rights.”129  
Other groups supported the SPD’s formulation, but with additional stipulations. For 
example, the Wuppertal branch of the Deutscher Frauenring (Frauenring Wuppertal) 
proposed to add the following phrase: “All existing opposing legal definitions are to be 
voided and immediately replaced.”130 Similarly, the non-partisan Women’s Committee of 
Hamburg (Frauenausschuss Hamburg e.V.) recommended that the Council add, “All 
opposing laws of the Civil Code are overturned,” to the constitutional clause.131 Yet others, 
such as the labor-oriented Female Civil Servants and Salaried Employees in Frankfurt 
(Beamtinnen und weiblichen Angestellten im Arbeitsamt Frankfurt a/M) urged the Council to 
adopt only the following: “All people are equal before the law, without distinguishing 
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between sex, race, origin, religious, or political persuasion.”132  
Several association leaders offered their own versions of the “equality clause.” The 
independent, non-party South German Women’s Circle of Nuremberg (Süddeutsche 
Frauenarbeitskreis Nürnberg, SFN), for example, rejected the formulations of the CDU and 
SPD, stating instead: “Men and women have equal constitutional and private rights and 
duties.”133 They stressed the urgency of constitutional protection as a response to major 
social changes. At the same time, their reluctance to embrace the word “Gleichberechtigung” 
and its so-called erasure of sexual difference was clear. Their proposed phrase left out the 
term entirely, instead reiterating the words “rights and duties” from Weimar and the 
CDU/CSU, but qualifying them by adding “equal constitutional and private” and “absolute 
equal status (unbedingte Gleichstellung).” In another letter, the SFN drew inspiration from 
the Women’s Association of Hessen (Frauenverband Hessen), which had proposed the 
following: “Men and women have equal rights and duties.” These independent associations 
exemplified the plethora of opinions among postwar women’s associations. Support of 
equality did not automatically translate to adherence to the SPD. These groups therefore 
attempted to find their own solutions to the issue of Gleichberechtigung.134 
Women’s associations were not the only members of civil society to respond to the 
Council’s decision. Trade unions, in particular their women’s bureaus, wrote petitions to the 
Council in opposition to the December 3rd vote. As the Free Trade Union of Hessen (Freier 
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Gewerkschaftsbund Hessen) asserted: “As employed women, we know exactly and yes, 
experience daily, the equality of us women is not yet ensured in a paragraph of the 
constitution.” They furthermore averred that they must fight for equality in practice in all 
areas of the economy and politics in order to persuade the Council.135 Likewise, the Industry 
Trade Union Metal for the British Zone and Bremen (Industriegewerkschaft Metall für die 
Britische Zone und Bremen), representing 40,000 women metal workers, wrote to Adenauer 
personally to affirm their support of the SPD’s proposal for all women.136 Trade union 
representatives of workers’ councils sent letters to the Council to protest the 1953 deadline. 
The women’s committees of the trade unions representing Deutsche Dunlop Gummi 
Compagnie and W.C. Heraeus Platinschmelze, for instance, each wrote to demand the 
implementation of Gleichberechtigung even before the proposed 1953 deadline.137 The 
women of these trade unions and workers’ councils, though coming at the issue with the 
specific agenda of equal rights for female workers, joined forces with the independent 
women’s associations to urge the Council to change its mind. 
Finally, individuals wrote to the Council. Unlike the women’s associations, who 
presented legal arguments, and the women’s committees of trade unions, who argued for 
equal treatment in the workplace, individuals’ arguments emphasized the social changes in 
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postwar Germany. For example, the letter from Dorothea Groener-Geyer of Ludwigsburg 
stressed that the equal status of women had already been realized during World War II when 
women provided for their families as their husbands fell in battle.138  
The fifty-plus petitions, representing independent associations, trade unions, 
companies, state-level governments, and individuals, began to sway the Council. Some 
members of the FDP, for instance, uncomfortable with the prospect of being on the losing 
side, started to shift allegiance. The FDP had no female delegates in the Council, but Herta 
Ilk, a doctor of law who had been a member of the FDP party executive committee in 
Bavaria since 1948, worked behind the scenes to urge male FDP delegates to switch sides.139 
In early January 1949, she wrote to Thomas Dehler (FDP) with her own formulation of the 
equality clause, which read: 
Men and women have equal rights in all areas of law. Exceptions can only be allowed 
in civil law, so far as it necessitates the preservation of the family. Here the mutual 
agreement of men and women of the parliamentary committee is required.140 
 
Ilk attempted, with this formulation, to find a “third way” that combined the SPD’s broad 
promise of equal rights with the CDU/CSU’s concerns about the endangerment of the Civil 
Code. She argued that the family’s needs must not systematically come before 
Gleichberechtigung. The FDP did not introduce the clause, but Ilk was nevertheless 
influential. Dehler changed his mind and threw his support behind the SPD in the next 
Council vote on the issue. 
On 18 January 1949, the Council met again to review the basic rights of the Basic 
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Law. Walter Strauß, a leading Hessian CDU representative, pushed the rest of the Council to 
respond to the resounding public response, saying that the Council had been “too juridical.” 
He asked the Council if they could strike the word “civic (staatsbürgerlich)” from the clause. 
He justified this proposal by acknowledging the double burden placed on women. He stated: 
“Most German women have now been employed for years, like men, but they have the 
additional tasks of the household and childrearing.”141 The framing of his argument suggests 
that he did not challenge the notion that women should be primary caretakers and that men 
played an ill-defined role as fathers and breadwinners. Rather, he saw the equal rights clause 
as a reward for women taking on the “double burden” of employment and family life.  
Other members of the CDU offered similar interpretations. Helene Weber, for 
example, stressed the different natures of men and women. According to her, the Council had 
to be careful to consider “the uniqueness and dignity of women and not a schematic equal 
status and rights.”142 Weber illustrated her example by citing military service as an example 
of an area where “the nature of women should accomplish only a little of what we expect 
from men.”143 For Weber and many women of her generation who supported relational 
feminism, natural gender differences determined different duties of both sexes in the 
economy, society, and politics. According to her, the military—although only hypothetical, 
since Germany was demilitarized after the war—was a special arena in which women were 
unequal with men. At the same time, she confirmed her commitment to furthering equality in 
all legal areas. She qualified this statement by saying: “I express the hope that we all adopt a 
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formulation of this paragraph that should fulfill and can unify what is befitting of women in 
the family and professional life.”144 Like her colleague Walter Strauß, Weber never 
questioned the gendered division of labor and voiced any doubt that women alone had to deal 
with the double burden of work and nurturing, but she at least acknowledged that an 
expansive equality clause could help them better accomplish their duties in these roles. 
Elisabeth Selbert interjected to criticize Weber and Strauss, stating that the Council, 
the CDU in particular, had to stop with the “yes, but” statements and commit to an 
“unconditional yes.” She emphasized that the public supported the SPD position and cited 
several of the above referenced letters, in particular those from the 40,000 trade union 
workers, the Women’s Circle, the South German Women’s Working Group, and the female 
delegates of all the state parliaments. She took a jab at the Bavarians, noting that they were 
the only state parliament without any female representatives. She attacked the Council for 
fearing that Western Gleichberechtigung would closely resemble Soviet zone equality. She 
even acknowledged her own stance that men and women were not inherently equal. At the 
same time, she argued that treating Gleichberechtigung as “equalization” of the sexes was 
unsubstantiated.145 
After these attacks, Selbert shifted her attention to the problem of a narrow definition 
of equality. For her, the old call “equal rights and duties,” which the SPD had supported in 
the Weimar Republic, had wider implications. She argued that such framing allowed 
marriage and marital property laws to continue to privilege men and oppress women in terms 
of alimony and inheritance, because it assumed that men and women had different and 
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particular duties in these arenas. It also permitted the unequal treatment of housewives and 
working women, who both contributed in important ways to their households. As a KPD 
member added, it prevented equal wages for men, women, and youth. Helene Wessel of the 
Center Party supported the SPD as well, stating that she no longer saw “civic” duties, the 
formulation of the Weimar constitution, as an acceptable compromise for the millions of 
women who had struggled through and after the war. Their arguments, plus the pressure of 
public opinion, were effective. By the end of the session, the Council unanimously voted in 
favor of the SPD’s formulation (“Men and women have equal rights”).146  
On 8 May 1949, the Parliamentary Council approved the final version of the Basic 
Law, which included the following provisions as part of Article 3: 
1) All people are equal before the law. 
2) Men and women have equal rights. The state supports the effective implementation 
of the equality of men and women and will act to remove disadvantages. 
3) No one may be advantaged or disadvantaged due to gender, national origin, race, 
language, heritage, beliefs, and religious or political opinions. No one may 
discriminate based on disability. 
This article, however, was constrained by Article 6, which devised that “marriage and family 
stand under special protection of the state.” Finally, the Basic Law included Article 117, 
which stipulated that all laws contradicting Article 3, especially those in the German Civil 
Code that had been in place since 1900, had to be changed by 31 March 1953. 
 Over the course of five months, the Parliamentary Council’s formal definition of 
Gleichberechtigung had changed dramatically. At the beginning of the Council, women had 
no civil equality, but a promise of equal wages. By the end of the Council, women had full 
equality, no guarantee of equal wages, and a promise that marriage and the family would be 
protected by the constitution. A combination of factors shaped this outcome. First, it became 
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evident in their discourse that Parliamentary Council members wished to divorce themselves 
from the Weimar and Nazi past and, in the context of the rising Cold War conflict, from the 
Soviet zone. Second, female activists relied on the problematic and outdated Civil Code in 
their discourse as a reason to give women more constitutional equality. Finally, protests from 
society, especially women’s organizations and the independent trade unions, played a 
significant role in swaying the Christian conservative coalition within the Parliamentary 
Council to adopt a broader equality clause. 
 
The Soviet Zone’s Reactions to the Western Parliamentary Council 
 
As the Western Parliamentary Council concluded its proceedings, the Eastern 
People’s Council was also in the process of wrapping up its debates. Despite publishing the 
draft of the constitution in October 1948, the SED could not formally approve it until the 
next People’s Congress, planned for May 1949. In the meantime, the West prepared to 
approve its own Basic Law in May 1949. According to legal expert Inga Markovits, as late as 
March 1949 the East still reached out to the West to settle the larger dispute over the 
constitution, but were unsuccessful.147  
In particular, the equality clause earned further attention from the People’s Council in 
February 1949. As outlined above, in January 1949, the Parliamentary Council in the West 
decided to adopt the SPD’s proposal to change the Basic Law’s equality clause to say: “Men 
and women have equal rights.” The news soon reached the People’s Council, who had not 
only been keeping close tabs on the developments in the West, but had constantly and 
publicly denigrated the Western Parliamentary Council’s decisions. As shown above, the 
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Soviet zone media had depicted the West as the losers in the debate over equal rights since 
1946, even before the formal division of Germany.148 Not only had the West beaten the East 
to a new constitution, but had stolen one of the People’s Council’s and SED’s main 
arguments: that sexual equality was a hallmark of socialism, not capitalism or liberal 
democracy, which only served to oppress women. 
Despite public proclamations that the West had fallen behind in terms of women’s 
rights, behind the scenes, the People’s Council was less confident. Internal protocols reveal 
the delegates’ anxiety about and unwillingness to negotiate on the topic of equal rights with 
the West. By early February 1949, the People’s Council possessed copies of the West 
German Basic Law.149 Members of the constitutional committee responded with different 
degrees of consternation over the text as a whole, because they had staked their claim to 
legitimacy on their ability to pass a new constitution first. Some stressed that the very 
existence of the Basic Law was the major problem, namely because it ruined their claims to 
represent all of Germany. Committee chairman Otto Grotewohl assured the People’s Council 
that their version was better, stressing the importance of socialism for Germany’s future and 
asserting that socialism would win, in the end.150  
One of the most problematic areas, the delegates determined, was the Bonn 
constitution’s treatment of Gleichberechtigung. Their delegates clearly resented losing a 
battle that they had set themselves up to win since late 1946. The committee designated three 
female members to work with the legal committee to determine how to implement the equal 
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rights clause to ensure that “equality exists not only in constitutional text, but to stipulate 
concrete consequences in an appendix.”151 When the People’s Council understood that the 
Western sectors had swept the rug out from under them by using the same wording, they had 
little choice but to look ahead to the next step: reforming the Civil Code as quickly as 
possible. 
This section has demonstrated that the Eastern People’s Council intentionally shaped 
its own future political moves in response to the Western Parliamentary Council’s decision to 
adopt full equality for men and women as a constitutional right. The SED had always 
maintained that its socialist model would prevail. One way socialism would improve the 
future of Germany, they argued, was through its egalitarian treatment of men and women in 
all areas of society, politics, the economy, and home life, a promise that was validated by the 
constitution. In its public rhetoric, the ruling party had always set up the West, especially in 
terms of leading Christian conservatives’ views on women’s equal rights, as a foil. After 
February 1949, upon the discovery of the West’s adoption of a broadly worded equality 
clause, the SED and the People’s Council no longer relied on just rhetoric. Rather, they 
propelled forward reforms of the Civil Code as a direct response to the West’s promise of 
equality in order to demonstrate that they led the more progressive German state. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the path dependencies of the equality clauses in the Soviet 
and Western occupation zones, which was determined by several intersecting political, 
economic, cultural, and social factors. First, social and cultural conceptions of gender and the 
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family played into the debates on constitutional equality. Christian conservatives and some 
liberals had held up the male breadwinner and female homemaker model, based on the idea 
of natural sexual difference, as the ideal family model since the late nineteenth century. This 
model was consistently challenged by Communists and Social Democrats—who often agreed 
with the idea of sexual difference and the ideal of the male breadwinner/female homemaker, 
but recognized the impossibility of this model for many families—in the late empire and the 
Weimar Republic. After World War II, it endured: Christian conservative and Free 
Democratic politicians, media pundits, and some individuals stressed that the traditional 
family model could once again stabilize Germany. Even the SED in the Soviet zone did not 
contest including its own family protection clause for numerous reasons. For one thing, they 
followed the Stalinist model, which strongly emphasized the family as the cornerstone of 
socialist society and a pillar of postwar stability. Furthermore, much of the Soviet zone still 
adhered to Protestantism, meaning they still clung to Christian ideas about marriage and the 
family, and the SED did not want to upset a large portion of its population.  
Second, the new German states inherited several laws and institutions from imperial, 
Weimar, and Nazi Germany that created high degrees of path dependency for equal rights of 
men and women after 1945. This strong path dependency was especially evident in West 
Germany, where, in the context of postwar reconstruction of liberal democracy in the wake 
of Nazism’s destruction and the burgeoning Cold War, Christian conservative politicians 
were more willing to replicate the Weimar constitution’s equality and family protection 
clauses. They were also more disposed to leaving the Civil Code intact indefinitely. Path 
dependency was less strong in the East, where the SED and the Soviets, in the context of 
founding an antifascist and socialist Germany, were more willing to abandon the Weimar 
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template and the Civil Code. Moreover, their constitution included guarantees of equal wages 
and equal status for illegitimate children. Still, elements of the old legal structure, such as the 
family protection clause, reappeared without controversy in the SED’s new constitutional 
drafts. As a result, competing notions of equal rights were prevalent in politics, society, and 
the media in both Germanys. 
Third, political factors, in particular different political cultures, played significant 
roles in shaping politicians’ decisions on the equality clauses on each side as well. The SED 
and the Soviets’ desire for political dominance in the Soviet zone manifested itself in the 
introduction of the equality clause in the Soviet zone in late 1946, since they saw equal rights 
as a way to entice women to Communism, fulfill socialist emancipation goals, and out-do the 
West. Meanwhile, in the West, the tug-of-war between the Christian Democrats and the 
Social Democrats for political control and the Western occupiers’ relatively hands-off 
approach to the Basic Law delayed approval of the equality clause. The Christian 
conservative coalition in the Parliamentary Council fought to keep the old Weimar 
formulation, which they believed would maintain the “natural order” of the sexes as they 
rebuilt the West. They opposed the Social Democrats’ proposals for a broader equality clause 
and a related mandate to ensure the overhaul of the Civil Code. Unlike the East, where civil 
society was fairly limited, in the West, it was beginning to bloom. The collective efforts of 
women’s associations, trade unions, and individuals pushed the Parliamentary Council in the 
West to change course, approve the equality and family protection clauses, and mandate 
reforming the Civil Code before 31 March 1953. 
Fourth, economic considerations factored into their negotiations and decisions as 
well. Equal rights clauses played important roles in the context of reconstructing the postwar 
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economies, which had depended heavily on female labor in the earliest postwar years. In the 
East, female activists and other politicians saw the equality clause as a way to bolster other 
rights and policies, such as equal wages for equal work, to help women gain economic 
independence and actively participate in the Soviet-style planned economy. In the West, 
Christian conservatives and some Free Democrats saw the equality clause and state 
protection of the family as opportunities to empower male breadwinning and reduce women 
to homemakers and part-time workers. In addition, the Christian conservatives and some Free 
Democrats rejected the KPD’s proposals for equal wages for men and women in order to 
preserve men’s places as chief breadwinners in the family and to avoid resembling the East, 
where women were more integrated into the workforce. 
Finally, the burgeoning Cold War influenced debates about constitutional equality on 
both sides. The competition with the Western zone pushed the SED and the People’s Council 
to press for complete equal rights of men and women in the economy, politics, society, and 
marriage and the family. The same conflict urged Western politicians to initially reject the 
same model of equality, instead focusing on the male breadwinner family model. The 
competing equality clauses were key markers of difference between the two Germanys in the 
Cold War. Moreover, this conflict was not just discursive, but affected the negotiations on 
both sides, especially the Soviet zone. When the East German People’s Council realized the 
magnitude of this decision and its consequences for their own conception of equality, they 
pushed to overhaul the Civil Code in the East immediately. The next chapter outlines how 
these debates unfolded in the early 1950s as the two sides formally separated and broached 
their own reforms of the marriage and family law sections of the Civil Code. 
   
  
190 
  
CHAPTER FOUR 
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND LEGAL INEQUALITIES: 
THE FAILED REFORMS OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW IN EAST AND 
WEST GERMANY, 1949–53 
 
 
On 9 March 1950, the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, received a letter 
from Frau C. of Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia, who observed: “As of late, no one hears 
anymore if the law for the equality of women has been adopted or not.”1 Across the Iron 
Curtain, a few months later, on 14 August 1950, Herr L. of Kretzschau, Saxony-Anhalt 
penned a one-sentence letter to the East German Ministry of Justice that asked simply: 
“When will the new family law finally arrive?”2 Herr L. and Frau C.’s letters were part of a 
surge of correspondence from East and West German citizens to their respective 
governments regarding the forthcoming reforms to marriage and family law provisions of the 
Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) and the 1946 Ehegesetz. The letters expressed a 
range of reactions, from mere curiosity to outright desperation. Governmental representatives 
in both Germanys assured citizens that new laws to replace the old BGB and the 1946 
Ehegesetz were imminent. 
These legal reforms stemmed from the mandates in the May 1949 West German 
Basic Law and the October 1949 East German constitution requiring legislators in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to  
                                                          
1 Carnott an Adenauer, March 9, 1950, B141/2018/11, BArch Koblenz. 
2 Lück an MdJ, August 14, 1950, DP 1/7198, Bl. 29, BArch Berlin. 
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overturn all existing legislation opposing equality. The diverging political, social, and  
economic paths of the two German states in the early years of the Cold War, however, 
complicated reforming the Civil Code. By the end of 1950, for instance, the SED in the GDR 
had approved its first Five-Year Plan, started political purges, and reformed labor laws, 
including legislation aimed at protecting working women and mothers. Meanwhile, in the 
FRG, the leading Christian conservative CDU/CSU coalition was setting up a social market 
economy, pursuing Western integration policies, and had declared its goal of implementing 
Christian conservative social policy, for which a male breadwinner and female homemaker 
family model was a cornerstone.  
By the time Herr L. and Frau C. wrote in 1950, politicians, society, and the media in 
both postwar German states were also mired in discussions of new family law provisions of 
the Civil Code. In late 1949, the Ministry of Justice of the GDR (Justizministerium der DDR, 
MdJ), drafted a new family law that allowed, for example, men and women to make mutual 
decisions regarding their children, or to adopt either spouse’s surname. In the West, under 
order from the Bundestag, the Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 
BdJ) formulated a new law allowing mutual decision-making among spouses and equal 
property ownership, among other changes. Despite having drafted new laws by 1952, neither 
state passed the legislation as originally planned. The GDR ended up with partial reforms, 
encased in the 1950 “Law for the Protection of Motherhood and Children and the Rights of 
Women,” but did not address major sections of the old law such as divorce regulations or 
property rights, the adjudication of which then fell to the courts. Similarly, the FRG passed 
no reforms before its constitutionally mandated 31 March 1953 deadline, leaving marriage 
and family law up to judges. 
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In the following I use the approach of path dependency to explain what first 
facilitated and then ultimately prevented reforms to family law in both postwar Germanys 
between 1949 and 1953. I demonstrate that several interlinking factors—the complexities of 
state-building, competing interests among the leading political parties in both states, 
resistance from social organizations (especially the Protestant and Catholic churches), strong 
cultural norms, and the different social, political, and economic agendas of the two postwar 
German governments—alternately urged and hindered progress toward new legislation, 
despite the best efforts of legislators, Ministry officials, and leading party members in both 
states to push through reforms. The particular climate of the early Cold War years, when 
tensions and the hope for reunification were highest, shaped the competition between the two 
sides in this period. Policymakers’ inability to pass the reforms they desired created 
momentum for larger reforms later in the 1950s and the early 1960s, when it became 
increasingly apparent to contemporaries that the Cold War division of the Germanys was 
more permanent than they had initially assumed. 
A central part of the examination of the factors that enabled and prevented reforms on 
both German states, is the analysis of the multiple and co-existing discourses on the parallel 
legislative drafts by politicians, leaders of social organizations, and newspaper editors in both 
Germanies, where the frontlines were astonishingly similar. On the one side, Christian 
conservatives, much like they had before 1945, defended the 1900 Civil Code’s paternalistic 
provisions as a resolution to high levels of instability in politics, society, and the economy, 
because it restored the “natural” gender order in a society defined by postwar calamity. On 
the other side, Communists, Social Democrats, and liberals emphasized the previous 
limitations on women’s rights in Weimar and Nazi Germany, the burdens women had borne 
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for Germany during and after World War II, and the postwar crisis of the family as 
compelling reasons to alter the longstanding legislation. After 1949, in the context of the 
burgeoning Cold War, Christian conservatives, Social Democrats, liberals, and Communists 
in both postwar Germanys increasingly shifted toward comparisons and contrasts with the 
“other Germany” in their discourses on family law.  
This chapter uncovers the history of the first period of debates over marriage and 
family law reforms in both states from 1949 to 1953. The first section focuses on the East 
German Ministry of Justice’s creation of the first draft of a new family law in the GDR 
between 1948 and 1950. The second section examines the West German Ministry of Justice’s 
first steps toward a new family law in the FRG between 1949 and early 1952. The third 
section explores how and why East German politicians revived discussion of family law after 
1950, but were unable to pass any reforms by 1953. Finally, the fourth section analyzes how 
politicians, society, and the media in West Germany assessed the potential Equal Rights Act 
and what ultimately prevented the Bundestag from reforming the law between March 1952 
and December 1953. 
 
Creating and Propagating a New Family Law in the GDR, 19481950 
In late 1948 and early 1949, while formulating the new constitution of the GDR, the 
Soviet zone People’s Council and the German Justice Administration had already begun 
discussing reforms of the Civil Code. In January 1949, the People’s Council Legal 
Committee produced a series of proposals for future legislation, called the “Theses on the 
General Rules of Marriage,” which privileged “the principle of equality of the sexes at 
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utmost consequence.”3 As a result, some old regulations remained, like the guarantee of 
spousal obligation, but in theory would take on a new character under Communism, 
allowing, for example, the right to work and live separately, seen as necessities in a 
production-driven, socialist economy.4 At the same time, the “Theses” made several large 
changes, undermining the masculine privilege embedded in the preceding legislation. For 
example, couples and their children would have the same family name, but it could be the 
husband’s, wife’s, or a combination. In addition, both spouses would have the right to decide 
on important matters, a stark change from the old BGB’s Stichentscheid, which allowed only 
men to make decisions. Furthermore, each partner would have the right to contribute to the 
support of the household, either through domestic labor or employment outside the home. 
Women were no longer required to lead the household. If living separately, each spouse 
would have to support him- or herself. The right of spousal support could be reduced or 
repealed through the payment of an equal contribution. If one spouse refused to contribute to 
the common household, he or she would lose all rights to alimony. If living separately, each 
spouse had the right to demand objects from the household (regardless of property relations) 
that would facilitate leading separate households.5  
To be sure, the “Theses” only addressed parts of the family law and did not cover 
divorce law or marital property law. Still, the proposals hinted at the People’s Council’s—
and by extension, the SED’s—desires to make family law more egalitarian in the future. One 
                                                          
3 Hans Nathan later published the “Theses” in Neue Justiz, the organ of the German Justice Administration (the 
precursor to the Ministry of Justice). Hans Nathan, “Zur Neugestaltung des Familienrechts,” Neue Justiz, Nr. 5, 
May 1949, 104. 
4 Ibid., 104. 
5 Ibid., 103. 
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reason for the dramatically altered “Theses” was the personalities in the Legal Committee, 
namely Hilde Benjamin and Hans Nathan. Benjamin had already established a name for 
herself as the Director of the German Justice Administration and a founding member of the 
DFD, while Hans Nathan had a less prominent public profile. Born in 1900, Nathan briefly 
had served in the military in 1918, before receiving his law degree. He worked as a public 
defender for the Communist-affiliated Rote Hilfe, the German affiliate of the International 
Red Aid for political prisoners, before joining the Weimar-era left-liberal German 
Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP; later the Deutsche Staatspartei in 
1930). In 1933 he had to flee to Prague, where he joined the Communist Party in 1938.6 After 
the occupation of Czechoslovakia in October 1938 by Nazi Germany, he had to go into exile 
in England because of his Jewish ancestry and political activities. He returned to Berlin in 
1946 and took up a position in the German Justice Administration, and later, as an academic 
assistant at the Humboldt University in Berlin. He gained a more prominent public profile in 
the Soviet zone by serving on the People’s Council Legal Committee alongside Benjamin 
and other well-known jurists. Benjamin and Nathan’s background as lawyers, their ardent 
Communist conviction, their memories of Weimar and the Third Reich, and work in the 
Soviet zone informed their approaches to the “Theses.”  
Benjamin and Nathan, in fact, frequently cited historic precedent as an important 
influence on the “Theses.” For one thing, Nathan emphasized that the People’s Council 
delegates had looked back to the Weimar constitution for inspiration on topics such as equal 
rights for women and equal legal status for out-of-wedlock births. As the last chapter 
                                                          
6 Dirk Breithaupt, “Nathan, Hans,” in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 18 (1997), 745. https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/gnd13867647X.html#ndbcontent 
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showed, the People’s Council had used and then rejected Weimar as an example of what not 
to do regarding women’s rights at an early stage. While the People’s Council Legal 
Committee explicitly linked their work to Weimar, Nathan refrained from mentioning the 
Third Reich, although it was almost certainly a second historical influence. But there were 
reasons for this omission. The SED were avowed antifascists and refused to be seen as the 
successors to the Third Reich, two salient points that grounded Communist claims to a 
legitimate state.7 
In addition, the earlier activities of women’s committees and the German Justice 
Administration left their imprint on the “Theses.” As the second chapter showed, women’s 
committees and the DFD had already worked on proposals for the new Civil Code, to which 
Benjamin and Nathan attributed their ideas for the reforms. For example, months before, in 
August 1948, Benjamin praised the DFD’s work on new provisions of family law.8 In 
addition, Nathan cited DFD proposals as the basis of the “Theses.”9 These references shed 
some light on the relationship between the DFD and the People’s Council. As the women’s 
mass organization in the Soviet zone and the GDR, the DFD’s prime purpose was to 
represent women’s interests. On the one hand, the Council’s appropriation of their work—
which in turn stemmed from the earlier women’s committees—can be read in a positive light: 
the Council valued the DFD’s contributions. On the other hand, the Council’s heavy reliance 
on women’s committees gave it an easy out: they did not have to figure out their own 
                                                          
7 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 24-25.  
8 Benjamin an Volksrat, 4. Tagung, August 3, 1948, DA 1/5, BArch Berlin. 
9 Nathan, “Zur Neugestaltung des Familienrechts,” 102-3. See also “Wirkungen der Ehe im allgemeinen,” 1949, 
DA 1/110, BArch Berlin. 
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solutions, since the DFD did it for them.  
Finally, the imminent division of Germany informed Benjamin’s and Nathan’s 
approaches to the “Theses.” According to historian Mary Fulbrook, “the issue of separation 
from the West was of overriding concern to SED leaders,” which reflected in their 
discussions of family law.10 On several occasions, Benjamin and Nathan referred to the 
possible effects of East and West German separation and the potential for reunification. At 
one point, responding to the commencement of the Western Parliamentary Council and 
recognizing how it might affect the legality of their own initiatives, Benjamin stated: “There 
must be ways to come quickly to a unified and more progressive structuring of this law.”11 
She also warned the People’s Council to tread carefully because of the Western 
Parliamentary Council.12 At another point, noting that the earliest discussions of 
Gleichberechtigung occurred “not only in the Eastern zone,” Nathan asserted that it was 
important for the future GDR “that our new family law obtains legitimacy in all of 
Germany.”13 Even at this stage, Nathan expressed anxiety about their version of family law 
being taken seriously by the West in the future. Furthermore, he asserted that “the West has 
all reason to enter the discussion,” because its states were already doing so on a regional 
level, although ultimately, the West never joined the East in such discussions.14  
Benjamin’s and Nathan’s suggestions for a new Civil Code remained hypothetical 
                                                          
10 Fulbrook, Anatomy, 93. 
11 Benjamin an Volksrat, 4. Tagung, August 3, 1948, DA 1/5, BArch Berlin. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Nathan, “Zur Neugestaltung des Familienrechts,” 102-3. 
14 Ibid., 103. 
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until the fate of the German question was resolved, when the Western Allies approved the 
Basic Law on 23 May 1949 and the People’s Council declared the GDR on 7 October 1949. 
The People’s Council then turned into a provisional parliament (Volkskammer) and 
government, planning elections for the end of 1950 to confirm their power. Although former 
Social Democrat and Minister-President Otto Grotewohl and Communist and President 
Wilhelm Pieck nominally helmed the East German government, SED chairman Walter 
Ulbricht was the actual power behind the scenes. Ulbricht had long been on the rise to power. 
He had been an early convert to Communism in 1920, spent the war years in Moscow, and 
then one of the first German Communists to return to Germany with the Red Army to set up 
a socialist state.  
Under Ulbricht, the SED “attached itself to extant currents in postwar Germany, such 
as antifascism, fear of war, and the desire for national unity” which “provided the GDR with 
a mantle of legitimacy.”15 The ruling party maintained that the West was the illegitimate 
state, because of its separatism, rejection of East German constitutional proposals, approval 
of the Basic Law in May 1949, and allowance of former Nazis in the new government. The 
West, for its part, claimed that without free elections, the East was illegitimate.16 Over the 
course of the early 1950s, Ulbricht steered the state toward a Stalinist model.17 Like the 
Soviets, the SED aimed to implement a planned economy, which, according to Communist 
                                                          
15 Donna Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: Women, The Family, and Communism in the German Democratic 
Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 61. 
16 Robert Grünbaum, Deutsche Einheit: Ein Überblick 1945 bis heute (Berlin: Metropol, 2010), 13. 
17 For biography of Otto Grotewohl, see: Dierk Hoffmann, Otto Grotewohl (1894-1964): Eine Politische 
Biographie (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009); for biography of Wilhelm Pieck, see: Hermann Weber, “Pieck, 
Wilhelm,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie 20 (2001), 421-422, https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/gnd118594273.html#ndbcontent; for biography of Walter Ulbricht, see: Mario Frank, Walter 
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thinking, would erase class and gendered inequalities. 
In addition to promoting the GDR as the more progressive and legitimate Germany 
for its antifascist and more egalitarian economic policies, the SED considered itself the 
leading force in “women’s emancipation” in postwar Germany. SED leaders frequently cited 
their party program and the constitutional mandate that overhauled any legislation 
prohibiting Gleichberechtigung as evidence of the party’s progressiveness.18 At the same 
time, the constitutional mandate’s immediate invalidation of family law posed certain 
obstacles for the ruling party and other members of the East German government. When 
Benjamin took up the post of Vice President of the Supreme Court of the GDR in December 
1949, it fell to Nathan, as head of the Legislation Department (Hauptabteilung 
Gesetzgebung) of the new Ministry of Justice of the GDR, to spearhead the Civil Code 
reforms. Drawing from the aforementioned “Theses,” a similar list of proposals from 
Benjamin, and the DFD’s suggestions, Nathan completed the “Bill for the Reordering of 
Family Law,” in early 1950.19  
The proposed 1950 law restructured and replaced the old BGB regulations on marital 
unions, marital property, adoption, and the rights of children born in- and out of wedlock.20 
The new legislative draft departed from the old BGB in stating that couples had the right to 
                                                          
18 “Gleichberechtigung vor dem Gesetz,” Die Frau von heute 6, 1950, 6; “Otto Grotewohl antwortet den 
Frauen,” Für Dich 11, 5, March 12, 1950, 3; Socialist Unity Party Program, April 1946, 
http://www.cvce.eu/de/obj/politisches_programm_der_sed_berlin_21_und_22_april_1946-de-d9c5faf7-5c39-
43fa-aa3f-88d5431e3746.html   
19 Hilde Benjamin, Vorschläge zum neuen deutschen Familienrecht (Berlin: Deutscher Frauen Verlag, 1949). 
20 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 2-3, BArch Berlin. As they noted on page 2 
of the document, they did not intend to change provisions regarding engagement (§§1297-1302), custody 
(Vormundschaft, §§1773-1921), and the 1946 marital law (Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 16). They explain that these 
provisions were not necessarily disruptive to Gleichberechtigung and were practical in everyday life. 
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live separately if it advanced their education or careers.21 Neither were permitted to abuse 
their right, and both were expected to come to mutual agreements.22 In addition, spouses 
were now permitted to agree on a family name, whether it be the man’s, the woman’s, or a 
hyphenated name.23 Both spouses could work in the business of the other.24 They both had 
the obligation to support the household income (Unterhalt).25 In the case that the spouses 
lived separately, they each had the right and duty to support themselves unless one was 
incapable; then he or she could rely on the other for support.26 Regarding marital property, 
the law proposed that property inherited before and after marriage would remain in the 
authority of the receiving spouse, but was subject to adjustment.27  
At the same time, there were BGB provisions Nathan and the Ministry of Justice 
intended to keep intact. The first provision, for example, stated that “spouses are obligated to 
one another in matrimony”28—phrasing directly lifted from the old Civil Code. This clause 
bound both spouses to not only remain faithful, but to take actions designed to promote 
marital union. As another example, all provisions regarding engagement could remain 
                                                          
21 §1, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 5, BArch Berlin. 
22 §2, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 6, BArch Berlin. 
23 §3, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 6, BArch Berlin. 
24 §4, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 6, BArch Berlin. 
25 §6, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 8, BArch Berlin. 
26 §7, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 8, BArch Berlin. 
27 §10-11, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 10, BArch Berlin. Accruals would 
not include the spouses’ separate property (earned by inheritance), items not included in the marital contract, 
property acquired after separation, or property acquired (due to an adjustment) before separation. 
28 §1, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 5, BArch Berlin. This provision echoes 
§1353 of the original BGB.  
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because they “play a minor role in practical life” and there was no reason to remove them.29 
Additionally, they argued that the structure of the custody court demanded simplification, in 
accordance with the economic changes since 1900, but did not call for its complete overhaul. 
Finally, they saw no urgent reason to change the 1946 Allied Control Council law, namely 
because “the legal unity between the GDR and West Germany must remain undisturbed.”30 
As the second chapter showed, however, the 1946 law reified parts of the old BGB, meaning 
the old Civil Code was technically still in effect in the GDR after all. Although Nathan and 
the Ministry promoted some major changes to the BGB, they also saw practical and political 
reasons for retaining parts of existing laws. They furthermore used discourse about unity with 
the West to justify their suggestions for family law. 
Throughout early 1950, the SED disseminated information about the new family law 
via its mass media, particularly the radio and the national newspapers Neues Deutschland and 
Berliner Zeitung, which served as mouthpieces for the regime to exercise its “opinion 
monopoly.”31 The print media and broadcasts on the radio not only served to inform readers 
about the new law’s provisions, but also to propagate the law.32 As authors editorialized, they 
                                                          
29 §§1297-1302, Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 2, BArch Berlin. 
30 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familienrechts, 1950, DP 1/8028, Bl. 2, BArch Berlin. 
31 Anke Fiedler and Michael Meyen, Fiktionen für das Volk: DDR-Zeitungen als PR-Instrument: Fallstudien zu 
den Zentralorganen Neues Deutschland, Junge Welt, Neue Zeit und Der Morgen (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011), 
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32 In early 1950, for instance, the two papers ran series of articles by the jurist Heinrich Löwenthal and Hanna 
Keusch explaining the proposed changes to the regulations on family name, parental authority, marital property, 
and age of majority. For bio of Heinrich Löwenthal, see Hermann Wentker, Justiz in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953: 
Transformation und Rolle ihrer zentralen Institutionen. Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im 
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drew on several common themes, such as comparison with the West. Hans Nathan, for 
instance, penned an article for Neues Deutschland in April 1950 that insisted a new family 
law was necessary in the East because the old one “corresponded to a primitive economic 
order,” and because the West had not, and would not, move past Weimar.33 As another 
example, the Berliner Zeitung published an article titled “Women treated ‘preferentially,’” a 
comparison of women’s rights in the workplace in the two Germanys. The author, 
Wilhelmine Schirmer-Pröscher, a member of the East German Liberal Democratic Party of 
Germany (LDPD) and deputy chairwoman of the DFD, claimed that during a recent trip to 
Hamburg, she was appalled to see so many unemployed women. She criticized the “forces in 
West Germany” that worked to keep women at home, unlike in the GDR.34 In both articles, 
the editors of the East German media framed the West, especially its capitalist system and 
outdated notions of rights, as the cause of gendered inequalities. 
The SED’s media campaign prompted a number of individuals and representatives of 
interest groups and state-level ministries to write to the Ministry of Justice to inquire about 
the forthcoming legislation. Some expressed fervent support for the new legislation. In 
January 1950, for instance, the DFD Brandenburg formulated and forwarded a resolution in 
support of the law and asked that the Ministry ensure that women had equal rights in their 
property.35 Other respondents were clearly more ambivalent. Herr R. of Nauen, in 
Brandenburg, for example, indicated in response to a radio broadcast that he supported 
women’s choice to keep their maiden name because he favored Gleichberechtigung. He 
                                                          
33 Hans Nathan, “Um die Neugestaltung,” Neues Deutschland, April 9, 1950, 5. 
34 Wilhelmine Schirmer-Pröscher, “Frauen “bevorzugt” behandelt,” Berliner Zeitung, April 23, 1950, 4. 
35 Protokoll öffentliche Frauenversammlung des DFD am 30.1.50 Kreisverband Wittenberge, January 30, 1950, 
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wanted, however, to see equality elsewhere too, where it discriminated against men, like in 
alimony payments.36 Finally, some respondents disagreed fervently with expanding women’s 
rights. As one example, Herr J., a retiree from Waren (Müritz) in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
explained that, as a man who had been married four times, he would find it confusing if each 
of his children took both parents’ names. He stated, “A woman who does absolutely not want 
to submit herself to the will of the husband should remain alone and not establish an unhappy 
family, then she [best] serves all of humanity!”37 These types of responses gave the SED 
some insight into the population’s varied reactions to the legislative draft. Many more 
citizens never wrote to the Ministry or the media, indicating that they perhaps feared the 
ruling party or were indifferent. Nevertheless, the SED used these reactions by groups and 
individuals to monitor their progress and adjust their promotion of the proposed legislation. 
This section has shown how numerous political, economic, social, and cultural factors 
intersected and informed the initial momentum behind family law reforms. As they drafted 
the new family law for the GDR, the legal experts in the People’s Council and the Ministry 
of Justice took into consideration historic precedents as well as the Cold War competition 
with the West. Even in the face of potential resistance from society, the Ministry of Justice 
seemed confident that the Volkskammer was planning to pass the new family law by the end 
of 1950. In fact, according to numerous letters from Hans Nathan to others, the Ministry of 
Justice intended to send the new family law to the East German Parliament (Volkskammer) in 
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April 1950, with the goal of implementing it on 1 July 1950.38 That never happened. The 
final section will show how this process was continually delayed and finally disappeared 
completely from the agenda of the SED leadership and the Volkskammer in late 1950 before 
reappearing in mid-1952. In the meantime, as the next section shows, the West began its own 
set of reforms in late 1949, the initial discussions for which lasted until early 1952. 
Inciting Controversy Over A New Civil Code in West Germany, 194950 
The East German Ministry of Justice got a head start on family law reforms, but the 
West German government and legislature were not far behind. Female activists such as 
Elisabeth Selbert, the Social Democratic lawyer best known for urging the inclusion of the 
equal rights clause in the Basic Law, had already raised the issue of a new Civil Code in the 
Parliamentary Council, but the matter could not gain traction until the declaration of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the outcome of its first Bundestag elections on 14 August 
1949. Following a close election, the CDU/CSU eked out a narrow victory over the SPD with 
31 percent of the vote to the latter’s 29.2 percent.39 As the majority in the Bundestag, the 
Christian Democrats then rejected a grand coalition with the SPD in favor of an alliance with 
the FDP and DP.40 On 15 September 1949, by a narrow margin, the Bundestag selected the 
pro-Western, Catholic, Christian Democratic Union chairman Konrad Adenauer as 
                                                          
38 See for example: An die Landesregierung Sachsen – Justizministerium – in Dresden, February 29, 1950, DP 
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Chancellor over his opponent, Social Democratic leader Kurt Schumacher. A few days later, 
in a speech to the Bundestag, Adenauer laid out his agenda for the Federal Republic. For one 
thing, he embraced a social market economic system, in contrast to the planned economy 
Schumacher wanted and the Soviets already had.41 Currency reform and the introduction of 
the American Marshall Plan in 1948 had provided a vital boost to the faltering economy of 
the Western zone.42 The same year, British zone Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, 
introduced the social market economy, defined by a delicate balance of social welfare 
provisions and a market free of governmental intervention except when “needed to ensure 
competition.”43 As Adenauer’s Minister of Economics from 1949–1963, Erhard implemented 
these policies, to which contemporaries credited West Germany’s “economic miracle” during 
this period.44  
Adenauer and Erhard’s reticent attitudes toward planned economies were intrinsically 
linked to their stances on Western integration and reunification with the East. Adenauer 
pursued Westbindung as a matter of practical politics and firm belief that Western orientation 
was best for the future of Germany.45 He rejected the idea of an inner-German ministry, 
                                                          
41 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages [1.] Deutscher Bundestag, 5. Sitzung, September 20, 1949, 22. 
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ostensibly on the grounds that the Allied Control Council prohibited the new republic from 
having any type of foreign office.46 It is more likely that he opposed it for fear that such an 
office would legitimize the existence of the Soviet zone. Additionally, Adenauer maintained 
that the lack of free elections in the East had “forced East Germans into a Communist 
dictatorship.”47 While he made some public calls to consider reunification, a position 
supported by his opponent Kurt Schumacher of the SPD, in practice he did not act on them.48 
Adenauer instead sought sovereignty for the FRG supported by its rearmament and 
participation in Western international defense (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO) 
and economic communities (European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC).49 
In addition to his pro-Western and anti-Communist policies, Adenauer also had plans 
to transform Germany via social policy. As historians such as Robert G. Moeller, Eric Weitz, 
and Merith Niehuss have shown, for the CDU/CSU, the guiding force behind all (or most) 
social policy was the re-Christianization and “re-familialization” of the Federal Republic.50 
As such, Adenauer promoted the idealized vision of the “traditional” male 
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breadwinner/female homemaker (and later female part-time worker) family.51 This image 
stood directly counter to the social reality of the “surplus of women,” which Adenauer 
attributed to the “consequences of war and the displacement of men.”52 As mentioned in 
chapter 2, there were 7 million more women than men in Germany after World War II and 
politicians viewed the demographic imbalance as part of the “crisis of the family.” They 
therefore attempted to respond to these issues early on through legislation aimed at recreating 
the “traditional” male breadwinner family model. In an address to the Bundestag, Adenauer 
called for the creation of jobs and training opportunities for women as one solution to their 
“unavoidable spinsterhood.”53 Adenauer’s remarks conveyed that he supported women’s 
equal rights only because of the irreparable demographic imbalance. Without men, Adenauer 
implied, women had no choice but to work, and the CDU/CSU would support them as 
necessary until the FRG’s “surplus of women” righted itself. In the meantime, if a conflict 
arose between women’s rights and family protection, Adenauer and his party would defer to 
the latter because of their Christian conservative political beliefs.54 He stated that the federal 
government would form a “women’s department” (Frauenreferat) to tackle these problems.  
In November 1949, the oppositional SPD and KPD made the first proposals to the 
Bundestag to implement Gleichberechtigung in all legislation; create a department for 
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women in the federal government; and ensure equal wages for equal work.55 The last 
proposal from the KPD gained no more traction in the Bundestag than it had the 
Parliamentary Council. In fact, from this point forward, the CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD 
excluded the KPD from internal Ministry discussions of Civil Code reforms and other 
legislation because of strong anti-Communist sentiments in the West that limited available 
political space.56 In addition, the federal government established a “women’s department” in 
the Ministry of the Interior in the fall of 1950, as a result the Bundestag did not pursue any 
legislation or further discussions of this idea. It was the SPD/KPD’s proposal from 
November 1949 to incorporate Gleichberechtigung in all legislation that remained in limbo. 
In the ensuing debates on 1 and 2 December 1949, representatives from the CDU/CSU made 
their position clear: that Gleichberechtigung meant equal, but different, and that any radical 
legal changes would interfere with, as Protestant lawyer and CDU member Robert Lehr put 
it, the “God-willed order of creation…especially in the fulfillment of marriage as a life 
union.”57 
The oppositional SPD persisted in its efforts despite warnings from Christian 
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conservatives that their proposals might disturb natural and preternatural meanings of gender 
roles. Frieda Nadig—selected by her party to speak because of her strident advocacy for 
Article 3 in the Parliamentary Council—asserted that the Bundestag must restructure all areas 
of economy, politics, and society to include Gleichberechtigung.58 She assured the Bundestag 
that the huge undertaking before them was necessary, given that men were still patriarchs of 
the family and women still had the property rights of “patronized children.”59 For Nadig and 
her SPD compatriots, equality did not override the importance of marriage and the family, 
but rather deserved to be incorporated into these institutions.  
Outside the Bundestag and the federal government, the West German media was 
instrumental in the public discussion of the suggested new family law through a series of 
articles. The new liberal-conservative daily the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, founded in 
November 1949, for example, stated that it could not “fix the powers [embedded] in the 
BGB,” but it could outline the “prominent points on the legal situation of women.”60 The 
paper’s use of “rights” in scare quotes as they discussed limits, for example, on marital 
property indicated that perhaps the editors were skeptical of maintaining the BGB’s treatment 
of women. The liberal newspaper DIE ZEIT, meanwhile, ran an article in January 1950 that 
featured anecdotes designed to demonstrate the complexity of the current legal situation for 
married couples. For example, there had been cases of men and women remarrying, under 
the impression that their husbands and wives had been killed in battle or by approaching 
troops, only to learn later that their spouses were alive. To whom, then, were they legally 
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married?61 At other points, the West German media informed about the developments in the 
East. In March 1950, for example, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported that new 
provisions of family law such as the surname clause and marital property were to be changed 
in the GDR.62 These examples demonstrate that, at an early stage, West German newspaper 
editors mediated debates on family law by offering readers a variety of perspectives. 
The Bundestag decided to send the matter of family law to the Federal Ministry of 
Justice, where a lower level official named Maria Hagemeyer took on the reforms. 
Hagemeyer had studied law in Bonn and, after a brief stint in the Berlin Justice Ministry, 
became the first female judge in Germany in 1927.63 After 1945, she was a district attorney 
in Bonn before being appointed to the Federal Ministry of Justice.64  In 1951, Hagemeyer 
published a memorandum (Denkschrift) with proposals for new family law provisions in the 
BGB and the 1946 Allied Control Council marriage law. Although Hagemeyer emphasized 
reform above all, she also argued that parts of the old law did not conflict with the Basic 
Law. Hagemeyer stated, for example, that the age of marriage could remain different for men 
and women because “women mature earlier than men” and different ages did not present a 
                                                          
61 Alfred Thoß, “Eherecht und Ehetragik,” DIE ZEIT, January 19, 1950, http://www.zeit.de/1950/03/eherecht-
und-ehetragik/seite-3 
62 “Gleichberechtigung der Frau,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 2, 1950, 3. 
63 “Jung und anmutig,” Die ZEIT, July 10, 1987, 1. 
64 According to Der Spiegel’s obituary, she was so well-known for her work on the Denkschrift that she was 
nicknamed “Gleichberechtigung-Marie.” “Gestorben,” December 9, 1991, Der Spiegel 50 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13491790.html. Not much is known about her political affiliation. Robert 
Moeller indicates that she was Catholic but party association is not clarified. See Moeller, Protecting 
Motherhood, 253. 
  
211 
  
legal disadvantage.65 In addition, she supported keeping the clause which “obligated spouses 
to a marital life community.”66 She also retained the paternal family name on the grounds 
that it was important that children have the same name as the parents, but she offered 
hyphenation for mothers as an option.67  
She determined, however, that other provisions prioritizing male authority did not 
align with the principle of equality. The right of men to make all decisions, or the 
Stichentscheid, for instance, was one. Hagemeyer stated that it must be replaced with a clause 
that guaranteed equal decision-making, but she acknowledged the possibility of indecision 
and the necessity of third-party intervention.68 Relatedly, she argued that the clause that 
forced women to live with their spouses must be overturned.69 Furthermore, she asserted that 
the BGB’s prescription of women as the head of the household was against the Basic Law. In 
addition, Hagemeyer pointed out that the Schlüsselgewalt clause supposedly disadvantaged 
men.70 Regarding legal transactions, both spouses would have the same obligation to the 
other, except in “circumstances when the matter should not be handled equally in the name of 
the other spouse.”71 Only those who abused their rights would have them removed by the 
Guardians’ Court. If spouses lived apart, they were obligated to support the other. In some 
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regards, Hagemeyer’s proposals represented significant departures from the old BGB, 
enforcing more egalitarian relations between spouses. In fact, on many subjects, her 
suggestions closely matched Nathan’s suggestions in the East. In other areas, however, 
Hagemeyer adhered more closely to the old Civil Code, provided its regulations did not 
overtly contradict Article 3 of the Basic Law. 
To some degree, Hagemeyer’s proposals were a product of the two predominant 
juridical interpretations of the clause that had arisen in the past year in legal journals and 
important meetings of the judicial profession, such as the 1950 Jurists’ Congress, or 
Juristentag, in the West.72 The first strain of thought, derived from texts by several liberal 
and Social Democratic legal experts, maintained that Article 3 of the Basic Law “normalized 
complete equality of women and that biological sexual difference allows no differential 
treatment in legal relations.”73 The second view, held by Christian conservative legal experts, 
was that “an ‘equalization’ cannot be in the essence of Article 3, but rather the physiological 
and functional differences of the sexes must be observed.”74 Hagemeyer explained that the 
cause for these prevailing differences of opinion was that the Basic Law did not define 
Gleichberechtigung. This particular circumstance arose, she asserted, because of the history 
of the Weimar constitution’s equality clause, the discussions in the Parliamentary Council, 
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and the constitutions of individual states within the FRG that had adopted their own equality 
clauses.75 The consequence, she implied, was that the concept remained open to 
interpretation and offered little guidance for going forward. 
Another strain of argumentation present in Hagemeyer’s Denkschrift concerned the 
recent division of Germany and the increasingly tense Cold War relations between the two 
German states. First, Hagemeyer explained that individual state constitutions as well as the 
constitution of the GDR guaranteed that “men and women have equal rights.” Second, she 
noted that, in stark contrast to the FRG, “in the Eastern zone, as far as one can see, [there are] 
no differences of opinion over the meaning and the extent of the concept of equality.”76 She 
also compared the Soviet Union’s 1936 constitution and Article 7 of the GDR’s 1949 
constitution as a way of drawing correlations between the two texts. Finally, she observed 
that the East German constitution’s immediate overhaul of all laws opposing 
Gleichberechtigung in the GDR and Article 117’s 31 March 1953 deadline posed potential 
“legal insecurity,” because both states would no longer follow the same laws.77 Each of these 
statements engaged with the issue of equality and family law in the East, but in different 
ways. On the one hand, Hagemeyer implied that women’s equality did not have to be that 
contentious—after all, many Germans across all four occupation zones already settled on it. 
On the other hand, she warned readers that the East was veering too close to the Soviet model 
and it could jeopardize German unity. Each of her points added to one larger argument: 
potential long- and short-term legal consequences for married men and women and their 
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families on both sides of the German-German border.  
Related to her analysis of East Germany, Hagemeyer also used contemporary 
comparative law to point out possible paths for the West to take.78 As a lower-profile 
Ministry official and legal expert, Hagemeyer was not bound by the politics of the ruling 
CDU/CSU or other parties and therefore could appropriate or consider ideas from other legal 
traditions as she saw fit. At times, for instance, she referred to other Western states, such as 
France, Belgium, or Spain, as well as Scandinavia. Regarding the husband’s right to decide, 
for instance, she contrasted the patriarchal provisions of the Netherlands with those of 
Swedish, Soviet, and Chinese (Maoist) laws, which gave partners the equal right to decide, 
implying that perhaps other models existed.79 Interestingly, Hagemeyer also extolled the 
Soviet Union for its progress in certain areas. Regarding the choice of men to decide the 
domicile, for example, Hagemeyer praised the Soviet zone’s dismissal of the provision, 
though she ultimately rejected their version on the grounds that in West Germany, spouses 
could come to mutual decisions.80 Comparative law, references to the East, and 
acknowledgment of different strains of thought in West Germany were all major influences 
on Hagemeyer’s text. 
 
Discussions in West German Society 
As a memorandum, Hagemeyer’s Denkschrift was limited to some extent because it 
was not legally binding, but it nevertheless stimulated discussion in society, which in turn 
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helped the Ministry of Justice gauge reactions on the ground level. Throughout 1951, the 
Ministry of Justice sent out copies to the major political parties and their women’s 
committees and independent women’s associations, requesting their opinions on the text.81 
Some, mainly the political parties and groups that had already earlier supported a reform of 
the Civil Code before, responded favorably. Even the Protestant Church of the Rhineland—
one of the factions comprising the larger Protestant Church in Germany (EKD)—offered tacit 
approval.82 Others, like the Weltorganisation der Mütter Aller Nationen (W.O.M.A.N.), an 
international women’s organization affiliated with the peace movement, agreed with the 
spirit of the Denkschrift, but nevertheless offered their own suggestions for different 
provisions.83 Perhaps most significantly, this camp included independent women’s 
associations, other professional organizations, and some major political parties, such as the 
Club der berufstätigen Frauen Hamburg, the Deutsche Akademikerinnenbund, the Deutscher 
Anwaltverein, and the SPD.84 To make their voices stronger and to coordinate their activities 
for women’s equality, in the end of 1951, fourteen independent women’s associations—
confessional, trade unions, and professional—had formed an umbrella organization, the 
Deutscher Frauenrat, in the tradition of the pre-1933 Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine 
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(BDF).85 Funded by the American government, the Deutscher Frauenrat formed the 
Information Service for Women’s Issues and began publishing the newsletter Information for 
Women (Informationen für die Frau, IfF) in April 1952.86 The Deutscher Frauenrat and its 
newsletter became also an important voice in the debate about the draft of the Equal Rights 
Act.   
Although Hagemeyer had her supporters, her Denkschrift also provoked opposition, 
namely from the Catholic and Protestant church leadership, who represented 43 percent and 
51 percent of the population, respectively.87 Especially fierce was the opposition from 
Catholic side. In February 1952, Catholic bishops warned Adenauer and the federal 
government that they had “serious concerns” about Hagemeyer’s proposals.88 Catholic 
Church leaders thereafter maintained firm opposition to the Ministry’s work on family law. 
Protestant leaders took a slightly softer line, but nevertheless stressed their commitment to 
the family before equal rights. In March 1952, for instance, Otto Dibelius, the Chairman of 
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the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany, wrote to Hagemeyer. On the one hand, he 
agreed with Hagemeyer that married women could control their own property. On the other 
hand, he emphasized that his first priority was to ensure that “the new rules of the subjective 
rights of men and women” did not maintain the “presently endangered institutions of 
marriage and the family.”89 For these reasons, the EKD supported the retention of measures 
that helped the family, such as the paternal surname and the Stichentscheid in cases of 
indecision.  
In addition, the Ministry of Justice also received opinions from individuals. Whereas 
social organizations had focused primarily on the wording or legality of specific provisions, 
and church leaders had emphasized restoring the family, individuals homed in on other 
issues, often based on personal experiences and anecdotal evidence. For instance, men 
typically wrote to the Ministry with a range of requests that both helped and indicted former 
spouses. For example, Herr G. wrote in February 1952 that he had read in the last edition of 
Der Spiegel about the reforms and was curious to know about the right of spouses to inherit 
the property of the other upon death.90 Some were less supportive of the proposals. A Herr 
M., a rector from Bavaria, wrote to the Ministry in March 1952. He asked rhetorically in his 
letter: “But how will it stand with the equal duties [emphasis original] of women? Will 
women, especially civil servants, also be held to contribute her part to the support of the 
family and herself?”91 He then elucidated his own story. Pronounced the guilty party in his 
divorce proceedings because his former spouse was unable to support herself, he had been 
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paying her alimony, despite his remarriage and support of another woman. Their children 
were grown. How could it happen, he asked, “that a woman never never must rise up for her 
own support?”92 Herr M.’s letter highlighted that some men struggled against the old Civil 
Code because it forced them into difficult financial and personal positions.  
For the women who wrote to the Ministry of Justice in overwhelming numbers, any 
expansion of rights was welcome. In October 1951, Frau W. from Frankfurt am Main wrote 
that her husband of 28 years had been “tormenting her mercilessly” because she refused to 
hand over half of her property in a divorce.93 Since marrying, she recounted, she had to 
“stand behind the counter and watch, powerless, like an expensive piece of furniture, after 
the other wanders to this felling area and she herself is utterly withheld from him.”94 She 
would consent to the divorce if she had the chance to divide the house and property.95 
Similarly, one recently divorced woman from Rottorf am Winsen, who had had trouble 
getting alimony from her ex-husband, pleaded for the Ministry to pass a law that would 
protect the family, not leave it to “a man to allow a family to go into misery and 
destitution.”96 Another described her difficulties raising a family and working full time—in 
her case, through two wars—and wanted to know if the new law would help women’s 
economic status.97 Yet another, a Frau M., expressed in February 1952 that she found it 
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shameful that as a married woman she had no rights to property or her own bank account or 
to keep her name. Moreover, she found it ridiculous to argue that the circumstances of the 
BGB were different, when women had always worked in agriculture or industry, and even 
bourgeois women who stayed at home were “busy from early until late.”98 She ended by 
encouraging the Ministry “to listen to women [emphasis original], not churches.”99 
Other individuals harnessed the language of comparison to East Germany and the 
Eastern bloc in their letters. Some correspondents used reluctant praise of the East to pressure 
the Ministry to alter certain regulations. Herr M., for example, lauded the Soviet Union’s 
removal of alimony payments to support his own case, though he qualified that he was “no 
[emphasis original] Communist!”100 Others picked up on the problem of legal unity. In an 
article in the Aachener Nachrichten, the first licensed anti-Nazi newspaper in postwar 
Germany, one author pleaded that “one foresees from the other problematic side [that] the 
thing is, legal development in the other half of Germany has progressed further than in the 
Federal Republic and that the demands of our time are taken into account.”101 Here, the 
author urged the Ministry to move quickly with their reforms in order to keep pace with the 
East. In both cases, the authors tried to use the progress in the East to pressure the West 
German federal government to pursue more expansive reforms.  
This section has shown that momentum for a new family law—whether it reified the 
old law or offered a new vision—was building up in the West between November 1949 and 
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early 1952. From the start, the Bundestag was divided between left and liberal proponents of 
women’s equality and Christian-conservative defenders of the “traditional” family based on 
“natural” gender roles. When Hagemeyer put together a list of proposals for forthcoming 
reforms to family law, she tried to balance these two, competing sides. What Hagemeyer’s 
Denkschrift ultimately provoked was a society-wide debate—one that utilized a range of 
arguments, from the legality of the current regulations, the preservation of the traditional 
family, and the situation in the East—over the future of the Civil Code. As the Ministry 
worked to turn these myriad suggestions and critiques into a legislative draft, internal 
divisions threatened to derail the reforms of family law in the GDR. 
 
 
Resisting and Revising Family Law in the GDR, 195053 
At the same time that the SED and the Ministry of Justice created and propagated a 
new family law, the ruling party addressed other issues confronting women, especially 
mothers, in the workplace. The GDR already theoretically promised equal wages to men and 
women, a policy set down by the Soviets in 1946 and further encased in the 1949 constitution 
as a basic right of the new socialist state. In addition, on 19 April 1950, the Volkskammer 
passed the “Labor Law for the Promotion and Care of Manpower, the Increase of 
Productivity, and the Further Improvement of the Material and Cultural Situation of Workers 
and Employees.”102 The law guaranteed every citizen the right to work “according to his 
capabilities.” It also outlined how to increase productivity and the role of the trade unions. 
Furthermore, its regulations were supposed to promote the empowerment and training of 
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women, though its provisions on this front were rather scant, other than stating that age and 
gender were not supposed to impede equal wages for equal work (and studies of practice 
show that gender often did interfere).103 Additionally, one provision offered pregnant women 
time off before and after giving birth. Finally, the law did not regulate health codes for 
women or youth, only guaranteeing that such definitions were forthcoming.  
These provisions aimed at women became the “Law for the Protection of Motherhood 
and Children and for the Equality of Women,” or the Mutterschutzgesetz. This law had been 
in the works since late 1949 in the Ministry of Labor and Health under the watchful eye of 
the well-known SED functionary and DFD leader Käthe Kern, who led the “Mother and 
Child” department.104 Maternity protection laws, however, predated the GDR, going back to 
the late nineteenth century as a result of the labor movement and Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck’s social welfare reforms.105 Over the years, the imperial, Weimar, and Nazi 
governments made critical changes to the legislation, reducing women’s work hours, 
increasing wages, and upping maternity leave.106 In the immediate postwar period, the Allies 
suspended these payments to working mothers and decided that the new German government 
could determine what regulations it preferred. Now that Germany was divided, GDR 
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politicians chose to reinstate welfare provisions in order to support and entice their largely 
female population to the workplace and the socialist planned economy. 
On 21 September 1950, the Ministers’ Council—the executive branch of the GDR—
sent the “Law for the Protection of Motherhood and Children and for the Equality of 
Women” to the Volkskammer, who met a few days later to discuss and approve the 
Mutterschutzgesetz, a catch-all piece of legislation designed to promote what historian 
Dagmar Herzog calls “the triple burden” of work, housework, and political activity.107 The 
law simultaneously provided state aid to working mothers, recriminalized abortion, gave 
women more rights in their partnerships and families, and opened doors to them in politics 
and the workplace. In addition to job training and political participation, this legislation 
reformed parts of the old BGB. The new law declared that “a healthy family is the 
cornerstone of a democratic society.”108 Its text further stated that the equal standing 
(Gleichstellung) of men and women necessitated equality in family law, and reiterated that 
any laws opposing women’s equality in marriage or the family were overturned. Thus, the 
man’s right to decide was overturned explicitly in this provision and couples were mandated 
to make decisions together. Furthermore, marital status could also no longer prevent women 
from pursuing employment. Both parents would be expected to care for the children. Finally, 
illegitimate children would no longer be considered “a stigma.” The legislation promised that 
the Ministry of Justice would produce a corresponding and expansive law by the end of the 
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year.109 At the same time, the law did not change marital property regulations, divorce, or 
any number of other provisions that restricted women’s equality with men. The central point 
of the law was to provide social aid to working mothers in order to incentivize and support 
their work under the Five Year Plan. It did not provide the extensive revisions that the old 
BGB required. 
In their discourse surrounding the new law, members of the National Front—a 
coalition of Communist and non-Communist parties and mass organizations in the 
Volkskammer—voiced their support for the law by praising the Soviet Union as a model of 
pronatalist population policy, denigrating the preceding Nazi model, and emphasizing that 
the patriarchal Western model across the border dangerously limited women’s 
emancipation.110 At the end of the meeting, the Volkskammer voted unanimously to adopt the 
law. Historians debate why the Mutterschutzgesetz turned out this way. One explanation is 
offered by Gesine Obertreis, who theorizes that “the central planning of all economic and 
social processes made it quite possible to abruptly break and initiate a new direction.”111 To 
some degree, Obertreis’s suggestion is logical, given that the SED-controlled Ministry of 
Justice and the Volkskammer had so easily been able to create and pass legislation with the 
unanimous support of approximately 466 representatives. She overlooks that compromises 
on the part of the SED several months beforehand were at play as well. Outside the 
government ministries, mass organizations like the DFD propagated their own version of a 
law for women’s rights at home and in the workplace. On 7 March 1950, at the International 
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Women’s day celebration, the DFD met with Minister-President Otto Grotewohl to offer 
their proposals for the new “women’s law,” or Frauengesetz. Above all, the DFD wanted to 
work toward the “strengthened inclusion of women in economic life,” which, they argued, 
would require increasing the numbers of employed women and offering them the chance to 
earn higher qualifications in fields like optics and engineering 112 Women would also need to 
receive better benefits and protection in the workplace. They furthermore called for greater 
civic participation of women. Finally, they stated that family law would have to be reformed. 
Not long after this meeting, on 18 April 1950, the Politbüro of the SED issued an official 
statement that it would pursue a law meeting the DFD’s demands.113 
Publicly, the SED was very much in favor of the Frauengesetz, because the party 
touted itself as the deliverer of women’s emancipation. Behind the scenes, however, the DFD 
faced an uphill struggle. On 8 June 1950, Grotewohl met with several leading DFD members 
(who were also members of the SED Central Committee), the Minister of Justice, and other 
prominent SED officials. He reported that the Soviet Control Commission refused to allow 
the law as it was, claiming it was “a declaration, not concrete provisions.”114 Moreover, he 
asserted that the SED had to contend with changing notions of socialism and women’s 
equality. He argued that the SED’s “perceptions were outdated” because August Bebel was 
“obsolete.”115 This statement was in line with contemporary Soviet thinking, which had 
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initially favored women’s liberation before reversing in the 1930s to support more traditional 
family structures—hence re-outlawing abortion, making divorce more difficult, and again 
requiring legal registration of marriage. One major aim of this change was during and after 
the Second World War a pro-natalist policy that attempted to address the vast population 
losses.116 In the end, Grotewohl, DFD, and SED members decided to spend the next week 
reworking the law under the auspices of the State Administration department of the Politbüro 
of the SED.117 The next time the law appeared was before the Ministers’ Council in 
September 1950. In the interim, the SED settled on a compromise measure: merging the 
Mutterschutzgesetz, the Frauengesetz, and parts of the proposed family law, which is how 
elements of each piece of legislation ended up in the final version of the “Law for the 
Protection of Motherhood and Children and for the Equality of Women.” 
To be sure, the SED recognized that media propagation was a crucial part of the 
success of the 1950 legislation. After the Volkskammer passed the Mutterschutzgesetz in 
September 1950, all of the major papers, such as the Berliner Zeitung (BZ), printed the law 
for all East Germans to read, proclaiming that “women [were] finally equal” in the GDR.118 
Evincing this claim, Neues Deutschland later ran an article explaining how working women 
at the synthetic fiber factory in Premnitz benefited from the law’s mandated “social 
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facilities”—in this case, a laundry, a kindergarten, and a children’s clinic, among other 
things.119 In addition, BZ emphasized the law’s efforts to increase the role of women in social 
and cultural life and balance out the surplus of women to men.120 Furthermore, BZ used 
women’s voices to reiterate the law’s surefire impact on the West. One BZ article quoted a 
woman from the Western side of Berlin asking about the law.121 Another woman, a trade 
union representative, was cited as saying that the Mutterschutzgesetz would show West 
German women “how to fight for such profits.”122 These examples demonstrated a clear 
strategy by the paper’s editors to show that the East was more progressive than the West, 
who would learn from their example.  
The BZ editors also employed the voices of men in their reporting to demonstrate how 
the law affected men and women. On 7 October 1950, for instance, the paper ran an article 
titled “For Some, the Women’s Law is a Hard Nut [to Crack].” The article quoted East 
German men who openly supported the law and West Berlin men who opposed it. One man 
described how his wife went to a DFD meeting and came back “crazed” about the 
Mutterschutzgesetz in the East.123 He told the paper, “These people in the East are totally 
mental!”124 With these excerpts, the East German media contrasted “more civilized” Eastern 
men with less sympathetic Western men.  
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Another common theme in the media was the reactions of married men to the new 
legislation. Neue Zeit—the organ of the East-CDU, which was increasingly falling into line 
with the SED—printed an article on 29 September 1950 that relayed the story of a “Herr 
Wegner,” who attempted to exercise his right to a final decision on his teenage son’s 
education. The paper reported that his wife stepped in with a copy of the morning edition, 
pointed out to him that his legal rights had changed, and he subsequently altered his 
perspective.125 A BZ comic from the same date depicted a man taken out on a stretcher by 
medical orderlies. The caption explains that he had opposed his wife’s right to work, and 
now she was his superior at work, which shocked him.126 These messages were meant to 
push male readers to adopt more progressive positions on women’s rights in marriage and the 
family. 
The media’s presented the law as a victory for women’s economic and civil rights. 
The SED leadership hoped that this argument would win female voters the upcoming 
elections in October 1950 and thus pressed for the quick passage of the law. In general, 
according to historian Mary Fulbrook, elections served in the GDR, “as a means of mass 
mobilization, presenting candidates and issues to the public, and advertising policies which 
had already been decided upon elsewhere.”127 This observation also applied to the new 
family law and Mutterschutz. The ruling party had already decided on the parameters of the 
law and used its incentives for working women and mothers to attract their votes in the 
upcoming elections. 
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According to the Mutterschutzgesetz, the Ministry of Justice was slated to pass larger 
family law reforms by the end of 1950, but it did not. Although newspaper articles in early 
1951 promoted the new family law128, the Ministry set aside the reforms until July 1952, 
when the SED Party Congress (Parteikonferenz) resurrected the matter of the old Civil Code 
as part of its forthcoming “building of socialism (Aufbau des Sozialismus)” initiative.129 To 
create a new socialist family law, the Ministry of Justice convened a Legislative Commission 
(Gesetzgebungskommission) in December 1952. In her opening address to the Commission, 
committee chairwoman Hilde Benjamin attributed the legislation’s delayed passage to “many 
causes.”130 One key factor, she acknowledged, was that the 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz had 
already removed some of the most controversial regulations of the former family law, such as 
husbands’ rights to make decisions for their wives and restrict their rights to work.131  
A second possible factor was that the legislation did not really have a champion 
within the Ministry at the time. Benjamin had largely stepped out of the picture because of 
her role on the Supreme Court administering a series of show trials between 1950 and 
1952.132 Under her watch, roughly 78,000 people were convicted of crimes in 1950 alone.133 
Hans Nathan, meanwhile, divided his time between the Ministry and the Humboldt 
University. Finally, building socialism—a process that included abolishing states in the 
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GDR, enforcing their own version of Gleichschaltung of the educational and judicial systems 
and religious groups, and cracking down on political dissent—was beginning to occupy 
much of the SED’s attention.134 With the most urgent provisions of family law taken care of 
in the Mutterschutzgesetz and the attention of the SED functionaries in the Ministry of Justice 
diverted elsewhere, family law reforms were momentarily delayed.  
When the Legislative Commission finally reopened debates on family law in late 
1952, the stakes of their work had changed. This time, Benjamin, as chairwoman, asserted to 
the Commission that the work set out before them was no longer just about women, but about 
the “entire complex of family law, including divorce, custody, and so forth.”135 Letters to the 
Ministry of Justice and recent court decisions underscored the very issues that Benjamin 
raised about divorce and other sections of the law. One correspondent, for instance, explained 
that he had been separated from his wife for 20 years, divorced for 10, and was still paying 
her alimony. He wanted to know how long this would continue in the GDR, given that the 
1950 legislation did not address divorce.136 Others wrote to inquire about adoption and 
custody rights.137 Court decisions highlighted the ongoing dilemma. Without a law, judges 
had to rely on the “equality principle” to guide their decisions, which was open to 
interpretation, depending on the issue. In matters of property, for instance, the decision was 
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rather straightforward: women were entitled to their own.138 Other issues presented more 
complex problems. In the case of divorce, because men and women were granted the equal 
right to work, “the right to alimony was negated.”139 One expert even ruled that “a divorce is 
‘no license for a divorced woman to lead an idle life, speculating for the alimony of the 
husband’.”140 At the same time, courts had to take into account what women contributed to 
the home, in the case they did not work. After all, in the early 1950s, it was not unusual for 
women to leave the workforce as men returned from POW camps.141 Thus, one of the 
outcomes of the “legal chaos” of this time was that Communist judges became so focused on 
creating equality between men and women in divorce settlements that they overlooked how 
the removal of alimony would disadvantage women, especially housewives. 
In response to these issues, the Gesetzgebungskommission finally tackled this 
complex of laws. In contrast to the unified and enthusiastic front the SED put on for the 
public, the internal work was sometimes contentious and more often tedious. While some 
topics attracted little attention—no one disagreed, for example, that marriages should be 
forbidden between relatives and that bigamy should be outlawed—others proved more 
controversial and demonstrated the difficulties Communists faced in implementing socialism. 
The family surname was one. The commission had to decide if it prioritized unifying the 
family under one name or women’s individual rights and claims to self-identity (especially in 
professional life). In the end, they left it up to the discretion of the marrying partners to 
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choose what they preferred as a surname. Property posed another challenge for the SED, 
which considered “life partnership (Lebenskameradschaft) as a progressive social aim.”142 If 
one of the spouses purchased something with money he or she earned before marrying, did it 
become communal marital property? Did entitlement to communal marital property change if 
a woman stayed home and contributed no income, but offered her domestic labor instead? 
For a state that absolved to get rid of bourgeois notions of individual property, marital 
property law presented a complex dilemma. It was up to the Gesetzgebungskommission to 
figure out how to balance the conflicting priorities of the SED regime with the realities 
facing East German citizens.143 While their efforts eventually resulted in a new legislative 
draft, its approval was pushed aside in favor of other more pressing issues to the regime and 
the Ministry of Justice, such as reforming the judicial system and clamping down on political 
opposition.144 Moreover, in March 1953, the death of Joseph Stalin, the de-Stalinization of 
East Germany, and then the 17 June 1953 uprisings shook up the GDR and consumed the 
SED’s attention. 
Throughout the early 1950s, the official discourse on family law in the GDR 
presented the draft legislation as a symbol of progress. SED officials within the government 
and those running the East German media presented the law as a victory over Weimar- and 
Nazi-era restrictions on women’s rights. Moreover, they situated their legislation, in many 
ways, as modeling the Soviets’. Finally, they depicted the law as the winner in the contest 
with the West for women’s emancipation. At the same time, SED leaders such as Nathan and 
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Benjamin confronted objections from its own citizens, the reluctance of members of the 
ruling party, and uncertainty in court rulings. Furthermore, at some points during these 
debates, the Ministry of Justice focused its attention elsewhere. As a result, while family law 
took a few steps forward in this period, it was ultimately hindered by the SED’s reticence to 
pursue more radical reforms. 
 
Negotiating Equal Rights for Men and Women in West Germany, 195253 
In March 1952, the West German Minister of Justice, Thomas Dehler, debuted a new 
legislative draft based on Hagemeyer’s memorandum, the resulting responses from women’s 
organizations and churches, and opinions from other federal ministries.145 Dehler, born in 
1897, fought in the First World War before earning a law degree and joining the liberal 
German Democratic Party in 1920. After 1945, he became a district attorney in Bamberg and 
then represented the American zone in the Parliamentary Council as an FDP member. When 
Adenauer took office as Chancellor, he appointed Dehler to the post of Minister of Justice.146  
Dehler’s personal experiences and convictions as a liberal politician in a new, 
Western-oriented government informed his approach to the new legislation. One of the 
FRG’s goals, according to Dehler, was “to adapt the current law to the principle of equal 
rights of the sexes”—a goal, incidentally, that superficially resembled that of the GDR’s 
family law. In comparison to the GDR, however, the very concept of equality was more 
contested in the FRG. Furthermore, he stated that the Ministry’s second goal was to “restore 
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legal unity in the area of family law.”147 Unlike the East Germans, who emphasized all-
German unification, West German politicians did not explicitly focus on the legal unity with 
the East, but rather the “entire federal territory (Bundesgebiet),” meaning all of the Western 
sectors.148 This approach allowed them to avoid legitimizing the East while also promoting 
an image of unifying Germans in the early years of the Federal Republic. 
Although Dehler argued that his proposed law promoted equality and unity, in reality, 
it represented ambivalence and compromise. In certain regards, his legislative draft did not 
fundamentally change the old Civil Code. For instance, he retained the BGB’s guarantee of 
equal obligation to the matrimonial community. His draft also kept the paternal family name, 
but allowed women to hyphenate with their maiden names.149 In addition, Dehler maintained 
that women must have the right to work, but they must also uphold their domestic duties.150 
At the same time, his version changed many parts of the old law. For instance, he removed 
the Stichentscheid unequivocally. He decided that the Schlüsselgewalt, formerly the right of 
women only, had to extend to both spouses.151 In addition, his version allowed both parents 
(not just the father) to determine when a child was of age.152 The age of marriage—to which 
mothers and fathers had to consent—would be the same for men and women (18 years of 
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age).153 In addition, out-of-wedlock children no longer had to live with their fathers, but 
could share either parent’s domicile.154 Dehler determined that spouses no longer had to live 
together, a provision that had previously disadvantaged women.155 Under the new 
regulations, men and women would be responsible for support (Unterhalt) of the household 
and family.156 He furthermore overhauled the old marital property system, proposing that 
spouses would have control over their own property, would manage shared property, and 
would benefit from an “equalization of gains” clause.157 Regarding parental rights, Dehler 
stated that the old BGB’s regulations were decidedly against equality and therefore parents 
had to share authority over the children, including the right to make decisions.158  
Although parts of Dehler’s legislation garnered positive responses from the public, 
such as women’s organizations and female party representatives, he endured more negative 
feedback from Protestant and Catholic Church leaders and the Christian conservative 
Adenauer administration. At a meeting in April and May 1952, pastors, bishops, and other 
Catholic and Protestant public figures made it clear to Dehler that they did not believe 
individual rights could endanger the familial community.159 The Catholic faction took an 
especially hard line on this issue, supporting the retention of the Stichentscheid in spousal 
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and parental relations. Protestants took a softer line on this front; they supported the removal 
of the Stichentscheid in marriage, but not parental authority. In an effort to please his 
opponents, Dehler chose “a middle line: on the one side he left the claims of the Catholic 
Church unconsidered and stuck to Hagemeyer’s proposal to allow both spouses to decide. On 
the other side he left the right to decide to the father, diverging from the Denkschrift and 
holding to the line of the Protestant Church.”160 
Compromise, as Dehler soon discovered, was not the correct solution in the eyes of 
the Adenauer administration. He confronted discord while meeting with the Federal Cabinet 
on 27 June 1952. Although most of the Cabinet agreed that men and women were mutually 
obligated to contribute to the marital community, they also supported retaining measures that 
reinforced male authority, such as the Stichentscheid, which Dehler had opposed.161 They 
took this stance, Adenauer argued, because they believed that Articles 3 and 6 of the Basic 
Law could not be interpreted in isolation of one another. While Dehler and Adenauer agreed 
that a man could have the final decision in cases regarding the children, they stood at odds 
over the place of the Stichentscheid in marriage. Dehler defended himself by noting that his 
draft had garnered approval from Catholic and Protestant leaders, but it was not enough to 
convince the other Christian conservative Cabinet members.162 
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Although Dehler tried to fight the Federal Cabinet163, under duress from the Federal 
Chancellor and other Ministers, he reinstated the controversial Stichentscheid provision. His 
opponents argued that Article 3’s guarantee of equality did not apply to measures such as the 
Stichentscheid in marriage. In addition, he agreed to change other regulations, allowing now, 
for example, that women could only work if it was “reconcilable with her duties in marriage 
and the family.”164 Furthermore, under this version of the law, a woman would contribute to 
the household via domestic labor and would only seek employment outside the home if her 
husband’s income was not sufficient. To drive these points home even more, Adenauer wrote 
to Dehler on 2 September 1952 to remind him that prohibiting women from following 
decisions that went against their well-being would only endanger the marriage and therefore 
opposed the goals of the Federal Cabinet.165  
The Bundesrat, the representation of the Länder at the national level, received the 
federal government’s draft in September 1952. On most issues, such as the family name, the 
Bundesrat did not challenge the Federal Cabinet. On other matters, however, it opposed the 
federal government. Regarding the Stichentscheid in marriage, for instance, the Bundesrat 
responded that it would not accept “a one-sided right of the man to decide during differences 
of opinion between spouses,” stating that it would only “deepen the conflict.”166 The federal 
government ultimately rejected this proposal, in order to “promote indeed the best for the 
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family.”167 
The federal government’s prescriptions for what was best for the family ultimately 
divided society. On one side were Christian conservatives, who largely supported the 
Adenauer administration, although to different degrees. Catholic leaders fell completely into 
line with the Federal Cabinet, supporting a family model in which men still made major 
decisions for their wives and families, controlled all marital property, used the patriarchal 
family name, and relied on female caretakers in the home. One Catholic publication justified 
its position by arguing that “wives and mothers are the center of the home, which is an 
inviolable foundation of Judeo-Christian family order.”168 Protestants took a more moderate 
position, but nevertheless stressed their commitment to “God’s order.”169 For this reason, 
they continued to support a family model in which women took their husbands’ surnames 
and men could still make all decisions for the children, while they rejected male authority in 
marital decision-making and male control over marital property.  
In addition, the conservative press expressed its support of the Adenauer 
administration through a number of different strategies. Journalist Winfried Martini of the 
Münchner Merkur compared the Civil Code reforms to the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, stating that then, the “sacramental character” of marriage was “robbed” and 
“degraded to a bourgeois legal contract.”170 He went on to call Gleichberechtigung 
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“satire.”171 Meanwhile, the conservative Frankfurter Neue Presse warned readers that 
Gleichberechtigung was the work of “a minority” and that women could not be expected to 
serve in the military or work in mines or furnace—veiled references to East Germany and the 
Soviet Union, which employed women in industrial jobs in much higher numbers than in the 
West.172 Finally, others focused on the draft’s passage through the government. The CDU 
organ Union in Deutschland vaguely alluded to the controversies over the law, stating simply 
that Dehler’s version “did not find the full agreement of the federal cabinet.”173 All of these 
articles attempted to undermine Dehler’s proposals and support the Adenauer 
administration’s alterations to the law.  
These Christian conservative positions differed from those of the independent 
women’s associations, trade unions, professional organizations, and more left and liberal 
leaning media pundits in West German society. In their petitions to the federal government, 
groups such as the Deutscher Frauenring, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, and the 
Deutscher Anwaltverein laid out their visions of future German families. What they 
imagined, in contrast to the old BGB and the Adenauer administration’s proposals, were 
marriages in which women had mutual say in important decisions, could retain some 
individual identity by hyphenating their surnames, were no longer the legally designated 
caretakers, had the right to work outside the home without their husbands’ permission, and 
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could control their own property.174 This reimagined family model, while elevating the status 
of married women, also necessarily took certain key rights away from married men. 
One newspaper that emphasized its opposition to the Adenauer administration were 
the Western Allied-run Die Neue Zeitung.  One of its articles did not mince words when it 
bluntly reported that the removal of “the dictatorial capabilities of the husband” had caused 
strife in the Federal Cabinet.175 The typically more conservative Rheinische Post took a more 
neutral stance, reporting on the “problematic marriage law draft” and noting that the 
Stichentscheid remained an “unresolved” issue.176 One of the more popular national 
newspapers, the liberal-conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, emphasized that the 
Bundestag was reticent to grant primacy to men in matters of decision-making, a matter they 
labeled “undoubtedly legally unclear.”177 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s main 
competitor, the more left-liberal Frankfurter Rundschau, meanwhile, reported simply that the 
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Bundesrat’s resolution was “far-reaching.”178 Another article in the Frankfurter Rundschau 
was less neutral, praising the “wisdom” of the Bundesrat, but noting the uncertainty that its 
proposals would remain.179 Each of these newspapers alluded to the problematic nature of the 
Federal Cabinet’s draft and the in-fighting among government officials as a way of 
expressing their disdain, or at least reticence, for the Adenauer administration’s draft 
legislation. 
By October 1952, the onslaught of correspondence and the media coverage made 
Adenauer and his cabinet well aware that they had little support from the Bundesrat, 
nonparty women’s organizations, party-affiliated women’s committees, trade unions, other 
independent professional associations, and interested individuals. Even women in their own 
party could not agree on the fate of controversial regulations such as the Stichentscheid. 
Catholic women, for instance, butted heads over the provision’s removal, while Protestant 
women expressed their dissent to bishops like Dibelius.180 Still, the Adenauer administration 
disregarded all of their opposition and honored only the opinions of the male Catholic and 
Protestant Church leaders. 
On 23 October 1952, the federal government sent the final version of the drafted 
“Law about the Equal Rights of Men and Women in the Area of Civil Law and Restoring 
Legal Unity in the Area of Family Law (Family Law)” to the Bundestag. The legislative draft 
offered several minor changes from the original BGB but nevertheless reified the male 
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breadwinner/female homemaker family model. For the Stichentscheid, for example, the 
federal government proposed to give the man the right to decide in the case that an agreement 
could not be reached, and decisions made without consultation with the wife or that opposed 
her interests were not considered valid. Historian Christine Franzius characterizes this ruling 
as “just rhetorically weakened,” meaning that it did not really help married women.181 
Regarding surnames, women would still be required to take their husbands’ names, but could 
hyphenate with their maiden names. Women could work if it was “reconcilable with their 
duties in marriage and family.”182 Both spouses were considered responsible for supporting 
the family (Unterhalt), though the court could intervene in cases of abuse of this right. 
Women could fulfill their part through domestic work, and were only required to work if 
their husbands’ salaries alone could not support the family. In the case of separation, if one 
spouse was unable to support him- or herself, the spouse could demand a monthly support 
payment from the other.183 
A month later, on 27 November 1952, the Bundestag met to discuss and vote on the 
law. At this point, parliamentarians were well aware of the societal opposition to the law. 
Additionally, they knew the 31 March 1953 deadline was fast approaching. Pushing his 
colleagues toward compromise, Thomas Dehler (FDP), the Minister of Justice, reminded the 
Bundestag that they had a responsibility to coordinate Articles 3 and 6 of the Basic Law as 
peacefully as possible. Despite his calls for cooperation, Dehler also displayed his reluctance 
about keeping certain provisions such as the Stichentscheid, or the husband’s right to decide. 
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Dehler acknowledged that with children, there were a number of issues—names, confession, 
education, and medical emergencies—that necessitated decisions that were beyond the scope 
of a court ruling. In these matters, he agreed that a man’s right to decide should be upheld, 
though with careful consideration of the mother’s side, and she would be given the right to 
appeal to the court. In matters affecting only the spouses, however—in a public display of 
dissent against the ruling CDU/CSU government—he called for the dismissal of the 
Stichentscheid. He furthermore advocated giving women equal rights in household support 
and supported the legal separation of their property from their husbands’.184 
In the ensuing debate over the BGB, two competing visions of marital partnership, 
the family, and their places in German law and society emerged. A large part of their 
discourse revolved around defining the very meaning of equality. Luise Rehling, a Protestant 
pastor’s wife and member of the ruling CDU/CSU faction, for instance, succinctly outlined 
her party’s position by stating that: “Marriage and family are not classified as natural or an 
administrative union […] but rather a godly structure, a piece of God’s creation.”185 
Moreover, she asserted that “men and women can best develop their given characteristics to 
the best of their ability from their biological and functional differences in the service of the 
small community, with which they serve the welfare of the larger community.”186 Emmy 
Meyer-Laule, a functionary of the oppositional SPD, however, interpreted the place of 
marriage and family differently. In her purview, it was a “totalitarian state”—an allusion that 
                                                          
184 VDBT, 239. Sitzung, November 27, 1952, 11052. 
185 VDBT, 239. Sitzung, November 27, 1952, 11058. For Rehling’s biography, see Ulrike Hospes, “Luise 
Rehling,” last accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/37.8289/. Rehling was born in 1896 and 
married a pastor. They resisted the Nazis as part of the Confessing Church and joined the CDU after the war.  
186 VDBT, 239. Sitzung, November 27, 1952, 11059. 
  
243 
  
worked for the Third Reich or the Communist dictatorship next door—that controlled the 
inner structures of marriage. She asserted that the FRG had a responsibility to ensure that all 
citizens had equal human rights; as long as women were subordinate in marriage, this basic 
right would remain unfulfilled.187 
Additionally, each side justified their interpretations of marriage and the family by 
referring to social crisis and change. According to the CDU/CSU, the return to a patriarchal 
family structure would provide stability to a radically changed society. As an example of “the 
crisis of the family,” Rehling (CDU) cited statistics that “90% of juvenile delinquents come 
from destroyed families.”188 She furthermore called the rising number of divorces 
“unnatural.”189 SPD members, however, believed that the law had to change to reflect altered 
circumstances for women. Since 1900, the number of employed women had increased 
significantly, and the two World Wars had had a significant impact on marriage, divorce, and 
reproductive patterns. What Meyer-Laule (SPD) proposed was a law that not only freed 
married women from subordination, but granted more equality to unmarried women and 
mothers.190 
To be sure, their differing interpretations of the postwar social crisis did not denote 
absolute positions on either side. Meyer-Laule (SPD) recognized that many women, if given 
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the choice, would choose motherhood over the alternative of paid work outside the home.191 
For the time being, however, when many women had to bear the double burden of 
breadwinning and raising the family, the SPD maintained that the law had to change to fit the 
contemporary situation. Helene Wessel of the Center Party, the Catholic social worker who 
had supported women’s equality as one of the four “Mothers of the Basic Law,” supported 
the SPD’s proposals for a more egalitarian marriage and family law.192 So did select 
members of the FDP, despite earlier support during the Parliamentary Council for the 
CDU/CSU. 
In addition to the “crisis of the family” and sociological change, Bundestag members 
used the language of legal unity. Dehler, for instance, raised the issue of legal unity, which in 
the FRG meant the unification of various regional statutes passed between 1945 and 1949, as 
well as the 1946 Kontrollratsgesetz, but it did not necessarily include the GDR. He proposed 
removing §48 of the 1946 Ehegesetz, which required a three year-long separation and dire 
cause in order for the spouses to ask for a divorce.193 The CDU/CSU rejected his proposal. 
Not only did they disagree with the notion of overhauling the three year-long separation, they 
argued that the Bundestag simply did not have enough time to change the BGB and deal with 
extensive changes to divorce law.194 As a result, the Bundestag postponed divorce law 
revisions until a later date (through the 1976 “First Law for the Reform of Marriage and 
Family Law”) and chose to focus on rest of the BGB. 
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The SPD pointed out that any discussion of legal unity was incomplete without 
consideration of the East. Frieda Nadig (SPD) argued that adopting this version of the law 
would create “greater legal insecurity and inequality and would deepen the rift between East 
and West.”195 The Christian conservative members of the Bundestag, however, were 
unconvinced and remained focused on the differences of women’s status in the GDR. 
Rehling (CDU) cited §12 of the GDR’s 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz, which named the family as 
the “cornerstone of a democratic society” and promised state protection. According to 
Rehling, this only meant that women were “freed as far as possible from their duties in 
marriage and family so they can place their powers at the disposal of economic and social 
reconstruction.”196 The merit of the FRG’s proposal, she asserted, was that it would not place 
this double burden on women.   
Without mentioning legal unity, the KPD encouraged the rest of the Bundestag to 
look to the East for examples of “real and realizable” Gleichberechtigung.197  At this point, 
the KPD in the West was on a rapid decline due to strong anti-Communist sentiments in- and 
outside the parliament.198 Historian Patrick Major suggests that the KPD suffered further 
losses by “self-destruction from within” because “Communists’ understanding of democracy 
was in fact deeply hostile to parliamentary norms.”199 Communist Bundestag members’ 
defense of the East in the context of family law did not help the party’s profile. For example, 
                                                          
195 VDBT, 239. Sitzung, 27. November 1952, 11061. 
196 VDBT, 239. Sitzung, 27. November 1952, 11059. 
197 Ibid., 11069. 
198 Major, The Death of the KPD, 109, 111. 
199 Ibid., 114. 
  
246 
  
Gertrud Strohbach—a longtime Communist from Stuttgart who later migrated to the GDR—
pointed out that in the GDR, Gleichberechtigung went into force with the approval of the 
constitution and then through the Mutterschutzgesetz—neither of which most West German 
politicians considered legitimate.200 She cited the East German law’s guarantee that marriage 
was not an automatic restriction of women’s rights. Finally, she cited scholars such as Justus 
Wilhelm Hedemann (who drafted the Nazi Volksgesetzbuch), who “have explained that this 
side of the legal development in the GDR has stimulating value.”201 With this statement, 
Strohbach implied that not all elements of East German law were legitimate or valuable, but 
its treatment of women’s rights was one area that deserved mimicry. 
Other delegates refused to engage with the idea of the GDR’s family law reforms and 
attempted to turn the Bundestag’s attention westward. Walter Menzel, an SPD member from 
Dortmund, stated that in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United States, and England, women 
had “full mutual authority” in marriage.202 Furthermore, he cited the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights’ Article 16, which guaranteed equality in marriage. With these points, Menzel 
attempted to steer the conversation away from comparisons to the GDR and toward the West, 
a tactic that appealed to the proponents of Western integration in the Bundestag and diverted 
accusations that the SPD wanted to resemble the East. 
The Bundestag’s debate of family law displayed several co-existing discourses. First 
and foremost, these were conflicts over gender roles and the partial redistribution of rights 
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from men to their wives. Christian conservatives resisted efforts to change the status quo of 
unequal rights between men and women in marriage and the family. Second, the discussions 
reflected larger queries about state intervention in private life and the relationship of the 
church to the state. To some degree, these were issues that far predated the founding of the 
Federal Republic. Catholics had been fighting state regulations of marriage and the family 
since the nineteenth century. The tremendous events of the early twentieth century only 
exacerbated these tensions. After all, state intervention in marriage and the family was a 
pillar of Nazi racial policy. “Racially unfit” individuals such as Jews, Roma/Sinti, or 
mentally or physically disabled were barred from marriage, forced to divorce their “Aryan” 
partners, and sterilized to prohibit reproduction. This recent history no doubt informed their 
understanding of the power of the BGB. 
While state intervention was obviously a point of contention among Christian 
conservatives and their socialist opposition, the November 1952 debate revealed a critical 
omission: the Third Reich’s treatment of marriage and family policies and laws. For all their 
talk of the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, both world wars, and the changing status of 
women, the Bundestag rarely mentioned the Nazis overtly. In fact, the only one who 
mentioned the Nazi years directly was Strohbach, a Communist, when she cited Hedemann, 
who had spearheaded the Nazis’ Volksgesetzbuch efforts. The Third Reich was no doubt an 
implicit guiding force; the Bundestag’s intensive debates over state intervention and the 
dangers of totalitarianism hinted at anxieties of repeating a difficult past. At the same time, 
the parliamentarians steered away from explicitly mentioning the Third Reich, which 
indicated that they were as equally reticent to associate themselves with the Nazis as they 
were the Communist dictatorship in East Germany. 
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Indeed, while the Bundestag rarely mentioned the Third Reich, they did discuss the 
other prominent German dictatorship next door. The CDU/CSU held up the GDR as an 
example of what not to do, while the Communist faction extolled the East German legal 
system for its treatment of women’s rights. But it was the SPD that brought up the elephant 
in the room: that this particular law held the potential to further divide the two states. The 
extent to which their law would resemble the GDR’s Mutterschutzgesetz was 
inconsequential. The Adenauer administration had already made its anti-Communist stance 
clear, and even the SPD was unwilling to venture as far as the SED had. The issue of legal 
unity, however, was more potent. New laws on both sides of the Iron Curtain had the 
potential to leave indelible marks on German legal history, and more importantly, Germans. 
With all of these considerations in mind, the SPD proffered the following changes to 
the government’s draft. First and foremost, they opposed the retention of the Stichentscheid. 
Frieda Nadig (SPD) argued that “despite [the draft’s] wordiness, the husband’s right to 
decide is fully and completely anchored in it.” Such a provision was not only “anti-family 
and unconstitutional,” she asserted, but un-Christian. Nadig stated that “in the Bible, God 
gave man a companion, not a subject.” On the same grounds, she opposed the retention of the 
father’s right to decide. Regarding maintenance payments (Unterhalt), she criticized the 
ambiguous wording and argued that it only solidified women’s double burdens in law.203 
In the end, the Bundestag did not come to an agreement on the law. The CDU/CSU 
insisted that the Parliament “had gone as far as possible with Gleichberechtigung already” 
and should pass the law and move on. They furthermore claimed that the CDU/CSU would 
work with the Parliament to revise the law before the 31 March 1953 deadline. To the 
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CDU/CSU’s outrage, the SPD, the KPD, and some FDP members refused to approve the 
legislation.204 The Bundestag elected instead to send the law to a special parliamentary 
committee, which would revise it before the 31 March 1953 deadline.  
Meanwhile, the West German media reported on the legislation’s failure with 
differing degrees of dismay. A few weeks before the Bundestag debate, the Deutsche Zeitung 
ran an article titled “Family Law between Two Fires,” which explained how the entire 
structure of marriage and the family changed through the law.205 After the debate, the 
conservative-liberal Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported that the law received an 
“honorable burial” in the first round of Bundestag debates. The same article furthermore 
remarked that the CDU/CSU had “gone too far” while the SPD/FDP went “too little.”206 
Meanwhile, the conservative General-Anzeiger reported that the debate had displayed not 
conflicts among parties, but among men and women. The author warned readers that 
although men and women were legally equal, they were also “essentially different by 
nature…and must have different duties and rights.”207 The American-backed Neue Zeitung 
was more neutral, offering a play-by-play of the meeting with little editorializing.208 The 
Western media’s display of a plurality of opinions reflected its editors’ various styles and 
differed significantly from the Eastern media, which was largely controlled by the SED. 
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With the March deadline looming, a Parliamentary committee took on the law, 
though their work ultimately resulted in a political stalemate. In response, the CDU/CSU 
proposed extending the deadline another two years, meaning that the Civil Code would stay 
in place and the constitutional guarantee of equality would remain compromised.209 The 
SPD, the FDP, and numerous women’s organizations protested and successfully defeated the 
extension. Although the absence of a new law before 31 March 1953 offered the risk of 
Rechtschaos, or legal chaos, it also meant that West Germans, especially married women and 
mothers, could finally claim their constitutional right to equality in court cases concerning 
marriage and family law.  
The West German media offered several different responses. For instance, the 
women’s magazine Constanze cynically asked its readers in April 1953: “Do you look at 
your husband—if you have one—differently than before? No? […] Do you find that hardly 
anything has changed since 31 March 1953 at midnight, when you became equal with your 
husband and all other men according to the Grundgesetz?”210 According to other 
publications, circumstances had changed. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported, 
without much editorializing, that the separation of marital property was now the “legal 
status.”211 The CDU organ Union in Deutschland expressed the party’s trepidation about the 
changed legal circumstances, but vowed that “1953 is the year of marriage and the 
family.”212 Meanwhile, the SPD women’s newsletter Gleichheit proclaimed that “the hour of 
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equal rights for men and women has arrived.”213 
In actuality, 1953 became the year of equality and marriage and the family. After 1 
April 1953, the interpretation of marriage and family law turned over to the courts. 
Sometimes, judges adjudicated according to the principle of equality. In one case, a refugee 
from East Germany was told that he could not, by West or East German law, force his wife 
to join him by claiming a right to the Stichentscheid.214 Had he attempted to do so before 31 
March 1953, he might have succeeded. In other cases, the courts did not appeal to the 
woman’s interests and continued to privilege men and fathers. One Catholic woman tried to 
baptize her child in her faith without the permission of the child’s Protestant father. The court 
proclaimed that she had no right to claim equality, and in this case, the judges ruled in favor 
of the father.215 The fate of average Germans ultimately rested on local judges’ personal 
interpretations of equality and the place of the family. After several months of conflicting 
court decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest court in the FRG, ordered the 
federal government to draft a new law.216 
This section has shown that it was never inevitable that the Federal Republic would 
adopt a male breadwinner/female homemaker family model. In fact, initially, when Dehler 
and the Ministry of Justice drafted a new law, they rejected that model in favor of one that 
barred men from making decisions for their wives and allowed greater equality in marital 
property and household management and support. Dehler, however, buckled under pressure 
from the Catholic and Protestant Churches and the Christian conservative government and 
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changed the draft legislation to reflect their views. This move enraged party-based and 
nonparty women’s organizations, trade unions, and individuals, who petitioned the federal 
government to change its mind. The Adenauer administration ignored their pleas and pushed 
through its version to the Bundestag, demonstrating the pseudo-authoritarian nature of the 
Christian conservative government in the early 1950s. After all, in the purview of the 
Adenauer administration and its parliamentary arm, listening to women and workers on the 
left would destroy natural order and bring the law dangerously close to the SED’s 
Mutterschutzgesetz in the GDR. As the Bundestag debates indicated, other forces, namely 
memory of Germany’s legal treatment of women before 1945 and legal reforms in the GDR, 
were at play as well. The combination of social activism within the FRG and the problem of 
the GDR ultimately halted the Bundestag from passing the legislation by its constitutionally 
mandated deadline of 31 March 1953. 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, between 1949 and 1953, the path dependencies of the 
parallel family law reforms in the GDR and FRG were shaped by numerous legal, political, 
social, cultural, and economic factors. First, the legal and institutional frameworks in both 
states informed their separate paths. In the West, in the context of constructing a post-fascist 
and anti-communist liberal democratic state, path dependency was particularly strong. 
Christian conservative politicians and Protestant and Catholic Church leaders willingly 
touted the merits of the old Civil Code as a stabilizing force, even in spite of a constitutional 
mandate to overturn it. The examples of both German dictatorships—the Third Reich and 
especially the GDR dictatorship next door—only deepened their desire to reinstitute the old 
  
253 
  
Civil Code. Their opponents in the independent women’s associations, trade unions, Free 
Democratic Party, Communist Party, and Social Democratic Party, meanwhile, picked up the 
earlier struggle to change the law. Path dependency was less strong, but still evident in the 
East in the context of building a socialist state. The Ministry of Justice (and by default, the 
SED) were willing to abandon the Civil Code in principle, but found opposition from party 
members and citizens who found parts of the old law useful and practical, or conversely, too 
difficult to change. 
Second, the political climate of each state shaped the paths of family law reforms. In 
the GDR, the ruling SED, in the process of building socialism, continued to narrow available 
political space. On the one hand, the SED’s de facto control of the state and alignment with 
the Soviets enabled the party to alter and quickly push through legislation such as the 
Mutterschutzgesetz. On the other hand, the ruling party’s internal divisions and its alternating 
fears of disapproval from its citizens and longing for their endorsement halted it from 
initially going too far with family law reforms. On the other side of the German-German 
border, the political competition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD continued to mark the 
political atmosphere of the FRG. This time, however, unlike during the earlier Parliamentary 
Council proceedings, when the CDU/CSU was less conservative and less rigidly controlled 
by Konrad Adenauer, opposition from society was not enough to convince the Adenauer 
administration to change course. Citing their support from the Catholic and Protestant 
churches, the ruling CDU/CSU coalition pushed back, insisting on legislation that reinforced 
a male breadwinner/female homemaker family model. This maneuver resulted in further 
dividing the Bundestag and society, creating a political stalemate that prevented reforming 
the law by the mandated 31 March 1953 deadline. 
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Third, the economic and labor policies and situations in the two states shaped these 
debates and decisions. In the GDR, overhauling the provisions in the old Civil Code that 
limited women’s economic rights served ideological and pragmatic purposes for 
Communists. For one thing, the GDR needed female labor to keep its production-based 
economy going in a situation of chronic labor shortage. For another, long-held beliefs about 
women’s economic emancipation through equal wages and access to employment combined 
with the SED’s desire to attract women’s votes before the October 1950 elections. When full-
scale family law reforms were not possible, the SED pursued incremental reforms through 
legislation such as the 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz, meant to help women become equal in the 
workplace, at home, and in the political sphere. Although this law did not change all of the 
old BGB provisions, it gave key civil rights to women in the home in order to support their 
work outside the home. The Adenauer administration in the West reacted to similar labor 
shortages by pushing married women and mothers back into the home and favoring their 
husbands’ breadwinning. Christian conservatives in particular masked used language about 
natural order and duties to support these discriminatory practices, while Social Democrats 
argued that changing sociological circumstances, such as the “surplus” of women, many of 
whom had to earn money for their families, necessitated changing rights in the workplace 
and at home. 
 Fourth, notions of the gender order and hegemonic cultural ideas played important 
roles in these parallel debates as well. The SED always put forward a public image of itself 
as the most progressive and aggressive supporter of women’s rights in all of Germany—East 
or West. Its family law proposals and the section of the 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz attempted to 
create more egalitarian marital partnerships that granted women equal rights in the 
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workplace, politics, and their families. The Ministry of Justice’s internal debates, as well as 
letters from citizens, however, demonstrated that changing longstanding ideas about gender 
and cultural norms was more difficult than the ruling party anticipated. In the West, Christian 
conservatives, Free Democrats, and Social Democrats all cited changing demographics as 
reasons for defending or opposing retaining the old Civil Code’s regulations. On the ground 
level, citizens in both Germanys expressed concerns about too much equality for men and 
women and what reforms to the Civil Code might do to their families, while others supported 
retaining the old law in the name of postwar stability and order. Yet others supported reforms 
and hoped for more egalitarian familial structures. These enduring social and cultural norms 
were strong enough to give each of the ruling parties pause in their reform processes.  
 Finally, the Cold War competition informed the debates over family law between 
1949 and 1953. Even before the GDR was established, the People’s Council had already 
begun formulating proposals for a new Civil Code, expressing alternating motivations. On 
the one hand, they wanted to hurry and beat the West to the reforms. On the other hand, they 
noted that legal disunity could result from moving too fast. Throughout their subsequent 
debates, the SED, members of the Ministry of Justice, and the media denigrated the 
perceived lack of progress in the West over women’s equal rights in the economy and at 
home. In comparison, West German politicians made fewer overt references to the East, but 
still at times expressed reservations about resembling the GDR or creating legal confusion 
between the two Germanys. The following two chapters show how each state finally 
accomplished family law reforms in 1957 (in the West) and 1965 (in the East). Furthermore, 
these final chapters show how family law reforms were shaped by the further divergence of 
the two German states from one another in the mid-to-late 1950s and early 1960s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
“THE INEQUALITY OF MEN AND WOMEN IS COMPLETE”: THE WEST 
GERMAN EQUAL RIGHTS ACT, 1954–68 
 
 
On 12 March 1957, Frau K. sent a letter to Eduard Wahl, a Christian Democratic 
member of the West German Bundestag from Heidelberg, describing the circumstances of 
her seventeen-year-old son’s death.1 In 1941, her husband signed the boy’s enlistment papers 
for the German Navy. Not long after their son went off to war, his submarine was sunk off 
the coast of Scotland. In her letter, Frau K. did not explicitly fault Nazi warmongering or 
Allied troops for her son’s early demise. Rather, she blamed her husband, who by exercising 
his right under the German Civil Code to make all decisions for his wife and children 
(Stichentscheid), sent their only son to an early grave. The background of this story remains 
unknown and is not discussed in her letter. It is evident, however, that Frau K. believed the 
root of the problem was the discrimination against mothers and wives embedded in the Civil 
Code. If the laws were different, if they gave mothers the same rights over their children, she 
argued, the boy might have lived.2 
When Frau K. delivered her cautionary tale to Eduard Wahl, West German politicians 
had been debating reforms of the Civil Code for nearly eight years. Despite a series of fits 
and starts that had previously halted reforms, the ruling federal government coalition of the 
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Christian Democratic Union and Christian Socialist Union was confident it would win this 
time, namely because it controlled the government and the legislature. The September 1953 
election saw the CDU/CSU’s popularity skyrocket when they earned 45.2 percent of the vote 
over the SPD’s 28.8 percent.3 Voters credited Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s leadership and 
the CDU/CSU with the “economic miracle” of the postwar society, made possible by 
American Marshall Plan money and the social market policy of Economic Minister Ludwig 
Erhard (CDU).4 In addition, the political shift towards the right was fostered by the heating 
Cold War. The CDU/CSU labeled “the Social Democrats as the party that would open the 
gates for the Communists,” an accusation that harmed the SPD’s reputation in the 1950s and 
resulted in a polarization of West German political culture. The Communist Party in West 
Germany was not allowed any longer in August 1956. Its members were persecuted. The 
other smaller parties flocked to the right and supported the CDU/CSU government.5 As 
historian Christoph Klessmann asserts, anti-Communism “played a deciding role” in the 
Federal Republic in the 1950s.6 As a result of these factors, the CDU/CSU gained a much 
larger majority than it had in the previous election and Adenauer firmly secured his place as 
Chancellor of the FRG. His leadership appealed to voters who were still struggling to come 
to terms with democratization and sought out a strong, authoritarian leader.7  
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One of the priorities of the Adenauer administration after 1953 was social reforms, 
including family law. When Frau K.’s letter arrived in March 1957, politicians, leaders of 
social organizations, and the media were still in the midst of debating the new Equal Rights 
Act, which was under review by a special Bundestag committee. By this point, the committee 
had chosen compromise. On the one hand, they determined that married women could 
control their own property and that their husbands no longer had the right to decide all 
matters in marriage. On the other hand, the committee still required that women adopt their 
husbands’ surnames, only take on work outside the home if it could be balanced with their 
domestic responsibilities, and that they obey their husbands’ decisions regarding their 
children. In the end, despite protests from the ruling CDU/CSU Bundestag faction, who 
favored a more conservative version of the law that continued to limit women’s rights, the 
Bundestag signed the 1957 Equal Rights Act into law on 18 June 1957. The law went into 
effect on 1 July 1958. Although the law was ultimately a compromise that never went as far 
as the more conservative wings of the CDU/CSU or the progressive wings of the SPD, FDP, 
and women’s associations had hoped, the 1957 law signified important changes for married 
women’s rights. At the same time, the limits of the 1957 legislation left the door open for the 
SPD, FDP, and the 1968 New Women’s Movement to instigate further reforms in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
 In this chapter I use the approach of path dependency to examine how and why the 
FRG finally passed the 1957 Equal Rights Act, and the subsequent fallout of these reforms in 
the 1950s and 1960s. I show that numerous related factors—the political, economic, and 
social agenda of the Adenauer regime, political competition and compromise among the 
leading political parties, and resistance from below (in particular, women’s organizations)—
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shaped the final form of the 1957 Equal Rights Act in West Germany. Furthermore, the 
atmosphere of the Cold War in the late 1950s, when the Federal Republic pursued the 
Hallstein Doctrine and refused to formally recognize the GDR, informed these debates as 
well.8 In the end, policymakers chose to compromise on the legislation, a move that 
alternately signified progress after years of limits on married women’s rights and provided 
momentum for further series of reforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 An important part of my examination of the factors that finally facilitated the 
approval of the 1957 Equal Rights Act is the analysis of the multiple discourses by 
legislators, media pundits, and social organization leaders over the competing legislative 
drafts in the Federal Republic. On the one side, Christian conservatives continued to defend 
the old Civil Code’s regulations as the ticket to keeping Germany stable. Moreover, they 
thinly veiled references to the Nazi past and the GDR dictatorship in language about the 
dangers of totalitarianism and state control over the family. In addition, going further into the 
1950s, politicians’ focus gradually shifted from the past to the present threat of the GDR in 
the East. Finally, they began to emphasize that these debates were no longer about women, 
but rather about men’s rights in and duties to the Federal Republic. On the other side, Social 
Democrats and liberals stressed that the Bundestag had a legal and moral imperative, 
especially in the postwar environment, to help women by changing the law. In the context of 
strong anti-Communism spurred by the Cold War, Christian conservatives, Social 
Democrats, and liberals continued to emphasize the similarities and differences with East 
Germany’s Family Code and treatment of women in the discourses over their own reforms. 
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 This chapter is structured in four sections. The first section examines the 1954 
Bundestag discussion and the subsequent critiques from members of the parliamentary 
opposition and extraparliamentary social organizations, especially women’s organizations 
that eventually pushed the Bundestag to compromise, passing the law in 1957 and enacting it 
in 1958. The second section explores the FRG’s interactions with and responses to the 
developments of family law in the GDR and argues that anti-Communism played a large part 
in the West German government and legislature’s approaches to their own family law 
reforms. The third section analyzes the final round of Bundestag committee and Bundestag 
plenary debates and the fallout of passing the Equal Rights Act on 18 June 1957 and 
implementing the new law on 1 July 1958. Finally, the chapter ends by exploring the 
revitalized power of the SPD and FDP and their new quest for further reforms of marriage 
and family law in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
Contesting the Family in the Federal Republic, 195455 
The major political parties anticipated that family policy, gender policy, and family 
law reforms would return to the fore after the September 1953 election. According to 
historians Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, once Adenauer secured victory in 1953, he 
was determined to pursue social reforms in order to provide “social welfare and individual 
freedom at home,” as part of the ideology of the social market economy, and attract East 
Germans to the West.9 One of the ways Adenauer jumpstarted the process of social reforms 
was by creating the Federal Ministry of Family Issues in October 1953—a longtime demand 
of Catholic lay organizations such as the Familienbund der Deutschen Katholiken—and 
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appointing the conservative Catholic Franz-Josef Wuermeling as its Minister.10 Born in 1900 
in Berlin, Wuermeling served in the German navy near the end of World War I before 
pursuing a law degree. In 1945, he joined the CDU and represented Rhineland Palatinate in 
the Bundestag.11 Despite coming under fire from women’s organizations, such as the German 
Female Academics’ Association (Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund), who argued that a 
Family Ministry was unnecessary with the already-existing Women’s Department 
(Frauenreferat) in the Ministry of the Interior, Adenauer persisted.12  
Wuermeling’s appointment as the first Federal Minister of Family Issues further 
solidified the influence of political Catholicism on the federal government. Political 
Catholicism, specifically in the form of the Center Party, formed in the nineteenth century in 
order to represent Catholic interests, first in individual Protestant-dominated German states 
and then, after 1871, in the German Empire. It grew stronger in response to Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf and remained an important political force until 1933, when the 
Nazis took over and expelled other political parties from power. After 1945, most former 
Center Party members migrated to the newly founded, interconfessional Christian 
Democratic Union, which maintained close ties to the Catholic Church. In fact, some 
Catholic bishops such as Josef Frings even briefly joined the party, which inspired many 
Catholics to follow. The old Center Party (which still existed in some areas of Germany in 
the 1950s) and the new CDU/CSU proclaimed themselves the political representatives of the 
43 percent of the population that was Catholic (although Catholics also comprised the ranks 
                                                 
10 Lukas Rölli-Alkemper, Familie im Wiederaufbau: Katholizismus und bürgerliches Familienideal in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1965 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000), 473. 
11 Stefan Marx, “Franz-Josef Wuermeling,” last accessed December 26, 2016, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.9969/ 
12 Entwurf Gethmann eines Briefes an den Herrn Bundeskanzler, NL 1151/225, BArch Koblenz. 
261 
 
of the SPD, FDP, and DP).13 
At the core of political Catholicism was the idea that the state had a responsibility to 
protect religious belief and that Catholics must use the state to pursue Catholic social 
teaching.14 Pope Pius XI argued in texts such as the 1930 Papal encyclical “Casti connubii,” 
that “governments can assist the Church greatly in the execution of its important office, if, in 
laying down their ordinances, they take account of what is prescribed by divine and 
ecclesiastical law.”15 This idea became popular again among Catholic clergy and lay 
organizations (especially the Familienbund der Katholiken) in the late 1940s and 1950s as a 
response, on the one hand, to the memories of the Nazi regime’s persecution of Catholic 
clergy who opposed Hitler, and on the other hand, the increasing secularization of the East 
German state next door. Regarding the latter, at one point, Adenauer argued that the 
traditional family was a priority of his administration “so the natural manner of the perils that 
appear for the nation from the present situation are controlled.”16 In other words, Christian 
conservatives considered secular Communism and the way it employed women outside the 
home as a threat to the homeostasis of the Christian family, which they identified as the 
cornerstone of (West) German society. 
Specifically, as historian Lukas Rölli-Alkemper states, “The protection and 
promotion of marriage and the family belong to the central political concerns of the Church 
in the postwar period.”17 When it came to family law, the most conservative Catholics were 
                                                 
13 “Decline in Religious Observance among Catholics and Protestants (1960-1989),” last accessed February 17, 
2017, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=846 
14 Rölli-Alkemper, Familie im Wiederaufbau, 415. 
15 Pope Pius XI, “On Christian Marriage,” December 31, 1930, 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius11/P11CASTI.HTM 
16 VDBT, [2.] Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Sitzung, 20. Oktober 1953, 18. 
17 Rölli-Alkemper, Familie im Wiederaufbau, 415. 
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outspoken about the state’s right to protect marriage and the family. Traditionally, Catholic 
teaching held that marriage and the family were the cornerstones of society and the state. By 
their teachings, the division of labor in marriages and families were determined by God, not 
society, and the state had a responsibility to protect Christian families. As a result, Catholic 
clergymen and Catholic lay leaders in organizations such as the Familienbund der Deutschen 
Katholiken (founded in 1953) and even some members of the Catholic German Women’s 
League argued for the retention of the provisions of the old Civil Code, such as the 
Stichentscheid, on the grounds that any changes would undermine the traditional Christian 
family and parents’ rights to raise their children.18  
Wuermeling’s work in the Family Ministry fell into a series of policies and proposals 
aimed at easing the burden of mothers. For Christian conservatives, the solution to women’s 
“double burden” of paid labor outside the home and domestic care was male breadwinning, 
which they proposed supplementing through two measures: the family wage (in effect a 
higher male wage) and family/child allowances. According to some advocates, the family 
wage would be enough to provide for a wife and two children.19 Ultimately, the CDU/CSU 
and the FDP in the Bundestag shied away from mandating a male wage, preferring to leave 
decisions about wage levels to employers.20 To supplement the male family wage, Christian 
Democrats, Social Democrats, and Free Democrats suggested the introduction of family 
compensation (Familienlastenausgleich), which included a monthly stipend compensating 
women for staying home and prevent them from being “forced” to pursue paid labor outside 
                                                 
18 Rölli-Alkemper, Familie im Wiederaufbau, 107, 416-487. 
19 Oertzen, Pleasure of a Surplus Income, 51. See also Hanna Schissler, “German and American Women 
between Domesticity and the Workplace,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–
1990: Volume 1, 1945–1968, eds. Detlef Junker, Philip Gassert, and Wilfried Mausbach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 2004), 564. 
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the home to supplement their husband’s wages.21 Although reticent to be associated with the 
National Socialist system of family allowances, legislators saw the advantages in granting 
families a monthly sum to help cover costs for children.22 Many mostly male 
parliamentarians from the CDU/CSU and SPD saw allowances as a way to honor Article 6 of 
the Basic Law’s promise of protection of the family, but both parties differed in one major 
point: the CDU/CSU wanted to pay the family allowances to the father, the SPD intended to 
pay it directly to women, who, as mothers, often controlled the household, regardless of 
marital status. Only a small number of mainly female Social Democrats and Free Democrats, 
argued that a family model reduced wives to dependent status and left little space for other 
family structures.23 Merely the Center Party offered an alternative to the family allowances. 
It suggested taxes on unmarried individuals and married couples with no or only one child 
would make up the difference for larger families.24 Finally, with the support of the 
Familienbund der Katholiken, the CDU/CSU proposed a separate piece of legislation 
mandating child allowances for the third child (Kindergeldgesetz) in 1954 and reformed the 
law in 1961 and again in 1964.25 
Most contemporaries assumed that the “traditional” family was a male breadwinner 
and stay-at-home wife and mother. Many families, however, did not fit this mold because of 
the devastating impact of the two world wars on the family. In other words, as Heineman 
frames it, the law existed “to improve the health of children born to parents who could not 
meet this ideal,” which meant many working wives and mothers, working single women, 
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widows, childless married women, or unmarried mothers.26 Indeed, many women did not fit 
the idealized image of the unemployed homemaker and mother dependent on a male 
breadwinner. For instance, married women’s employment (which included those with 
children) rose from 36 to 50 percent between 1950 and 1962.27 Trends were similar among 
widows with children.28 Then, in the mid-1950s, part-time work for married women and 
mothers became more accepted in light of a labor shortage.29 Still, the emphasis on and 
toleration of part-time female labor indicated that the federal government had not entirely 
relinquished the idealized image of men working outside the home while women took on the 
“double burden” of household labor and employment. 
If some mothers and married women must work, the SPD argued, they must be 
protected by law. In the prior legislative period, the Social Democrats, aided by some 
liberals, Christian Democrats, and Communists, had pushed through reforms to help working 
women and mothers. The 1952 Law for the Protection of Motherhood (Mutterschutzgesetz), 
for instance, offered several protective measures, such as preventing expecting female 
workers from performing heavy or dangerous labor or taking night shifts. In addition, 
breastfeeding mothers were granted pauses every four-and-a-half to five hours, and mothers 
received twelve paid weeks away from work.30 Additionally, after heated debate for two 
years, the Civil Service Law (Beamtengesetz) of 1953 removed the provision that forced 
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women to leave their posts if their husbands held secure employment.31 At the same time, the 
CDU/CSU coalition had prevented the implementation of an equal wages constitutional 
clause and later a related wage policy. Legal protections for working wives and mothers 
expanded slightly during the early 1950s, although not to the extent that some Social 
Democratic, Communist, and Free Democratic advocates imagined.  
In addition to these laws and the proposals for the male family wage and the family 
allowance, contemporaries saw family law as a key way to confront the sociological changes 
brought on by the war. The experience of the last round of debates between 1949 and early 
1953 left the CDU/CSU painfully aware that the SPD, FDP, numerous social organizations, 
and some newspaper editors opposed its plans for marriage and family law. But then the 
balance of power tipped heavily in the CDU/CSU’s favor after the September 1953 election. 
The Christian conservative coalition in the Bundestag, taking advantage of its majority, 
reintroduced an earlier defeated proposal to extend the constitutional deadline to 31 March 
1955. This time, the strength of the CDU/CSU and its smaller allied parties (the conservative 
German Party and the parliamentary newcomers, the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees 
and Deprived of Rights) in Bundestag granted the Christian Democrats the two-thirds 
majority they needed to approve the extension.32 Independent women’s groups, trade unions, 
the SPD, the FDP, and their respective constituencies, however, immediately opposed the 
                                                 
31 Regarding the Beamtengesetz, see Curt Garner, “Public Service Personnel in West Germany in the 1950s: 
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proposal.33 Then, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe rejected the postponement 
and ordered the federal government to address the issue.34 The CDU/CSU had little choice 
but to surrender.  
Under pressure from the Federal Constitutional Court, the CDU/CSU-led government 
reopened the debate over family law in January 1954. The Bundesrat, the federal 
representation of the Länder governments, reviewed competing drafts submitted by the 
federal government (in effect the CDU/CSU), the SPD, and the liberal FDP. The last time the 
Bundesrat criticized the Adenauer administration’s plans for family law reforms in 1952, the 
Chancellor and his Federal Cabinet ignored their critiques. Still, as a matter of process, the 
Bundesrat had to be involved, because it had to consent to all laws affecting state 
competences; furthermore, all constitutional changes required its consent. 
A month later, on 12 February 1954, the Bundestag gathered to discuss the three 
competing legislative drafts from the SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU. In the roughly year-long 
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period between the last Bundestag debate and the federal court decision, the leading parties’ 
positions had changed little. The CDU/CSU-led federal government, its parliamentary 
counterparts, and its coalition partners still saw the potential of a new family law to further 
protect and boost the male breadwinner/female homemaker family model. The SPD and the 
FDP, especially their female members—many of whom can be classified as relational 
feminists—did not necessarily disagree with the idea of sexual difference or differentiated 
social roles for men and women. They determined, however, that the legal preference of 
male authority and limitations placed on wives and mothers (especially unmarried) was what 
endangered families.  
Ascertaining what threatened the family was further complicated by the fact that 
Bundestag representatives had little consensus on what defined a family. The major parties’ 
legislative proposals made it clear that they imagined the family quite differently. The 
CDU/CSU’s version privileged male authority at the expense of women’s equal rights. They 
imagined a family structure in which a husband made all decisions for his wife and family on 
the grounds that further marital strife would come from indecision; women took their 
husbands’ surnames (although they could hyphenate); and the household was the domain of 
the wife, who could only work if it was reconcilable with her domestic duties.35 The FDP’s 
version largely aligned with the CDU/CSU’s, although they were more liberal in certain 
regards, such as overturning the husband’s right to decide in marriage but upholding it for 
children and designating both spouses as supporters of the household.36 In contrast to the 
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CDU/CSU and FDP, the SPD supported a marital and familial model that gave both spouses 
the right to come to a mutual agreement; permitted either spouse to take the other’s name or 
hyphenate; refused to designate women head of the household or restrict their right to work 
outside the home and gain economic independence; and identified both spouses as 
responsible for supporting the household.37  
 Despite fundamental dissimilarities, the CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD’s respective 
proposals overlapped on several issues. For one thing, all the major parties supported 
abolishing men’s rights to control their wives’ property, agreeing instead to allow the 
separation of marital property, although the CDU/CSU qualified that it was “in the interest of 
the family” not to divide property holdings.38 Additionally, all parties agreed that men could 
no longer terminate their wives’ legal contracts. Finally, all the major parties agreed to 
overturn the regulation that forced women to share a domicile with their husbands.39 
Although the major political parties were divided on some issues, they found common 
ground on others, namely matters that did not stem from beliefs about sexual difference. 
Their proposals also made it clear that these discussions were, above all, about married 
women’s rights in their marriages and families, and did not pertain to other large groups of 
women in postwar West Germany, such as unmarried or widowed women and mothers.  
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In defending their proposals, the leading political parties relied on several different 
discourses. One strategy the CDU/CSU employed was invoking Germany’s occidental 
tradition, both in terms of the political support of the Catholic and Protestant Churches and 
theological understandings of marriage and the family. Karl Weber, a Catholic lawyer from 
Koblenz, and Wuermeling, the Family Minister, cited earlier letters from Catholic and 
Protestant leaders that opposed the expansion of women’s rights.40 One letter from the 
Catholic Fulda Bishops’ Conference declared that legislators had a duty to “keep inviolable 
the essential order of the home, which is endowed through a higher than human, namely 
godly authority and wisdom.”41 Leading Protestant authorities issued a warning based on the 
same premise: that it could lead to “destruction of life.”42 Furthermore, the CDU/CSU used 
notions of natural law drawn from Catholic and Protestant theology to defend its support of 
provisions such as the Stichentscheid. The CDU/CSU and some liberals argued that the 
patriarchal Civil Code followed “the natural order of the family.”43 Furthermore, Neumayer 
asserted, in “healthy, normal marriages, such a regulation is hardly necessary.”44 The 
CDU/CSU not only emphasized theological arguments about “natural” and God-given 
gender roles, but it invoked the major churches’ support as a threat to its opponents and 
evidence of its political power in the FRG.  
Despite pressure from the CDU/CSU, other members of the Bundestag did not find 
the ire of the churches or religious doctrine convincing enough reasons to abandon reforms. 
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Thomas Dehler (FDP), Minister of Justice from 1949 to 1953, told the assembly: “The 
legislator does not govern the Christian, godly world, he does not disturb it, he only rules the 
material world through law.”45 Furthermore, Social Democrat Ludwig Metzger, a Protestant 
lawyer from Darmstadt, reminded the Bundestag that not all Christians—including himself—
followed such rhetoric.46 He cited letters from the Protestant Women’s Aid Organization 
(Evangelische Frauenhilfe) as evidence that Christian women did not necessarily believe in 
subordination to their husbands, and reminded his audience that Christians were part of his 
party too.47 CDU member and prominent leader of a Protestant women’s group, Elisabeth 
Schwarzhaupt, aided Metzger by professing her own opposition to her party’s proposed 
legislation.48 Born in 1901 to two teachers, Schwarzhaupt earned her law degree in 1930 in 
Frankfurt am Main and joined the liberal German People’s Party (DVP). An active opponent 
of the Nazis during the Third Reich, she found employment as a legal aide in the Protestant 
Church of Germany in Berlin, where she continued to work after the war. After 1945, she 
joined the CDU and led the reestablished Protestant Women’s Association (Evangelische 
Frauenarbeit) until 1953, when she entered the Bundestag.49 Now, she found herself in 
opposition to her chosen party, telling them that “it is neither not confessional difference […] 
nor is it sexual difference […] nor generational,” but rather the Bundestag members’ 
willingness to cooperate that mattered most for women’s rights.50 
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In addition to citing churches and natural law, the CDU/CSU argued that their version 
was more pragmatic. CDU representative Karl Weber argued, for instance, that “there are 
things in marriage that cannot remain undecided.”51 Even Dehler, agreed, asserting that it 
simply was not legally possible to have no final authority (especially in medical 
emergencies), and for this reason, he suggested the intervention of a Custody Court when the 
parents did not agree on the father’s decision. For their opposition, patriarchy for the sake of 
pragmatism was not a compelling reason to uphold the outdated provision. According to 
Frieda Nadig (SPD), the “legally anchored lesser rights of married women” through 
provisions such as the Stichentscheid did not solve problems, it caused them.52 She criticized 
the federal government’s attempts at conciliation by allowing women to contest the decision 
if “it did not correspond to the welfare of the family.”53 Nadig pointed out that women could 
disagree, but they had no way to fight the decision. A woman could press the case in court, 
but she stood the risk of taking on “the role as destroyer” in her marriage.54 For this reason, 
the SPD wanted to codify equal decision-making on the parts of both spouses, which 
simultaneously encouraged equal partnership while discouraging the reification of patriarchal 
family structures, even for the sake of practicality. Nadig furthermore observed that it was, in 
fact, impractical for men to be given such a right when it was typically the mothers who 
made these decisions every day and especially in the postwar years.55  
Nadig’s argument supplemented another topic of the Bundestag’s debate: protecting 
the rights of mothers who had endured the double burden of employment and raising 
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families. For representatives like Karl Weber (CDU), it was only natural that men worked 
outside the home and women stayed inside it.56 He found the CDU/CSU’s formulation of the 
maintenance provision, that women fulfilled their obligation to support through domestic 
labor and men theirs through work outside the home, perfectly acceptable.57 Here, the SPD 
took a more ambivalent position. On the one hand, as representatives of the labor movement, 
they opposed ordering that women could work outside the home only if it was reconcilable 
with their household duties.58 On the other hand, the SPD saw the utility of such a regulation, 
because without it, women’s equality might actually become more limited if they had to take 
on “an unnecessary double burden” of work and childrearing.59 To balance out these 
conflicting beliefs, the SPD demanded that women’s domestic work received total 
recognition as equal to men’s work outside the home. If women did work outside the home, 
the SPD wanted them to receive equal wages for their labor.60 
 Another argument, which the Bundestag had used before in 1952, was the fear of 
totalitarianism. Wuermeling warned the Bundestag to be wary of the abuse of the individual 
for the purposes of “state socialism” and “the goals of the omnipotent state.”61 Here, he drew 
on three examples to evince his point. First, he mentioned the conscription of “healthy young 
girls, as we experienced under National Socialism,” as evidence of the state’s overreach, 
although the enlistment of young women in the Bund Deutscher Mädel and the labor force 
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under the Third Reich had little to do with family law.62 Second, he argued that the Soviet 
Union’s evolving family policies evinced the danger of too much state intervention. Under 
Stalin, women entered the workforce in much higher numbers and had access to daycare, 
which facilitated their work. Christian conservatives in the West considered such state aid as 
a major contributing factor behind the destruction of the family.63 Finally, Wuermeling 
pointed to the dictatorship next door as evidence. He cited verbatim the 1950 Law for the 
Protection of Motherhood as an example of legislation that had gone too far in expanding 
women’s rights, particularly in the work force, to a point of abusing the principle of equality. 
He stated that the law’s emphasis on bringing women into production and industry “is an 
equality which has necessary consequences, if one understands the equality of men and 
women as isolated from the worth and essence of women and from the natural order of 
marriage and the family.”64 Each case he cited suggested that drawing women out of the 
home for work or to serve the state was ultimately harmful to the family, because it separated 
children from their parents and indoctrinated them with particular agendas.  
In addition to fears about totalitarianism destroying the family, Christian 
conservatives also voiced concerns about it destroying masculinity. At one point, 
Wuermeling acknowledged that “an orderly society is not possible without authority.”65 He 
argued that just as states did not have to have total control over their populations, neither did 
fathers—but the ability to wield authority was always there.66 Authority, he asserted, was 
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“care and responsibility for the welfare of the family, and surely more of a duty than a 
right.”67 He implied that it was, to some degree, a burden and a duty, but without some form 
of control, society would falter. In short, Wuermeling attempted to turn the discussion on its 
head. Rather than focusing on women’s rights, he made the debate about masculine duty and 
privilege, constructing an image of men as the overburdened members of postwar West 
German society. In the postwar period, reconstructing masculinity was important in the wake 
of Nazi militarism and the humiliation of defeat, and paralleled discussions of reinterpreting 
women’s roles. Men had to relearn how to be peaceful providers for their families and 
recreate themselves as consumers and citizens in postwar Germany.68 
 The opposition in the Bundestag was just strong enough to prevent approval of the 
CDU/CSU’s version of the law. In the end, the Bundestag sent the three competing drafts 
from the CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD to the Committee on Legal and Constitutional Matters, 
who would ultimately decide on the legal reforms.69 The Committee formed a subcommittee 
for family law, whose seventeen members met seventy-seven times between 1954 and 
1956.70 The committee, generally comprised of six CDU members, four SPD, one FDP, and 
several federal government representatives, prepared the formulation of a final version of the 
law carefully.71 It combed through the SPD’s, the FDP’s, and the federal government’s drafts 
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and debated the competing provisions on marital property, spousal relations, and parental 
authority. In addition, it called on legal experts to advise them. On 12 July 1954, for 
example, law professors Günther Beitzke, Hans Dölle, and Friedrich Wilhelm Bosch offered 
presentations with different interpretations of marital property law.72 Furthermore, it studied 
the relevant legal periodicals for marriage and family law, such as Ehe und Familie im 
privaten und öffentlichen Recht: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht, a journal 
published since 1954 by a panel of legal experts with Friedrich Wilhelm Bosch, a 
conservative Catholic law professor at the University of Bonn, who was trained like so many 
of his peers during the Third Reich.73 The journal featured court cases and opinions from 
legal experts on the adjudication of the Civil Code. Finally, the committee reached out to 
civil society, asking organizations such as the Deutscher Bauernverband (German Farmers’ 
League) and the Deutscher Landfrauenverband (Rural Women’s League) to advise them on 
the intricacies of marital property for rural couples.74 As usual in the West German 
parliamentarian system, the Bundestag committee relied not only on its own legal expertise, 
but also asked for advice and opinions from other experts and the relevant civil society 
organizations to make its provisional resolutions. 
As the Bundestag committee began its proceedings, the West German press updated 
the public on the new family law as well as other issues related to equal rights, according to 
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their own worldview. The more conservative papers often interpreted the debate as favoring 
the Christian Democrats. The Union in Deutschland. Informationsdienst für aktive 
Parteimitglieder, the information service for members of the CDU published by the party 
headquarters, of course, defended its own party position and emphasized that the CDU/CSU 
wanted to protect the family and preserve its “natural” and “Godly order.”75 At the same 
time, it admitted that there was even divisions among CDU members in some matters.76 The 
conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) supported the CDU/CSU position, as 
usual, and published an article on 13 February 1954 titled “A More Vigorous Struggle for the 
Rights of Women,” which described the conflict in the Bundestag and explained 
Wuermeling’s arguments about totalitarianism and authority in the family and the SPD and 
FDP’s opposition to the CDU/CSU’s arguments about natural order. 77 Another FAZ article 
from the same issue sided even more clearly with the CDU/CSU, noting that the SPD and 
FDP “do not deny the possibility…of harming children and increasing the vulnerability of 
their parents” while praising the CDU/CSU’s recognition that men would likely listen to their 
wives before making decisions.78 Even though the FAZ tended to support the CDU/CSU 
position, its editors knew that its readers were more divided in this matter and thus printed 
readers’ letters that exposed different opinions. One woman, for example, wrote that since 
men were the ones who typically harmed women, it made no sense for the administration to 
uphold a law conveying them more authority.79  
                                                 
75 “Gleichberechtigungsdebatte vor dem Bundestag,” Union in Deutschland 14, February 17, 1954, 4. 
76 “Gleichberechtigung in parlamentarischer Sicht. Meinungen innerhalb der Fraktionen geteilt,” Union in 
Deutschland, March 5, 1954, 1-4. 
77 “Scharfer Kampf um die Rechte der Frau,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 13, 1954, 1. 
78 “Charaktersache,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 13, 1954, 1. 
79 “Briefe an die Herausgeber: Gleichberechtigung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 22, 1954, 2. 
277 
 
More liberal and left-leaning party organs and newspapers seized the moment to 
reemphasize the Left’s commitment to women’s equality with men. Articles in the SPD 
newspaper Neuer Vorwärts. Zentralorgan der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 
(founded in 1949) called the Bundestag’s decision an “overdue change” and reiterated the 
SPD’s commitment to “full civil equality of married women.”80 An article in the monthly 
SPD women’s newsletter Gleichheit, meanwhile, assured readers that “the SPD has never 
vacillated in its ninety-year existence from the issue of the equality of men and women.”81 
The SPD’s position was supported, as in the past, by liberal papers, like the weekly DIE 
ZEIT. In October 1955, in DIE ZEIT, one author warned in an article titled “Problem Child 
‘Family Law’,” readers that no matter what form of marriage the parliament chose—
“partner-like” or “patriarchal”—“the other [form of marriage] is placed in opposition to the 
law.”82 At the same time, the author labeled the committee’s resolutions on property law as 
“progressive” and called for the recognition of marriage as a “free space” where religious and 
secular beliefs could be implemented.83 Surprisingly, Der Spiegel remained silent on the 
debates at this point in time. In contrast to the conservative press, which had portrayed the 
CDU/CSU’s version as natural and less disruptive to families, the more liberal and left-
leaning newspapers depicted the reforms as a necessary break in historical tradition and a 
shift that would not harm families, but rather, granted them more freedom.  
This section has shown that for much of the second legislative period in the FRG, 
family law reforms remained in limbo for a number of reasons. The power struggle between 
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the CDU/CSU and the oppositional parties in the Bundestag and society was one main factor. 
For this reason the ruling CDU/CSU initially tried to avoid addressing the reforms and 
proposed an extension of the constitutional mandate, but was defeated by the Federal 
Constitutional Court and protests from society. The power struggle also resulted in the 
inability of Bundestag legislators to find middle ground at this point. The polarization 
between the political camps during the 1950s in Cold War West Germany prevented the 
Bundestag from reaching its reforms in 1954. As the next section shows, anti-Communism 
was an important matter that swayed the path of family law reforms in the FRG in the mid-
1950s. 
 
The Effects of Increasing Anti-Communism on Family Law, 19541956 
Anti-Communism—the “legitimation ideology” of the FRG—also played an 
important role in the development of German family law.84 First, the persecution and ban of 
the KPD, its members, and everyone who was supposedly a Communist was one factor. 
Since the inception of the Federal Republic, the KPD, led by Max Reimann, had been a 
minority party.85 During the Parliamentary Council, Communists had allied with the Social 
Democrats on issues of gender equality, though this coalition crumbled in the early years of 
the republic as the SPD drifted away from Marxism and distanced itself from the SED in the 
East. The KPD had tried in vain to introduce equal wages and other measures, which were 
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Social Democratic demands since the Wilhelmine Empire, but in the heated Cold War 
climate after 1945, these old socialist aims too closely resembled the politics of the SED on 
the other side of the Iron Curtain. In the 1949 election, the KPD barely cleared the 5 percent 
barrier to earn representation in the Bundestag. Four years later, in the 1953 Bundestag 
election, the KPD only gained 2.2 percent of the vote, not reaching the minimum 5 percent to 
maintain its spot in the Bundestag. Increasingly, Communist and other leftist critics of the 
Adenauer government were persecuted after 1949. In September 1950, for instance, the 
CDU/CSU-controlled government adopted the so-called “Adenauer-Decree.” This order 
requested loyalty to the West German Basic Law (Verfassungstreue) from all employees in 
public service and with this outlawed the membership in any organization that was perceived 
as disloyal to the constitution. Many Communists lost their positions in public service as a 
result. In November 1951, the Adenauer government requested that the Federal 
Constitutional Court investigate the Verfassungstreue of the KPD and its organizations. After 
a lengthy trial, the Court decided in August 1956 that the KPD was anti-democratic and 
unconstitutional. The Court banned the KPD, which had at this point in time around 6,000 to 
7,000 members. The Adenauer government responded immediately by implementing this 
ban, which also prohibited so-called “substitute” organizations. Afterward, thousands of 
KPD members were brought to court and imprisoned and thousands of Leftists were 
persecuted.86 Additionally, the international context was important. In 1955, the Adenauer 
government adopted the Hallstein doctrine, which stated that the FRG “was the sole 
legitimate representative of the German nation in the international community and the legal 
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successor to the German Reich…West Germany would not grant diplomatic recognition” to 
East Germany or any country recognizing it.87 
The persecution and ban of the KPD and its members, supporters, and “sympathizers” 
(Sympathisanten) had the effect of removing a potential ally for the SPD, one that would 
have advocated a more egalitarian family law and related policies. One of the targeted so-
called “substitute” organizations was the West German branch of the Democratic Women’s 
League of Germany (Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands, DFD), which had grown 
22,000 members strong by 1950.88 By 1954, the DFD had become quite outspoken about the 
forthcoming family law reforms. On 24 December 1953, for instance, the organization sent a 
letter to the CDU Minister of the Interior, Gerhard Schröder, to voice opposition to the 
federal government’s plans.89 Then, in July 1954, the organization held a conference in 
Cologne to formulate their own version of a new family law, arguing that “the federal 
government’s bill does not correspond to the wishes of the majority of women.”90 The DFD 
clearly had reservations about the federal government’s proposed legislation and offered an 
alternative to sympathetic Germans, which drew heavily from the parallel legal reforms in 
the GDR. The DFD proposals closely resembled (nearly verbatim) sections of the 1950 East 
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German Mutterschutzgesetz and the Family Code, or Familiengesetzbuch, the final version of 
the family law drafted in the GDR between 1949 and 1954. They suggested, like their East 
German counterparts, fostering “the equality of men and women in state, economic, and 
social life.”91 Furthermore, they proclaimed that “marriage has for women no limitations or 
impairments of their rights to consequence,” nor would it curtail a woman’s right to work or 
help make decisions for the family.92 The DFD hoped that these proclamations would sway 
some West Germans to their interpretation of a new family law, but in the context of Cold 
War-era anti-Communism, they did not. 
All West German parties and their supporters—of course, with the exception of the 
KPD—automatically rejected everything coming from the SED-controlled Germany on other 
side of the Iron Curtain. Even before the official adoption of the Hallstein Doctrine, the 
CDU/CSU-led government reacted only very reluctantly—if at all—to GDR initiatives. This 
was also the case regarding family law. After the GDR government had suggested a new 
Family Code in the summer of 1954, the West German federal government, major political 
parties, and the media kept close tabs on its progress, but refused any collaboration with the 
East. On 26 July 1954, for instance, the East German Minister of Justice Hilde Benjamin 
reached out to her West German colleague Fritz Neumayer (FDP), proposing that politicians 
and legal experts from East and West meet for an “Academic Conference on Questions of 
Family Law in Germany” in Leipzig on 13-14 November 1954. Neumayer refused to answer 
her letter, instead publishing a press release condemning the reform of family law in the 
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GDR.93 Supporting Neumayer’s reticent attitude, the anti-Communist People’s League for 
Peace and Freedom (Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit), founded in 1950 in Hamburg as an 
anti-DDR propaganda and news organization, contacted all jurists in the FRG to warn them 
against participating in the conference. According to the anti-Communist League, the SED 
would use the attendance of Westerners as propaganda for their own “party-political 
interpretation” of the law.94 The extent to which Western lawyers were convinced by this 
particular argument is unclear, but in the climate of heated Cold War anti-Communism and 
fear of persecution, Neumayer and the anti-Communist People’s League got their wishes. 
Fewer than 20 Westerners attended the conference.95 Those who did, such as Waldemar and 
Hildegard Wolle-Egenolf, a married Social Democratic couple who practiced family law and 
published a booklet on West German family law reforms in 1952, tended to have a more left-
leaning independent position or sympathized with the GDR.96 Some jurists at least expressed 
their regrets in letters to Kurt Büttner, a Director of the German Institute of Legal Science 
(Deutscher Institut für Rechtswissenschaft), one of the main organizers of the GDR 
conference. They refrained from attending because of ideological reasons, illness, family 
obligations, or old age.97 Others, like a professor from the law faculty at the University of 
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Hamburg asked for more materials on the GDR law to become better informed.98 But the 
majority of legal experts in the West simply ignored the event. 
One main aim of the West German federal government, specifically the Inner-
German Ministry, was to discredit the GDR’s Family Code in the public. For this reason they 
published a brochure by Maria Hagemeyer—the same Ministry of Justice associate who had 
provided proposals for the new West German family law—titled “Regarding Family Law in 
the Soviet Zone” (Zum Familienrecht der Sowjetzone) in 1955. Hagemeyer explicitly 
condemned the tendency of the GDR law to supposedly force women into production and 
raise children under the direction of the state and Bolshevism.99 The bulk of her brochure was 
an in-depth and incisive critique of each section of the East German Family Code. According 
to Hagemeyer, provisions such as the right to independent surnames meant the GDR did not 
value familial unity.100 Other regulations, she argued, proved that “a proper family life with 
shared mealtimes and shared free time is not the ideal of the Soviet administration.”101 
Removing the right to alimony in divorce would “lead to an obvious worsening of the 
position of women under the cloak of equality.”102 In addition, she disapproved of the GDR’s 
shared marital property, claiming it would further disadvantage women when their husbands 
could use common property for personal uses.103 Finally, she denounced the GDR’s 
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proclamation of equality between legitimate and illegitimate children as a sham, because the 
child only took its mother’s name and the father had few rights.104 Hagemeyer critiqued 
every provision that the SED considered radical and progressive for supposedly destroying 
women’s equality and endangering the family. 
Beyond trying to convince readers that equality did not truly exist in the GDR, 
Hagemeyer’s brochure had a second purpose: to undermine the SED’s assertions about 
German unity. She criticized Hilde Benjamin’s opinion that “the draft of the Family Code 
has a pan-German meaning” and praised the response of her West German counterpart Fritz 
Neumayer, who bluntly rejected an all-German debate about family law. For Hagemeyer, the 
GDR draft “endangered the structure of the German family” and the law and the 1955 
relaxation of divorce regulations in the GDR would “lead to the dissolution of the family.”105 
These sentiments reverberated around the Federal Republic at a number of meetings. At a 
Mütterdiensttagung (Mothers’ Service Conference) in Stein near Nürnberg, organized by the 
Evangelical Diakonie, presenters supported Hagemeyer’s rhetoric, calling the “difference of 
juridical formulations” a “huge danger” for reunification.106 Hagemeyer presented her 
position to the public as often as possible. One event was a women’s conference with the 
telling title Gleichberechtigung der Frau als Aufbau- oder Zerstörungsprinzip (Women’s 
Equality as a Principle of Construction of Destruction) in March 1956 in Bad Sooden-
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Allendorf, organized by the Deutscher Frauenring, where she concluded in her keynote that 
women’s equality and family law would hinder German reunification.107 
The Protestant Church of Germany was also an active mediator in the East-West 
debates over family law. The Protestant Church stood in the somewhat unique position of 
being one of very few organizations that remained structurally unified across the German-
German border in the 1950s and 1960s. Accordingly, EKD leaders on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain corresponded about family law throughout 1955.108 Additionally, the Protestant press 
produced articles on the competing legislative drafts in the FRG and the GDR. In February 
1956, for example, Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt published an article comparing and contrasting 
the two drafts. She stressed that the FRG honored “familial community” while the GDR 
“placed individual freedom…in the foreground.”109 Furthermore, she emphasized the 
differences between marital property models, namely that the GDR’s suggested equal 
separation of property would be detrimental to women.110 Schwarzhaupt intended both 
examples to demonstrate that the GDR’s new family law would in fact harm and not help 
German families. 
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In addition, the major political parties in the West kept a close eye on the 
developments of family law reforms in the East. The SPD Ostbüro—a department within the 
party aimed at helping Eastern refugees and keeping intelligence among former SPD 
members in the East—produced a report on the public debates in the GDR in the summer of 
1954.111 Unnamed “sources” provided the SPD with insights into the public forums. They 
reported that a law “seldom has … aroused so much feeling as the one presented by the 
Ministry of Justice and put forward for discussion.”112 The other political parties had 
Ostbüros that were active in spreading information about the East and vice versa. One was 
the CDU Ostbüro, based in West Berlin, which organized the Christian-Democratic expellees 
and refugees from the GDR. It published since 1949 the newspaper Der Tag, which was 
smuggled illegally into the GDR to inform dissidents there. In the early 1950s, one key issue 
featured in Der Tag was the family law reforms in the GDR and the opposition against it.113  
The West German and West Berlin media also monitored the developments in the 
Eastern sector. The local Berlin newspaper, Spandauer Volksblatt, for instance, reported on 
the controversial decision of the Protestant Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in 
Deutschland, EKD) to withdraw its support of the GDR Family Code. It stressed that 
Protestant leaders had revoked its earlier statements because the SED “used the marital and 
family life of citizens ‘to posit definite political goals.’”114 On 14 September 1954, the 
nation-wide FAZ, too, published an article titled “Critics of Family Policy in the Zone” that 
reported on the Protestant Church of Germany’s recent rejection of the East German Family 
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Code.115 Its depiction of the EKD’s opinion focused similarly on the church leaders’ 
reticence about the highly politicized nature of the law and its destruction of distinct gender 
roles. It notably did not mention the issue of German unification, although the EKD had also 
raised this as an issue in other papers.116 In an earlier article from 16 June 1954, the FAZ had 
taken a more neutral tone in presenting the key points of the East German Family Code, but 
emphasized in its final sentence that “political circles in Berlin have labeled the law as a new 
hit against the legal unity of Germany.”117 Such a statement was designed to steer West 
German readers away from positive impressions of the law. Other more liberal and left-
leaning media outlets also criticized the suggested new GDR Family Code and the family 
policies behind it as anti-democratic and totalitarian. Der Spiegel, in a 15 September 1954 
profile of the new Family Minister Franz-Josef Wuermeling, called the policies of the Soviet 
Union (and by extension, the GDR) “similar to those of the National Socialist regime in 
Germany.”118 However, Der Spiegel article also criticized the CDU family policy and titled 
the designated Family Minister Wuermeling a “papal guard.”  
This section has shown how Cold War anti-Communism informed to the debate on 
family law reforms in the West. First, for the advocates of reform, such as the SPD and FDP, 
rising anti-Communism and the constant confrontation with the East made it very difficult to 
articulate their own position and find support for it. Second, despite the Adenauer 
administration and major political parties’ frequent dismissals of the GDR, they kept a close 
watch on the Family Code’s debut in the East. They were unwilling to get too close, 
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however, refusing to participate in open discussions with the East German Ministry of 
Justice. Finally, the Protestant Church, which maintained formal ties with the East, became a 
key player in these debates. All of these factors combined prevented a serious debate about 
the East German Family Code and made it harder for supporters of a reform in West 
Germany that aimed for equal rights to be heard.  
 
Finalizing the Equal Rights Act, 19561961 
 By the end of 1956, the Bundestag committee had concluded its debates. On several 
issues, the committee found common ground. On marital property, for example, the members 
agreed that men and women could separately govern the use of their own belongings. All 
sides were willing to grant surviving spouses a greater share of inheritance. On the matter of 
the Stichentscheid, however, the committee remained divided. On 15 November 1956, by one 
vote, its members narrowly overturned the Stichentscheid of men in marriage and replaced it 
with a provision that promised equal decision-making by both partners.119 On 12 December 
1956, however, by a margin of two votes (15 to 13), the committee opted to keep the “final 
decision” of the father. The conflicting messages of these two decisions defined the 
subsequent discussions of family law in in civil society, the media and last but not least the 
Bundestag, where oppositional factions openly stated their reservations about the 
committee’s proposals. One place of intensive debate was the CDU/CSU faction itself, which 
did not respond favorably to the committee’s votes and sought to strengthen its position by 
quashing perceived dissidence within the party. The day after the committee elected to 
overturn the Stichentscheid, in the CDU/CSU Parliamentary fraction meeting, for example, 
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chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction and Adenauer’s confidante, Heinrich Krone, 
singled out Wilhelm Lotze, a CDU parliamentarian from Niedersachsen and committee 
member who had missed the vote on the Stichentscheid in marriage in order to attend another 
meeting. Krone chastised Lotze, stating, “It must be left to his discretion, which work he 
considers more urgent.”120 Krone’s remark implied that Lotze was in some way responsible 
for the vote going awry. Moreover, he offered a subtle warning to other members of the 
CDU/CSU to prioritize the Equal Rights Act. At another point, in May 1957, Krone targeted 
Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, who had openly opposed the CDU/CSU party leadership on the 
issue of the Stichentscheid and had led a dissenting faction within the party. He told 
Schwarzhaupt: “If you are of another opinion on this matter, refrain from making a motion 
for an amendment.”121 His statement was meant to silence Schwarzhaupt and serve as a 
warning to other present members of the CDU/CSU who had voiced their opposition, but this 
did not happen, neither inside the CDU/CSU faction and the Bundestag in general, where 
SPD and FDP continued to pursue their oppositional agenda, nor in civil society and the 
media. 
 The major opposition came from outside the Bundestag. Earlier, when Hagemeyer 
debuted her first Denkschrift in 1951, individual women’s associations had written to the 
Ministry of Justice to explain their views on her proposals. As the last chapter showed, many 
women’s organizations had pressed the Adenauer administration in the summer and fall of 
1952 to scale back its proposed reforms, but to no avail. Then, in January 1954, when the 
federal government and Bundestag took on the legislation again, the Deutscher Frauenrat 
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pursued a series of different strategies to disseminate information about the law and pressure 
the Adenauer administration and the Bundestag. For one thing, the organization used its 
newsletter, Information for Women (IfF), to communicate to its readers the existing dissent in 
society. Before, individual women’s organizations, the two major churches, trade unions, and 
other professional organizations had petitioned the Ministry of Justice separately. Now, the 
editor of IfF, Annelise Glaser, reprinted their petitions and opinion pieces in the pages of the 
newsletter, an approach that already the newspaper of the BDF, Die Frau, had used before 
1933, which is not accidental because many of the older leaders of the Deutscher Frauenrat 
were politically already active in the Weimar Republic.122 Publishing all the petitions side-
by-side was a way of spreading information about the opposition to and support for the law. 
Furthermore, it allowed readers to see how widespread their protests were. The IfF continued 
this policy until the final decision of the Bundestag about the Equal Rights Act. 
Another strategy women’s associations, other professional organizations, and 
individuals used was letter-writing campaigns to the representatives of the political parties in 
the Bundestag, especially the FDP and CDU/CSU. The main message of these letters by 
individuals was the opposition of women against the Stichentscheid. One female FDP 
member, for example, stated in 1954 her opposition to party leader Thomas Dehler, 
explaining that when her husband was in a Russian POW camp, she had made all the 
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decisions, and she resented having that right removed again.123 Another wrote Dehler in the 
same year that she believed the Stichentscheid made men into bullies.124  
In addition, individual women’s organizations continued to write letters until the final 
decision of the Equal Rights Act. Here, especially the Bundestag’s committee’s decision of 
1956 to uphold the Stichentscheid for fathers caused action by many women’s organizations. 
The German Academic Women’s Association (Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund), the 
Karlsruhe Women’s Group, Deutschen Frauenrings-Ortsring Sinsheim/Elsenz, and the 
Frauenring Kehl, for example, all proposed in statements in January 1957 leaving decision-
making to both parents, not only the father.125 In the same month, the Protestant Women’s 
Work (Evangelische Frauenarbeit in Deutschland) expressed in an opinion piece that the 
BGB conferred “parental (emphasis original) authority” and supported instead allowing a 
court to step in when parents could not come to a mutual agreement. It supported with this 
statement its representative in the Bundestag, CDU parliamentarian Elizabeth 
Schwarzhaupt.126 The Hessian Women’s Association (Frauenverband Hessen) too backed up 
in a statement from January 1957 mutual decision-making, arguing that this approach would 
in no way undermine “Christian marriage and Christian ethic,” nor would it force non-
Christian couples to adhere to subjugation of one gender to another.127 The Frauenring 
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Baden-Baden, the Frauenring Wilhelmshaven, the German Protestant Women’s Association, 
and the Landesverband Hessen im Deutschen Hausfrauenbund all argued that women spend 
more time with their children; therefore it was nonsensical to deny them equal rights as 
parents.128 Finally, a local-level Social Democratic women’s committee argued that it was the 
“harsh wartime and crisis years of our century” that granted “women and mothers their 
equality with men.”129 Whether approaching the subject from a juridical, Christian, or 
retributive perspective, there was a consensus among women’s associations that the parental 
Stichentscheid unfairly favored men.  
In particular, women’s associations targeted the CDU/CSU and the FDP with their 
letter-writing campaigns. In the CDU/CSU’s case, the party’s staunch opposition to women’s 
equality provoked women to write. On 14 January 1957, for example, Frau C. of Karlsruhe 
wrote to her CDU parliamentarian Eduard Wahl to explain that she was “deeply 
disappointed” and “alienated” by the Bundestag legal committee’s decision to retain the 
father’s right to decide.130 In later correspondence, she told Wahl that keeping such a 
provision was reminiscent of the Nazi state.131 Similarly, Frau H. compared and contrasted 
war and peacetime, asserting that the wars proved women were fully capable of making 
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decisions for the family on their own.132 Finally, Frau Dr. C. offered her disdain, because it 
“opposes Article 3, gives men ‘blank’ authority without proving themselves,” and forced 
women to pursue a court case when men simply had the right to decide.133 In the case of the 
FDP, women feared the ambivalence and divisions within the party would lead its 
representatives to side with the CDU/CSU. One female FDP member even threatened to 
leave the party if “just one member votes” in favor of the Stichentscheid.134  
Other professional organizations and trade unions protested the proposed legislation 
as well. On 27 June 1955, for instance, the chairwoman of the Munich chapter of the Union 
for the Improvement of the Legal Rights of Illegitimate Children, Orphans, and for the 
Protection of Unmarried Mothers (Verein zur Verbesserung der Rechtsstellung des 
ausserehelichen Kindes, der Waisenkinder und zum Schutz der unverheirateten Mutter e.V. 
Sitz München) accused the Bundestag committee of maintaining “barbaric primitive 
conditions” for illegitimate children, particularly regarding their inheritance rights.135 In 
addition, some groups such as the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund) refused to issue an opinion on matters pertaining to parental authority 
and focused, unsurprisingly, on other issues, such as employment.136 Meanwhile, industrial 
and agricultural associations stressed the important legal changes for couples’ finances. The 
German Conference on Industry and Trade, for instance, liked the notion of a system of 
“gains settlements,” but cautioned the Committee against only paying the compensatory sum 
                                                 
132 L. Horning an Eduard Wahl, February 11, 1957, NL Eduard Wahl, 01-237-026/2, Archiv für Christlich-
Demokratische Politik-Sankt Augustin.  
133 Gertrud Carl an Eduard Wahl, February 5, 1957, NL Eduard Wahl, 01-237-026/2, Archiv für Christlich-
Demokratische Politik-Sankt Augustin. 
134 Diemer-Nicolaus an Lüders, January 8, 1957, A5-51, Archiv des Liberalismus-Gummersbach. 
135 Ditsch an die Mitglieder des Familienrechtsausschusses, June 27, 1955, 2-32-3, Nachlass Weber, 
Katholischer Deutscher Frauenbund Archiv-Köln. 
136 Maria Weber an den Informationsdienst für Frauenfragen, January 23, 1957, B 211/26-2, BArch Koblenz. 
294 
 
in cash.137 A letter from Bernhard Bauknecht, a Christian Democratic Bundestag 
representative and president of the German Agricultural Association (Deutscher 
Bauernverband e.V.), to the Committee on 26 March 1957 similarly praised the proposed 
switch to a system of “earned profits,” because it would benefit agricultural and silvicultural 
enterprises.138 Although women’s associations were the primary group pushing for reform in 
society, other professional organizations voiced their opinions about niche issues, 
demonstrating that the Civil Code reforms interested a wide variety of groups in society who 
were perhaps less invested in women’s equality but still would benefit from its changes. 
West German newspapers and party organs offered an array of opinions on the work 
of the Bundestag committee as well. The CDU organ Union in Deutschland emphasized that 
the state had to ease women’s burden by allowing them to stay home, rather than balancing 
employment outside the home and domestic care. The same article also stressed that the 
Bundestag did not want to repeat the policies of the Third Reich or replicate those of the 
GDR.139 Some national newspapers quietly supported the CDU/CSU. On 5 January 1957, for 
instance, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung relayed to readers without further comment that 
the Bundestag committee had decided to uphold the father’s right to make decisions for his 
children.140  
The Social Democratic and liberal press responded to the same core issues regarding 
the forthcoming legislation. The SPD women’s newsletter Gleichheit, for instance, reminded 
readers that women’s work in the war justified giving them more rights, and moreover, that 
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regimes with “the freedom and sovereignty of humans’ God-given rights” should not ignore 
women’s equality.141 Other newspapers communicated similar criticisms of the federal 
government’s plans. On 14 March 1957, for example, DIE ZEIT ran an article by CDU 
member and city councilwoman Elisabeth Kamm, who was supposed to relay the “view of a 
woman” on the controversial issues of the new law.142 Kamm stated that “we women were 
utterly disappointed” by the decision of the committee to maintain the paternal right to 
decide.143 She furthermore asserted that “we were never asked if we wanted to be free of 
[maternal responsibility].”144 By using the critical voice of a semi-prominent Christian 
Democratic female political leader, DIE ZEIT displayed the fault in the committee’s recent 
decisions. Other left-liberal magazines, such as Der Spiegel, were silent on the matter. The 
range of reporting methods, from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s “objective” report to 
DIE ZEIT’s more explicit conveyance of critique, demonstrated the multiplicity of media 
reactions to the topic of family law.  
The Committee on Legal and Constitutional Matters concluded its work in April 
1957. The final version of the law proposed by the committee represented a number of 
compromises among the major parties. Under this version, men could no longer assume 
control over their wives’ property.145 Women’s work in the home was supposed to be valued 
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the same as men’s work outside the home.146 Relatedly, both spouses were obligated to 
support each other and the family; women primarily through domestic labor, men through 
income earned outside the home.147 Women were still expected to adopt their husbands’ 
surnames, although now they could hyphenate. Women would also maintain the “power of 
the key” (Schlüsselgewalt) in their capacity as the head of the household. By a margin of one 
vote—a sign of how controversial the issue was—the committee determined that men would 
no longer have the final right to decide in marriage, although they maintained this right over 
their children.148 Under this version of the legislative draft—a compromise among members 
of the Bundestag committee—married women could expect gains in key areas such as 
marital property and decisions made in marriage, but it still limited their rights in parental 
authority and still designated them as the primary domestic caretakers. 
  On 3 May 1957, the Bundestag convened for the final time to discuss the suggested 
Equal Rights Act. Many of the same issues that had been controversial in 1952 and 1954 
arose again as sources of discontent among Bundestag members. Karl Weber (CDU) 
reintroduced the Stichentscheid, for instance, in hopes of getting the Bundestag to reverse the 
decision.149 According to Weber, there were certain issues—domicile and permitting a 
relative to live with the family—that demanded “external structuring of married life” and a 
“regulatory provision.”150 He maintained that the provision was “no privilege, not a step back 
for women…[but] a duty, a final responsibility imposed on the husband to make a 
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decision.”151 When it came to household matters, however, women could take the lead 
because of “functional difference.”152 In addition, it was necessary to preserve the clause, 
Weber argued, because it upheld the constitutional promise of Article 6.153 More broadly, he 
asserted, the Stichentscheid represented “Western culture and history.”154 He cited tradition, 
sexual difference, and masculine duty as reasons to reinstate the right to decide. 
The SPD and the FDP refuted these arguments on several grounds. Karl Wittrock, a 
lawyer and longtime SPD member, argued that “every marriage has and must possess an 
order. But this order cannot be one based on power.”155 Legislators therefore had no right to 
intervene in the internal structure of the family. Additionally, Wittrock argued, marriage 
should be based on “common responsibility,” not “the principle of final responsibility that 
corresponds to ideas of patriarchy.”156 Furthermore, he asserted that marriage was based on 
the equality of the sexes. Here, he pointed out that since 1 April 1953, several judges had 
supported the idea of marriage based on equality through their decisions.157 FDP 
representative Herta Ilk came to Wittrock’s aid, proclaiming that if the “internal order is not 
litigable, then we should not try to make laws that bring such things before a court where 
they cannot be clarified through a decision.”158 Moreover, she pointed out that “marriage 
questions are not only household questions,” so it made little sense to divide 
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responsibilities.159 She used as an example the case of a couple building a home together. 
Should they disagree on the location, why would it be a “manly function” for the husband to 
decide the matter?160 Finally, Nadig asserted that the Bundestag must take into account the 
“changed sociological place of women and mothers,” especially in the absence of men.161 
The SPD furthermore cited a statement by Free Democrat and women’s rights activist Marie-
Elisabeth Lüders that a certain psychology defined motherhood.162 These arguments, 
however, did not prove compelling enough to most of the Bundestag.  
By a narrow margin, the Bundestag voted to keep the committee’s recommended law. 
Although the SPD and FDP had some help from CDU members such as Schwarzhaupt, who 
supported their proposed amendments, they did not overhaul all of the committee’s 
recommendations. The final version of the law that the Bundestag approved on 18 June 1957 
and went into effect on 1 July 1958 therefore can be interpreted as a series of compromises. 
On the one hand, it offered fundamental changes from the old law. It entirely removed the 
Stichentscheid in marriage, with no replacement provision. Men could also no longer make 
the sole decision on the marital home or whether their wives worked. If spouses separated, 
women would only be forced to take on employment if they would otherwise be expected to 
contribute income to the household. Marital property changed from a “marital property 
scheme” to a “community of accrued gain,” meaning that property held by each spouse 
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before or acquired separately during marriage remained their private property.163 
Management of the other’s property could only be undertaken with express permission. If the 
pair should separate under circumstances other than death, then they had to determine which 
accruals each had made in marriage. If one spouse’s accruals were higher than the other, half 
the surplus amount would be awarded to the less well-off spouse. If one spouse died, a 
quarter of their inheritance would go to the remaining spouse.164 
On the other hand, it reinforced the gendered division of labor. For instance, women 
still retained responsibility over household affairs, although men were now legally required 
to assist and legally represent them. The new law maintained the Schlüsselgewalt—the right 
of the other spouse to take on dealings regarding the household with a third party—as the 
prerogative of the woman (in contrast to giving it to both partners). The idea behind this 
provision was that the “power of the keys” should remain the woman’s responsibility 
because the household was her domain. In addition, women could now hyphenate their 
married and maiden names, but still had to adopt the husband’s surname. Furthermore, both 
spouses would contribute to the household; women’s domestic labor counted as their half. 
Finally, women could work outside the home, but only if it was reconcilable with their 
household work and only if it was necessary to supplement an insufficient male wage.165 The 
1957 Equal Rights Act went into effect on 1 July 1958. 
Almost immediately after the law was approved, the West German media provided 
some critiques of its provisions. While some papers took a more neutral stance on the law’s 
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regulations, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s coverage of the new marital 
property scheme, some were congratulatory. The SPD women’s newsletter Gleichheit, for 
instance, called the law a “significant step,” at least for marital equality.166 Yet others were 
more critical.167 On 9 May 1957, for example, DIE ZEIT published a brief article by Justus 
Richter called “The Final Word of Father (Das letzte Wort beim Vater).”168 Richter declared 
that the Bundestag had “allowed the fallacy to resurface…about the legal anchoring of the 
equality of women and mothers.”169 Similarly, an article in the 9 July 1958 edition of Der 
Spiegel, titled “The Future of Civil Law Notaries (Die Zukunft der Notare),” for example, 
explored the frenzy of the final weeks before the law went into effect on 1 July 1958. 
According to the author, “ten thousand married men and in fewer numbers married women 
hurried in the last weeks to their notaries” as they anticipated the forthcoming law, a result, it 
was implied, of its mixed outcomes.170 Under the old law, men had all rights to their wives’ 
property, and unless the pair had drawn up a marital property contract beforehand, women 
could not claim the same right. Under the new system of “Zugewinngemeinschaft,” or 
“accrued gains,” property would be treated separately, with a few exceptions where common 
property required consent from the spouse.171 While the author praised the new property 
scheme, he or she denigrated the law’s treatment of parental rights, as it continued to invest 
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all final authority in the father.172 “The inequality of men and women,” the author asserted, 
“has been fully accomplished here.”173 
Unequal parental rights, as Der Spiegel identified, remained a point of contention in 
the Federal Republic. In July 1959, a year after the law went into effect, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that men no longer had complete parental authority. The federal 
court’s decision can be partly attributed to the intervention of Erna Scheffler, the only female 
judge on the high court. Scheffler had earned a law degree in 1914, working first as a lawyer 
and then a judge before the Nazis expelled her from her position because of her “non-Aryan” 
heritage.174 Scheffler’s earlier correspondence with liberal feminists like Marie-Elisabeth 
Lüders had further cued her into the main problems of family law reforms. The 1959 high 
court decision was significant because it helped married women regain some of their rights, 
but it still did not overturn the male breadwinner/female homemaker paradigm or the 
privileges married women still had over unwed mothers.  
 This section has shown the shifting contours of the final debates over the Equal 
Rights Act in the FRG. Initially, the Bundestag committee agreed to expand women’s rights 
and curb men’s rights in certain areas such as marital property, although they also decided to 
retain men’s authority in marriage and the family. The CDU/CSU did everything in its power 
to ensure that their own party members supported their version of the law. Resistance from 
society and from within the Bundestag, including members of the CDU/CSU majority, 
however, undermined the Christian conservative coalition’s plans for family law. As a result, 
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the final version of the Equal Rights Act represented compromise. Throughout the 1960s and 
early 1970s, marriage and family law remained controversial. 
 
Liberalizing Marriage and Family in the 1960s and early 1970s 
While the Equal Rights Act expanded rights for married women and limited male 
authority in critical ways, the Bundestag still did not address all controversial aspects of the 
old Civil Code, such as divorce and illegitimacy, by the end of the 1950s. More dramatic 
changes came on 11 August 1961, when the Bundestag passed the related “Law to Reform 
Family Law” (Familienrechtsänderungsgesetz), which expanded the rights of children born 
after the dissolution of a marriage (a subject that was ignored in the earlier debates).175 It 
provided further provisions for men and children to dispute legitimacy.176 While the 
CDU/CSU proposed adding no-fault divorce to the legislation, the SPD and FDP rejected the 
measure in favor of larger reforms.177 The 1961 legislation allowed, however, one party to 
sue the instigating spouse and challenge the divorce proceedings.178 The new law also 
overturned several measures in the 1946 Allied Control Council law. For instance, those who 
had prior committed adultery were no longer barred from remarriage.179 Additionally, 
women no longer had to wait ten months to remarry.180 The law also granted greater 
authority to the custody court. For example, the court now had the authority to grant special 
dispensations for men and women to marry before the age of majority, or to marry people 
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related to them by marriage or “sexual relations.”181 Foreigners could seek the dispensation 
of the court to marry without a witness from their home.182 Despite all these changes, the 
1961 law left other matters unturned. For example, women were still nominally in charge of 
the household and illegitimacy would remain a legal disadvantage until 1970.183  
Since the 1961 law did not include illegitimacy or full-scale divorce reforms, Social 
Democrats and some Free Democrats maintained pressure on their Christian conservative 
compatriots throughout the early 1960s to continue changing family law and societal 
perceptions of marriage and the family more broadly. An SPD-led Bundestag committee 
determined in its 1963 “Survey of the Situation of Women in Professions, Family, and 
Society,” for instance, that contributions of housewives were increasingly seen as equal to 
men’s work outside the home and there was a “new understanding of marriage as 
partnership.”184  At the same time, the report noted that “the development process is still in 
flux” and legal changes to the status of women had not yet upended lingering social 
practices.185  
Although the SPD and some FDP members drafted these reports, their success largely 
depended on the waning power of the CDU/CSU and their ability to continue gaining 
electoral power. The 1961 election saw the CDU/CSU lose its absolute majority in the 
Bundestag as the SPD and the FDP made electoral gains of 4.4 percent and 12.8 percent, 
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respectively.186 In the case of the SPD, the party’s marked shift toward the center with the 
1959 Godesberg Program helped its electoral prospects. Then, in 1963, Christian 
conservative rule furthered its rapid decline when the Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, resigned 
following a year of scandals such as the Der Spiegel affair.187 The Economics Minister, 
Ludwig Erhard, was appointed his successor and remained in power through the 1965 
election, during which the CDU/CSU maintained a coalition with the FDP. At times, Ludwig 
Erhard’s administration tried to acquiesce to the demands of their parliamentary opposition. 
In 1965, for instance, Erhard agreed to commission a two-year-long report on the status of 
the family in West Germany, designed to “assess the material and spiritual situation of the 
family” in order to “instruct a rapidly changing society.”188 The drafters of the report also 
made it clear that it was a “situational analysis rather than a performance report” on the status 
of the family.189 
Erhard only stayed in power for another year, until 1966. At this point, the economy 
began tanking and the FDP withdrew from the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition for the first time in 
nearly two decades. Then, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, a Christian Democratic politician from 
Baden-Württemberg whose earlier membership in the Nazi Party drew scrutiny throughout 
his tenure in postwar politics, served as Chancellor between 1966 and 1969. Kiesinger 
formed the Grand Coalition with the FDP and the SPD. For the first time ever in West 
German politics, the Social Democrats held a leading position in the Bundestag.  
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In 1968, the West German Ministry of Justice established a Marriage Law 
Commission. By this point, the Ministry of Justice, which had traditionally been under the 
control of the FDP or the CDU/CSU, was headed by SPD member and Protestant leader 
Gustav Heinemann, who pushed through his party’s reforms. Throughout 1970 and again in 
1972—this time, under SPD member Gerhard Jahn’s leadership—this Commission 
assembled a list of proposals for divorce law and other regulations. Although the Social 
Democrats had traditionally spearheaded reforms from within the Bundestag, further 
momentum came from outside the parliament, namely in the form of the 1968 New Women’s 
Movement, but also from more conservative sectors of society. Legal scholar W. Müller-
Freienfels notes that even many Catholics, by 1970, favored no-fault divorce.190  
 By 1968, marriage and family law were well on their way to another major overhaul. 
In the early 1960s, the hegemonic power of the Christian conservative Adenauer government 
began to crumble amidst scandals and a declining economy. Although Christian conservative 
chancellors such as Ludwig Erhard and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger remained in power, their 
traditional opposition, the Social Democrats, began to make gains in the Bundestag again. 
Finally possessing a better position of power, the SPD and FDP, aided by the 1968 New 
Women’s Movement and even some conservatives, reintroduced marriage and family law 
reforms in the 1960s.  
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has shown that between 1953 and 1968, the path dependency of the 
parallel family law reforms in the FRG was shaped by numerous legal, political, social, 
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cultural, and economic factors. First, the path of family law was informed by breaks in 
longstanding legal and institutional norms in the FRG. By 1953, the West had established a 
semi-functioning liberal democracy—albeit one defined by Adenauer’s “authoritarian power 
politics”—and the Christian conservatives were at the peak of their power.191 Going into 
further debates over family law in the mid-1950s, the Adenauer administration intended to 
use this strong position, as well as its support from the Protestant and Catholic churches, to 
recreate the paternalistic regulations encased in the 1900 Civil Code for the purposes of 
stabilizing West German society as it emerged from the lowest points of postwar destruction 
and as a bulwark against the perceived Communist threat in the East. The ruling party still 
faced opposition, however, from some of its own members, the FDP, SPD, trade unions, 
professional organizations, and women’s associations. Their continued resistance against the 
ruling party ultimately forced it to compromise, both reifying and breaking the long legal 
tradition at the same time. 
 Second, political factors shaped the outcome of the 1957 Equal Rights Act and the 
subsequent reforms in the 1960s. Unlike the earlier legislative period, where the SPD rivaled 
the CDU/CSU, the 1953 election delivered the government and the Bundestag squarely into 
the Christian conservatives’ hands. By 1957, when the Bundestag passed the Equal Rights 
Act, the CDU/CSU was on the verge of earning its largest electoral majority ever. Still, the 
ruling party had to compromise with its opposition to expand women’s rights in critical ways 
through the 1957 reforms. In the early 1960s, the hegemony of the Christian conservative 
coalition that had dominated West German politics since 1949 began to wane. The declining 
influence of the CDU/CSU opened the door for Social Democrats and Free Democrats to 
                                                 
191 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952 
(New York: Berghahn, 1995), 657. 
307 
 
press for more extensive reforms of divorce and illegitimacy, especially once they controlled 
the federal government and the Bundestag in the early 1970s. Moreover, the shape of 
extraparliamentary politics began to change in the late 1960s with the rise of the autonomous 
women’s movement. Germany had had a long tradition of women’s movements dating back 
to the nineteenth century. Indeed, many of the female activists of the Weimar-era, as they had 
before 1933, actively opposed retaining the Civil Code in the early 1950s, and their pressure 
on the government helped sway Bundestag members. By 1968, however, a new generation of 
women who had been socialized in the postwar environment where women’s employment 
and education were more expected, rose up, and became influential in the next round of 
debates over marriage and family law. 
 Third, economic changes mattered immensely for the path of family law in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. By the mid-1950s, the “economic miracle” had revived the West 
German economy so much that legislators confronted a labor shortage. One way they dealt 
with this labor shortage was enlisting the paid, part-time labor of married women. By the end 
of the 1960s, the married female part-time laborer was normal and even marketed to women 
as an enjoyable way to balance home and work life. This idea stood in stark contrast to the 
image the Adenauer administration hoped to continue with its family law reforms: that of a 
male breadwinner/female homemaker family model in which female labor was only 
employed under extenuating circumstances. The changes in female labor pushed legislators 
in the 1970s to embrace a more open and equitable form of marriage and family law. 
 Fourth, social and cultural factors continued to play into debates about family law. 
The Christian conservative Adenauer administration and the Protestant and Catholic 
Churches continued to emphasize the “traditional” family as the cornerstone of a stable, 
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postwar German society. Their family and welfare policies reinforced the idea of a male 
breadwinner and female homemaker. Although the New Women’s Movement challenged 
this family model in full force after 1968, so did Free Democrats, Social Democrats, and 
(until 1956) Communists in West Germany in the 1950s and early 1960s. The conflict 
between the Christian conservatives and Social Democratic-led opposition in the 1950s over 
reconciling equal rights with protection of the family ultimately resulted in partial reforms 
that, over time, began to change West Germans’ views on family and partnership.  
 Finally, the Cold War conflict continued to cast its shadow over family law reforms. 
As the 1950s went on, the two Germanys diverged more and more in terms of politics, the 
economy, and society. Compared to the GDR, Western politicians had always been less vocal 
about the East’s family law reforms. Still, anti-Communism was a defining feature of the 
early Federal Republic, and shaped postwar politicians’ different discourses and legislative 
decisions. Legislators had to carefully craft a law that did not resemble the Family Code, and 
they had to avoid appearing friendly or sympathetic to the SED in the GDR. Furthermore, 
earlier discussions in the Ministry of Justice and the Bundestag had raised the problem of 
legal unity, a problem that diminished once the Adenauer administration formally began 
following the Hallstein Doctrine in 1955. The federal government’s formal non-recognition 
of the East in many ways eased the work of the Bundestag on the 1957 Equal Rights Act, 
because legislators no longer had to consider legal unity a possibility. As the next and final 
chapter shows, the divergence of the two Germanys in the late 1950s also further liberated 
the GDR to pursue a more radical version of its Family Code. 
309 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
BUILDING SOCIALISM, DEFINING FAMILIES: THE NEW SOCIALIST FAMILY 
CODE, 195468 
 
 
On 15 December 1954, Herr M. of Stuttgart, West Germany, wrote to the Ministry of 
Justice of the GDR to ask about the forthcoming East German Family Code 
(Familiengesetzbuch, FGB). He explained that his ex-wife and child live in the GDR, and he 
is paying 40 DM a month into a savings account in West Germany for his child. He inquired 
as to how he could pay the child support to an account in the GDR. A Ministry official wrote 
back to explain that Herr M. could not send the money, because “on principle, Western 
currency cannot be introduced into the GDR.”1 On one level, his story was universal: 
divorced couples often face difficulties navigating child support and custody. But Herr M.’s 
case was complicated by the exceptionally complex and unique legal situation regarding 
marriage, family, and divorce in the divided Germanys. No easy resolution existed for Herr 
M., his former spouse, and their child because of the divisive nature of Cold War politics and 
the unresolved quandary of family law. 
Herr M.’s letter arrived near the end of several months of intense public debate over 
the new family law in the GDR. In June 1954, the Ministry of Justice in the GDR debuted the 
drafted Family Code, designed to replace the old patriarchal Civil Code with new, socialist, 
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and more egalitarian regulations on marriage, divorce, marital property, and parental 
authority. The new legislative draft had gained new momentum in 1952, when the ruling 
party had begun its “building socialism (Aufbau des Sozialismus)” initiative, which included 
reorganizing agricultural collectives, abolishing states, bringing educational and judicial 
institutions into line, and aligning all legislation, such as family law, with the goals of Soviet-
style Communism. Two key events in 1953, however, disrupted the SED’s progress on these 
initiatives. The first was the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in March 1953. His 
successors, seeking to “de-Stalinize” the Soviet Union and distance themselves from his 
legacy, announced the “New Course,” meant to scale back the terror and high production 
goals of the Stalin years. Then, when SED leaders refused to follow the New Course and 
reduce production levels, disgruntled workers rose up against the regime on 17 June 1953. 
The SED violently cracked down on dissenters, a decision that led to international 
embarrassment and forced the party to find ways to restore its reputation at home and abroad. 
Among other measures, the ruling party turned its attention to legal reforms such as the new 
Family Code to prove to their citizens that socialism was about far more than repression.  
To propagate the forthcoming legislation and monitor citizens’ feedback, the Ministry 
of Justice published numerous newspaper articles, held public forums, and allowed citizens 
to write in to a formal petition system set up by the East German government in February 
1953.2 The forums and the petition system were meant to give the appearance of democracy 
and boost the SED’s reputation both at home and abroad. Instead, it backfired on the ruling 
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party. While the SED expected widespread praise of its new legislation, it received an 
overwhelmingly negative response from its populace, especially Protestants and Catholics. 
Without a word to East Germans, the SED abandoned the legislative changes in November 
1954. Instead, the party chose to pass some incremental reforms in 1955, but otherwise 
repeatedly delayed addressing the issue until 1963.  
After two decades of discussion in the Soviet zone and then the GDR, the East 
German Volkskammer finally approved the Family Code on 20 December 1965, which went 
into effect on 1 April 1966. In stark contrast to the old Civil Code, which divested married 
women and mothers of equal rights and power with their husbands, the new socialist Family 
Code prescribed a more egalitarian family model. Earlier legislation such as the 1950 
Mutterschutzgesetz had already removed controversial provisions such as the right of men to 
decide, or the Stichentscheid. Now, the Family Code designated both spouses as equal 
partners in their marriages, childrearing, and household maintenance. All property earned or 
bought during the marriage was common property. It allowed no-fault divorce. The law also 
offered other concrete changes, such as permitting married couples to take either spouse’s 
surname. Apart from some minor revisions in 1975, the Family Code stayed valid in the 
GDR until August 1990. 
This chapter examines several intersecting factors that informed, initially halted in 
1954, and finally provided momentum for approving the final form of the Family Code in the 
GDR in 1965. First, I argue that the SED abandoned its reforms because of the negative 
feedback from its citizens. Studies of resistance against the East German regime have 
typically focused on the 17 June 1953 uprising or the peaceful demonstrations of 1989; in 
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other words, the big waves of defiance of the SED.3 Other studies, however, have conceived 
of resistance from the perspective of everyday life, examining complaints and petitions from 
East Germans to the government.4 The research undergirding this chapter falls into the latter 
category. When faced with draft legislation, many East Germans attempted to negotiate its 
provisions with the government.  
In particular, this chapter focuses on the conflicts between the Protestant and Catholic 
Churches and the SED dictatorship over the Family Code.5 The two major churches and their 
various sects had had, for the most part, an antagonistic relationship with the SED-led 
government. According to sociologist Sabrina Petra Ramet, 1945 to 1948 was a 
“honeymoon” period of cooperation between Christian preachers and Communists who had 
experienced the torture of the Nazi concentration camps together.6 By 1948, when the 
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Communists had safely secured control over the Soviet zone, their positive attitudes towards 
Christians changed and they sought to eradicate Christianity’s influence and political 
competition. Despite the SED’s efforts, in the early 1950s, Catholicism and Protestantism, 
but especially the latter, were still strong in East Germany. When the socialist Family Code 
debuted, leaders and members of the Catholic and Protestant churches protested its deep 
intervention into daily life, especially childrearing, and argued it was at odds with their 
Christian ideas of marriage and the family. Moreover, they argued that the SED stood poised 
to destroy all-German unity. This chapter shows that the churches’ opposition played a 
significant role in preventing the East German government from passing its reforms in 1954, 
but the diminishing strength of the churches by the mid-1960s assisted the SED in approving 
a new Family Code in 1965. 
Finally, I show that the Cold War, both in discourse and particular policy decisions, 
shaped the contours of all discussions of the Family Code in the GDR in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. For one thing, in the mid-1950s, the German-German borders were still 
somewhat permeable, creating confusing legal situations for men like Herr M. Moreover, the 
East German government was confronting the mass exodus of East German citizens to the 
West, leading the SED to fortify the German-German border, which ultimately culminated in 
the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. With so many male laborers leaving, 
female labor was that much more critical to the SED. Additionally, the West forged ahead 
with its own family law reforms without consulting the East German government. Moreover, 
social and generational change had made ordinary East Germans more receptive to a new, 
socialist Family Code. All of these factors contributed to the East German Family Code’s 
passage in 1965. 
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This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section summarizes the 
political, economic, and social developments in the GDR in the early 1950s, focusing on the 
party’s program of the “building of socialism” as its driving force during this time. The 
second section examines the revival of debates in the Ministry of Justice and in public over 
family law in 1954. In particular, this section explains how citizens, especially Christians, 
upended the SED’s planned reforms in 1954. The third section analyzes how the SED’s 
incremental reforms in the 1950s set the stage for the eventual approval of the 1965 Family 
Code and the new equality clause in the 1968 constitution. Finally, the fourth section 
explores the reforms to the 1968 constitution in the GDR, which not only explicitly labeled 
the state as a socialist republic, but in doing so, granted expanded civil rights to women. 
 
Building Socialism Through Marriage and the Family, 195455 
In July 1952, following a Soviet initiative, the SED announced at its Second Party 
Congress that the party’s priority was the “building of socialism (Aufbau des Sozialismus),” 
which would require the complete “power of the state.”7 “Building of socialism” ushered in 
several changes for East Germany. First, the government abolished former states, 
reorganizing the GDR into new districts (Bezirke).8 Second, the SED “announced special 
privileges for agricultural collectives.”9 Third, educational institutions were brought in line 
with socialism; other forms of education, such as religious teachings, were discouraged. 
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Fourth, the GDR formally fortified the border with West Germany and formed the Barracked 
People’s Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei), the precursor to the National People’s Army.10  
In addition to fortifying its borders against potential foreign invasion, the SED also 
prepared itself to fight insurrection within the GDR. The SED thus increased its persecution 
of potential or perceived political dissidents or anyone who might oppose socialism. Liberal-
minded judges, Christians, and independent business owners, for example, fell into these 
categories. “Less reliable” jurists and judges were removed from their positions.11 The ruling 
party began to harass Christians, through measures such as forcing farm workers and laborers 
to report for work on Sundays; banning Bible studies; and eventually introducing the 
Jugendweihe, the secular equivalent of confirmation, in 1953.12 Finally, the SED placed more 
radical family law reforms on their agenda. All of these initiatives were meant to place 
socialism front-and-center and undermine the influence of subversive non-socialist forces 
such as religion or the West. 
The SED’s plans for installing socialism—and by extension, changing family law—
were disrupted by Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953. Immediately after the Soviet leader 
died, the leading members of the Communist Party Central Committee and his successors, 
Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrenti Beria, and Georgi Malenkov, proclaimed the New Course, a 
                                                 
10 Bruce, Resistance with the People, 159. 
11 Bruce, Resistance with the People, 160. 
12 Ramet, “Protestantism in East Germany, 1949-1989: A Summing Up,” 171, 172-174. Bruce, Resistance with 
the People, 161. According to historian Gary Bruce, the SED’s discrimination against Christians continued until 
after the announcement of the New Course. For more on the Jugendweihe, see: Alexander Bolz, Jugendweihen 
in Deutschland: Idee, Geschichte und Aktualität eines Übergangsrituals (Leipzig: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung 
Sachsen, 1998). Jugendweihe existed among socialists since the late nineteenth century and was also practiced 
in West Germany, so while it was not unique to the SED or East Germany, the way they explicitly used it as a 
practice to drive out church influence was different from the past or Western practice. 
316 
 
plan to increase consumer goods, repeal terror, and reduce industrial production.13 When the 
SED did not remove the productivity quotas as promised, however, workers began leading 
demonstrations on 17 June 1953 in Berlin and then across the GDR. Approximately 40,000 
workers in Berlin, plus thousands of others around the GDR, took to the streets.14 Under 
orders from the SED, the People’s Police (Volkspolizei) and the Soviet Red Army violently 
suppressed the protests. The ruling party asserted that the uprisings were the work of Western 
espionage and infiltration. 
In the months following the 17 June 1953 uprisings, two seemingly conflicting trends 
took place within the SED. On the one hand, the 17 June 1953 uprisings alerted the SED to 
the potential consequences of its draconian behavior. According to legal scholar Inga 
Markovits, in some regions, for example, the party continued to relax implementation of its 
criminal codes.15 On the other hand, paranoia urged party leaders to clamp down on potential 
dissent. Historian Richard Millington argues that the “ghost of the uprising of 17 June 1953 
and the possibility that it might one day happen again haunted the SED regime until its 
demise in 1989.”16 In the years after the mass protests, the ruling party monitored its citizens 
and especially uncooperative party officials even more closely to quash dissidence.17 Where 
necessary, the SED dismissed known anti-Ulbricht members such as Max Fechner and Elli 
                                                 
13 Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany; Edward Taborsky, “The ‘New Course’ in the Soviet Economy,” 
Southern Economic Journal, 23, 2 (October 1956): 160; Klaus Schroeder, Der SED-Staat: Geschichte und 
Strukturen der DDR 1949-1990 (Köln: Böhlau, 2013), 139. 
14 Schroeder, Der SED-Staat, 141. See also Arnulf Baring’s well-known study. Arnulf Baring, Uprising in East 
Germany: June 1953 (Ithaca: Cornell, 1972). 
15 Inga Markovits, Justice in Luritz: Experiencing Socialist Law in East Germany (Princeton: Princeton, 2010), 
107. 
16 Richard Millington, State, Society and Memories of the Uprising of 17 June 1953 in the GDR (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 97. 
17 Millington, State, Society, and Memories, 97; Schroeder, Der SED-Staat, 142-143. 
317 
 
Schmidt from their positions.18 Fechner, a former Social Democrat, had served as Minister of 
Justice from 1949 to 1953. His public apprehension about Ulbricht’s handling of the June 
1953 uprisings and the persecution of political dissidents during and after led to his removal 
from office and expulsion from the SED in July 1953.19 Elli Schmidt was a member of the 
Party Executive Committee of the SED from 1946 to 1953, a member of the town council of 
East, and together with Käthe Kern, leader of the SED women’s executive committee (SED-
Frauensekretariat) from 1946 to 1949. In 1953 she lost her positions in the SED but was 
rehabilitated in 1956.20 
With the dismissal of the two, the supporters of family law reform lost important 
influence. Fechner’s dismissal had especially profound consequences for family law, because 
it led to the appointment of Hilde Benjamin, then Vice President of the Supreme Court of the 
GDR, as the new Minister of Justice in July 1953.21 When Benjamin took over the Ministry 
of Justice, family law reforms had long been on her personal agenda. Since 1946, as a leader 
of the Central Women’s Committee, founding member of the DFD, and a Volksrat 
representative, she had conducted many discussions herself regarding the future legal 
reforms. In the meantime, she also presided over a series of show trials in the GDR. 
Benjamin was responsible for bringing family law to the fore again as a part of the SED’s 
broader program of “building socialism,” which the leading party reiterated in its IV. Party 
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Congress in March 1954.22 But the publicity failure of the June 1953 uprisings inspired 
Benjamin to orchestrate the legislation’s public debut in June 1954 very carefully. 
 On 30 June 1954, the Ministry of Justice under Benjamin published drafts of the law, 
as well as commentary on its major provisions, in the major newspapers and legal journals—
namely Neues Deutschland, Neue Justiz, and Der Schöffe. The new Family Code’s most 
tangible changes included fixing the age of majority to 18, replacing the guilt principle in 
divorce, giving women greater independence to work or live away from their spouses, and 
allowing partners to choose which surname they preferred.23 The preamble to the Family 
Code outlined the ideological motivations behind these changes. The new law, for instance, 
emphasized the necessity of equality for women in marriage and society as a whole. In 
addition, it would govern relationships between spouses, parents, children, and other relatives 
“for the development and stabilization of the family and upbringing of children in the spirit 
of democracy, socialism, patriotism, and friendship between nations.”24 Finally, the text 
asserted that raising children was not only the duty of parents, but of the state (represented by 
youth organizations and schools).25 The introduction to the FGB demonstrated the SED’s 
dual commitment to fostering Gleichberechtigung and building strong, properly socialist 
families, albeit with greater amounts of state intervention. 
 
Citizens’ Protest and Praise 
                                                 
22 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IV. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands in der 
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24 §1, “Entwurf eines Familiengesetzbuches der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” Neue Justiz, June 30, 
1954, 377. 
25 §§2-4, “Entwurf eines Familiengesetzbuches der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” 377. 
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In the weeks leading up to and following the legislation’s debut, the SED and its 
partners in the National Front sought to further publicize the law through the mass media. 
One approach the ruling party used was publishing synopses of the legislation. One unsigned 
article in Neues Deutschland from July 1954, for instance, explained to readers the changing 
legal expectations regarding marriage ceremony and family names.26 These summaries were 
not without their own form of interpretation, however. The author, for instance, compared the 
GDR’s new law to the old German and French Civil Codes, implying that old provisions 
such as attaching property to engagements were outdated.27 Another article in Neues 
Deutschland published one month later covered marital property, especially for spouses 
living apart. According to the SED, alimony placed undue pressure on the working partner, 
who would only have to pay longer than a year if he or she had refused support before.28 
Property earned for the benefit of the family would be treated as shared property, while 
property earned before marriage would belong to the individual. The SED left some 
provisions for special situations, such as the cases of housewives, whose unpaid labor in the 
home entitled them to some of their former husbands’ property after a divorce.29 In addition, 
Neues Deutschland covered illegitimate birth, arguing in favor of the rights of out-of-
wedlock children.30 Finally, a weeks-long series of articles in the women’s magazine Die 
Frau von heute published in July 1954 explained the major legal changes coming to married 
                                                 
26 “Über die Eheschliessung und den Familiennamen,” Neues Deutschland, July 8, 1954, 6. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Über die vermögensrechtlichen Beziehungen der Ehegatten,” Neues Deutschland, August 17, 1954, 6. 
29 “Über die vermögensrechtlichen Beziehungen der Ehegatten,” Neues Deutschland, August 17, 1954, 6. 
30 “Die rechtliche Stellung des nichtehelichen Kindes,” Neues Deutschland, August 25, 1954, 6. 
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women and unmarried mothers.31 The East German media suggested, through these articles, 
that East Germans could expect historically unprecedented and more egalitarian family 
structures when the Family Code was approved. 
In addition to providing overviews of potential legal provisions, the media in the 
GDR emphasized that legal changes were meant to ensure citizens’ privacy and individual 
rights. On 15 June 1954, for instance, Hilde Benjamin asserted in a Neues Deutschland 
article that the forthcoming law was not only a response to women’s complaints and court 
rulings, but the changing currents of SED policy. She noted that after 11 June 1953, with the 
adoption of the New Course, the SED was actively trying to “actually ensure the personal 
lives and personal interests of citizens, especially before the law.”32 It is more likely that the 
17 June 1953 uprising and its aftermath, not merely the introduction of the New Course, 
spurred the SED’s sudden interest in protecting its citizens’ private lives. Still, Benjamin 
tried to steer readers toward a positive image of the SED and the GDR by depicting the new 
Family Code as a response to contemporary political developments and citizens’ desires.  
Another strategy the East German media employed was allowing public—albeit 
carefully vetted—displays of differing opinions, in an attempt to demonstrate that it was a 
true “people’s democracy.” Berliner Zeitung printed excerpts from readers’ letters, for 
example, that covered a range of opinions on the subjects of marrying age and the guilt 
clause in divorce in August and September 1954. One seventeen-year-old expressed despair 
                                                 
31 “Zum Entwurf des neuen Familiengesetzbuches,” Die Frau von heute, July 9, 1954, 10; “Zum Entwurf des 
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32 Hilde Benjamin, “Über den Entwurf eines neuen Familiengesetzbuches,” Neues Deutschland, June 15, 1954, 
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that she would have to wait to marry her fiancé.33 An older woman stated that sixteen was too 
young for a girl “to make such an important decision for her life,” but if a girl was pregnant, 
then she should be allowed to marry.34 The article’s author noted, however, that in the GDR, 
the “bourgeois concept of a stigma of illegitimate birth” no longer existed, so the mother did 
not have to rush into a marriage and could wait a few years to see if the partnership 
developed with the father. In addition, Berliner Zeitung printed opinions from readers 
opposing the removal of the guilt clause in divorce, who argued that without it, men would 
commit adultery uninhibited, “the number of unlucky and destroyed marriages would rise,” 
and women would be disadvantaged.35 In this way, the East German media presented the 
SED’s reforms as improvements over past conditions. At the same time, these measures 
revealed a certain amount of traditionalism among readers, arguably a strategy on the part of 
Neues Deutschland and Berliner Zeitung to make the SED’s position seem even more 
progressive.  
In addition to the ongoing press campaign, the SED conducted public forums to court 
its own citizens. The Ministry of Justice set up a number of “Justice Conversation Evenings” 
in localities across the GDR. In these public spaces, citizens could pose questions and 
comment on the law to Ministry functionaries or members of mass organizations like the 
DFD. On occasion, such as the meeting at the Arts and Leisure Center for Workers 
(Kulturhaus der Bauarbeiter) on Stalinallee in Berlin in August 1954, more prominent 
figures from the Ministry were invited to speak.36 By October 1954, the Ministry had held 
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6,117 “Justice Conversation Evenings” in which 313,538 GDR citizens participated.37  
In a typical session, SED representatives walked the participants through each part of 
the law. For instance, at a meeting in Reichenbach im Vogtland in Saxony, the chief justice 
of the nearest district court led the discussion. He spoke primarily about indemnity claims 
during the breaking of engagements, whether or not medical certificates were required for 
marriage (Tauglichkeitszeugnis für Eheschliessende), and the consequences of parents 
holding different last names from children.38 Participants showed special concern about the 
intervention of the state in raising their children, especially the role of youth organizations 
like the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ).39 In these spaces, the SED 
facilitated the debates, but the participants—recalling the limits of their power during the 
Third Reich—raised their objections and attempted to negotiate with the party. 
Additionally, the presenters often underscored the “pan-German (gesamtdeutsch) 
meaning of the legislative draft.”40 There were both ideological and practical reasons for 
employing this argument. First, the SED had always proclaimed itself the protector of 
German unity, in contrast to the “divisive” West. Second, the inter-German borders were still 
open and many Germans harbored fantasies of reunification.41 Third, the 1946 Allied Control 
                                                 
37 Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des Familiengesetzbuches auf der Arbeitstagung im 
Ministerium der Justiz vom 19.10.1954, S. 1, DO 1/14398, BArch Berlin. A typical “Justice Evening” consisted 
of a presentation delivered by an official from the local District Court, the Ministry of Justice, members of the 
National Front, or a mass organization like the DFD. They attracted anywhere from fifty to 1000 participants. 
These estimates are drawn from reports in SAPMO-BArch Berlin, DY30/IV2/14/35, Bl. 61; DO 1/1555, Bl. 
110. See also Harsch, Revenge, 205. These meetings were also propagated in the women’s press. See, for 
example, “In dieser Woche besuchten wir: Minister Dr. Hilde Benjamin,” Die Frau von heute, June 25, 1954, 2. 
38 Protokoll über eine Justizaussprache, 24.8.54, DY30/IV2/14/35, Bl. 61-62, SAPMO-BArch Berlin. 
39 Ibid., Bl. 62-63. 
40 Ibid., Bl. 61. 
41 Mary Fulbrook states that “in the 1950s reunification ranked as one of the most important problems for West 
Germans” and that it represented “constant aspirations for large numbers of East Germans.” See Mary 
323 
 
Council marriage law still technically governed both Germanys. On the one hand, 
highlighting the pan-German implications of the law allowed the SED to portray itself as the 
German state that unite German families in opposition to its Western counterpart. On the 
other hand, the pan-German argument demonstrated that the SED was fully aware of the 
looming consequences of the law’s imminent approval and sought to head off accusations 
that it led the divisive Germany.      
The East German mass media predictably presented the public discussions in a 
positive light. The author of one article praised the forums for “clearly showing what a real 
democracy is.”42 To further evince the success of East German democracy, the media printed 
myriad opinions by forum participants. One report on a meeting in Berlin showed that male 
and female attendees supported the removal of the guilt clause. In addition, surnames were a 
topic of heated discussion. One female participant complained, for example, that despite 
having the right to select her own surname, she still had no choice in retaining her citizenship 
when marrying a foreigner. Meanwhile, one man opposed the freedom of choice of 
surnames, claiming that prestige was passed along via the last name and hinting that he was 
not ready to relinquish masculine privilege in this regard.43 Through these excerpts of the 
forums, the media aimed to depict the SED as a democratic state willing to listen to and 
respond to its citizens’ reservations. 
The East German media’s presentation belied a more complicated reality. The SED 
quickly found that its public forums, designed and carefully controlled to reinforce the 
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party’s aims, were turning into spaces for voicing complaints about the new law’s provisions. 
In addition, the correspondence from private citizens to the Ministry of Justice displayed a 
population that was confused at best and severely discontented at worst about the proposed 
family law. Over the course of the summer of 1954, the Ministry of Justice received 
hundreds of letters and petitions from curious and dissatisfied citizens on all types of issues 
related to the Family Code. Although writers sometimes mentioned tangential issues such as 
prostitution, more commonly, they emphasized problems related to property and inheritance 
rights, alimony for spouses and children, family names, the legitimacy of children, women’s 
working rights, adultery, and divorce. These letters often described problems of everyday life 
that the new family law posed to some East Germans; typically, writers inquired about 
circumstances unanticipated by the SED. Many East Germans in the early 1950s tended to be 
more conservative—often because of strong religious beliefs—than the ruling Communist 
regime. According to historian Felix Mühlberg, they saw their petitions as “an instrument for 
solving conflicts,” which in this case stemmed largely from differing conceptions of marriage 
and the family. 44  
Property and inheritance rights were one area that provoked much confusion among 
East Germans. The law’s provisions stated that any property acquired during the marriage for 
the support of the family was to be divided equally in divorce. As one case from Zeulenroda, 
Thuringia demonstrated, such regulations were not so easily enforced. A local lawyer wrote 
in on behalf of his clients, a divorcing couple whose assets were invested primarily in 
livestock, extracted from both spouses’ money but primarily the husband’s livelihood. To 
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make it more difficult, the animals had reproduced.45 The couple and their lawyer wanted to 
know how the proposed law handled such situations. As another example, one man wrote to 
the Ministry to ask about spousal property rights.46 If one spouse died and the widowed 
spouse sold the family home, for example, how would that affect the children’s 
inheritance?47 These examples demonstrated to the Ministry of Justice that equality in 
property rights was simple in theory, but difficult to apply in a state that was still in the midst 
of transitioning from a bourgeois to a socialist society and economy. 
Another common complaint from correspondents was the equal treatment of 
illegitimate children. The rights of out-of-wedlock births were already safeguarded by the 
1949 constitution and the 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz. The 1954 Family Code’s reiteration of 
the SED’s stance on illegitimacy nevertheless attracted hostility from some citizens who 
spotted its potential for disrupting their families and personal lives. For instance, Frau F. 
from Badersleben, Saxony-Anhalt, explained that in her town, there was a case of a young 
woman who seduced a married man, became pregnant, and attempted to ruin the family. In 
her opinion, the woman had no right to demand money from the man and his family. The 
Ministry of Justice informed her that children born out-of-wedlock had equal rights.48 
Another writer, Herr M., proposed refusing out-of-wedlock children the right to inherit, 
because “females are the origin of illegitimate children…if illegitimate children are given 
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inheritance rights, it will just encourage sinful women.”49 The regime largely ignored these 
pleas on the grounds that birth status was not an impediment to social or economic status. In 
pursuing this path, the SED not only elevated the legal status of out-of-wedlock children and 
mothers (a long-time demand of the women’s movement and something that the West did not 
do until the 1960s), but it diminished the alleged fathers’ rights to distance themselves from 
and disinherit their illegitimate children. Still, overcoming the social norms that had long 
privileged men and disadvantaged their mistresses and out-of-wedlock progeny posed a 
major obstacle for the ruling party. 
Another controversial area, as indicated by the petitions, was the family surname. The 
proposed law stated that both spouses could keep their names or they could take the other’s 
name. The children would have to take the name of one or the other, but all offspring had to 
have the same name. This provision was designed to allow both spouses individual identities, 
especially in the workplace, but also to foster some sense of familial unity, which was still 
important to leading Communists. In some petitions, citizens did not necessarily oppose the 
provision, but offered exceptions or expansions to the text. One woman from Döbeln, 
Saxony, for instance, criticized the draft FGB for being too restrictive in its family name 
provisions. Why must spouses be restricted to either the man’s name or individual names, she 
asked? What about hyphenation as an option, like the 1944 Soviet law?50 Another asked why, 
after leaving an abusive husband and father, it was not possible for her child to take her 
maiden name.51 Men were particularly keen to find out if they could change their surnames, 
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but typically only if the last name was especially embarrassing. One man asked if he could 
change his last name to his wife’s, because his long Polish surname “causes [him] again and 
again problems in public life.”52 A Herr Ficker made a similar request.53 Other writers 
opposed the SED’s proposals altogether on the grounds of protecting the family. One man, 
for instance, wrote to express his opinion that men and women should have the same name, 
for the sake of “the smallest unity in the state, the family.”54 A woman similarly supported 
one shared family name, but for different reasons. She argued that with different names, no 
one would know who was married to whom, which “would lead to much unpleasantness.”55 
The petitions regarding surnames exposed the SED to a wide variety of opinions from their 
citizens that ranged from mostly positive to outright opposition.  
Another common topic among correspondents was how the law dealt with infidelity, 
which had been largely overlooked in the draft legislation. On several occasions, concerned 
citizens wrote to ask about the fallout of adultery under the new family law. Some wished to 
see adulterers punished. For instance, a woman from Karl-Marx-Stadt, Saxony, wrote in July 
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1954 that “a woman who serves a different married man…year-long in her apartment and 
grants him every wish may not under any circumstances be exempt from punishment in our 
state…these people must be educated in morality and discipline according to the law.”56 As 
another example, a woman from Görlitz, Saxony, called adultery “the worst crime” and 
asserted that the criminalization of adultery would curb high divorce rates, lead to “happy 
marriages,” and assist with the “upbringing of children.”57 Yet another woman from 
Oberschöneweide, Berlin, proposed punishing the third party as well.58 These calls for the 
criminalization of adultery reflected a certain adherence to longstanding ideas of monogamy 
and marital fidelity, which reemerged from a chaotic wartime and postwar environment in 
which adultery had been more common.  
Related were the petitions regarding anxiety about “free love.” Herr W. wrote in 
September 1954 to the State Broadcasting Committee (Staatliche Rundfunkkomitee) to clarify 
the issue of “open marriage.”59 Helmut Ostmann of the Ministry responded that “the Family 
Code does not recognize the concept of companionship or the so-called ‘free marriage’.”60 
He furthermore cited the Nazi restrictions on marriage law for certain individuals as the 
reason why the GDR saw “registered marriages” as the foundation of the state.61 Ostmann 
told another writer that to equate lifelong companionship, or the “anarchistic form of the 
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promotion of free love” with marriage “opposes the goals of the constitution of the GDR.”62 
These responses made it clear that the Ministry of Justice and the SED still valued 
heterosexual, monogamous, state-sanctioned marriages over alternative forms of life 
partnership as the cornerstone of East German families and society. 
Another major point of contention for petition writers was the subject of alimony 
after divorce. In July 1954, the women’s newspaper Die Frau von heute printed a letter from 
a Frau G. in Birkenwerder, Brandenburg, who advocated keeping the guilt clause in 
divorce.63 Her letter resonated with many female readers who saw its removal as a burden on 
women and an exoneration for men. One subscriber, for instance, wrote to the magazine to 
say she agreed with Frau G., because “it would definitely no longer be a problem for the 
men’s world then, to still look at their ‘marriage’ as complete.”64 Another agreed that it 
would create “a hell” for “a poor mother with multiple children, who has to fight for her daily 
bread, while the man lives with a bad woman, earns enough money, and because he has no 
guilt, he doesn’t need to pay the former wife alimony  and he can bribe (bieten) the children 
with more money.”65 At the same time, Frau G.’s opinion fomented opposition. Another 
respondent stated that she saw guilt as a consequence of the actions of both spouses, and that 
women who sought to blame their husbands for leaving did not reflect enough on their own 
damaging actions.66 A male reader called Frau G. “anti-man (Männerfeindlich)” and stated 
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that he saw both sides as responsible for the breakdown of marriages.67 
In addition to the law’s provisions and potential legal loopholes, correspondents also 
used references to Germany’s division as a form of argumentation. Sometimes, writers were 
literal. In July 1954, for instance, Heinrich Heydemann, a lawyer from Rostock, urged the 
Ministry “not to range too far from the Germans west of the Elbe” in terms of the new law, 
especially since “the approaching unity of our Fatherland is in motion.”68 Other times, 
writers used Germany’s division as a metaphor. One male writer used an analogy of German 
reunification to make a point about individual surnames, stating that for spouses to have 
separate names “is as wrong as wanting to call both halves of Germany the GDR and the 
Federal Republic after reunification.”69 These writers invoked the West as a way of 
conveying their anxieties about individual provisions as well as the greater international 
consequences of passing the new Family Code. 
The aforementioned correspondence offers several insights into citizens’ responses to 
the new legislation. For one thing, it highlighted specific controversial issues stemming from 
the draft legislation, namely property rights, naming rights, and the fallout of adultery and 
divorce. The 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz had already removed many of the provisions (such as 
the right of men to make all decisions) that women’s rights activists had traditionally 
opposed (and were still fighting against in the West). Thus, correspondents, who were often 
less versed in socialist theory than the functionaries drafting the legislation, focused on how 
outstanding problems, such as divorce and property law, affected their everyday lives. In 
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addition, these petitions hint at perceptions of gender and the family in the GDR. For 
instance, many writers blamed women for marital breakdown, illicit trysts, and unexpected 
pregnancies. These writers, especially men, were unwilling to trade the privileges marital 
status granted to ensure equality for unmarried mothers. Others were willing to forgo 
individual identities for the integrity of the family. It is important to note, however, the 
silence of others. Those who wrote in did so in order to find solutions to their own problems 
or to attempt to sway the SED. Many more, however, chose not to correspond with the SED, 
indicating apathy, contentment with the law, or on the other extreme, perhaps fear of outing 
themselves to the regime.  
 
Protestant and Catholic Resistance 
In addition to the provisions themselves, the issue of German unity quickly developed 
into one of the major points of the 1954 Family Code public discussions, where the SED 
stressed the pan-German nature of the law. The issue of German unity became a rallying cry 
for the SED’s largest opposition: members of the Protestant and Catholic churches. The SED 
had been implementing “de-Christianizing” measures for years, but still recognized the 
influence of the churches. In fact, SED leaders courted and attained the Protestant 
leadership’s favorable opinion on the new family law in March 1954, months before the 
Ministry debuted the draft of the Family Code.70 Still, Christians on the local level started to 
protest the law in the summer of 1954. Historian Donna Harsch has convincingly shown that 
their petitions and discussions sought to undermine the SED by labeling “the law as anti-
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Christian and as forcing women to work and abandon their children.”71 In addition to their 
arguments about their religious rights, they often underscored their assertions about gender, 
the family, and religious rights with arguments about German reunification. On 24 August 
1954, for example, at a “Justice Conversation Evening” in Reichenbach, attendees objected 
to the notion “that caring for children is the law, rather this is the natural right [emphasis 
original] of parents.”72 They defended this idea on the grounds that “this formulation has a 
meaningful pan-German character,” because Article 6 of the West German Basic Law 
guaranteed that caring for children was a natural right.73 They invoked the West to 
undermine the SED’s position.  
Picking up on the unrest of their parishioners, the governing body of the Eastern 
churches, the Ecclesiastical Eastern Conference of the Protestant Church in Germany 
(Kirchliche Ostkonferenz der Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, KO-EKD), issued an 
official opinion to the Ministry of Justice on 1 September 1954. Their statement employed a 
distinct rhetorical change from an earlier Synod resolution, which had emphasized namely 
that in Christianity, “marriage and parenthood are endowed by God.”74 Now, the 
Ecclesiastical Eastern Conference added another compelling reason to stymie the FGB: the 
parallel developments in the West. They called for the SED to halt the passage of the law on 
the basis that it was creating “an artificial cleft in cultural cohesion.”75 The law, they 
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asserted, must be considered for and by all Germans, especially in the case of future 
reconciliation.76 With such arguments, the Ecclesiastical Eastern Conference simultaneously 
appropriated the SED’s own rhetoric about desiring a unified Germany while criticizing the 
East German government’s efforts to keep their nation divided on the basis of marriage, 
family, and culture. 
The EKD disseminated its message that the new FGB endangered both Christian 
beliefs and all-German unity in its weekly newsletter DIE KIRCHE. An unsigned article from 
26 September 1954 titled “About Marriage and Family” noted the similarities between the 
equality and family protection clauses of the East German constitution and the West German 
Basic Law. Furthermore, the author argued that “divergent developments in this area in the 
still separated parts of Germany would only lead to deep regret.”77 The article encouraged 
readers to follow the official church opinion issued a few weeks before, which said to avoid 
anything that created “an artificial rift in unified German cultural relations.”78 The author 
then went on to explain the dogmatic reasons why the Protestant Churches could not support 
the FGB: that it opposed the Christian idea that marriage came from God and that parents had 
the right to raise the children in the church (not under socialist indoctrination). It ended by 
stating that “the overwhelming majority of the German population in East and West belong 
to a Christian church,” reminding readers that their strength lie in numbers and that they 
belonged to a unified Christian community in spite of the Iron Curtain.79 
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Protestants in the GDR clearly took this call seriously, because their petitions flowed 
into the Ministry of Justice between September 1954 and February 1955. Some clearly stated 
their stance. In January 1955, for example, a pastor from Schulzendorf, Brandenburg, argued 
that the Ministry should not pass the law, because “what aggravates a reunification of 
Germany it is to be avoided on all sides.”80 Others wrote to express agreement with the 
EKD’s official opinion from 1 September 1954, without overtly mentioning the point that the 
law might hinder German reunification.81 Still, the local churches’ express agreement with 
the opinion piece signaled implicit support for all of the EKD leadership’s arguments against 
the FGB. In addition, the Ministry received petitions from parishes around the GDR simply 
stating that they and their fellow parishioners opposed the law.82 Yet others played up their 
commitment to the goals of the GDR, perhaps in an attempt to gain the SED’s favor. One 
Protestant men’s group in Auerbach assured the participants of their public forum that they 
supported “the struggle for German unity, the prevention of the remilitarization of West 
Germany, and the retention of peace,” in spite of their opposition to the FGB.83 
For some protestors, Christian belief and legal unity were indivisible. For instance, at 
an illegal meeting of a Protestant congregation in Bautzen on 8 November 1954, the pastor 
spoke to approximately 450 participants about the issue of “legal unity (Rechtseinheit) 
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between East and West.”84 He observed that both states had made a mutual commitment to 
Gleichberechtigung in 1949, yet neither side had passed new legislation, though the GDR 
was close to doing so. He then stated that “the church must reject it, that separate laws will be 
made and that only family relations will be regulated in the GDR.”85 Finally, he asserted that: 
“Legal unity and legal security are holy and where they are split, there the Bible and belief in 
God are much holier than the law.”86 He not only condemned the SED for deepening the rift 
between East and West on a legal basis, but a spiritual one. He called on Christians to pursue 
another form of dissent by honoring God’s law above the man-made laws of the regime.  
Although the majority of the petitions came from Protestant ministers and their 
parishes, the Catholic Church formally opposed the new Family Code as well. On 28 August 
1954, the Catholic bishop of Berlin, Wilhelm Weskamm, wrote to Otto Grotewohl, the 
Minister-President (prime minister) of the GDR, on behalf of the other Catholic bishops in 
the East.87 Weskamm did not mention the developments in the FRG, but was nevertheless 
highly critical of the SED. Calling the FGB “very radical and momentous,” he critiqued the 
law’s intervention in family life.88 He also stated that the law had “only an economic-social 
function” and as such, “abused the natural order that basically assigns married women and 
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mothers their places within the family.”89 Moreover, he asserted, it moved family life “into 
the state’s sphere of power without allowing human figures space for their peculiarities.”90 
Weskamm’s arguments emphasized Catholic dogma and protection of the private sphere 
from state (especially Communist) intervention. Unlike his Protestant counterparts, he 
avoided any mention of the West, but other Catholics alluded to its specter in their petitions. 
In January 1955, for instance, the priest of the Catholic Church in Limbach-Oberfrohna, 
Saxony, wrote to the SED to express concern that “this legislative draft poses a new obstacle 
for all of us who have longed for a reunified Germany.”91 
Although the Catholic Church opposed the new Family Code on the basis of dogma 
and reunification, its impact on the SED was largely inconsequential. Historian Konrad H. 
Jarausch suggests that in the GDR, “There were too few Catholics to have any political 
impact,” which was part of it.92 Compared to Protestants, who comprised roughly eighty 
percent of the GDR’s population in the 1950s, Catholics were only about twelve percent of 
the population.93 Another historian, Donna Harsch, asserts that the Catholic Church never 
mobilized at the grassroots level like the Protestant parishes.94 Both factors contributed to the 
Church’s relatively minor role and SED’s general negligence of the Catholic Church. After 
all, the SED had not sought out the Catholic leadership for an opinion on the law the way it 
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had the Protestant churches. In one letter responding to the EKD and Catholic opinion pieces, 
Benjamin referred to the Protestant Church leadership’s abrupt change of heart from its 
earlier positive position. She only added in Catholics as an afterthought, indicating that she 
was more concerned about the Protestant majority.95 Protestants had the numbers and a 
different set of strategies to rile up Benjamin and the SED in a way that Catholics did not. 
Benjamin’s consternation over the Protestants and not the Catholics indicated that she 
knew from early on that she was facing a formidable opponent. In fact, within a few days of 
the issuance of the EKD’s Stellungnahme, the SED drew up an anonymous report responding 
to the churches. The report lamented that the church leadership had many possibilities to 
critique the law’s provisions or offer proposals. The SED might have been open to these 
suggestions, because “one can make do with a short explanation.”96 Instead, the author 
expressed indignation that the churches chose to point out the consequences for reunification. 
He or she stated:  
Such a step can lead to very difficult outer and inner shame in our people, who are so 
strong in family ties, despite political division. The church must expect, that 
everything [in the law] that can deepen the cleft between both parts of Germany is 
omitted. We strongly see this hazard as a given.97  
 
The dogmatic rifts between Communism and Christianity—namely the aforementioned issue 
of state intervention in the family and childrearing—did not appear to cause the writer much 
concern. Nor would have proposals for new provisions. Despite his or her clear annoyance 
with the EKD, the author conferred a certain amount of respect on the church leadership for 
pointing out the issue of a divided Germany, stating, “In conclusion it is indeed not 
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unimportant, but also does not come directly in the central question.”98 The best way that the 
SED could momentarily brush off the criticism of the churches was to claim that 
reunification was not much of an issue. The SED’s sudden reluctance to discuss unity 
conflicted with the party’s explicit emphasis on the pan-German significance of the law since 
its introduction. 
 
Western Opposition 
The SED’s anxieties about internal dissent were furthermore compounded by the 
perceived developments in the West. As shown in the last chapter, the Federal Republic, at 
the time, was in the midst of formulating its own reforms to family law, of which Hilde 
Benjamin and the East German Ministry of Justice were well aware. In fact, in August 1954, 
Benjamin and the West German Minister of Justice, Fritz Neumayer (FDP) engaged in a 
brief tussle, which ended when Neumayer issued a press release condemning Benjamin and 
the FGB for only deepening the divide between West and East through its thorough societal 
restructuring.99 The SED seized the opportunity to declare Neumayer the divisive one on the 
pages of its newspapers Berliner Zeitung and Neues Deutschland, as well as the Christian 
Democratic organ Neue Zeit, but the damage was done.100 Aware that Neumayer’s rejection 
would incite problems in the public forums, Benjamin warned the courts and regional justice 
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administrations to emphasize the importance of “the implementation of the principle of 
equality in all of Germany and that it serves the fight for unity and stabilization of peace.”101 
The West’s rejection of the SED’s Family Code signified more than just ideological 
disagreements over the status of women and the family. It represented the fact that the West 
would not legitimize the East’s existence by engaging with its political leaders and foremost 
legal experts on the topic of family law. 
The problem of the West’s reforms continued to haunt Benjamin. For example, on 5 
October 1954, Hilde Benjamin wrote to Anton Plenikowski, then in charge of the State 
Administration department of the SED Central Committee.102 Her letter, citing information 
from Wilhelm Karl Gerst, a West German Communist and journalist, indicated some 
apprehension that the West German Bundestag would pass its own family law reforms before 
East and West German jurists had a chance to meet to discuss the laws.103 The press release 
that accompanied her letter portrayed the West as uncooperative and preventing its own 
citizens from discussing the laws, stating that:  
Neither the rejection of the Bonn Minister of Justice Neumeier [sic] to meet with the 
Justice Minister of the GDR, Dr. Benjamin, nor the lies and attempts at destruction 
can prevent [the fact] that numerous citizens and jurists in West Germany recognize 
the meaning of the draft and were prepared [to join] the pan-German conversation in 
the area of law in the manifestation of its different forms.104 
 
The language of the press release relied on the image of willing and eager West Germans to 
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depict the West German government as the problem. The letter, however, demonstrated that 
Benjamin saw herself in a bind. If the West went forward with its reforms and completely 
ignored the East, then the GDR would appear as a failure. 
 The Ministry of Justice paused to take stock of the public forums and protests in 
August and October 1954. According to a circular (Rundschreiben), sent by Hilde Benjamin 
to the leaders of the local justice ministries and court directors on 27 August 1954, the 
purpose of the meeting was to “formulate a final version of the draft from the opinions of the 
colleagues of justice administrations, especially judges.”105 In addition, their report 
acknowledged the ambivalence of East German citizens. On the one hand, the Ministry 
praised the public for its positive reactions to the laws. In their October report, the Ministry 
lauded East Germans for recognizing “that there can be no democracy in the state … if the 
subordination of women in the family and the marital principle ‘he should be your patriarch’ 
are not eliminated.”106 Furthermore, the public found “decisive agreement” on the preamble 
of the Family Code, which defined the aims of the new law.107 They also largely agreed on 
issues such as the removal of the Stichentscheid and reforms to marital property law.108 
On the other hand, the public forums had exposed the SED to direct criticisms from 
their citizens. In their correspondence, when reproached, Ministry representatives bristled 
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and did not hesitate to tell writers they were wrong.109 In their internal meetings, the Ministry 
of Justice dismissed most of these critiques as the consequence of “misunderstandings and 
unrecognition of the law and an insufficient understanding of its practical effects.”110 
Moreover, they blamed the Western press for propagating “incomprehension and insufficient 
explanation of definitions.”111 Among some of the misunderstood issues that the Ministry 
identified were the legal marrying age, the process of the marriage ceremony, prohibitions on 
marriage, the right of spouses to live separately, and naming rights.112 Criticism from the 
public only pushed the SED to further clarify their goals for the law and to get the speakers to 
express “not only their personal opinions but rather the unified position of the judges.”113 
Obtaining unity among their own cadres, however, sometimes proved difficult for the 
SED. In September 1954, for instance, a representative of the Halle Ministry of the Interior 
wrote to the Ministry of Justice to propose revisions to the provisions on legitimation of 
children, defining illegitimacy, and handling civil marriage ceremonies.114 In a report from 
the Leipzig district administration (Bezirksverwaltung), another functionary explained that 
the citizens were most interested in the marriage allowance of men and family names.115 The 
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colleague from Erfurt called for clarity on issues such as declaration of death (especially for 
those remarrying) and alimony.116 In October 1954, the leader of the district administration 
of Dresden wrote to the Ministry with a long list of proposals for the forthcoming law. He 
prioritized the common family name above individual names, for instance.117 These regional-
level functionaries communicated the desires of their constituents, but to the effect of 
demonstrating further disunity among party leaders, which is precisely what Benjamin and 
other higher officials hoped to avoid. 
Furthermore, the SED faced opposition from the West, in particular its Protestant 
church leaders. On 20 November 1954, Gustav Heinemann penned a letter to Otto 
Grotewohl, the Minister-President of the GDR. Heinemann, born in 1899, had gotten a law 
degree, joined the anti-Nazi Confessing Church during the Third Reich, and eventually 
became mayor of Essen under the British occupation. After 1949, he became leader of the 
Synod of the Protestant Church in Germany.118  He wrote: “For every German, who doesn’t 
want to give up hope of the reunification of our people […] from this perspective of pan-
German responsibility, allow me to ask you, Mr. Minister-President, to impede on the 
initiated changes to family law in the GDR.”119 He furthermore argued that the GDR’s 
reforms would “intervene in the personal relations” of their citizens and disrupt the “basis of 
order that was already valid in Germany and will be continued in its Western part.”120 This 
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order was, as West German women’s rights activists alleged, the continuation of the old, 
bourgeois, and patriarchal Civil Code. As the leader of the EKD, which at the time was 
structurally unified with the West, Heinemann’s words carried extra weight. While based in 
the West, his reach extended to the East. When he wrote to Grotewohl, indicting the GDR for 
deepening the rift between the two Germanys on the basis of women and the family, he did 
so as a representative of German Christian interests, but one that the SED could not touch. 
 The petitions and public forums, the protests of East German churches, the rejection 
of the Western government, and the intervention of West German religious leaders shook 
Benjamin and other Ministry of Justice officials. In November 1954, the ruling party closed 
discussion of the FGB. In January and again in April 1955, Benjamin forwarded petitions 
from the churches to Erich Mielke, then lieutenant-general (second-in-command) of the 
Stasi.121 Her letters did not explicitly ask the secret police to watch and inform on church 
members, but it might be inferred that this was her intent. While it is not obvious exactly 
which routes the Stasi pursued to observe the leaders and members of the protesting 
churches, it is more obvious what conclusions they drew. In 1956, the Stasi produced an 
internal report chronicling its activities between 1 September 1954 (the same date the EKD 
issued its opinion piece) and 1 September 1955. The report labeled the churches’ work as 
representative of “the policy of aggression” of the West.122 In particular, the author singled 
out Otto Dibelius, a leading Protestant bishop in Berlin, for “opposing the democratic 
institutions of our republic [...] against the regulations of our government, for example 
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against the Law of Equal Rights of Women, against the youth confirmation, against the 
family law, etc.”123 The Stasi’s report ultimately blamed the West for the churches’ rebellion 
over women’s legal rights and the family. 
 This section has shown that civil unrest in the GDR over family law reforms deeply 
unsettled the SED, leading the ruling party to abandon the reforms. The regime initially 
seemed willing to respond to and negotiate with citizens over parts of the law. What, then, 
halted the SED in their path?  I have argued here that citizens’ protests were one major factor. 
An even greater factor were the churches—long the perceived enemy of the SED—
succeeded largely because they appropriated the ruling party’s rhetoric about German 
reunification as a way of criticizing the state.124 During the 1950s, Germans on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain considered reunification to be one of the most significant issues facing them, 
especially because they yearned to reunite their families.125 By constructing the SED as the 
foremost destroyer of German unity, the churches struck at a vulnerable point of the party. 
Moreover, the churches remained structurally unified with their Western counterparts, a 
factor that made the churches all that more dangerous to the SED. The vocal opposition of 
Western church leaders and politicians only exacerbated the issue. As a result, the SED 
retreated and did not broach the reforms for another decade, suggesting, as historian Jürgen 
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Kocka has stated, that “the dictatorship’s rule was more limited than assumed by theories of 
totalitarianism.”126 
 
 
Incremental Steps Toward Approving the 1965 Family Code 
 The disappearance of the Family Code did not escape public notice. Throughout 1955 
and early 1956, the SED still received petitions and letters from East Germans inquiring 
about the status of the law. One woman pleaded that “many people await the resolution,” but 
the Ministry’s reply that the law was under further review did not assuage her concerns.127 
Those who wrote with explanations of personal problems typically received more detailed 
responses, but were nevertheless stuck in limbo until a new law passed.128 The SED also 
continued to receive petitions from individual churches.129 Some expressed skepticism of the 
regime’s attempts to respond to individual petitions. In early 1956, one writer noted that the 
Ministry of Justice had recently passed a decree on marriage and divorce processes, but he 
wondered “if and how far [his] contribution to the discussion about the restructuring of 
family law was evaluated and found resonance.”130 
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 The SED’s muted propagation of the Family Code in 1955 coincided with major 
changes in economic and foreign policy that unintentionally had consequences for the law. 
West Germany earned its sovereignty from the Western occupation powers, rearmed itself, 
and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955.131 In response, in May 
1955, the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s answer to NATO, and formed its 
own National People’s Army (already in the works from 1950 with the introduction of the 
Volkspolizei). The Soviet Union proclaimed the GDR a sovereign state on 20 September 
1955. The declaration of sovereignty by the USSR represented an important shift in GDR-
USSR relations. The nominal regression of Soviet influence meant that Allied Control 
Council laws no longer had to be enforced, although the USSR still required consultation 
about overturning the legislation.  
Leading GDR government officials like Hilde Benjamin took advantage of the 
dissolution of the Allied Control Council laws. Unable to make the Family Code the SED’s 
priority or overcome public discontent with the proposed reforms, she aimed for partial 
solutions. With the permission of the Soviet Union, the SED sought to replace the 1946 
Kontrollratsgesetz.132 Benjamin, reflecting on this decision later, stated that the GDR simply 
“needed legal definitions for divorce.”133 On 24 November 1955, the Ministry released the 
“Decree on Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage (Verordnung über Eheschließung und 
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Eheauflösung).”134 The decree established that men and women could marry at the age of 
eighteen. Bigamy, incest/adoptive relations, and marrying disabled persons were prohibited. 
Marriages could be dissolved by death. If a spouse declared dead reappeared, the remarried 
spouse could only honor the earlier vows once the second marriage was divorced. Divorce 
could also be granted “for serious reasons” and if “the marriage had lost its purpose for the 
spouses, children, and society.”135 Courts got to decide who would have custody of the 
children. Divorced partners could revert to their former names. If one was unable to support 
him- or herself, the other was obligated to provide alimony for a limited period of time. On 7 
February 1956, the Ministry of Justice updated the previous year’s Verordnung with the new 
“Directive to the Adaptation of the Regulations on the Process in Matters of Marriage in the 
Order on Marriage and Divorce – Marriage Process Order.”136  
 Additionally, on 29 November 1956, the Ministry of Justice followed up by issuing a 
decree defining the rules of adoption of children. The goal of the order was to unite differing 
interpretations of the rules of adoption and “ease and promote the adoption of a child.”137 The 
decree ordered that children had to be a minor and their adoptive parents over the age of 
majority. The adoption contract had to be approved by the local education department 
(Abteilung Volksbildung). Adoptions could only go through with the willing consent of the 
other marital partner. Except for special circumstances, the child would take its adoptive 
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parents’ names. The child would have equal rights with its siblings and relatives. If for some 
reason the parents’ circumstances came to endanger the child’s welfare, the courts could 
intervene and rule on the matter.138 The divorce and adoption decrees signaled incremental 
steps toward regulating more pressing aspects of family law in the mid-1950s. 
Even with the 1955 and 1956 decrees on the books, the Family Code did not 
disappear from the Ministry’s agenda. Historians such as Donna Harsch and Elizabeth 
Heineman have suggested that the reforms simply disappeared and later reappeared in other 
decrees.139 Historian Gesine Obertreis similarly claims that the 1955 decree silenced the 
matter until the 1963 Parteitag.140 I argue that the matter is more complicated than that. The 
decrees issued did cover many of the major issues the SED hoped to address (like divorce 
regulations), but the party still aimed to overturn the Civil Code as a sign of its radical social 
restructuring. Prompted by a request by Walter Ulbricht at the Fifth Party Congress in 1958, 
the Ministry’s officials still produced several new drafts of the Family Code and circulated 
them among the various other ministries of the government.141 According to Benjamin, the 
Politbüro ordered her to complete the reforms and send them to the Volkskammer, a sign that 
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the SED leaders were prepared to pass the new law.142 The new drafts were reviewed and 
produced by a group of academics under the guidance of Benjamin, who then circulated their 
recommendations among the other governmental ministries.143  
For the most part, the other ministries had few complaints, but they nevertheless 
offered criticisms. In May 1958, for instance, the leader of the Department of Internal Affairs 
proposed that the Ministry allow any child born during a marriage—regardless of whether 
the parents separated or if the father was declared dead before the child was born—to be 
considered legitimate. He cited the unfairness of the BGB’s discrimination against 
illegitimate children.144 Incidentally, the constitution and the 1950 Mutterschutzgesetz 
awarded legitimate and out-of-wedlock children the same status, but he implied that more 
needed to be done in this area. Meanwhile, Richard Dombrowsky, the leader of the 
Volkspolizei, expressed concerns about name changes, citing potential fraud as a reason. He 
wrote in May 1958 that it must be required by law to register with the police when a name is 
changed and “it is solely about the question of marriage under a false name and how far 
under the oversight of §10 a rule will be made.”145 Finally, another cadre wrote in December 
1958 that the law needed further revisions to make it “more comprehensible and 
corresponding to our socialist conditions.”146 The East German media reported on the 
internal reviews of the law as well, keeping the public in the loop on important Ministry 
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decisions about parental custody, adoption rights, declaration of paternity, and property 
rights.147  
Their internal discussions also reflected that government officials were contending 
with the problem of the West. The ongoing Bundestag committee debates in 195556 and the 
subsequent approval of the Equal Rights Act in the FRG in 1957 presented a new set of 
problems for Benjamin and the Ministry of Justice. At this point, with the division of family 
law realized, and not by their own doing, the SED and the Ministry of Justice had to 
reconsider their position and language. For instance, Benjamin noted in a letter to Karl 
Maron, the Minister of the Interior, on 30 April 1958, that the “existence of two sovereign 
states in the territory of Germany” posed “the question of [if] the applicability of West 
German law must be regulated the same way as the relationship of laws to other states.”148 
She further asserted that the laws were incompatible, as the GDR did not uphold 
discrimination based on race, sex, or religion, like “capitalist societies.”149 
In response, by 1959, the Ministry of Justice had made further attempts to prioritize 
the Family Code. The Politbüro, for its part, issued a formal resolution to pass the Family 
Code, its introductory act, and the “Code of Procedure for Families 
(Familienprozessordnung).”150 The latter especially occupied the attention of Benjamin at 
this point in time. The introduction of a new Seven-Year Plan in 1959 accelerated 
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agricultural collectivization and nationalization of key industries, which led to a spike in 
defections.151 The increasing numbers of East Germans heading westward forced Benjamin 
and the Ministry of Justice to confront a brutal reality: that their citizens and their families 
were divided. They had to readdress their earlier stance that West German family law was 
illegitimate and incompatible. In response, they needed to provide “clear boundaries of the 
responsibility of the courts of the GDR and the West German courts.”152 The “Code of 
Procedure for Families” determined that East German courts could adjudicate all matters 
related to the family, even if the other party resided in West Germany or West Berlin.153 For 
example, there was the matter of support for children and “easing the execution of 
requirements against the party liable for alimony in the Western zone or West Berlin.”154 
This decree was one step toward addressing one of the fundamental quandaries facing the 
Ministry of Justice and East German judges.  
The dilemma of adjudication across borders was short-lived, although contemporaries 
could not have foreseen the possibility that East Germany would close off its borders 
entirely. In 1952, East German officials had formally closed the German-German border, 
making it more difficult, but not impossible, for their citizens to flee. The special status of 
Berlin, however, meant that East Germans could still escape to the West there. By 1956, 
defections to the West had risen significantly. On 12 August 1961, Walter Ulbricht signed 
the order to close off East Berlin from the West via the Berlin Wall. This move divided 
families, halted East Berliners from going to work in the West, and stopped the refugee 
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drainage to the West. With very limited numbers of East Germans crossing the border after 
1961, the Ministry officials’ and judges’ concerns about implementation of any procedures 
concerning marriage or families diminished. 
 It was not until 1963 that the SED finally revived the subject of the long abandoned 
Family Code. Most contemporaries later credited the renewed interest in the Family Code to 
Walter Ulbricht’s speech at the VI. SED Party Congress, held 15-21 January 1963. This 
Party Congress was particularly significant because it was the meeting at which Ulbricht 
introduced the New Economic System (NES) to the GDR. The New Economic System set 
aside the Five-Year Plans and “deemphasized central planning and placed more power in the 
associations (VVB) of socialized industries (VEB).”155 In addition to economic reforms, 
Ulbricht insisted that it was “urgent to improve the legal standards, which rule the economic-
organizational and cultural-educational activity of the state and economic organs…new legal 
codes for civil, criminal, and family law will be developed.”156 The Ministers’ Council 
followed up on Ulbricht’s proposal in April 1963 with a resolution and formed a commission 
to draft a new family law in October 1963.157 
 The new commission began its work in January 1964. It was headed by Benjamin and 
comprised of members of the government, mass organizations, academics, and “members of 
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the collectives of the workers.”158 In a concerted effort to demonstrate equality, the 
Ministers’ Council insisted the committee contain equal numbers of men and women.159 
According to a report by the Ministers’ Council in May 1964, the ongoing discussions by the 
commission were proceeding apace.160 Their progress ended in October 1964, however, 
when the Ministry of Justice’s Women’s Working Group and its department of State and 
Law intervened and issued an opinion piece that asked the SED not to pass the new law yet. 
The opinion piece stated that the law did not go far enough in “delivering and stabilizing 
marital and familial relationships and the further development of socialist conduct and 
lifestyle.”161 They wanted the draft to explain in more detail what the family meant for 
socialism and especially raising the next generation under socialism. Accordingly, the 
working group argued that the draft focused too much on Gleichberechtigung of women and 
not enough on the family. In an even more drastic turn, the working group alleged that the 
draft did not “overcome the reflecting commercialization of family relations characteristic of 
bourgeois families and in bourgeois family law,” especially when it came to property law.162 
Finally, they attacked the language of the law, explaining that it was too juridical and 
difficult for average citizens to understand.163 
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 The opinion piece must have had some effect on the SED. The original plan to 
conduct a public discussion from October 1964 to January 1965 was postponed and the 
legislative drafts changed drastically between September and December 1964.164 On 18 
March 1965, the steering committee of the Ministers’ Council of the GDR approved and 
published the “final” draft of the new FGB. The resolution passed by the steering committee 
outlined specific guidelines for the conduct of the public discussions to come between April 
and July 1965.165 The discussions would be led by the National Front (the compendium of 
political parties in the GDR), the FDGB, the DFD, the Union of Democratic Jurists of 
Germany (Vereinigung Demokratischer Juristen Deutschlands), and the Society for the 
Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge (Gesellschaft zur Verbreitung wissenschaftlicher 
Kenntnisse), with help from social welfare organizations.166 Their aim was to educate the 
masses on the role of marriage and the family for all citizens (not only women) in their 
socialist society. The purpose of the discussions was to inform the public on the status of 
marriage and family law in West Germany.167 
Furthermore, the ruling party conspired to set up public discussions, much like it had 
in 1954.168 Like before, regionally-based jurists, judges, attorneys, and lawyers would be 
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briefed ahead of time on the FGB and its underlying sentiments.169 The Agitation 
Commission of the SED (its propaganda department) sent out special documents (the 
Ministers’ Council resolutions and a report on the family from the German Academy of 
Sciences) on the FGB to the chief editors of all the media organs.170 Special seminars would 
be held for lawyers in various locales around the GDR, so that they could lead the public 
forums. This time, however, the SED intended to keep tighter control on the forums. 
A month later, on 14 April 1965, the SED held an international press conference 
where it formally introduced the new FGB to the public. In her opening address, Hilde 
Benjamin observed that the struggle for a new family law had its roots in the antifascist 
sentiments of the immediate postwar period, especially because the Nazis had actively tried 
to destroy families with their racist rhetoric and policies.171 According to Benjamin, the new 
FGB would join the ranks of other labor laws, collectivized agriculture, and youth laws to 
complete the “unified socialist system.”172 She then outlined the importance of the law for 
women’s economic independence, stressing that unlike the capitalist laws that preceded the 
FGB, this law would provide job and educational opportunities without presuming conflicts 
between personal and public life.173 Finally, she emphasized the moral basis of the new law 
for raising children.174 
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Beyond the goals of the SED for the family in its socialist republic, Benjamin also 
acknowledged the significance of the competition with West Germany for a new family law. 
According to Benjamin, “such a law as we have here in this draft is neither imaginable under 
the circumstances in West Germany, nor under the present circumstances could a genuine 
discussion among the people be conducted.”175 She furthermore attacked the FRG’s recent 
policies toward women. She asserted, for example, that the West German conscription of 
women into the civil service would endanger the family and that despite CDU member 
Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt’s appointment as head of a Federal Ministry and the founding of the 
European Economic Community, West Germany was merely full of “empty promises.”176 
Finally, she credited the pronouncement of women’s rights as a Social Democratic goal at the 
1964 SPD Party Conference as a reaffirmation that the GDR was “an entire historical epoch 
ahead of the West in the area [of equality].”177 
Following Benjamin’s address, the SED opened the floor to questions by the press, 
notably non-German and non-Communist journalists. They asked: how progressive were 
East Germans compared to West Germans when it came to women’s rights? What do 
Christians have to say about the new law? Was it true, what the West German press said, that 
families would forfeit raising their children to the socialist state?178 Civil law expert Anita 
Grandke fielded their questions. Born in 1932, Grandke spent her formative years in the 
Soviet zone and the GDR. She studied law at the HU in the early 1950s and then wrote her 
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thesis on property law in a socialist state under the direction of Prof. Hans Nathan, who 
taught Civil and Family Law and Criminal Law at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. 
She later became professor of civil and family law at the HU herself. Grandke elucidated to 
the press the ways the GDR had outpaced the FRG in terms of sex equality. She proclaimed 
that the GDR’s law “took seriously the complete development of a woman’s personality,” 
allowed women to work, and gave men and women equal childrearing duties.179 In contrast, 
West German women by law could only seek employment if it was reconcilable with their 
duties as mothers and wives. Regarding the question about whether the state would take 
childrearing duties away, Grandke assured the press that the law was meant to “increase and 
further develop the parental influence in the development of spouses and before all the 
children.”180 Her colleague similarly refuted the claims by the Christian population that 
claimed socialism destroyed the family.181 According to him, Christians had fallen victim to 
anti-Communist propaganda; if one looked at the law, one would see that these claims were 
unsubstantiated.182  
 The following day, 15 April 1965, the East German press exploded with news about 
the new Family Code. Berliner Zeitung, Neue Zeit, and Neues Deutschland all printed articles 
and/or drafts of the new law.183 Historian Dagmar Herzog suggests that the GDR in the late 
1950s and early 1960 combined “a period of sexual conservativism” and “elements of 
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liberality,” which certainly applied to the Family Code.184 While the GDR’s Family Code 
may have outpaced the FRG in certain areas, such as divorce reform, the new legislation no 
doubt placed the heteronormative, dual-parent family model, childrearing, and mothers’ 
reproductive capabilities at its core. The law emphasized the “recognition and appreciation of 
the accomplishments associated with the birth, upbringing, and care of children.” 
Additionally, it proclaimed that the equality of men and women was vital to “the character of 
the family and the socialist society,” setting down in law that both spouses must support one 
another. Parents also had the right and duty to work closely with society to ensure a healthy 
upbringing for the children.185 The state, in turn, was obligated to help families.186 
 If anything, compared to earlier versions of the family law, the new Family Code put 
even more emphasis on establishing stable and long-lasting partnerships that would produce 
an abundance of children. The new provisions dictated that upon marriage, men and women 
over the age of 18 “establish a closed community for life, based on mutual love, attention, 
fidelity, understanding, trust, and selfless help.” The ability of the partner to do so was 
supposed to be assessed before marriage. It was expected that children would come out of the 
marriage. All ceremonies would be conducted at the magistrate’s office. Couples were free to 
take either spouse’s last name or keep their own, but the child must have one or both of the 
parents’ names—a stark change from earlier drafts that allowed couples to hyphenate or keep 
their own names. Bigamy, incest, or marriage to a disabled person were expressly prohibited. 
Spouses were encouraged to live together and run a household together—another key change 
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from the earlier 1950 and 1954 versions, which allowed spouses to live separately. Spouses 
had equal rights to legal representation of the other. Both parents had equal obligations to 
raise the children and contribute to the household. If one partner got a new job or decided to 
pursue further training, the other was expected to support him or her. Unemployed spouses’ 
domestic work was considered equal. Family members living outside the home and the 
property of children could be contributed to the support of the household. Property or income 
earned during the marriage became common property; property acquired beforehand was 
personal.187  
 The new law, despite its obvious promotion of marital harmony, necessarily had to 
address the end of marriage as well. Marriages were considered over in four circumstances: 
death, divorce, annulment, or if one spouse was declared dead. No-fault divorces were now 
permitted and the law did not designate a separation period for the couple. At the same time, 
divorce was still considered a grave matter and could only be completed “for serious 
reasons…when the marriage has lost its meaning for the spouses, children, and society.”188 
Divorce would be decided by a court, which would rule with the child’s best interests in 
mind. The court would decide which spouse would care for the children, after consultation 
with youth welfare services. Parents were obligated to not allow their personal disputes to 
interfere with their parental childrearing duties. After the divorce, spouses could revert to 
their former names. If one spouse fell ill, the other could take over parental responsibilities 
and support for an interim period. Marriages could be annulled in a court of law if conducted 
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under a forbidden circumstance (such as bigamy).189 Couples were clearly encouraged to stay 
together, and the new law mandated state intervention to assess post-marital life for both 
spouses and their children. 
 The new Family Code also highlighted that raising children, especially in the name of 
socialism, was a paramount goal of the SED-led government. State-run bureaus would help 
families provide for, raise, and educate their children. Youth welfare services could step in to 
help make important decisions if parents lived separately. Parents were obligated to make all 
decisions regarding children mutually, unless one fell ill and was unable to contribute. If the 
parents were not married at the time of birth, mothers were given sole responsibility for the 
child, though men were obligated to provide support. In the case of unwed parents, the father 
could either declare himself or be named the father by a court. Fathers were considered 
whoever had lain with the woman during the conception period, defined as one hundred and 
eighty one days. Children could be adopted with official approval.190 
 Finally, the new law defined who a relative or an in-law was by the degree of their 
relation to the family. The socialist state would provide support for ailing citizens, but those 
in the direct line (parents or grandparents) could request support from their relations. 
Grandparents were only required to support grandchildren if the parents were unable to 
support the underage child. In the fifth part, custody of children without parental care was 
determined by the youth welfare services. In most cases, custody would go to the next of kin, 
but if no one was able, another would be chosen based on “his or her characteristics and 
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relationship to the child.”191 If an adult was unable to care for him- or herself, he or she could 
be placed in the custody of another. The sixth and final part of the law defined the statute of 
limitations for alimony claims. 
The preamble of the 1965 Family Code explained the multiple reasons behind the 
provisions of the new Family Code. First and foremost, the SED considered the family as the 
“smallest cell of society” whence the building of socialism came. Socialism, the preamble 
reminded citizens, would free them from the “falsifications” of bourgeois society. The new 
Family Code would ensure “free creative work, comradely relations among people, the equal 
place of women in all areas of life and educational opportunities for all citizens.” The SED 
believed that “harmonious relationships in marriage and the family have a huge influence on 
the character building of the next generation and on the personal luck and life- and work 
happiness of the people.” The law’s emphasis on social organization with the family at the 
center would help the SED achieve these goals.192 
 Much like 1954, the SED spent the next several months conducting public forums to 
discuss the law. Documents from the Stasi archive indicate that this time around, the SED 
kept a closer eye on the development and running of these discussions.193 Corroborating 
reports, recorded biweekly, from the Bundesarchiv confirms that the SED took careful notes 
on the participants. By July 1965, more than 400,000 East Germans had attended the public 
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forums—more than the entire total of the discussions a decade earlier.194 The SED tracked 
which issues concerned Germans the most, discovering that the majority of their questions 
were about contracting a marriage (Eheschließung), marital property, divorce, the basic 
principles of the law, and miscellaneous issues (such as procedural law).195 
 It was also during this time that other political parties and mass organizations in the 
GDR offered up their opinions and official endorsements of the law. The Free German Trade 
Union Confederation (Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB) praised the law as a 
“convincing manifestation of socialist democracy in the GDR” and committed the 
participation of trade unions to the public discussions.196 The Liberal Democratic Party of 
Germany (Liberal-demokratische Partei Deutschlands, LDPD) stated that the FGB’s 
“fundamentals and definitions” supported the “efficacy over the last twenty years of our new 
socialist social order.”197 The East CDU expressed overwhelming support for the draft as 
well. Their official Stellungnahme compared the goals of the GDR with a papal encyclical 
that declared the family the central cell of society, and proclaimed that the draft was quite 
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reconcilable with Christianity.198 Finally, in September 1965, the DFD confirmed its 
overwhelming support for the new legislation.199 
Some members of the National Front professed their support for the law because of 
its potential to combat Western influence—language that certainly appealed to SED 
leadership. According to National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) deputy chairman 
Heinrich Homann, the 24,000-plus party members who gathered to discuss the law supported 
it as a form of resistance against the “antinational and anti-humanitarian crisis dictatorship of 
West Germany.”200 LDPD member Gerhard Lindner argued that the East German FGB 
would help fight the “state monopolistic capitalist-dictated living conditions.”201 Lindner 
furthermore selected quotations from the 1957 West German Gleichberechtigungsgesetz, 
such as the right of women to work only if it was reconcilable with household duties, as 
evidence of the regression of the FRG.202 Finally, the East CDU asserted, the FGB proved 
“the superiority of our socialist social order over the imperial West Germany.”203 
Despite their general affinity for the law’s goals, especially its anti-capitalist and anti-
Western bent, different parties in the National Front nevertheless maintained certain 
reservations about the law. The NDPD, for example, opposed the marrying age and held 
                                                 
198 Stellungnahme des Präsidiums des Hauptvorstandes der CDU zum Entwurf des Familiengesetzbuches, July 
1965, DP 2/1509, Bl. 75, BArch Berlin. 
199 Stellungnahme des DFD zum Entwurf des Familiengesetzbuches, September 2, 1965, DY 31/1019, Bl. 32-
36, BArch Berlin. 
200 Homann an die Vorsitzende der zentralen Kommission, July 31, 1965, DP 1/23791, BArch Berlin. 
201 Lindner an LDPD Zentralvorstand, May 1965, L4-126, Bl. 81, Archiv des Liberalismus-Gummersbach. 
202 Ibid., Bl. 83. 
203 Stellungnahme des Präsidiums des Hauptvorstandes der CDU zum Entwurf des Familiengesetzbuches, July 
1965, DP 2/1509, Bl. 79, BArch Berlin. 
364 
 
differing views on marital property.204 The LDPD pointed out that “absolute equality” of men 
and women might interfere with other laws on the books, such as the Hausarbeitstag.205 The 
East CDU relayed a few points that had been raised in public forums, namely reinstating an 
engagement period, naming rights, and recognition of unpaid labor in the home.206 The other 
major parties did not openly resist the SED’s proposed legislation, but they did offer subtle 
critiques of its provisions. 
 The CDU’s official endorsement of the FGB did not necessarily reflect the views of 
all the Christians they represented. As they had in 1954, church leaders rose up against the 
FGB. In April 1965, Alfred Bengsch, the Catholic archbishop of Berlin, wrote on behalf of 
the Catholic bishops and bishop commissioners to Willi Stoph, the Prime Minister of the 
GDR and a leading member of the SED, to express their reluctance about the new law.207 
Bengsch stated: “The overall tendencies of this draft…allows the recognition of a worldview 
constriction in the sense of the primacy of Marxism-Leninism, which as a binding law is 
impermissible for all citizens.”208 Much like the Catholic Church leadership had done in 
1954, Bengsch argued that the new law replaced the “intimate space of the family” with 
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atheistic state intervention.209 Much like the earlier period, Catholic leaders protested on 
behalf of their citizens. Furthermore, Bengsch’s letter focused primarily on the goals of 
Christians to raise their children a particular way, indicating that other potential arguments 
(such as reunification) no longer carried the same weight as they had in 1954. 
Protestant leaders took a different tack than their Catholic counterparts. They formed 
committees and printed handouts for their members to use. One that caused the SED 
particular consternation was the “10 Questions” handout, which the church leadership 
encouraged its members to use as guidance for provoking public discussions.210 On 22 April 
1965, Hans-Jürgen Behm, head of the Protestant chancellery in East Berlin, sent out a list of 
ten provocative questions to the leaders of the member churches of the EKD. Some of the 
questions were direct critiques of the FGB, such as: “Is the term ‘socialist’…to be understood 
in the direction of a political-ideological objective and relationship of marriage and family? 
Can it be the ‘utmost task’ of Christian parents to raise their children for the building of 
socialism?” Others were less polemical in nature and aimed to elucidate confusing 
provisions, such as ascertaining who would make a decision if the spouses could not agree, 
or the role of the youth welfare services, which did not yet exist. The handouts clearly had an 
impact on lower-tier church leaders. A letter from a pastor from Schwarzenberg to the 
members of the Volkskammer echoed the language of the first question, asking them “to 
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explain the term ‘socialist’” and why the law had to be understood as “materialist and 
atheist.”211 
 The SED and especially the Stasi were alarmed by the handouts. By June 1965, the 
Stasi was keeping close watch on church leaders. Stasi informants reported that on 16 June 
1965, the leaders of the eight Landeskirchen planned to draft a letter to the government, 
though it never panned out. One member, Friedrich-Wilhelm Krummacher, the regional 
bishop of Pomerania, opposed such a step because it would weaken the churches’ positive 
assessment of the law.212 He furthermore argued that under the constitution, the churches had 
no rights to demand religious education, only worship, so their potential to intervene was 
weak. The only member of the meeting who appeared sympathetic to the SED was Moritz 
Minderheim, the regional bishop of Thüringia. According to the Stasi, Minderheim opposed 
passing out handouts or writing a formal petition because “in far-reaching Christian circles 
the Family Code will be affirmed,” meaning that he recognized that many churchgoers would 
not oppose the law.213  
 The SED conducted public discussions until 30 September 1965. According to the 
SED’s estimates, 752,671 citizens gathered in 33,973 locations to discuss the law, which 
coupled with readers’ and radio listeners’ letters, amounted to a total of 23,737 proposals for 
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the new law.214 As before in 1954, the proposals covered a wide range of opinions. Forums in 
Schleiz, Freital, and Lichtenberg in May 1965, for instance, garnered requests to up the legal 
marrying age to 21 and to allow men to press paternity suits in court.215 The legal right to 
change one’s name seemed pointless to some participants, because “all citizens are satisfied 
with the former regulation.”216 Participants in Erfurt asked if the draft prohibited combining 
marital property.217 The Intelligenz-Klub in Freital (an extension of the Kulturbund) inquired 
about the possibility of inheritance rights for out-of-wedlock children.218 Others wanted to 
know why the draft was appearing now.219 
 Throughout this period, the mass media and the women’s press in the GDR 
propagated the new legislation as well. The May 1965 issue of Für Dich featured an article 
on “intact marriages,” which explored the inner happiness of one Berlin couple, the Karls.220 
Their family was happy and she could pursue her career, Gisela Karl maintained, because her 
daughter, husband, and mother all pitched in around the home. In addition, in June 1965, the 
women’s magazine Für Dich published an article by Inge Lange, then the chairwoman of the 
Women’s Commission of the SED Central Committee, who told readers that if the GDR 
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wanted to accomplish full equality, then the onus was on men to change their expectations of 
marital life, fatherhood, and women’s employment.221 Finally, in July 1965, the same 
magazine printed a roundtable discussion with leading legal experts in the GDR, who 
focused on the parallel West German reforms as a way of fostering support for their own 
legislation. They called the West German Equal Rights Act “a farce” and stated that it 
reinforced the “three big K’s” and the regulations of the old Civil Code.222 Each of these 
publications delivered the same general message to readers: that the GDR’s reforms were 
incomparable and the best step toward changing social and economic disparities. 
 On 11 November 1965, the Ministers’ Council of the GDR issued their approval and 
sent the legislative draft to the Volkskammer, where in early December, various 
subcommittees met to finalize the draft of the Family Code. In support of the legislation, the 
Committee for Labor and Social Policy suggested supplementing the new Family Code with 
housing policies to encourage “child-abundant families,” better child-care facilities, better 
promotion opportunities for working women, and further aid for single parents.223 The 
Committee furthermore repeated in their meeting the SED’s desire to out-do the West. The 
chairman stated: “The sense is not—as in bourgeois family law—to establish an abundance 
of complicated juridical formulations for marriage, in which a conflict may occur…but rather 
a way of behavior for the people with the disposition for marriage, a responsibility that 
springs from a high moral position that the marriage has in a socialist society.”224 With this 
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statement, the chairman made a subtle critique of the West while lauding the new morality of 
the East. The committee acknowledged, however, the continuous conflict between the GDR 
and FRG, asking Benjamin to reiterate “how much bigger the interest must be, if West 
German women had such a law…the national meaning may not be abstract, but rather must 
be concretely defined.”225 
 The idea of a unified legal system reappeared in the discussions of the Constitutional 
and Legal Committee of the Volkskammer a few days later. At one point, Benjamin 
proclaimed: “One can justifiably say that it is an example for future German legislation,” 
unlike the Western version, which she argued “failed to regulate existing daily problems of 
the family” and deserved “to replace the BGB in museums.”226 Additionally, the idea of 
unification mitigated national unity and instead concerned unifying socialist law. When 
Benjamin spoke to her fellow parliamentarians, she emphasized family law as kin to the 
Legal Code of Labor, the Law for LPGs, and education law. It was a “deciding cornerstone 
in the construction of the institutions of [their] socialist law” in their “state development.”227 
In other words, she reiterated the idea of the new Family Code as progressive while the 
Western law was archaic. 
 In December 1965, the Volkskammer finally met to approve the new Family Code. 
Several themes characterized the session. One of the points Volkskammer representatives 
reiterated was the importance of the Family Code to the SED’s agenda for the GDR. In her 
address to the Volkskammer, Hilde Benjamin asserted that the new Family Code would 
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support the “economic and social development, [and] the unified socialist legal system,” in a 
state where “socialist production relations have prevailed…the lives of our population are 
richer, nicer, and more full of culture from year to year.”228 Furthermore, transforming the 
law necessitated abandoning the old BGB. Benjamin hailed the new law as “the first 
cohesive codification of family law. It overhauls the fourth book of the BGB, the old 
regulations of the family law of bourgeois society in Germany.”229 Sharing these sentiments, 
Roberta Gropper, the representative of the Committee for Work and Social Policy and 
DFD/FDGB member, stated that the new Family Code was important because it would 
expand women’s equality in the workplace to their families and had potential “for the 
development of a new, socialist moral.”230 Both comments made it clear that the SED saw 
the GDR’s economic changes as a triumph and could now turn its attention to social, legal, 
and moral transformations using the family as its vessel. 
 The transformation of the GDR’s family law with the aim of “building socialism” 
came about with a constant eye toward the West. Benjamin pointed out that the Western 
family law (passed in 1957) perpetuated the old capitalist and patriarchal structures of the 
BGB. The Western law “unilaterally restricts the lobby of the woman by means of the law 
and upholds the hegemony of men in the family.”231 Her colleague Ingeburg Lange took it a 
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step further, condemning the “men of the bourgeois monopoly in the Bonn cabinet, the 
ideologues of the CDU/CSU and their employees in the editorial and radio stations beyond 
the Elbe” for spreading false information about the new Family Code in the GDR.232 She 
moreover stated that the Family Code attracted “huge attention in the West German public 
sphere,” causing “West German families to compare our law with the West German reality 
and [they] can recognize, which state efforts exist for a healthy, stable family.”233 Finally, the 
language of unification came into force here again. Lange asserted that it was the 
“reactionary forces in West Germany that already destroy the division of Germany.”234 The 
members of the Volkskammer not only relied on comparison with the West to garner support 
for the new Family Code, but insisted that it was the West, not the East, that divided family 
law and disparaged women’s status in society. The law went into effect on 1 April 1966.  
 In the decade since the Family Code’s previous failure to pass, the SED pursued 
several paths toward a new family law. In 1955 and 1956, the Ministry of Justice created 
some decrees to regulate divorce and adoption. The Ministry also continued to discuss among 
its colleagues potential revisions to the Family Code, demonstrating that the issue never 
completely disappeared from the party’s agenda. Throughout the various levels of debate, the 
West loomed large in the SED’s language. The party’s emphasis on the West, however, was 
not merely rhetorical. The ever-tightening border control posed a physical obstacle for a 
regime that did not want to acknowledge its bourgeois, capitalist neighbor. Once the West 
passed its own law and the Berlin Wall went up, the SED no longer had to fret about the legal 
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situation of the family. The SED recognized the opportunity: they could implement an even 
more radical, more socialist, and less bourgeois version of the Family Code in 1965 because 
they no longer considered the West competition and their citizens could not escape as easily. 
Furthermore, the regime knew to circumvent opposition from churches. As a result, despite 
seemingly similar circumstances as in 1954, the SED had a much easier time passing the law 
in 1965. 
 
Reconstituting Women’s Equality in 1968  
 1968 marked the final turning point for the equal rights of men and women in the 
GDR. At the 1967 Party Congress, Walter Ulbricht proclaimed the need for a new 
constitution that accurately reflected the historical progression of the GDR since 1949. He 
appointed a commission in December 1967 to formulate a new constitution. On 9 April 1968, 
after weeks of public discussion and a plebiscite, the new constitution went into effect. The 
1968 constitution made a significant departure from the 1949 text. The earlier document had 
represented somewhat of a compromise for the SED between Sovietization and pursuing a 
“German road to socialism.” Thereafter, although the SED was in control of the state, it still 
put up a front of democratic pluralism. The 1968 document abandoned this façade. It 
formally designated the GDR “as simply ‘a socialist state of workers and farmers’.”235 It 
explicitly forbid democratic structures such as political parties (besides the SED and those in 
the National Front) and was far more Stalinist than its 1949 predecessor.236 
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 One area in which the Stalinist model was evident was the equal rights clause. In the 
1949 constitution, men and women were granted equal rights; marriage and the family were 
protected by the state; and unmarried mothers and their children received elevated legal 
statuses. The 1949 text’s treatment of women’s rights had represented a compromise between 
the Weimar and the 1936 Soviet constitutions. Article 20 of the 1968 version was much more 
reminiscent of the earlier Soviet document. The new clause promised: “Men and women are 
equal and have the same legal status in all areas of social, public (staatlich), and personal 
life. The promotion of women, especially in professional qualification, is a social and state 
goal.”237 At the same time, the 1968 constitution continued to uphold state protection of 
marriage and the family. The new text, however, qualified that it was the socialist state that 
protected mothers and children, promising “pregnancy leave, special medical care, and 
material and financial support will be granted through birth and child allowances 
(Kindergeld).”238  
 By and large, the East German media, especially the women’s press, propagated the 
new 1968 constitution’s expansion of equal rights for men and women as a positive 
development. One 1968 article in the women’s magazine Für Dich titled “Four Constitutions 
in a German Woman’s Life” detailed the different constitutions under which many women 
had lived in the past century. The article credited the 1949 GDR constitution with “forming 
new human relationships in society that come inherently from the manifestation of equal 
partnership in marriage.” The new constitution, however, would “ensure girls and women 
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equality at a higher level.”239 Another article in Für Dich proclaimed the new 1968 
constitution as “the dream of Clara Zetkin realized.”240 Finally, the same magazine printed 
readers’ letters praising the new equal rights clause. One writer declared her support for it 
because it guaranteed her “personal security,” while another argued that compared to the 
West, where “equality is just on paper,” the East had real equality.241 
 As this section has shown, SED leaders in the GDR were eager for their constitution 
to better reflect their established socialist state than the 1949 version. One key way they 
accomplished this goal was by making the equal rights clause even more expansive. The 
amended version of the constitution, approved in 1974, maintained the same language of the 
1968 constitution. The 1968/1974 constitutions thus assured men and women equality in this 
form until the demise of the GDR in 1990. The 1965 Family Code, apart from a minor 
change in 1975, remained intact as well, supporting the constitutional guarantee of protection 
of the family.  
 
Conclusion 
Several different political, economic, social, and cultural factors steered the path of 
the GDR toward a decidedly different Family Code in 1965. First, the 1954 and the 1965 
Family Codes broke with several legal and institutional norms present before 1953. The 
persecution of Communists under the Third Reich, the holdout of Christian conservatives in 
West Germany, and the strength of the Soviets in the early Cold War had emboldened the 
                                                 
239 “Vier Verfassungen im Leben Deutscher Frauen,” Für Dich, February 1968, 17-25. 
240 “Traum von Clara Zetkin verwirklicht,” Für Dich, February 1968, 2-3. 
241 “Die Diskussion ist im Gange,” Für Dich, February 1968, 15. 
375 
 
SED to change course on nearly every area of politics and society, including marriage and 
the family. The decision to “build socialism” in the early 1950s signaled the SED regime’s 
goal to formally dissolve its legal and institutional ties to pre-1945 Germany. In its internal 
party discussions and public forums, however, the SED confronted the social and political 
difficulties of breaking longstanding traditions. In 1954, these sentiments were strong enough 
to delay the ruling party’s reforms. Once the West adopted the Equal Rights Act in 1957 and 
Ulbricht ordered the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the SED was ready to 
completely abandon the old legal traditions and adopt a socialist family law that reflected the 
aims of the regime. Later on, in 1968, the SED bolstered these sentiments when they 
approved a new constitution that established a socialist republic, not a faux democracy, and 
recommitted themselves to women’s full equality with men in all areas of society, politics, 
and domestic life. 
Second, political factors played a significant role in shaping the 1965 Family Code. 
By the mid-1950s, the GDR was in effect a one-party dictatorship, albeit one that remained 
cognizant of its citizens’ approval and its international reputation, especially following the 17 
June 1953 uprisings. The regime’s desire to keep the peace in the GDR informed its decision 
to abandon family law reforms in the face of criticism from Christians. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, the regime worked tirelessly to quash subversion, undermining the work of 
churches, expanding secret police monitoring, and finally, constructing the Berlin Wall in 
1961 to prevent more citizens from leaving. When the SED finally debuted an updated 
Family Code in 1965, the regime was fully prepared to defend it at all costs. 
Third, economic factors continued to matter in family law reforms. By the late 1950s, 
the GDR faced a shortage of male workers, mostly because of westward migrations, and 
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called upon women of all backgrounds to fill in the gaps. By the early 1960s, Walter Ulbricht 
and the SED began to shift from focusing on a production-based to a more consumer-friendly 
socialist economy. They nevertheless continued to emphasize in their rhetoric how 
instrumental women were to the economy and that the GDR needed civil rights to 
accompany the economic rights it granted women. While the new Family Code set up a 
family model based on equal partnership, parental authority, and breadwinning, it did not 
overturn old expectations that women take on domestic duties and nurturing as primary roles 
as well. The new 1968 constitution, however, set the stage for the onset of the “welfare 
dictatorship” phase of East Germany’s development, which finally sought to ease employed 
married women’s burdens at home.242 
Fourth, cultural factors played a key role as well. Many East Germans, especially 
those in the Protestant and Catholic Churches, still believed that the parents and the family 
were the primary space for raising children. They rejected the notion of state intervention in 
marriage and the family. Initially, Christians’ protests were enough to prevent the SED from 
going forward with its reforms in 1954 as it had planned, setting the ruling party on a path of 
small, incremental reforms until the early 1960s. In the early 1960s, however, when the SED 
dictatorship was more established, the influence of Christians in the GDR had waned, and the 
German-German division was considered permanent, the ruling party was emboldened to 
move forward with more radical reforms. Still, its final legislation revealed that the ruling 
party still clung to the idea of marriage and nuclear families—albeit dual-earner families in 
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which husbands and wives, fathers and mothers were supposedly equal in their 
partnerships—as the basis of their socialist society. Even when the SED shifted emphasis 
from the old patriarchal family model to a more egalitarian one, they did not challenge the 
utility of the heteronormative nuclear family. 
Finally, the Cold War context continued to matter immensely in a number of different 
ways. First, in 1954, Protestants and Catholics resisted the SED regime’s reforms by 
employing language about the destruction of all-German unity. Second, the permeable 
(although increasingly less so) German-German borders in the mid-to-late 1950s posed 
particular logistical and legal issues regarding marriage, families, and divorce. Third, once 
the FRG passed its own reforms and the Berlin Wall went up, the SED was inspired to 
implement much more expansive reforms, because the regime no longer had to combat the 
problems of legal uncertainty or the mass exodus of citizens. In their official discourse, even 
until the late 1960s, the SED continued to laud the GDR’s egalitarian family policies while 
denigrating the Western male breadwinner/female homemaker family model. At the same 
time, in their internal discussions, it was evident that legal disunity unnerved the SED, who 
only really moved forward with far-reaching reforms once the West had passed its own 
legislation and the borders had been closed. Despite the ruling party’s proclamations, it never 
really let go of the West as it constructed its own version of a new, socialist Family Code. 
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CONCLUSION 
By the late 1960s, the state of married women’s civil rights in the two Germanys had 
changed dramatically. In the early 1970s, under pressure from society, East and West 
German politicians decided to revise marriage and family law again. In 1973, for instance, 
the West German Bundestag reviewed the initial draft of the “First Act for the Reform of 
Family Law” (Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts)—the successor to the 
1957 Equal Rights Act. The legislation, proposed by the government of Social Democratic 
Chancellor Willy Brandt—sympathetic to the cause as an illegitimate child raised by a single 
mother—strengthened the old law’s commitment to “spousal community;” allowed couples 
to decide which surname they preferred (as long as it was the same); made both spouses 
responsible for the household income; and no longer restricted married women’s right to 
employment.1 More significantly, the legislative draft introduced no-fault divorce and new 
regulations on filing and subsequent judicial procedures.2 In the Bundestag’s debate on 11 
December 1975, Social Democrats assured Christian conservatives that they did not intend to 
“ease or complicate divorce,” but rather to aid divorces with “emerging problems.”3 
Some Christian conservatives, such as Bundestag representative Paul Mikat (CDU), 
were already on board with the SPD. Born illegitimate to an unwed mother and raised  
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Catholic by his adoptive parents, Mikat became a theologian and jurist before entering the 
Bundestag.4 In the context of discussing reforms to divorce law, Mikat—in a surprising turn 
for a devout Catholic—agreed that allowing couples to divorce because of irreconcilable 
marital breakdown might be better for the children. Furthermore, he invoked the example of 
the GDR, where, he noted, divorce because of irreconcilable breakdown had been allowed 
for much longer.  Mikat’s allusion to the GDR’s divorce law was striking. In contrast to the 
political discourse in the early years of the FRG, his reference contained no animosity or 
denigration of the Communist dictatorship next door. In fact, he seemed to offer faint praise 
for the GDR’s foresight on divorce reforms two decades before the FRG. 
Although the GDR had introduced no-fault divorce and expanded women’s rights in 
other critical ways far beyond what West German women had in the 1950s and 1960s, East 
German women still struggled in their daily lives to be considered fully equal with men. In 
response, in 1975, the SED initiated reforms to the 1965 Family Code in the GDR. The 
“Introductory Act to the Civil Code of the German Democratic Republic” (Einführungsgesetz 
zum Zivilgesetzbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik) from 19 June 1975 altered 
some key passages, namely concerning inheritance and parental authority, in the 1965 
legislation. Furthermore, the new SED General Secretary and chairman of the Ministers’ 
Council of the GDR, Erich Honecker, began to introduce welfare measures in response to 
both women’s demands within the GDR and pressure from the Soviet Union to change 
course and help workers.5 By this point, the SED’s and many East Germans’ notions of the 
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ideal family and partnership had begun to change as they embraced single motherhood and 
more state aid for childrearing and reproduction under Honecker’s “welfare dictatorship.” 
Honecker and the SED accepted pro-natalist policies in order to restore the declining birth 
rate and assist their economic shifts toward consumerism.6 
By 1977, in both states, no-fault divorce, the freedom to reject the paternal surname, 
and the unconditional right of women to work outside the home were written into law. 
Unexpectedly, despite all the efforts of politicians in both Germanys, the two family laws in 
both states came closer to resembling each other than they ever had in the first two decades 
after World War II. Major political and economic changes within each state, as well as the 
recent easing of tensions between the two Germanys, the crowning achievement of Social 
Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt, in many ways facilitated these new reforms in the 
1970s. Throughout the late 1960s, Brandt had pursued his policy of Ostpolitik, aimed at 
easing tensions between the East and West.7 On 11 May 1973, the Bundestag finally 
approved the Basic Treaty, which formally established relations between the two Germanys. 
By 1975, when the “First Law” was under scrutiny by the Bundestag and the new 
Einführungsgesetz was approved in the GDR, the Cold War struggle that had for so long 
marked the discourse and decisions regarding marriage and family law in both Germanys 
was thawing. At the same time, East and West German politicians still accepted the existence 
of two different models of marital and family life in the postwar Germanys. 
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This moment of acceptance was a long time coming. My dissertation has sought to 
explain the interplay of several political, economic, and social factors that initially prevented 
and then facilitated the approval of two new, parallel marriage and family laws in East and 
West Germany in the first two decades after World War II. Other scholars have examined 
marriage and family law in both Germanys, but usually in only one state or the other without 
fully examining how the “entangled and demarcated” relationship of the two German states 
in the Cold War played into debates in politics, society, and the media over the new 
legislation. Using path dependency, I have shown that the tensions caused by the Cold War 
conflict alternately drove forward, and at times halted, the parallel reforms of marriage and 
family law in the 1950s and early 1960s.  
The changing ideas of marriage, divorce, parenthood, and the family in the FRG and 
the GDR can be mapped against the dramatically changing political, economic, and social 
circumstances surrounding the divided Germanys between 1945 and 1968. Initially, Germans 
after 1945 faced dire circumstances. In May 1945, Germany and most of Europe lay in ruins 
after World War II ravaged the European continent. Across Europe, contemporaries firmly 
believed that the traditional family was the cornerstone to rebuilding German and European 
societies.8 Although Germans’ desires to restore the family were in line with pan-European 
trends, Germany was exceptional because it was the only state in postwar Europe that shared 
a common legal tradition and history, but was divided by the forces of the Cold War.  
The victorious Allied Powers and the Germans under their control initially faced 
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similar sociological and demographic conditions in the immediate postwar environment, but 
the intensifying contest between the Soviets and the Western Allies ultimately placed each 
state on simultaneously different and yet similar paths regarding women’s rights in marriage 
and the family. According to contemporaries in both Germanys and Eastern and Western 
Europe, World War II had fundamentally changed gender roles. Indeed, in overwhelming 
numbers, women, especially those who were married with children, took on the double 
burden of childrearing and breadwinning while their husbands were away at war. In addition, 
the demographic imbalance—some 7 million more women than men—did not escape 
contemporaries’ attention. On top of that, there was the mass destruction of millions of 
homes, high rates of illegitimate births, and a massive refugee crisis comprised primarily of 
women and children. If men returned home from the front, they were shocked by their wives’ 
newfound independence and equally dismayed to discover that their mental and physical 
condition made them unemployable and undesirable. In response, divorce rates rose 
significantly in the very early postwar years and especially conservatives determined that the 
family was in crisis.  
Contemporaries became divided over the matter. Some of them in the Christian 
conservative parties and the Protestant and Catholic Churches spoke of masculinity in crisis 
and wanted to revert to a more traditional family model as outlined in the Civil Code to 
restore honor and authority to men. Others, especially female activists, Social Democrats, 
Communists, and some liberals, saw an opportunity to expand rights for married women in 
the postwar years, but they faced logistical and political obstacles from the beginning. The 
1946 Allied Control Council law, for instance, reinforced several regulations from the old 
Civil Code, thus imposing limitations on the rights of married women again. For the next two 
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decades, discussions about marriage and the family revolved around the rights of married 
women in the FRG and the GDR. What resulted were two competing models. In the East, the 
dual male/female earner and female caretaker family became an integral part of constructing 
a socialist state with a planned economy and an effectively one-party government led by 
Ulbricht and the SED. Ostensibly egalitarian, in practice, women often bore significantly 
more household duties than their partners. In the West, the male breadwinner/female 
homemaker—and since the 1960s its “modernized” version the female part-time worker—
family model was at the center of a semi-liberal, multi-party democratic state with a social 
market economy led by the pseudo-authoritarian, Christian conservative Adenauer 
administration.  
These competing models emerged in response to several economic, political, social, 
and legal changes over the course of the late 1940s and early 1950s. First, changing 
international relations between the two Germanys in the early Cold War fundamentally 
shaped the final forms of the new Equal Rights Act in the West and the Family Code in the 
East. From the very beginning, the division (and potential reunification) of Germany factored 
into the East German People’s Council and the West German Parliamentary Council’s 
discussions about equal rights and the family in the 1949 provisional constitution of the GDR 
and the Basic Law of the FRG. The fate of the old Civil Code thereafter was contingent on 
the fragile legal situation of the two states and could not be resolved fully until the “German 
question” was partially settled in 1949. After the parallel constitutions, the next major break 
was the pronouncement of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1955 in the FRG, which declared that the 
West would not formally recognize or hold diplomatic ties with the East. In the meantime, 
East Germans could still flee via Berlin, although it was growing increasingly difficult for 
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them to do so. Cross-border migrations and the approval of the 1957 Equal Rights Act in the 
FRG placed undue stress primarily on the SED leadership, namely Minister of Justice Hilde 
Benjamin, who wanted to refuse recognition of the West, but had to address the fact that the 
laws now differed on both sides. Her situation eased in August 1961 with the construction of 
the Berlin Wall, which stanched the outward flow of East Germans to the West. These 
various moments signified points where the Cold War competition intervened and redirected 
the parallel family law reforms in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The changing political climates and domestic policies between the late 1940s and the 
early 1960s also drove forward these analogous reforms. In the East, the SED-led 
dictatorship, intent on “building socialism” in the early 1950s, began to eradicate much of its 
political opposition and intended to start a social revolution by radically restructuring marital 
and familial models. Still, the SED dictatorship was neither all-powerful nor insusceptible to 
criticism in the early 1950s. Where necessary, the leading party bowed down to demands 
from society, especially the Protestant (and to a lesser degree) the Catholic Churches, in 
order to appear more democratic and benevolent to its own citizens and critics abroad. By 
1965, however, the political climate had changed in the GDR. While the Protestant and 
Catholic churches were still the SED’s primary political opponents, the ruling party had 
severely diminished the churches’ influence through Stasi supervision and persecution of 
leading pastors and bishops. In addition to undermining their political enemies, the SED 
entrapped their own citizens in 1961 with the construction of the Berlin Wall. The expansion 
of the SED dictatorship by the early 1960s therefore facilitated the party’s more successful 
attempt at passing the Family Code in 1965. The party then ramped up its commitment to 
socialism by debuting the 1968 constitution, which firmly supplanted the previous faux 
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democratic model of governance with an avowed promise to create a socialist republic—one 
complete with the total equality of men and women in all areas of society, politics, and the 
economy. 
Meanwhile, West Germany was subject to its own political shifts over the course of 
the 1950s and 1960s that shaped the final form of the Equal Rights Act. In 1949, the 
CDU/CSU barely edged out the Social Democrats to take the Bundestag and elect a Christian 
conservative Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. For the duration of the first legislative period, 
the Christian conservative government endured pushback from women’s associations, trade 
unions, independent professional organizations, the media, and their Parliamentary 
opposition on the matter of family law. Then, in 1953 and again in 1957, the CDU/CSU won 
big in the elections, securing their majority in the Bundestag for eight years and control of 
the government for ten years. Furthermore, with the prohibition of the Communist Party in 
1956, the SPD lost a potential ally for the family law reforms. Despite the CDU/CSU’s clear 
majority and Adenauer’s authoritarian style of governing, resistance in society and the 
Bundestag were strong enough to force the ruling party to compromise on certain key 
provisions in the Equal Rights Act, such as removing the husband’s right to decide. Then, in 
the 1961 and 1965 elections, the SPD and FDP regained some power (in light of economic 
downturns and restlessness with Adenauer’s iron-fisted style of rule) and began to press for 
more far-reaching reforms of marriage (especially divorce) and family law in the 1960s.  
Second, economic reconstruction and changing economic policies were major driving 
forces behind the new marriage and family laws. In the East, the Soviets and the SED set out 
early on—even before the two sides formally divided—to establish a planned, production-
based economy in the Soviet zone, and later, the GDR. For pragmatic and ideological 
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purposes, the SED sought out female labor, initially from single women and later from 
married women, to support its Five Year plans for its socialist “workers’ and peasants’ state.” 
As a result, the dual breadwinner/female homemaker family model became the norm in the 
GDR. Throughout the 1950s, the SED continued to introduce new Five Year plans to 
stimulate production. By the early 1960s, however, failures of the Five Year Plans forced 
Ulbricht and the SED to shift direction and introduced the New Economic System, which 
was designed to increase production and consumer goods. This system, however, flopped 
almost immediately because it did not find a good balance between consumerism and 
socialism. Throughout these changing economic policies, the SED emphasized that they 
wanted to reward married and unwed mothers with expanded civil rights via a new Family 
Code was a way of upholding Communist theories of the success of planned economies and 
achieving “women’s emancipation” through economic independence in the fraught early 
postwar decades. Ideological imperative aside, they also desperately wanted women to 
continue supporting the Communist regime through their political activity and labor. 
Across the border, the Western Allies and the leading CDU/CSU responded to the 
massive postwar economic and social upheavals differently. Adenauer and his administration 
acknowledged the postwar “surplus of women,” but were reluctant to normalize it because of 
firmly held beliefs about sexual difference. When the Christian conservative government 
created a social market economy, it privileged male labor outside the home and only valued 
female labor in the home. Adenauer’s government wanted family law to match its other 
policies that supported a male breadwinner/female homemaker family model. The Adenauer 
administration’s own economic policies, however, disrupted these plans, because they 
resulted in the “economic miracle.” By the mid-1950s, the West German economy was 
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booming so much that policymakers had to permit female part-time labor partly to fill in the 
gap, but mostly to aid consumerism by boosting German families’ financial status. Reticent 
to let go of its idealized image of the family, legislators settled on a “temporary” solution that 
only allowed married women to work part-time, giving way to a new model comprised of a 
male breadwinner and female homemaker/part-time worker. The increasing prevalence of 
this model in the FRG in the 1960s forced legislators to reconsider marriage and divorce law 
in the early 1970s. 
  In addition, social and cultural changes both enabled and prevented reforms of family 
law in both states as well throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the East, the SED regime 
initially encountered societal resistance to its reforms. Many East Germans, especially 
Catholics and Protestants, did not want the law to disrupt well-established marital relations 
and familial structures. They also were afraid of state intervention in childrearing. Given the 
state’s track record of subverting the practice of Christianity, they had further reason to fear 
that family law was another way for the SED to clamp down on them. By 1965, when the 
Family Code came out, the SED had succeeded in muting its Christian opposition. 
Furthermore, a new generation of men and women who had been socialized under the GDR 
dictatorship were entering the workforce, marrying, and starting their own families. The 
relative lack of opposition in 1965 compared to 1954 indicated that the SED had 
accomplished social alongside political and economic changes in the GDR.  
In the West, social and cultural expectations changed too over the course of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Initially, the wartime destruction pushed many Germans in the Western zones of 
occupation toward desiring the male breadwinner family as a source of stability. Adenauer 
and his Christian conservative administration were more than happy to oblige the groups in 
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society, especially Protestants and Catholics, who demanded policies that fostered this family 
model. Over time, however, the CDU/CSU’s vision of the ideal family—male 
breadwinner/female homemaker—had to be “modernized” in the face of major economic 
changes, political forces in- and outside the FRG, and societal opposition from women’s 
organizations, trade unions, independent professional associations, and some media outlets. 
Policymakers decided to use part-time work for mothers in order to keep the breadwinner 
family intact but at the same time allow women to earn the surplus-income desired by many 
families to allow more consumerism. Furthermore, by the end of the 1960s, a new generation 
of women who had been raised in West Germany began to challenge the gendered norms 
under which they had been socialized and no longer fit the economic and political 
circumstances they were entering into as young adults in 1968 and were influenced by the 
ideas of the rising New Women’s Movement. 
Legal and institutional legacies also enabled and informed the different paths of 
family law reforms in the GDR and FRG. Both states inherited the same law that dated back 
to 1900, but they dealt with its legacies quite differently. In the GDR, path dependency was 
strong in certain regards, but weak in others. For political and economic reasons tied to the 
Cold War, the SED willingly abandoned the Weimar template for equal rights in the 
constitution early on. At the same time, the SED never objected to state protection of the 
family as a fundamental constitutional right, meaning that certain continuities from the 
Weimar Republic existed in the GDR. When it came to reforming the Civil Code, the SED 
attempted to balance its commitments to the family and women’s equality with men. In 
certain ways, the new Family Code’s emphasis on egalitarian marriages was a radical 
departure from the 1900 Civil Code. Still, the new Family Code in 1965 emphasized long-
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term partnerships with abundant children as the key to building a socialist, antifascist postwar 
state. The SED was more willing to break with legal tradition because it staked its legitimacy 
on its claims that it was forging a new, post-fascist, socialist, postwar German state with no 
ties to pre-1945 Germany.  
 The FRG shared a legal tradition with the GDR, but its path dependency was much 
stronger. Unlike the GDR, the FRG staked its own claims to legitimacy on the notion that it 
was a liberal democracy—albeit new and improved—in line with German tradition, and that 
the preceding twelve years were an aberration in the German Rechtsstaat. From the 
beginning, Christian conservative politicians and legal experts in the West wanted to keep the 
old Civil Code’s regulations on marriage and the family, believing that different civil rights 
were commensurate with sexual difference. Later on, they remained reluctant to change the 
Civil Code, arguing that its prescriptions for a patriarchal family structure would help the 
social and cultural reconstruction of (West) Germany. They finally were forced to agree to 
compromises that reformed the constitutional and legal tradition under immense pressure 
from Social Democrats, Free Democrats, Communists (until 1956), trade unions, women’s 
associations, and professional organizations.  
In both Germanys throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the parallel reforms of marriage 
and family law, at their cores, were about expanding the legal rights of married women and 
mothers and contracting the rights of married men and fathers. The 1957 Equal Rights Act, 
although not as far reaching as Free and Social Democrats had hoped, reified the traditional 
male breadwinner/female homemaker family model by “modernizing” and reforming it. In 
certain regards, the law finally gave married women some autonomy in decision-making for 
their marriages and families while continuing to limit their ability to work outside the home. 
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At the same time, then, the Equal Rights Act took away rights from men in some regards 
while allowing them the authoritative position in the home and their partnerships. The 1965 
Family Code in the GDR pursued a much more radical overhaul of the old law, making 
partners completely equal in every regard. Still, the law did not challenge conceptions of the 
heteronormative, nuclear family. In the everyday life of the GDR, married women continued 
to be burdened with most domestic labor as they took on full-time jobs outside the home in 
the GDR’s planned economy. The parallel reforms of the marriage and family law in the 
1960s and 1970s in the GRD and FRG catalyzed further discussions of altering the gendered 
division of labor and rethinking marriage and family models in the 1970s, which are ongoing 
today. 
As these overarching political, economic, social, and legal changes took place, 
different actors in politics, social organizations, and the media in both Germanys employed a 
number of conflicting discourses to both defend and denigrate legal reforms. For one thing, 
discourses about gender images and gender relations as the foundation of social order 
resonated throughout West and East Germany. In the West, Christian conservatives, echoing 
earlier pre-1945 arguments, proclaimed the patriarchal family model as set out in the Civil 
Code as a vessel for stabilizing calamitous postwar conditions and restoring (West) Germany 
to its “natural” social and gender order. Their Social Democratic, Free Democratic, and for 
the first half of the 1950s, Communist opposition argued that family law had to change with 
the times and adapt to a wholly different demographic reality and economic structure. The 
SED in the East, meanwhile, emphasized stability in its own way, focusing on how 
bourgeois, capitalist social and economic orders had contributed to Germany’s destruction. 
Marriages and families that were more egalitarian, their logic followed, would prevent such 
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instability from ever gracing Germany’s territory again. Their opponents in the major 
churches, however, stressed that the Family Code disrupted natural order and intercepted 
Christians’ rights to raise their families as they pleased. 
These same actors relied on rhetoric about historic memory as well. At times, they 
reached back far in the historic vault to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Some 
Christian conservative and Free Democratic politicians, for example, extolled previous 
governments’ interpretations of women’s status and roles in the family. Meanwhile, some 
Social Democratic, Free Democratic, Communist, and independent female activists in both 
Germanys proclaimed that past regimes had not done enough to ensure equal rights for men 
and women. Additionally, just about all policymakers of all political persuasions in both 
Germanys agreed that the Third Reich offered a negative example of state intervention in 
marriage and the family.  
Above all, on both sides of the German-German border, the Cold War loomed large 
in political discourse, although in different ways. In the East, a constant theme from the late 
1940s well into the mid-1950s was the problem of legal unity. The SED desperately wanted 
to beat the West to reforms, but they hesitated at times because they feared further dividing 
Germany (while simultaneously arguing that their version of the law would unite all 
Germans). West Germans spoke of legal unity as well, but only in reference to their own 
states. In both states, politicians stressed how family law reforms on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain were detrimental to all Germans, although again, these discourses tended to be 
employed more heavily by the SED. 
In the end, the 1957 Equal Rights Act in the West and the Family Code in the East 
created similar patterns in both states. Neither law challenged the idea that the 
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heteronormative family was the cornerstone of German society, although they imagined the 
relations within the family quite differently. Moreover, in practice, similar gendered divisions 
of labor existed on both sides of the German-German border, meaning that women typically 
bore the brunt of domestic labor, even when the law promised them equal partnership. Still, 
the differences between the two sides were critical and obvious. Different responses to the 
imbalanced gender ratios, economic circumstances, political systems, and diverging social 
and cultural norms set the two states on separate paths regarding family law and gender roles 
by the mid-1960s. 
In exploring the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that shaped the 
discourses and decisions surrounding marriage and family law in the GDR and the FRG in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, this dissertation makes a fundamental contribution to the existing 
literature on gender and the family in the divided Germanys and postwar Europe more 
broadly. This study has demonstrated that the postwar environment and the ensuing Cold 
War competition pushed East and West Germans to firmly reassess their positions on the 
family and women’s rights. In other words, centering this study of family law reforms in the 
historical context of the early Cold War helps illuminate sociologist Ruth Lister’s notion of 
civil rights as the last frontier for women, as opposed to men, who typically receive civil 
rights first.9 It furthermore highlights other feminist historians’ calls to situate social justice 
and civil rights movements as historically contingent.10 At the same time, this study offers a 
                                                          
9 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 70. 
10 Karen Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered: Rethinking Theories and Practices,” in Civil Society and Gender 
Justice: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, eds. Karen Hagemann, Sonya Michel, and Gunilla Budde 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 17-42, 32; Regina Wecker, “Dilemmas of Gender Justice: Gendering 
Equity, Justice and Recognition,” in Civil Society and Gender Justice: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives, eds. Karen Hagemann, Sonya Michel, and Gunilla Budde (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 
43-56. 
393 
 
unique glimpse into the “entangled and demarcated” German-German relationship as it has 
traced how politicians, media pundits, and members of society used family law to distance 
themselves from each other—both within each state and between the two Germanys—in the 
early years of the Cold War. Despite their efforts, similar patterns of behavior, especially the 
gendered division of labor, continued to exist on both sides of the Iron Curtain well after 
1968. Germans in both states saw great progress in the first two decades after World War II, 
but nevertheless faced certain social and cultural barriers that still remain strong among 
former East and West German women today as they continue to strive toward equality and 
work-home life balance. 
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